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THE AMERICAN ARMY 
IN THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT 

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH 
BY THE AUTHORS 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

NBW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALtAS 
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 

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MELBOURNE 

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 

TORONTO 




MARSHAL PETAIN GENERAL PERSHING 

Commander in chief of the Commander in chief of the 

French Armies American Expeditionary forces 

AT CHAUMONT 



THE AMERICAN ARMY 

IN THE 

EUROPEAN CONFLICT 



BY 

COLONEL DE CHAMBRUN 

AND 
CAPTAIN DE MARENCHES 



WITH MAPS 



Jl3eto gorb 

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
1919 

All rights reserved 



±157'' 



Copyright, 1919 
By the MACMILLAN COMPANY 



Set up and electrotyped. Published November, 1919. 



NOV 26 1919 



©CI.A535877 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

PAGE 

The Declaration of War — Universal Military Serv- 
ice I 

CHAPTER n 

Arrival of General Pershing in France — First 
Plans — Formation of the General Staff — Or- 
ganization OF Fighting Units — Selection of 
Ordnance Material and Other Equipment — 
Methods of Training — Camps — Schools — Es- 
tablishment OF General Headquarters at Chau- 
MONT 33 

CHAPTER HI 

Establishment of the Lines of Communication — 

Organization of the Services of the Rear . . 78 

CHAPTER IV 

First Appearance of American Contingents on the 
French Front — The First, Second, Twenty- 
Sixth, AND Forty-Second Divisions 116 

CHAPTER V 

Participation of American Forces in the Spring De- 
fensive AND IN THE SuMMER CoUNTER-OfFENSIVE 
OF I918 133 

CHAPTER VI 

Organization of the Main Services of the Expedi- 
tionary Forces — Chief of Artillery — Tank 
Corps — Chief Engineer — Air Service — Signal 



Contents 

PAGE 

Corps — Medical Department — Quartermaster 

— Ordnance — Chemical Warfare — Inspector 
General — Judge- Advocate i86 

CHAPTER VII 

Situation of the Expeditionary Forces at the Begin- 
ning OF September, 191 8 247 

CHAPTER VIII 

The American Army During the General Offensive, 
September-November, 191 8 (Battle of St. Mihiel) 

— Operations Between Meuse and Argonne . 262 

CHAPTER IX 
The March to the Rhine 307 

CHAPTER X 

Part Taken by American Units in the Operations on 
British Front — And in Secondary Theaters of 
the War 320 

CHAPTER XI 

Development of the Lines of Communication — Or- 
ganization IN America — Sea Transportation — 
Growth of the Services of the Rear in France — 
Director General of Transportation — Motor 
Transport Service — Military Board of Allied 
Supply 33 1 

CHAPTER XII 

Great Benevolent Associations Under the Mili- 
tary Authority — American Red Cross — Young 
Men's Christian Association — Knights of Co- 
lumbus — Salvation Army — American Library 
Association — Jewish Welfare — Young Wom- 
en's Christian Association, etc., etc 361 



Contents 

CHAPTER XIII PAGE 

Franco-American Cooperation — Conclusion . . . 385 

Appendix I — Order of Battle of the American Expe- 
ditionary Forces at the Date of December i, 1918 391 

Appendix II — Organizations of the American Ex- 
peditionary Fc«.CES Cited in General Orders by 
THE French High Command 410 

Index 421 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Marshal Petain and General Pershing at Chaumont . Frontispiece 

Situation of American Units before the summer counter- 
offensive Facing page 162 

Location of American Divisions on the 1st of September, 

1918 248 

Plan for Attack of the Saint-Mihiel Salient 266 

Operations between Meuse and Argonne 288 

Organization of the Services of the War 340 



THE AMERICAN ARMY IN THE 
EUROPEAN CONFLICT 

CHAPTER I 

THE DECLARATION OF WAR UNIVERSAL MILITARY 

SERVICE 

Although the American people have ever been 
patient and slow to anger they are not incapable of war- 
like resolution, and since 1776 have more than once given 
proof of their fighting spirit. But before taking up arms 
the nation must be permeated with a sense of the re- 
sponsibilities involved, and possess a clear notion of the 
inherent justice of her cause. 

Placed by nature in a position of independence and po- 
litical isolation, untroubled by international disputes, the 
United States has watched foreign conflict from afar. 
War has seemed an eventuality too fearful to be lightly 
invoked, and many grave persons considered that nothing 
short of a territorial invasion would ever arouse the 
Great Republic to an ordeal by battle. 

Such has never been our personal opinion. 

If the country, as a whole, seems peaceful and patient, 
the citizen is often a militant idealist, prompt to redress 
a wrong, proud of his independence, and ready to fight at 
a moment's notice on a question of personal or national 
honor. 



2 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The difference between his individual characteristics 
and those of the mass may perhaps be explained by the 
country's vast dimensions and the particularism of each 
state or city, which tends to concentrate popular atten- 
tion upon affairs of local importance and to limit the 
range of political interest and activity to each special dis- 
trict or community. 

It is thus natural that the first appeal to a broader na- 
tional sentiment should penetrate slowly through these 
vast areas, that a long interval must follow the first alarm 
and precede executive decision. 

This phenomenon has been noticed on previous occa- 
sions of political unrest.^ American wars have been re- 
markable for breaking out with sudden violence after a 
protracted period of hesitation, contradiction, party 
polemics, and sometimes even apparent public indiffer- 
ence. Thus the country passed through many gradations 
of feeling during the months which preceded the con- 
flict with Spain; long also were the years of tension that 
preceded the Civil War; McKinley, like Lincoln, was 
for a long time considered as a " temporizer." - 

^ It took all the veneration and military prestige of Washington to 
enable him to run counter to the strong trend of public opinion which, 
in America, favored the great French Revolution; when the violence of 
the American sentiment was such that nothing short of the President's 
inflexible character and the immense popularity which he enjoyed could 
have availed to prevent a declaration of war against England. (See 
Tocqucville and Marshall.) 

2 A long period of political tension and press provocation preceded the 
war with Spain. President McKinley, a warm advocate of arbitration, 
had declared that he would never allow outside pressure to force him 
into war, but the sinking of an American battleship in Havana Harbor; 
aroused the belligerent spirit to such an extent that the President was 
compelled to follow the pronouncement of the Investigating Commission. 
The specialist verdict that the Maine had been blown up from without 
at once precipitated the country into war. 



Declaration of War 3 

Germany's great diplomatic error was her failure to 
judge the country's moral evolution during the period of 
neutrality. 

The Imperial Government was incapable of under- 
standing that a people which had not sprung to arms at 
the first provocation might yet be goaded beyond endur- 
ance by the second or third repetition of a grave offense. 

It was only when the nation was ablaze with anger 
that the military psychologist beyond the Rhine realized 
that the fires of wrath had been a long time smoldering. 
And yet a brief survey of Foreign Office reports concern- 
ing past wars clearly indicates that this Is not the first 
occasion on which European statesmen and diplomatists 
have been misled into thinking that American patience 
was national apathy. 

Few in the Old World foresaw the formidable strug- 
gle between South and North. Contemporary argument 
tended to show that neither of the opposing factions 
would actually come to a trial of force, that President 
Lincoln, with his peace-loving nature, his horror of fra- 
tricidal strife, with what was then supposed to be his 
" hesitating " character, could never give the signal for 
battle. 

It was repeatedly declared that a commercial and agri- 
cultural people would not and could not make the sacri- 
fices which such a war must entail. That logically — 
then as now — war could not he. 

Such was the onlookers' conclusion in 1 861 when the 
first gun fired upon Fort Sumter was echoed by Lincoln's 
thrilling proclamation. Such was the conclusion of Ger- 
many in 19 1 6. 

A country which had submitted to a violation of her 
inherent rights at sea was one which would never fight. 



4 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Germany proclaimed that although some occasional 
American Don Quixote, led perhaps as much by a taste 
for adventure as by chivalrous impulse, might enlist un- 
der the British flag or enroll in our Foreign Legion, such 
isolated cases counted for nothing in the mass of Ameri- 
can commercialism, and that the people, as a whole, were 
far too busied in the pursuit of material welfare to be 
aroused in a cause pertaining merely to abstract right and 
wrong. That, in short, America would have " Peace at 
any Price." 

And yet America had endured in her Civil War a bit- 
ter four years' struggle which has since been aptly charac- 
terized as " right fighting with right." How could those 
who witnessed the titanic combat of brother against 
brother suppose that this same country would hesitate in 
a clearly defined cause of Right and Wrong? of Human- 
ity against Barbarism? How could the Great Republic, 
founded on the doctrine of Thomas Paine, bred in the cult 
of liberty and social justice, stand passively aside and 
watch the ideals her fathers bled for trampled beneath 
the iron heel? 

As we in France watched from the trenches at Verdun 
the flaming of the war beacon in the western sky, as we 
followed the impassioned utterances of those representa- 
tive statesmen who in House, Senate, Press and on the 
public platform, called on their fellows to remember the 
country's honor and arise in the cause of freedom no 
doubt ever entered our minds as to the eventual outcome 
of America's moral crisis. 

We knew that though many of us would not live to see 
the triumph of her ideals, yet her ideals would one day 
triumph; that if America hesitated longer than some 
who loved her might have wished, before taking the final 



Declaration of War 5 

decision, it was rather the hesitation of one who asks how 
and when and not whether to act. 

A complete study of the causes which led up to the 
eventual rupture between the United States and Germany 
is not within the scope of this work, nor could French sol- 
diers with propriety discuss the divergent opinions and 
different political tenets of American public men. 

Neither can we, for the same reasons, examine into the 
far-reaching influence of overt and concealed German 
propaganda, acting as an effective brake on the native im- 
pulse of the country to " take sides " in the European con- 
flict. 

The stirring events which preceded America's entry 
into the war are still fresh in every mind. They are, 
perhaps, as yet too near for any author to view them with 
the necessary mental perspective, or to embody their his- 
tory in permanent literary form. 

It must be our rule — except in describing certain ma- 
terial organizations where ofliicial statistics are given — 
to speak only of those things which have come under our 
personal observation and which occurred upon our own 
theater of war. 

Those who desire a more complete picture than we can 
give of certain personalities who played an active part in 
the drama of America's development as a world power, 
and who wish to study the two schools of thought which 
struggled with equal ardor to impose their respective con- 
victions upon the mass of their fellow-citizens, will find a 
quantity of such records among the files of contemporary 
journalism during the war, among American state papers 
and official publications. 

The President's published addresses, proclamations, 
and epistles, together with the correspondence between 



6 The American Army in the European Conflict 

the Secretary of War and Colonel Theodore Roose- 
velt, will give the searcher for historical data a compre- 
hensive view of both sides of the question of military pre- 
paredness. 

As for us we must limit ourselves rigidly to a brief re- 
cital of the facts — for in these pages facts alone import. 

Their dates mark the steady progress of the moral 
preparation of the citizen-soldier whom the nation was 
soon to send into battle on a foreign soil. 

Toward the end of April, 19 15, certain Americans con- 
templating passage on the British liner Liisitania received 
warning from the German embassy in Washington that 
they would do better to abandon their project of sailing 
on this vessel, it being the intention of the German Ad- 
miralty to sink her during the voyage. 

The threat was generally considered absurd; such a 
crime was thought to be too flagrant a breach of neutral 
rights for Germany to attempt. 

Nevertheless the fact that foreign officials should dare 
to make this threat and had even utilized the American 
press to sound the warning, ar-oused great wrath among 
certain Americans. Quite a general demand was made 
that the German Ambassador who had thus overstepped 
diplomatic prerogatives should at once be given his pass- 
ports. 

On the seventh of May, the great liner was attacked by 
two German submarines — one of which was identified as 
the U21 — and sunk without warning near the head of 
Old Kinsale off the Irish coast, no effort being made to 
save either passengers or crew, of whom upwards of 
eleven hundred, including more than a hundred Amer- 
icans, perished. 



Declaration of War 7 

From this moment we may date the rise and growth of 
an active belligerent spirit among the American people. 

During the horrified pause which followed this latest 
German atrocity a declaration was made and sworn to 
that the ship carried munitions of war and that Germany's 
action was justifiable on that ground, although it was 
subsequently proved and confessed that the witness who 
alleged having seen guns on the Ltisitania was paid to say 
so by funds collected for that purpose by the German 
propaganda. The check on popular indignation which 
the debates on this 'question involved had been effective. 
When, on May 15th, the President of the United States 
sent a formal warning to Germany that no further out- 
rage of the sort would be tolerated or go unpunished, this 
threat elicited a very humble response from the Imperial 
Government, offering indemnities for loss of American 
life and expressing sincere regret for the incident. 

The occasion to declare war on account of the Lusi- 
tan'ta had by this time passed. Nevertheless American 
opinion had been much incensed. In many public centers 
" Remember the Lusitania " was placarded. Memorial 
meetings were called. Money for the allied cause and 
for the widows and orphans of the war as well as for the 
victims of the submarines, poured Into Europe from the 
United States. The youth of America began to group 
itself together and form societies of military preparation.^ 
In some schools, practical efforts were made toward ob- 
taining a certain amount of soldierly discipline. 

Nine months elapsed without any definite incident tend- 
ing toward a rupture of friendly relations, for, although 

3 General Leonard Wood's untiring crusade on platform and in the 
press for military preparedness elicited a warm response from the mili- 
tary elements of the country. 



8 The American Army in the European Conflict 

submarine attacks continued against vessels carrying 
Americans on board the cases generally admitted of dis- 
cussion on technical grounds and terminated either with 
apologies and indemnities, or the proof that the aggres- 
sors, as in the case of the Ancona, belonged to the Aus- 
trian, and not the German, Navy. 

American indignation, however, had been excited. 
The exchange of diplomatic notes between the United 
States and Germany became, on the part of the 
former, progressively menacing until the climax was 
reached. 

On August 19, 19 1 5, the English steamer Arabic was 
sunk off the Irish coast. Two Americans were numbered 
among the forty-four victims. On November 9th the 
Italian ship Ancona met a similar fate in the Mediter- 
ranean. On January 2, 191 6, the Persia also was sunk 
without warning. 

Finally on March 24th the Channel packet Sussex, car- 
rying American passengers and mails, was sunk in the nar- 
row seas by a German submarine. 

This new outrage elicited a message to Germany far 
more aggressive in tone than the former notes relating to 
like incidents and terminated with a clearly defined warn- 
ing that should such another crime be perpetrated, the 
American Government would feel obliged to sever on 
the instant, all diplomatic relations with the German Em- 
pire. 

The Imperial Government reflected seriously upon this 
message and at length gave solemn assurances to the 
President of the United States that no more ships would 
be sunk without previous warning and without legitimate 
steps being taken to safeguard the lives of passengers. 
It should, however, be noted that Germany did not hesi- 



Declaration of War 9 

tate to demand America's intervention with a view to les- 
sening the rigors of the British blockade. 

This mild answer and the careful observance of her 
word during the rest of the year were probably induced 
by a very serious shortage in Germany's sea flotilla which 
required several months to reconstitute. Whatever her 
motive, the result was satisfactory to America, who ap- 
peared to have obtained a great moral victory in forcing 
the Imperial Government to " back down," and it was 
generally declared that by his vindication of neutral rights 
and humanitarian principles, President Wilson's diplo- 
macy had triumphed. 

From the German point of view, also, the policy was 
not unsuccessful. During eight months, America, reas- 
sured by the peaceful and friendly declarations of Ger- 
many, took no step in military preparation. Much of 
that spiritual " readiness for war " which had begun to be 
felt in the country at large had even been checked and 
more or less undone by the idea that Germany was 
pledged henceforward and forever to respect American 
rights at sea and definitely abandon her terrorization of 
all neutral nations by her submarine menace. 

In reality it was far from that country's intention to re- 
voke a policy so essential to the prestige of her sea com- 
mand. 

No sooner had a more numerous and powerful sub- 
marine fleet been constructed, than the German Ambas- 
sador in Washington handed to the Secretary of State a 
note dated January 31st, 19 17, revoking all former prom- 
ises. This note now declared it to be the inherent right 
as well as the irrevocable intention of the Admiralty to 
sink without warning, any vessel, whether neutral or bel- 
ligerent, in a zone defined by her as forbidden. 



lo The American Army in the European Conflict 

The indignation in America was now at fever heat. 
The national press, while loudly censuring Germany's 
duplicity, called upon the President of the United States 
to make a definite and hostile declaration. Mr. Wilson's 
patience was indeed at an end. Although on February 
3d he once more expressed incredulity concerning Ger- 
many's actual intention to carry out her monstrous threat, 
he nevertheless felt it incumbent upon him to fulfill his 
own menace to that power by taking the course indicated 
by him in the previous year and recalling his ambassador 
from Berlin. 

The presidential message concluded with the following 
words: 

"... We shall not believe they are hostile to us until we are 
obliged to believe it: and we purpose nothing more than a reason- 
able defense of the undoubted rights of our people." 

The world was not long to remain in doubt regarding 
the definition of Germany's hostile attitude by an overt 
act. 

Within a few days two American vessels were sunk — 
the Housatonic and the Lyman M. Law — and, on Feb- 
ruary 26, 19 1 7, the President appeared before Congress 
to ask a special grant of power authorizing him to arm 
American ships against similar aggressions.^ At the 
same time he confessed himself 

" For a time unable to believe that such things would be done by 
any government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane prac- 
tices of civilized nations." 

* The Cunarder Laconia with two Americans aboard was sunk at the 
same time. On the eighteenth of March the American ships, City of 
Memphis, Illinois, and Vigilancia, met the same fate. On March 21st the 
Healdton, crossing from Philadelphia to Rotterdam, was sunk without 
warning and with twenty-one victims. On April 1st the Aztec was sent 
to the bottom. 



Declaration of W ar 1 1 

The die had now been cast and wave upon wave of 
popular enthusiasm arose as one epoch-making event suc- 
ceeded another. 

On April 2, the President branded: 

" The present warfare of Germany against commerce a war- 
fare against mankind." 

And this statement was followed in four days by the 
solemn declaration of a state of war between the United 
States and Germany. Orders were also given for the re- 
moval of alien enemies from the civil territory of the 
Union and their forcible detention in concentration camps. 

The presidential address was.a strong denunciation of 
the actions in the United States of the German govern- 
mental agents during the three years of America's neu- 
trality. 

" It has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices 
of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere 
afoot against the National Unity of Council, our peace within and 
without, our industries and our commerce. Indeed it is now evi- 
dent that its spies were here even before the war began and it is a 
matter of fact that the intrigues which have more than once come 
perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the indus- 
tries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with 
the support and even the personal direction, of official agents of 
the Imperial Government accredited to the United States." 

After a further arraignment of such procedures, the 
President continued with a very noble and eloquent state- 
ment of American aims, now that her final participation in 
the European struggle was definitely decided. 

" We have no selfish ends to serve, we desire no conquest, no 
dominion ; we seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material com- 
pensation for the sacrifice we shall freely make. We are but one 
of the champions of the rights of mankind." 



12 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Although the public mind was ripe, the country was ma- 
terially quite unready for combat. With characteristic 
boldness America had in fact declared war without the 
slightest military preparation at a moment when the with- 
drawal of Russia from our alliance had placed the allied 
cause in a precarious situation. 

No one as yet knew what form American participation 
might be called on to take. Was an army to be raised? 
Was a fleet to be sent abroad or to guard the coast at 
home against a submarine aggression or bombardment 
from the sea? Was a rising of the dissatisfied pro- 
Germans to be feared from within? 

In order to discuss some of those questions it was de- 
cided on the part of both France and England to send 
missions to the United States. 

On the tenth of March accordingly, the French Prime 
Minister, M. Ribot, organized a war mission.^ 

No one better than Marshal Joffre could have been 
selected for such an embassage, nor could a more powerful 
appeal have been made to the public imagination. 

His personality was already familiar in the United 
States, where his simplicity, strength, and practical com- 
mon sense would lend weight to any proposition he might 
suggest. 

The wave of enthusiasm which greeted the arrival of 
the French war mission gave new energy to the conscrip- 
tion movement. 

It is scarcely too much to say that the eventual triumph 
of the Allies was assured on the day when House and 

5 This mission was headed by M. Viviani, Minister of Justice and 
Vice-President of the Cabinet Council. The members were: Marshal 
Joffre, Vice-Admiral Chocheprat, and Marquis de Chambrun, deputy, who 
left Paris on April 15, 1917. 



Universal Military Service 13 

Senate voted the measure for universal and compulsory 
military service in the United States. 

When, after a tour of the great cities of the Union and 
the French-speaking provinces of Canada, the French and 
British missions joined forces in New Yorlc and marched 
through the city, acclaimed by perhaps the largest throng 
of human beings ever assembled for such an occasion, it 
was evident to all that the tide of war was about to turn; 
that America was entering the European conflict deter- 
mined to achieve success and ready to fight for it as of 
old " to the last dollar and to the last man." On that 
day no one in America doubted the eventual triumph of 
the allied cause. 

Political tension was at an end; the war spirit coursed 
through every vein and artery of the vast continent. It 
only remained to organize this great moral force, to give 
practical instruction to the youth of America eager to 
learn how best to develop their martial spirit into military 
efficiency. 

On the day that war was declared, April 6, 19 17, the 
permanent army of the United States counted 190,000 
men distributed in small detachments — regiments, bat- 
talions, and even companies — over the immense terri- 
tory of the Union and her colonial dependencies. An ex- 
peditionary corps recently equipped for service in Mexico 
had just been disbanded upon the completion of their 
mission. 

The regular army had recrossed the Rio Grande, leav- 
ing upon the border a large force of cavalry and some 
elements of infantry, which latter would have scarcely 
amounted to a brigade. The National Guard units, 
which 'had also been employed upon the border, had been 



14 The American Army in the European Conflict 

relieved and sent to their respective States, only a small 
number of Pennsylvania militia still lingered near the 
Mexican frontier. Thus war surprised the American 
army, reestablished upon a peace footing and entirely 
unprepared by any previous attempt at mobilization, for 
taking part in a foreign war.^ 

Although the country had been recently divided into 
military departments this reorganization was purely ter- 
ritorial in character, corresponding approximately to 
the regional distribution in France before the war of 
1870. 

The formation of divisions, which was contemplated 
in some of the new mihtary departments, remained only 
in prospect, and it may be stated that the only appreciable 
advantage which had accrued to the army during the 
period of political tension was that the ranks of existing 
organizations were increased by numerous voluntary 
enlistments.' 

This army before November i, 19 18, was to swell to 
the formidable array of 181,095 officers and 3,483,444 
men, of whom more than two miUions crossed the 
Atlantic. 

To carry out this gigantic mobilization, to secure the 
number, form the commanding officers, and organize the 
fighting units, an immense effort was necessary. 

6 It should not be forgotten that Colonel Roosevelt, since two years, had 
never ceased to advocate military preparedness. Through personal pres- 
tige he was able to enroll a sufficient number of volunteers to make up 
a division which was complete on paper. 

7 The enlistments for the fiscal year 1917 totalled 160,084. If must be 
also considered that the Mexican expedition resulted in perfecting the 
training of the regular troops which participated. The National Guards 
who remained on the border also took advantage of this situation to im- 
prove their military training. 



Universal Military Service 1 5 

Under the modest title, " An act authorizing the Presi- 
dent temporarily to increase the military establishments 
of the United States " was voted. This epoch-making 
law, on May i8th, created compulsory military service 
by selection ^^ and thus secured the number necessary to 
create an army. 

8 In 1814, in spite of the political influence of President Madison and 
the no less great prestige of Secretary of War Monroe, a bill was in- 
troduced with a view of obtaining for the Executive the power to raise, 
by means of draft, a national army. Opposition developed and peace 
came before this bill was enacted. But in 1863, when the war of seces- 
sion was at its height, America had recourse to conscription. From the 
decision of the Supreme Court upholding the draft law of 1917, we extract 
the following quotation which serves to show that the Federal Congress 
in passing the act, " Authorizing the President to increase temporarily 
the military establishment of the United States " remained completely 
within the constitutional tradition: 

" In that year, when the mutterings of the dread conflict which was 
to come began to be heard and the proclamation of the President calling 
a force into existence was issued, it was addressed to the body organized 
out of the militia and trained by the States in accordance with previous 
acts of Congress. (Proclamation of April 15, 1861.) That force being 
inadequate to meet the situation, an act was passed authorizing the accept- 
ance of 500,000 volunteers by the President to be by him organized into 
a national army (Act of July 22, i86i). This was soon followed by an- 
other act increasing the force of the militia to be organized by the States 
for the purpose of being drawn upon when trained under the direction of 
Congress (Act of July 29, 1861). The two acts when considered together 
present in the clearest possible form the distinction between the power of 
Congress to raise armies and its authority under the militia clause. But 
it soon became manifest that more men were required. As a result, the 
act of March 3, 1863, was adopted, entitled, 'An act for enrolling and 
calling out the national forces and for other purposes.' By that act, 
which was clearly intended to directly exert upon all the citizens of the 
United States the national power which it had been proposed in 1814 on 
the recommendation of the then Secretary of War, Mr. Monroe, every 
male citizen of the United States between the ages of twenty and forty- 
five was made subject by the direct action of Congress to be called by 
compulsory draft to the service in a national army at such time and in 
such numbers as the President in his discretion might find necessary. In 
that act, as in the one of 1814, and in this one, the means by which the act 
was to be enforced were directly Federal and the force to be raised as a 



1 6 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Never before had so great a country and in so brief a 
time realized such a basic transformation of its funda- 
mental principles and most inveterate customs, and this 
with the unanimous consent and enthusiastic approval of 
all parties concerned. 

The drafting of this measure not only determined the 
general sources from which the new contingents were to 
be drawn, but also arranged the principle of their dis- 
tribution. The simple mechanism of this law gave, when 
put into application, an even greater result than that 
which had been foreseen.^ 

From the fifth of June, 19 17, to the twenty-fourth of 
August, 19 1 8, 10,481,000 citizens between twenty-one 
and thirty years of age inscribed themselves at the regis- 
tration boards. 

This age limit was the one first determined upon; but 
later on, with a view to avoid weakening any one category 
of worker and thereby defeating the economic interests of 
the country which it was so important to uphold, the age 
limit was extended to embrace those from eighteen to 
forty-five. In consequence of this extension, the number 
of inscriptions rose to 23,709,000. It thus became 
evident that " The act authorizing the President to 

result of the draft was therefore typically national, as distinct from the 
call into active service of the militia as such. And under the power thus 
exerted, four separate calls for draft were made by the President and en- 
forced. That of July, 1863, of February and March, 1864, of July and 
December, 1864, producing a force of about a quarter of a million of 
men." 

9 " The whole nation," said the President on the eighteenth of May, 
1917, "must be a team in which each man shall play the part for which 
he is best fitted. To this end Congress has provided that the nation shall 
be organized for war by selection. Each man shall be classified for serv- 
ice in the place to which it shall best serve the general good to call him. 
... It is in no sense a conscription of the unwilling, it is rather a selec- 
tion from a nation which has volunteered in mass." 



Universal Military Service 17 

temporarily increase the military establishment of the 
country " was capable of furnishing the numbers which 
would swing the balance of power to the Allies 
if it might be possible to organize, equip, and transport 
to Europe such large masses of men. Method was the 
first thing required in order to select among the men who 
had registered those best fitted for active service. 

The Federal Government and Congress had em- 
phasized their intention to apply the new laws in a demo- 
cratic spirit of equity. It was, however, essential to 
avoid mustering those individuals indispensable to the 
support of their families, those who were necessary to 
the material prosperity of the country, such as miners, 
agricultural and industrial workers, those employed in the 
great public services, and also the proselytes of certain 
religious sects which forbid their adherents to carry arms. 

On the twenty-second of May the services were or- 
ganized for recruiting operations at the War Department, 
and General Crowder, late Judge-Advocate, was placed 
at the head of the new services with the title of Provost 
Marshal General. 

Each State had been divided into districts of registra- 
tion comprising about 30,000 inhabitants. A registra- 
tion board consisting of three members, usually a local 
magistrate, a physician, and a clerk was to be found in 
each district. 

It was accordingly before these boards, assembled over 
the entire territory of the United States and on a date set 
by the President, that the men belonging to the categories 
which came under the new law were to present themselves. 
In less than sixteen days ^^ the central services at Wash- 
ington were in possession of all the results of the first 

10 The first conscript was drafted into the national army on July 30th, 



1 8 The American Army in the European Conflict 

military census which comprehended almost ten million 
names. ^^ 

The average registration was about 2,500 in each dis- 
trict. The number of registrants, recapitulated in each 
State, permitted the Federal authorities to determine the 
proportion which was to be furnished by each one when 
the time came to raise the effectives. In the completion 
of their work, which they handled in the same way as the 
voting machinery, these registration boards were suc- 
ceeded by local incorporation boards, ^^ charged with the 
duty of examining and classifying registrants In order to 
select among the names Inscribed the men who were to 
be Incorporated. These formed Class I and were first 
rendered liable for military service, those in the other 
classes being granted temporary exemptions. Like the 
registration board, these local boards were formed of 
three members appointed by the State governor and ap- 
proved by the President. They ordinarily comprised a 
prominent citizen of the locality, a sworn-in physician, 
and a clerk.^^ Practically all cases of exemption were 
examined by these boards, except those reserved for the 
district boards, where more delicate cases, such as exemp- 
tions, asked for on account of industrial or agricultural 
reasons were passed upon.^'* 

In what order might the citizens who had registered 
expect to be inducted into service? 

It was decided that the system of drawing by lot should 

^^ The disparity between this figure and that of 10,481,000 given above 
is explained by the number of men vpho had attained military age be- 
tween the first census operations and that of August 24, 1918. 

12 The local board numbered 4,552; the district boards numbered 156. 

13 Under certain circumstances the registration board was transformed 
into a local board. 

1* There existed one or more district boards in each Federal district. 



Universal Military Service 19 

be applied and one of the Senate halls was set apart for 
this procedure. 

Thanks to this very simple method recruiting opera- 
tions were decentralized and placed in the hands of the 
regional authorities in each State, the Federal Govern- 
ment only intervening in the process of drawing by lot. 

Certain modifications were made in the detailed appli- 
cation of the draft law. After December 15, 19 17, the 
administration of the law was improved by the system of 
classification that was employed in the selection of men. 
The economic needs of the nation required that men 
whose removal would interfere with its civic, family. In- 
dustrial, and agricultural life should be taken in the order 
In which they could best be spared. On December 15th 
all exemptions that had previously been granted were 
annulled and all registrants were required to file " ques- 
tionnaires " giving detailed information In regard to in- 
dustrial status. On May 16, 19 18, according to a joint 
resolution of Congress, it became possible to frame new 
regulations whereby the quotas to be furnished by the 
several States were apportioned according to the number 
of registrants in Class I instead of according to the 
population as was required by the original act. 

Additional types of local boards were established 
later. Medical advisory boards were appointed at a 
later date by the President on the recommendation of the 
State governors. At the same time legal advisory 
boards were also established to assist registrants and 
draft officials in the interpretation of the Selective Service 
law. The number of the members of these committees, 
particularly the medical personnel, was augmented. The 
Executive defined with greater exactitude what the motive 
for such exemptions were to be, but it may here be said In 



20 The American Army in the European Conflict 

2L general way that no fundamental changes were made 
in the application of the conscription laws. 

In spite of the fact that many members of Congress 
had, during the discussion of this military legislation, 
objected that it would be difficult if not impossible to 
apply the measure with equity, their fears were not 
justified. 

The Secretary of War, to whom is due in great measure 
the success of this legislation, attributes the merit of it to 
the zealous manner in which the State governors per- 
formed their task and especially to the immense popular 
enthusiasm, which carried all before it. 

" If the army," said he in November, 191 8, " had been 
obliged to create a new set of salaried Federal officials to 
handle the draft, we would«not have a force of over two 
million men on European soil to-day. The draft secured 
a large army in record time without unjust discrimination 
or destruction of industry; and it gained the respect and 
support of the American people." 

The mechanism of the recruiting system may thus be 
summed up in a few words : The central power merely 
fixed the total figure to be obtained and decided upon the 
number to be contributed by each State. The governor 
of each State was, in his turn, to distribute the effectives 
which had been called for among the different local 
boards, and these finally were to designate the men whom 
they had found apt for service. 

As we have said, the law besides laid down certain 
principles of general organization. 

While respecting the existing text of the National 
Defense Act promulgated in 19 16 the legislators decided 
first to increase the Regular Army to a strength of 18,033 
officers and 470,185 men; second, to increase the National 



Universal Military Service 2 1 

Guard to 13,377 officers and 456,800 men; finally, to 
create a new army called " National Army " to be entirely 
composed of men supplied by conscription. 

The military forces of America were thus to include 
three different organizations: the Regular Army, the 
National Guard, and the National Army. The first com- 
posed of professional soldiers to whom should be added 
voluntary enlistments and, if necessary, men supplied by 
the draft; the second, comprehending National Guard 
volunteers and eventually drafted men; the third, which 
was an entirely new organization, was to be formed from 
the contingents supplied by the compulsory draft. 

But as time went on, a succession of measures tended 
to break down the barriers separating these three armies 
from one another. It was decided that in the Regular 
Army, as well as in the National Guard, voluntary enlist- 
ments would be accepted only for the duration of the 
war. The age limit of men who signed these enlistments 
was unified in both armies. The pay, indemnities, and 
promotions were made practically identical for the entire 
forces of the United States. Thus the law had created 
three nuclei or centers of organizations and training 
rather than three different armies. 

The volunteer, whose desire was to fight as soon as 
possible — and there were many such in America at this 
time — enlisted in one army rather than in another with 
but one object in view, that of taking the shortest way to 
the battle-fields in France. 

As the war spirit grew, this state of mind became pro- 
nounced in all classes; among regulars and volunteers as 
well as army conscripts. 

Although at the beginning the War Department en- 
deavored to maintain in the National Guard and in the 



2 2 The American Army in the European Conflict 

National Army the links which are generally established 
between men coming from the same town or village, and 
to preserve the traditions of certain military organiza- 
tions it was to be foreseen that a tendency toward amal- 
gamation and the formation of one national army would 
become more and more evident as time went on. 

Moreover, the constantly growing necessity to call 
upon the resources of the country at large in order to 
keep up, at full strength, the organizations fighting at 
the front or training at the rear tended to bring about 
the same phenomenon as had been already observed In 
France: a growing inclination to dissolve all differences 
existing between active and reserve formations. 

From the month of August, 191 8, the existing barriers 
between the American units were abolished. One army 
only remained: The Army of the United States. 

In order to complete the Regular Army and the 
National Guard — to the extent permitted by law, and 
to form the first contingent of the National Army,^^ 
President Wilson called upon 687,000 men to be inducted 
from the first conscription. Later on the total of in- 
ductions reached 2,800,000 men.^^ 

IS The President was authorized in the first place to constitute the 
National Army by two successive calls for 500,000 men. The first con- 
tingent, however, consisted of 637,000, in order that the regular army 
might be brought up to the number authorized by the National Defense 
Act and afterward to dispose of the 500,000 necessary for the formation 
of the National Army. 

1^ Slightly over 2,800,000 of the registrants were inducted into military 
service, 2,541,000 through calls issued to local boards to furnish their 
allotted quotas, and 259,000 through inductions of individuals. Approx- 
imately 140,000 of the latter were inducted in October and during the 
first ten days in November for the Students' Army Training Corps. With 
the exception of these students and a few thousand volunteers, no men of 
the last registration were inducted into the army. 

1,680 officers were commissioned during the last eleven months preced- 



Universal Military Service 23 

It was an easier task to raise these forces than to officer 
them. On June 30th there were in all the Regular Army 
but 6,159 officers, and among these only 4,500 had seen 
more than one year's service. 

The National Defense Act, of which we have pre- 
viously spoken, had foreseen the formation of an Officers 
Reserve Corps, but on the declaration of war this law 
had been in effect for somewhat less than a year and the 
7,957 citizens who were inscribed upon the registers as 
reserve officers had had but a very rudimentary training 
and incomplete military instruction. 

Three years previous to the war, under the forceful 
impulsion of General Leonard Wood, quite a number of 
citizens' training camps had been organized throughout 
the country. The first of these had been instituted at 
Plattsburg, New York, and there during the summer 
months a large number of volunteers authorized by the 
department commander went in for military training. 
The period of instruction lasted thirty days, the course 
consisting of intensive elementary training for infantry, 
cavalry, field artillery, and engineers. Students who had 
attended one or more camps were used as non-commis- 
sioned officers or as subalterns and were given more ad- 
vanced instruction, including the knowledge required by 
administrative staff officers. The plan soon proved very 
successful and a large number of college students over 
eighteen years of age and young business men attended 
the camps for periods of a month or more. The War 
Department decided, very soon after the breach with Ger- 
many, as a first step toward the solution of obtaining 

ing the war; 747 came directly from civil life and 933 from West Point, 
the Regular Array, the Philippine Scouts, and the National Guard. 



24 The American Army in the European Conflict 

officers for the new army that it would Institute a three 
months' course of Intensive training In camps modeled 
In general on the Plattsburg Idea. 

Fifteen training camps were accordingly established for 
candidates seeking commissions. The first series of in- 
struction began on May 15th. The camps were dis- 
tributed through the entire country In order not to oblige 
the participants to undertake too long a journey. Each 
camp was prepared to receive 2,500 candidates either 
from the Officers Reserve Corps, selected enlisted men 
of the National Guard and the Regular Army, or civilians 
who possessed certain educational qualifications. 

The officers of the Reserve Corps accomplished their 
time of service In camp either as instructors or as students 
according to the extent of their military preparation, and 
were subject to regrading or to discharge. 

Upon completion of the course of Instruction both 
officers already holding commissions in the Reserve Corps 
and candidates were recommended by their commanding 
officers for appointment to such rank as their services 
seemed to merit. During the first five weeks, training 
was the same for all and the Instructors took special pains 
to observe the aptitude shown by each individual. After 
this period, there was a redistribution among the or- 
ganizations in each camp with a view to special training 
In the different branches of the service. At the same 
time, eight of the camps designated a number of candi- 
dates who were transferred to Fort Monroe and Fort 
WInfield Scott, for further Instruction in coast artillery. 

The engineer companies were likewise concentrated in 
three camps devoted especially to the training of candi- 
dates for commissions in that branch of the service. 

Led by the experience of the foreign armies during the 



Universal Military Service 25 

first years of the war, the instructing officers made a 
special point of teaching their pupils to be successful in- 
structors, administrators, and leaders — in short, to be- 
come thorough-going officers. 

The schedules of instruction for all camps were pre- 
pared in the War Department and prescribed a minimum 
number of hours per week for each specialty. Latitude 
was thus given to camp commanders for the most prac- 
tical adjustment of their program. The schedule was 
based on a minimum day of ten hours and a week of five 
days. 

The first series of such periods of instruction terminated 
on August 15th, when 27,341 candidates received com- 
missions, most of these being at once appointed In the 
infantry, cavalry, field artillery, coast artillery, or en- 
gineers.^^ 

In order to provide some of the staff departments with 
officers who had some basic military training, candidates 
possessing business experience, or such as would qualify 
them for service In the quartermaster corps, adjutant- 
general, and ordnance departments were commissioned in 
those branches of the service. 

Some few recently promoted officers were at once sent 
to Europe in order to supplement training in French and 
British schools, then to return and serve as Instructors at 
home. 

The Secretary of War summed up as follows the work 
accomplished in the American training camps: 

" A more salutary result would be impossible to imagine. The 
trained professional soldiers of the army received this great body 
of youthful capacity with hospitality and quickly impressed upon 

17 On leaving camp the officers appointed were commissioned as pro- 
visional officers in the regular service; 2 colonels, i lieutenant-colonel, 



26 The American Army in the European Conflict 

it a soldierly character. The young men brought to their training 
habits which they had formed for success as civilians, but which 
their patriotic enthusiasm rendered easily available in new lines 
of endeavor for the service of the country. They brought, too, 
another element of great value. They were assembled from all 
parts of the country. They were accustomed to the democracy of 
the college and high school ; they recognized themselves as new 
and temporary adventurers in a military life; and they therefore 
reflected into our military preparation the fresh and invigorating 
atmosphere of our commercial democracy. This has undoubtedly 
contributed to the establishment of a happy spirit which prevails 
throughout the army, and has made it easy for the young men 
chosen under the Selective Service Act to fall in with the training 
and mode of life which the military training camp requires. An 
effort was made by the department as far as possible to assign 
these young officers to the training of troops assembled from their 
own homes. By this means a preexisting sympathy was used 
and admiration and respect between officer and man was transferred 
from the home to the camp." 

The excellent results obtained from these periods of 
instruction led the government to institute a second series 
beginning August 27, 19 17, in anticipation of the need 
for officers to take charge of subsequent levies of troops. 
72,914 candidates presented themselves, of whom 21,000 
were admitted; 17,237 finally graduated and received 
commissions. 

In January, 1 9 1 8, a third course of training was begun ; 
but at this time the divisions of the Regular Army, the 
National Guard, and the National Army were organized 
and had been in training for several months. 

It became, therefore, possible to select from these units 
certain candidates for commission among the troopers 
who had shown natural military aptitude. Ninety per 

235 majors, 3,722 captains, 4,452 first lieutenants, 18,929 second lieuten- 
ants, making a total of 27,341 officers. 



Universal Military Service 27 

cent, of the candidates were chosen among the enlisted 
men of the army and the other ten per cent, from civiUans 
of draft age who had received mihtary training at recog- 
nized educational institutions. 

The course was prolonged two weeks in order to admit 
of a more thorough administrative instruction, and the 
men who had given complete satisfaction during the 
course of this last period were at the close of it commis- 
sioned as second lieutenants. 

Thus the American Army had procured in a minimum 
time 57,307 officers. 

They were distributed as follows : 

Field Coast 
Ar- Ar- En- 
Infantry Cavalry tillery tillery gineers Divers Total 



Colonels . . . 


2 




.... 




. . . . 


.... 


2 


Lieutenant- 
















Colonels . 


I 






.... 


. . . . 


.... 


I 


Majors . . . . 


, 185 


18 


37 


I 


50 


3 


294 


Captains . . 


. 3,379 


251 


849 


329 


419 


202 


5,429 


Lieutenants. 


. 7.665 


258 


2,128 


575 


747 


1,001 


12,374 


Second Lieu- 
















tenants . 


.23,346 


1,371 


8,540 


1,118 


750 


4,042 


39,207 



Total ..34,578 1,898 11,554 2,0531,966 5,248 57,307 

A fourth course was begun in twenty-four instruction 
camps with a view to securing 13,1 14 more candidates for 
commission. These camps were opened in the training 
areas of the divisions of the National Guard or National 
Army who were grouped in anticipation of receiving 
orders for embarkation. 

These schools formed a part of each division, which 
latter furnished the pupils. 

Under the original plan, the school was to accompany 



2 8 The American Army in the European Conflict 

the division when it moved overseas; but, owing to the 
urgent need of line officers, these training centers were 
separated from their divisions and five schools were es- 
tablished at permanent replacement camps for candidates 
of such divisions as were scheduled for early overseas 
service. Three of these central training schools were for 
candidates for commission in the infantry, one for those 
of the field artillery, and one for those of the machine- 
gun units. Two more centers were added in order to 
take in candidates for infantry commissions and another 
also for cavalry. 

Instead of one class graduating every three and a half 
months, arrangements were made for a new class to enter 
the central schools every two weeks, so that there would 
be practically a continuous flow of line officers available 
for replacements or for assignments to new units as they 
were organized. 

On November i, 191 8, there were approximately 
46,000 candidates in these schools. 

A center of instruction for colored officers was or- 
ganized in Fort Des Moines, Iowa; others were created 
at Porto Rico, in the Philippines, and the Hawaiian 
Islands. 

An idea of the American effort in view of obtaining 
competent officers for the army may be secured by group- 
ing the information contained in this ohapter with that 
concerning the measures undertaken in France by General 
Pershing to continue this work. 

Each of these separate efforts was necessary to bring 
about the desired end; namely, the rapid and efficient 
training of a hitherto inexperienced body of officers who 
were thus enabled to conduct a new warfare upon foreign 
soil. 



Universal Military Service 29 

It now remained to group the fighting units. 

In the early days of the war it had been decided that 
organization work in America would be limited to the for- 
mation of divisions. Upon his arrival in France General 
Pershing was to give his government the benefit of advice 
concerning the organization of that army which he was 
called upon to command. 

The composition of the division, undertaken in the 
United States, was to be uniform; and was to comprise 
two brigades of infantry of two regiments each and a 
brigade of artillery consisting of three regiments. 

It was at first expected to organize divisions of regular 
troops numbered from i to 25, divisions of National 
Guard numbered from 26 to 75, and divisions of the 
National Army forming a series from 77 to 91.^^ 

The First Division, made up for the most part of regu- 
lar troops, was grouped together on the wharves previous 
to departure, having never up to that time been entirely 
assembled. The Second Division also was made up of 
units already existing in peace time but, like the first, never 
occupied a divisional camp in America, being grouped to- 
gether only on French soil. It included a brigade of 
marines and a brigade of regulars. 

In order to form the other divisions, vast camps were 
established, each one with a lodging capacity for 40,000 
men or more. 

Sixteen of these military cities were reserved for the 
troops furnished by the draft, sixteen others for the 
National Guard divisions, the latter of whom, assembled 
at first in their own States, were given preliminary train- 
ing in local camps under the supervision of the generals 

IS The Ninety-second and Ninety-third Divisions which came to Europe 
were composed of colored troops. 



30 The American Army in the European Conflict 

commanding the different departments. In the month of 
September, 19 17, they began to pour in great numbers 
into the camps prepared for their reception by the Federal 
authorities. 

In the same month, the recruits sent directly from the 
local incorporation boards, began also to reach the divi- 
sional training camps. 

As to the regular divisions — not to speak of the al- 
ready mentioned First and Second — they were sent for 
training into those camps which had been occupied and 
left vacant by the units of the National Guard and the 
National Army which had been the first to embark for 
France. 

Once assembled in these training centers a long wait, 
sometimes of many months, was imposed upon most of 
the divisions on account of the shortage in sea transporta- 
tion facilities. 

This time was not, however, lost, but on the contrary 
was employed in valuable instruction for officers, non- 
commissioned officers, and men. Under the guidance of 
their own chiefs and with the advice of prominent 
technicists in every branch of the service furnished by 
the French and British armies, the Americans underwent 
strenuous drilling exercises and became adept in the use 
of most of the weapons which serve in modern warfare. 

A number of American officers, among whom were in- 
cluded the generals commanding the divisions which were 
In training, came over at this time for a short period of 
actual experience at the front. 

The program to be followed was drawn up for the 
division training camps by the training section of the Gen- 
eral Staff In Washington which remained in close touch 
with the headquarters of the Expeditionary Forces. ^^ 

19 See Chapter II, Methods of Instruction. 



Universal Military Service 31 

Unfortunately there was a serious shortage in the 
equipment necessary for the conduct of modern war. 
This shortage applied to practically all kinds of equip- 
ment, including rifles, machine guns and trench mortars. 
The lack was most felt, however, In artillery, aviation, 
and tank material. 

The difficulties in regard to rifle shortage were solved 
by the issue to National Army divisions of the old Krag- 
Jorgensen rifle of which there were several hundred thou- 
sand on hand until the model 19 17 rifle which had been 
adopted began to be produced in sufficient quantity, 
October and November, 191 7. The artillery material 
with which the American Army had been equipped was 
allotted, as far as available numbers would permit, to ail 
artillery organizations, so that usually each regiment had 
a few guns with which to begin training. Where this 
was not practicable, as in the case of the heavier field 
types, wooden models were made by the organizations for 
training purposes. Similar expedients were resorted to 
in the case of trench mortars, both light and heavy types. 
The problem of equipment for machine-gun and auto- 
matic-rifle training was solved In part by obtaining a 
variety of these weapons In addition to a number of 
Benet-Mercler, Colt, Maxim, and Catling guns already 
on hand. Those so obtained Included Chauchat rifles and 
Hotchkiss machine guns from the French, and VIckers 
guns from the British. 

Prior to their entrance into war, the United States 
Army comprised only nine regiments of field artillery. 
Under the provisions of the National Defense Act, this 
number was increased on May 15, 1917, to twenty-one 
regiments. The National Guard was likewise lacking in 
a large number of artillery organizations. In order to 



32 The American Army in the European Conflict 

remedy this, cavalry regiments of the Regular Army and 
infantry regiments of the National Guard were converted 
into field artillery units. Naturally, the great shortage 
in artillery equipment was felt particularly in these or- 
ganizations the personnel of which had had no experience 
in this branch of the service. 

The materials — cannons, mortars, airplanes — sent 
from France and England for training purposes were 
not always as numerous as desired and a great many 
were of antiquated types. 

Other schools and other units for specialists were 
created as occasion arose, and formed by the War Depart- 
ment. 

We have thus seen in a general way how the mobiliza- 
tion and constitution of divisions was carried out in 
America and how the instruction of these improvised 
forces which were soon to play so important a part in 
the European battle-fields was undertaken. 

For us Frenchmen the term mobilization has a more 
extensive meaning. It includes not only all the above- 
mentioned processes necessary for the constitution of 
fighting units, but also the preliminary measures essential 
for the furnishing of transportation, equipment, horses, 
and all the supplies requisite to make a military force 
live, move, and fight. 

An account of this series of operations which, in order 
to become effective, required not only time and money, 
but also the extensive aid of the Allies who were already 
engaged In war, will find its natural place in the chapters 
devoted to the services of the rear and the line of com- 
munications utilized In France by the American Expedi- 
tionary Forces. 



CHAPTER II 

ARRIVAL OF GENERAL PERSHING IN FRANCE FIRST 

PLANS FORMATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF 

ORGANIZATION OF FIGHTING UNITS SELECTION 

OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND OTHER EQUIPMENT 

METHODS OF TRAINING CAMPS SCHOOLS ES- 
TABLISHMENT OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS AT 
CHAUMONT 

The S. S. Baltic which left New York on the twenty- 
eighth of May, 19 1 7, had on board General John J. 
Pershing accompanied by his hastily improvised staff. 

The Allied governments had been informed of his ap- 
pointment to the command of the Expeditionary Forces, 
but aside from his name and its associations with recent 
American operations on the Mexican border, little was 
known in Europe of the man who was called upon to 
assume such important functions. 

In America, on the contrary, General Pershing was 
known to all and enjoyed a high and well-earned military 
reputation in the United States Army. 

At the West Point Academy, in the early days of his 
training, he was equally esteemed and liked by both in- 
structors and comrades. He graduated in 1886 well at 
the head of his class, of which he was chosen president; a 
good indication of popularity as well as ability. 

He had selected the cavalry as his particular branch of 
the service, and, after graduation, he made a reputation 

33 



34 The American Army in the European Conflict 

as an active campaigner in the Indian country scouting 
over the plains and mountains of New Mexico, Arizona, 
and Montana. 

He was particularly successful in coping with the fre- 
quent Apache outbreaks and was not only remarkable for 
his untiring work on the trail but also gave proof of great 
tact and diplomacy in dealing with that warlike tribe. 
His excellent services soon brought him under the favor- 
able notice of such veteran Indian fighters as General 
Nelson A. Miles and associated him with the galaxy of 
officers who surrounded him — both on the plains and 
in the Spanish War — Lawton, Leonard Wood, Hugh E. 
Scott, and many others. 

In 1896 we find him detached from his command as 
military instructor in the University of Nebraska, and 
there while teaching his own course, he became at the 
same time student of law in this college and was admitted 
to the State bar. In consequence of his successful work 
he was designated as Instructor at West Point in the 
tactical department, remaining until the outbreak of war 
with Spain at which time he asked and obtained leave to 
participate in action with the Tenth Cavalry regiment. 
After the attack on San Juan Hill he was cited by his 
colonel as the officer of the regiment who had shown the 
greatest coolness under fire. 

At the termination of this campaign, he was entrusted 
with the organization of the " Bureau of Insular Affairs " 
under the direction of the War Department. He subse- 
quently applied for colonial service and was sent to the 
Philippines. There he remained at the conclusion of 
his period of service, and took command of the troops 
participating In the campaign against the Moros. 

Having made a complete success of this enterprise 



General Pershing's Arrival 35 

which brought him considerable celebrity, Captain Persh- 
ing was at once proposed on his return to Washington 
for the rank of Brigadier-General; the proposition was 
not seconded, but his talents having been generally re- 
marked there was no hesitation shown in confiding to the 
young officer the post, which circumstances rendered ex- 
tremely important, of military attache in Tokyo whence, 
in the capacity of observer he was able to follow all the 
operations of the Russo-Japanese War. 

In 1906 Captain Pershing obtained his stars. 

He was once more called upon to return to the Philip- 
pines, where he was shortly appointed governor of the 
province of Mindanao, with very extensive powers; 
during the exercise of these functions he showed himself 
a most patient and able administrator. To his initiative 
and organizing capacity are due many roads, schools, and 
hospitals established in that province. 

Then, we find his name especially connected with the 
Mexican expedition. Starting at the head of an infantry 
brigade reenforced by a cavalry regiment, he was soon to 
take over entire direction of the punitive operations which 
had been decided upon by the American Government. 

The rapidity of his movements was a revelation to 
those who were aware of'all the difficulties of execution 
entailed by such maneuvers. In twenty-four days he 
had traversed the State of Chihuahua and had attained 
the lines of Durango, a distance of five hundred miles 
through a country where the hardships incident to lack 
of supplies were immense. Heading a detachment of 
cavalry and mounted artillery he made a raid of one 
hundred and twenty miles in forty-two hours. 

On returning from Mexico he obtained command of the 
Southern Division taking in most of the territory compre- 



36 The American Army in the European Conflict 

hended in the old Confederation and also the southern 
border States. 

The officers who accompanied General Pershing on the 
Baltic were his aides-de-camp, his chief of staff, and the 
future heads of the most important among the army 
services. In London, where they remained but a few 
days, General Pershing had interviews with the King and 
members of the government, who had special connection 
with the military operations then in progress, ^hile his 
companions, visiting the War Office, profited by their 
short sojourn to put themselves in touch with the English 
services which corresponded to the several branches of 
which each was about to assume the direction. 

On June 13th, at about five in the afternoon. General 
Pershing arrived in Paris, where he was met by a popular 
manifestation as remarkable for the warmth of its en- 
thusiasm as by its spontaneity, for the first news of his 
arrival was only made known through the evening papers 
of the same day. 

On leaving the Gare du Nord accompanied by M. 
Painleve, Minister of War, and Marshal Joffre, he was 
the object of a magnificent ovation, which continued all 
along the route up to the Place de la Concorde where he 
was to take up his residence. He was acclaimed by the 
Parisians with an emotion as intense as it was sincere. 

The offices of the American headquarters had been 
installed on the Rue de Constantine near the Invalides, 
and there, on the morning following his arrival,. General 
Pershing went to work upon the plans which were to 
govern the organization of his army. As to instructions 
he had few or none. His actual duty consisted in taking 



First Plans 37 

command of the American forces from the moment of 
their debarkation, to organize them progressively in such 
a manner that the Alhed victory might be rapidly ob- 
tained. Thus the plan was apparently simple; its ex- 
ecution, as will be seen, was long, complicated, and dif- 
ficult. 

Two dominant ideas, from the very beginning, inspired 
all subsequent determinations which the general was 
called upon to take; and it may be justly said that General 
Pershing followed out the realization of his ideal with a 
constancy of purpose which alone ought to earn him the 
particular gratitude and appreciation of his own country 
and those of his Allies. 

The commander of the Expeditionary Forces was de- 
termined to organize them in such a manner as to keep 
for the army of the United States its national autonomy; 
he was also determined to instill into this army the offen- 
sive spirit in its most ardent form. 

* He was well acquainted with the martial qualities and 
military defects of his compatriots, and he knew that the 
American citizen, once entered into the career of arms 
was capable of making an excellent soldl-er provided he 
was directed by methods consistent with the development 
of his warlike virtues. For, as has been excellently said: 

" There exists between the military habit and democratic 
customs a secret link which only war can make apparent. The 
men who dwell in a democracy have a natural desire to acquire 
rapidly the material benefits for which they strive, and when 
acquired, it is natural for these men to enjoy them easily. 
Audacious, they love to risk, but most of them fear death less than 
penury and suffering. In this spirit which directs their industry 
and commerce and which they carry with them on the battle- 
field, they are moved readily to expose their lives, to assure by 
doing so the fruits of victory. There is no success which is so 



38 The American Army in the European Conflict 

striking to the imagination of a democratic people as military suc- 
cess, for it is achieved rapidly with brief and concentrated effort 
and with no risk but of life. 

" Thus while their ordinary tastes and customs incline the citi- 
zens of a republic to avoid the military career, their manner of 
thought prepares them to wage war well. And once uprooted 
from their business habits and their comfortable ways they readily 
make excellent fighters. Peace is particularly harmful to the 
army of a democracy ; war, on the contrary, assures to such a force 
advantages unknown to other armies." 

It may be supposed that General Pershing understood 
his countrymen quite as well as Tocqueville eighty years 
before him, and that he was aware that the American 
farmer, of simple life, laborious habits, and often subject 
to severe privations, would necessarily make an energetic 
and uncomplaining soldier. As to the commercial and in- 
dustrial elements furnished by the business centers, they 
also inspired his full confidence; while perhaps more diffi- 
cult to handle than the contingents from rural districts 
they shared in the same spirit of ambitious independence 
and moral energy. The most important thing was to 
develop these qualities along military lines and the most 
indispensable element to this development was that the 
new formations should be officered under a competent 
command. 

The general-in-chief had decided to profit by the ex- 
perience of the Allies and to take their council, if need 
were, but he was quite determined, also, to reserve the 
right to judge in what manner he would adapt, for the 
profit of his army, the conclusions suggested to him by the 
veterans of the war. 

xA close study of the reports which had come under his 
attention, and a rapid inspection of the French ports, com- 



First Plans 39 

blned to make the general at once adopt all the conclu- 
sions that had been reached by the American military 
commission which had preceded him in this journey. 
Consequently, St. Nazaire first and Bordeaux second, 
were chosen as the harbors which were to be used for the 
debarkation of the American troops. He also approved 
the choice of railroads which were to supply the armies, 
but this latter with one reserve, that the lines chosen 
would be those best fitted to reach that part of the front 
ultimately entrusted to the American troops when they 
should come into action; for at this date the destination 
of the American forces was not definitely settled. 

The general was therefore naturally impatient to de- 
cide with the commander of the French forces upon the 
scene of operation where his armies would be called upon 
to act. 

While his staff and services were getting in touch with 
their corresponding bureaux in Paris — where the 
Ministry of War, according to the instructions of M. 
Painleve had opened wide its doors to receive them — 
General Pershing was frequently on the road to Com- 
piegne in order to consult with General Petain over the 
plans and projects governing the organization and ulti- 
mate engagement of his armies. 

Let us attempt to set before the reader one of these 
first interviews. The circumstances are yet sufficiently 
fresh In the minds of every one to make it unnecessary to 
dwell upon the emotional gravity of this encounter. 

The French commander found himself in a position 
which his knowledge of the actual situation made It 
impossible for him to embellish by any spirit of optimism. 

Even had he wished to remain under any Illusion as to 



40 The American Army in the European Conflict 

the possibilities which were confronting him, the great 
map which hung before his eyes behinci his office table 
would have reminded him at every instant of the im- 
mensity of the task before him and the dwindling re- 
sources at his command. 

From Belfort to the Oise, the enemy's trenches were 
still plentifully manned, and it was evident that, if Russia 
retired from the combat, the German troops, released 
from their positions in the East, would swell the ranks of 
defenders already in line. 

This living wall, which the map displayed to our gen- 
eral, had already once been broken by him, and by him 
only a,t the head of his thirty-third corps at Carency on 
the ninth of May, 19 15, but might it not now and almost 
any day move forward to the capital, and how could the 
present menace, increasing daily with the growing 
strength of the adversary, be effectively met and 
countered? 

The offensive ardor which was a natural instinct as 
well as a military precept with our chief was completed by 
his clear and logical reason, and he could not disguise 
from himself that the situation of the effectives under his 
command — known better to him than to another — was 
grave indeed. His thoughts were thus constantly 
brought back from the domain of speculation and desire 
to grim realities. 

The victory which he was bound to attain could be won 
only when he had fashioned the instrument. How could 
he foresee the day of its completion, now that he possessed 
neither the adequate number of infantry nor yet an 
artillery which by its massed fire was capable of protecting 
the approach and seconding the attack of the foot soldier? 
This theory of powerful concentration of fire he had him- 



First Plans 41 

self demonstrated at the War School with as much ability 
as conviction. 

While the forces under his command were gradually 
preparing for an offensive, following their instruction 
in training camps, in the trenches, and even on the bat- 
tle-fields, but with limited objectives, while waiting the 
time when the arms and munitions supplied by the in- 
terior should arrive in sufficient numbers, their chief was 
seeking to fix the propitious hour, the advantageous 
ground for a decisive assault. 

It was on one of these days of anxious waiting and of 
unremitting labor that General Pershing appeared at 
Complegne, and with him the French commander saw ar- 
riving at the same instant the possibility of attack. 
Memorable indeed was the day on which these two men 
met. The American gifted with the best qualities of his 
young and freedom-loving race, with vigorous and prac- 
tical sense, explained his conception of that organization 
which he was determined to create. The Frenchman, 
with the penetrating mind of the precisian, the acumen 
of the expert tactician, and the flexible logic of the man 
of learning, bent his wisdom and his experience to measure 
this new and unknown force which came armed to him 
from the New World. 

He saw this force now incarnate before him in the per- 
son whom he addressed. Clean-cut and expressive of 
feature, tall and broad-shouldered, with the curt, incisive 
gesture common to the man of action. Impatient with the 
effort of expression In a foreign tongue, and of transform- 
ing his thought Into activity. General Pershing's energetic 
profile recalled the line of that bronzed and warlike figure 
of the Venetian Colleone with clenched fist; typical, also, 
of those stalwart American men of his, whose sinewy 



42 The American Army in the European Conflict 

hands would soon be closing upon their fixed bayonets. 

In spite of all barriers made by disparity of language, 
of habits and method, these men were predestined to com- 
prehend one another and had many points of mutual con- 
tact. Both shared the same clear-headed prudence and 
powerful mind, both were dowered with resolute per- 
severance and indomitable will, both had the inherent love 
and practice of hard and constant work, the same dis- 
regard for undeserved criticism, the same horror of 
popular outcry and party intrigue. 

The friendly collaboration of such a pair was therefore 
certain to be close and its results epoch-making. 

The decisions taken during those first interviews were 
far-reaching and solved many difficult questions, even 
those of the still distant future. Later on events fully 
justified all these initial determinations. Events also 
justified the truth and appositeness of the formula which 
terminated one of their conversations, the application of 
which brought about victory: "A defensive strategy 
until the Americans are ready to come into line." 

After General Pershing had developed his conception 
of a great American army, described the means which 
the United States were to furnish, and formulated the 
hopes which he founded upon the dates of the debarka- 
tions, came the time when it was necessary to study the 
map, in order to determine upon the future zone where 
our new associates were to operate, and here the choice 
was necessarily made by the process of elimination. 

It would have been impossible to change the sector 
which the British held from the Channel up to the Oise 
where for three years they had worked on constructions of 
all sorts; this region was also in line with their supply base. 



First Plans 43 

From the Oise to Verdun there were various sectors, 
but this ground might at any moment become an immense 
battle-field, and it was impossible to count at that part of 
the front upon the fixity of the lines. ^ It was, of course, 
essential that the first American experiments in arms 
should be begun in a relatively quiet trench sector which 
could guarantee the stability of its defense. 

On the other hand it was quite indispensable to keep 
the territory about Paris free and the railroad lines un- 
congested, in order to permit maneuvering in case the 
enemy should succeed in breaking through, and in threat- 
ening the capital. 

The mountainous region of the Vosges presented the 
drawback of forcing the new soldiers to practice a warfare 
of a very special nature which was calculated to unfit them 
for those battles which later would probably take them 
in to open ground. 

There remained the Lorraine front, which seemed to 
be more favorable to the needs of the American army. 
This region possessed large plains of sufficient extent to 
permit of preparatory infantry maneuvers and sufficient 
high ground to allow the artillery to make use of ob- 
servatories. 

Saint-Mihiel presented a tempting salient for decisive 
attacks at the moment when the American forces might 
be expected to arrive in great strength.^ 

General Pershing was inclined to favor the choice of 
this sector after a careful consideration of the results 
of his study of the line of communication. As we have 

^ The French armies had already taken the offensive several times on 
certain portions of this front. 

2 The operations for the taking of St. Mihiel were discussed during one 
of the very first interviews between General Pershing and General 
Petain. 



44 The American Army in the European Conflict 

seen, It was essential to seek a point for the eventual 
abutting of the American effort in a region directly in line 
with the American railroads and maritime bases. 

It was also decided that the French command in the 
front zone, and our war ministry in the rear should place 
at the disposal of the American armies a number of camps 
in proximity with the lines of communication, which would 
make it possible to complete the instruction of the divi- 
sions arriving from the United States before coming into 
line. 

The village of Gondrecourt with its outlying districts 
was chosen for the infantry of the first division. In the 
meantime the artillery of this same division was to pro- 
ceed to Valdahon (near Besancon) for firing practice. 
This training ground was a little far from the American 
railway lines, but possessed the advantage of having 
barracks and other installations which could at once be 
utihzed. 

The two commanders-in-chief frequently met to ex- 
change their views upon the methods of instruction which 
were to be enforced. And while waiting the time when 
General Pershing could dispose of a sufficient number of 
well-drilled officers indispensable for the training of his 
troops, the French command arranged to detach from 
their ranks an entire division which might serve as guide 
and model to the first American unit which had disem- 
barked. They also agreed upon the eventual manner of 
placing the American troops in line when their instruction 
should be complete. 

No time was lost in following up all the decisions upon 
which General Petain and General Pershing had reached 
an agreement in order to set the American contingents 
to work from the very moment of their landing. One of 



Formation of General Staff 45 

the most pressing questions was the constitution of a 
General Staff. 

Up to this time the American army regulations had 
not foreseen more than three sections among which 
the entire constructive labor of the field armies was 
divided. The first was the Bureau of Operations, the 
second that of Information, the third directed the 
general Administration of the army. Such a division 
of work had now become inadequate for a General 
Staff of such importance as that of the Expeditionary 
Forces. 

After thoroughly studying the working of the French 
" Grand Quartier " and the British general headquarters 
and weighing the particular conditions in which the Ameri- 
can army would be placed. General Pershing decided to 
form his staff along the following lines: 

At the head was placed a chief of staff ^ holding the 
rank of major-general, assisted by a deputy chief of staff ** 
when active operations were in progress. Five sections 
were to be created, each one having at its head a brigadier- 
general. These sections were charged with the arrange- 
ment and organization as follows: 

First (known as G-i) : Organization and equipment 
of troops, effectives, replacements and remounts, questions 
regarding tonnage and priority in ocean transportation, 
and military benevolent associations.^ 

Second (known as G-2) : Intelligence service, censor- 

3 The first chief of staff of the American Army was General James 
G. Harbord. He was succeeded on the fifth of May, 1918, by General 
James W. McAndrew. 

* General LeRoy Eltinge was appointed deputy chief of staff on May i, 
1918. 

^ Colonel James A. Logan was first chief cf this section. He was 
succeeded by General Alvery D. Andrews on August 21, 1918. 



46 The American Army in the European Conflict 

ship, secret-service, counter-espionage, circulation, and 
map section.^ 

Third (known as G-3) : Military operations, strate- 
gical study, plans, orders, reconnaissances, location of 
troops, concentrations and liaison with the armies in ac- 
tive operation and the allied armies.'^ 

Fourth (known as G-4) : Supplies, transportation, 
labor, statistics, hospitalization and evacuation, distribu- 
tion of the units arriving in France and employment of 
operatives.^ 

Fifth (known as G-5): Principles and methods of 
instruction, training centers, schools, manuals, and regula- 
tions.^ 

This last-named section, which does not exist in our 
French staff or rather which is subsidiary to the operation 
section, was destined to be extremely important to the 
American Army. 

General Pershing did everything to extend the activities 
of this section whose role was not only to supervise the 
general instruction of the troops actually in France, but 
also to advise and determine the courses followed in the 
United States. 

There exists in the American staff bureau an instru- 
ment which our French service lacks. This is the func- 
tion of the adjutant-general.^^ 

^ This section remained during the whole war under the direction of 
General Dennis E. Nolan. 

^ The first chief of this section was Colonel John McA. Palmer. He 
was succeeded in the early days by General Fox-Connor. 

s This section was at first headed by Colonel W. D. Connor, who was 
in turn succeeded in May, 1918, by General George Van H. Moseley. 

^ This section was commanded by Colonel Paul B. Malone, who in 
February, 1918, was succeeded by Harold B. Fiske. 

10 The first adjutant-general was General Benjamin Alvord. He was 
succeeded, when he left France for America, by General Robert C. Davis. 



Organization of Fighting Units 47 

The commander-in-chief of the American forces gave 
to this function a very important role. 

The adjutant-general is entrusted with the current 
work, the keeping of archives and books, the registration 
and formulation of administrative orders, the settlement 
of the questions of personnel, the examination and estab- 
lishment of promotion, individual notes, printing service, 
identification cards, prisoners, and recruiting. The 
adjutant-general keeps in constant touch with the com- 
mander-in-chief and the chief of staff with whom he re- 
mains in intimate relation. He participates in their mess, 
prepares and registers a large part of their correspond- 
ence, and'attends to the important service of the cipher 
with Washington. In short his role is that of a co- 
ordinating link between all the staff services. The 
adjutant-general in Chaumont employed some 58 officers 
and 700 men. 

Naturally the great importance of the department was 
largely due to the fact that the American Army was 
operating far from home. It was therefore necessary for 
General Pershing to assure through his staff a number 
of those services which in the French Army are under- 
taken by our Ministry of War. 

The constitution of fighting units was now the principal 
preoccupation of the American high command during the 
days of preparation. 

Herein General Pershing gave his preference to a sys- 
tem which, while perhaps less elastic than our own, was 
more prudent and practical considering the great distance 
which was to separate the future combatants from their 
original base. He intended to place 'in the front line 
units sufficiently strong both in troops and material to be 



48 The American Army in the European Conflict 

able to maintain themselves for a considerable time with- 
out constantly calling for fresh supplies and reenforce- 
ments. In comparison with French units, depleted by four 
years of warfare, we may compute that the formations of 
our new ally were about double the strength of our own. 

The army corps was formed with six divisions. Four 
of these were to be employed in active service, one was for 
replacement, one for depot. The army corps also in- 
cluded some non-divisional units, practically forming a 
total of 6,050 officers and 170,000 men. 

It must not be supposed that this formation of the army 
corps was absolutely rigid and immutable, and one in 
which General Pershing admitted of no modification; on 
the contrary, the constitution of the army corps which 
we have described had as a principal object to supply a 
permanent base of computation for the calculations neces- 
sitated by the priority schedules. In this manner the 
proper number of troops with their auxiliaries could be 
reckoned upon by the transportation experts. 

The commander-in-chief had, as we have said, closely 
observed the methods employed by the French and British 
for the handling of their fighting units, especially those 
which were engaged in active operations, and he was 
fully persuaded of the desirability of forming an organism 
which would not be too rigid nor too unwieldy for the 
exigencies of modern warfare. 

Later on the divisions which had at first been denomi- 
nated " replacement divisions " were used like the others 
as fighting units, and the army corps, as in France, was 
transformed into a merely tactical organ. As for the 
depot divisions, they became a sort of a reservoir fur- 
nishing the fighting units with men and officers to replace 



Organization of Fighting Units 49 

those whom illness or the enemy's fire had forced to leave 
the first lines. 

The non-divisional elements of the army corps included 
about 500 officers and 16,000 enlisted men organized as 
follows : 

One brigade of corps artillery (usually that of the 
depot division), consisting of one regiment of 155 heavy 
guns and one of 4.7 inch guns, of American manufacture 
or else two regiments of 155. 

One battalion of trench artillery consisting of four 
batteries of 240 mm. 

One battalion of four batteries of auto-cannon for anti- 
aircraft defense. 

One machine gun battalion for the same purpose. 

Two cavalry regiments. 

One regiment of infantry pioneers. 

One engineer regiment. 

One field signal battalion. 

One telegraph battalion. 

One detachment of pontoniers; besides trains (am- 
munition, quartermaster, etc.) and aviation units of 
which the number varied according to need. 

The American division consisted of 979 officers and 
27,080 men; It Included: 

Two Infantry brigades. 

One brigade of field artillery. 

One battery of trench mortars. 

One engineer regiment of two battalions. 

One field signal battalion. 

One motorized machine-gun battalion of two companies 
and a certain number of trains and services. 

Thus constituted the division seemed well fitted for 



50 The American Army in the European Conflict 

action. Nevertheless this unit, to be well employed, had 
to be engaged under certain conditions. Its artillery was 
not sufficiently powerful to cover a wide front; but on a 
narrow one — two miles for instance — the infantry was 
numerous enough to be echeloned in depth and thus allow 
a vigorous attack or permit a long resistance. 

The infantry brigade was composed of 246 officers and 
8,169 men. It included a staff of 4 officers and 20 men, 
a machine-gun battalion of four companies, and two in- 
fantry regiments. 

The infantry regiment was formed of three battalions, 
a machine-gun company, ^^ one headquarters company,^^ 
and a supply company. It numbered 112 officers and 
3,720 men. 

The infantry battalion had 26 officers and 1,000 men 
and contained four companies. 

The infantry company comprised 6 officers and 250 
men; it was composed of a small headquarters detachment 
of 1 8 men and four platoons of 5 8 men each. 

The divisional artillery was formed by one brigade of 
three regiments of two or three battalions each. 

Two regiments manned each twenty-four cannons of 
75 mm. and possessed two battalions of three batteries. 

One regiment manned twenty-four cannons of 155 mm. 
howitzers and possessed three battalions of two batteries. 

Thus formed, the brigade effectives comprised 208 

11 The American machine-gun company includes 6 officers and 172 men. 
It is composed of three platoons of four machine guns and disposes of 
four spare guns. 

1- The headquarters company includes 8 officers and 336 men distributed 
among five platoons, i.e.: one regimental and battalion headquarters 
platoon including the band, one platoon of telephonists and signalers, one 
platoon of sappers — bombardiers, one platoon of pioneers, one platoon 
of three 37 mm. guns. 



Organization of Fighting Units 51 

officers and 4,769 men. The brigade disposed also of 
3,883 horses. 

The trench-mortar battery of the division numbered 5 
officers and 163 men. 

Command of tactical units was organized along the 
following lines : 

The regifnent was commanded by a colonel assisted by 
a lieutenant-colonel. 

The infantry or artillery brigade was placed under 
orders of a brigadier-general, whose staff consisted, if 
infantry, of 5 officers and 20 men; if artillery, of 9 officers 
and 54 men. 

The division was commanded by a major-general, 
whose staff consisted of 40 officers and 200 men. 

The staff comprised: 

A chief of staff of the rank of colonel. 

Three field officers, chiefs of supply, information, and 
operation. 

Three aerial observers. 

One inspector general of the rank of colonel charged 
by the division commander with inspection, investigations 
of all kinds concerning the instruction of troops, mainte- 
nance of equipment, and administrative accounts. 

One adjutant-general, a field officer whose duty was to 
assure the distribution of orders, to keep the archives, 
and furnish stationery and other accessories of the office 
work under his supervision. 

One judge-advocate charged with the duties appertain- 
ing to the department of military justice besides those 
concerning all questions of claims and indemnities in which 
matters he acts toward the general in command of the 
division as legal adviser. 



52 The American Army in the European Conflict 

One gas officer. 

One officer of the signal corps. 

One machine-gun officer. 

One division chief of engineers who is the colonel in 
command of the regiment of engineers belonging to the 
division. 

The army corps was under the command of a major- 
general disposing of a staff of 54 officers and 415 men. 

This staff comprised one chief of staff of the rank of 
brigadier-general and all the same chiefs of sections and 
of services as in the staff of a division, with the exception 
of the machine-gun officer. 

In less than a month after arriving In France General 
Pershing was ready to submit his organization plan to the 
Department in Washington. It was put Into practical 
effect with very slight modifications. 

His projects included the ultimate formation of a field 
army, on the organization of which he reserved his deci- 
sion. But in order to have the necessary elements at 
hand when the time came, he requested that space might 
be reserved in the priority schedules for the transporta- 
tion of the army services. 

Certain derogations made later in the original plans of 
the American headquarters caused the delay in the arrival 
of the field army services. But we may already give a 
general idea of their prospective organization. 

Their staff was to comprehend a number of sections 
corresponding to those of general headquarters. The 
army corps and other component parts of an army such 
as aviation, engineer, and artillery units were to vary In 
number. Each field army was to contain powerful artil- 
lery formations Including several brigades of 155 mm. 



Selection of Equipment 53 

(6 inch) guns, and several brigades of 8 and 9.2 inch 
howitzers, motorized regiments of French 75 mm., and 
brigades of railway artillery or of guns mounted on heavy 
tractors; for the engineers a regiment of miners, a regi- 
ment of water supply service, a regiment of construction, 
a regiment of electricians, and a regiment of park 
material operators consisting of six companies. 

The signal corps was to furnish a field battalion with 
two telegraph battalions to each army. 

A more complete enumeration of the detachments 
which each special service was to assign to the field army 
will be found in Chapter VI. 

The selection of arms and ordnance material ^^ was 
inspired by a close study of the French and British ex- 
perience since the beginning of the war, when the choice 
was not imposed by the conditions of manufacture. For 
often it became necessary to adopt certain models already 
at hand, whether in the case of rifle, machine gun, or 
cannon while awaiting the manufacturing of more per- 
fected weapons. 

The American infantryman was equipped with the 
model 19 17 rifle whose weight was practically the same 
as the French one. Somewhat shorter than the latter it 
was terminated by a knife bayonet also considerably 
shorter than ours. 

The automatic rifle which the American army utilized 
at first was the French Chauchat. Later, the units arriv- 
ing from America were supplied with their own automatic 

13 The clothing and equipment of the American Army were not modified 
to any appreciable extent during the war. The British helmet and over- 
seas cap made of olive drab were substituted for the felt hat and the 
garrison cap. Each man received a gas mask. 



54 ^/^^ American Army in the European Conflict 

Browning, firing a cartridge turned out in the United 
States. This weapon is hghter than the French auto- 
matic rifle, 15 lbs. instead of 21 lbs. Its filler holds 20 
cartridges. It can fire either one shot at a time or else 
automatically. 

The American divisions used two sorts of machine gun, 
the Vickers and the Hotchkiss models, which gave place 
before the war ended to the Browning water-cooled 
machine gun, and lighter by a third than the French mi- 
trailleuse (36.8 lbs. as against 52J/4 lbs.). 

Both these Browning weapons, the machine gun as well 
as the automatic rifle, were manufactured in large quanti- 
ties and calculated to replace progressively the other 
weapons which had been distributed in the opening days 
of hostilities. Thus the question of supplying ammuni- 
tion to the American units was greatly simplified since, 
toward the end, there was only one kind of cartridge in 
use among the American infantry. 

As to the artillery material of all kinds, almost every- 
thing was supplied by the French ordnance department 
up to the time when the United States should be ready to 
modify their machinery for the manufacture of the can- 
nons adopted by the army. 

It had been decided to supply the light divisional bat- 
teries with our French 75 model, which was able to fire a 
projectile weighing 13 lbs., .7 a distance of five miles and 
a quarter and of which the excellent practical working 
was well known. The heavy batteries received the 155 
mm. howitzer, system Schneider, firing a shell weighing 
117 lbs. to a distance of seven miles. 

Although it had been foreseen that these heavy divi- 
sional batteries might be motorized they nevertheless re- 
mained dependent on their horses as formerly. 



Methods of Training 55 

The artillery of the army corps was supplied with a 4.7 
inch gun (American) which carried about six miles, and 
whose shell weighed 109 lbs. and also with our 155 long, 
known as the great power 155 system Filloux, firing a 
1 10 lb. shell to a distance of ten miles. 

As to the artillery of the field army, it had been ar- 
ranged that it should use the 155 long (great power) and 
also American cannons of 5 and 6 inch firing, at a maxi- 
mum distance of about nine and eleven miles, shells of 
46J/2 lbs. and 95 lbs. respectively, also English 8 inch 
mortars ^^ and American mortars of 9.2 inch firing at 
short distance, about five miles and three-quarters shells 
of 222 lbs. and 319 lbs. 

The divisional batteries of trench artillery used the 
French 58 mortar No. 2, later replaced by the English 
Newton mortar of 6 inches.^'' 

The trench batteries of the field army were to be fur- 
nished with the French 240 while awaiting the manufac- 
ture of a similar American weapon. 

AH the material used for anti-aircraft defense, the 75 
cannon as well as the 4.7 inch shortened and with weight 
reduced, were to be furnished by America. 

The principles governing the instruction of the Ameri- 
can units were formulated by the fifth section of the staff 
a short while after the arrival in France of the first 
American contingents and were immediately approved. 

The doctrine thus enunciated during the formation of 
the army was practically not modified during the whole 
period of hostilities. The value of the theories which 

1* America was supposed to manufacture this gun during the first 
months of the war. 

^5 Which was distributed to the infantry. 



56 The American Army in the European Conflict 

had been thus put into force were absolutely upheld by 
the military events. 

The first instruction program delivered by the Ameri- 
can headquarters to the troops who were disembarking 
read in part as follows : 

" The general principles governing the training of the American 
Expeditionary Forces will be announced from these headquarters. 
Strict compliance with these principles will be exacted and nothing 
contrary thereto will be taught. All instruction must contem- 
plate the assumption of a vigorous offensive. This purpose will 
be emphasized in every phase of training until it becomes a settled 
habit of thought. 

" The general principles governing combat remain unchanged in 
their essence. This war has developed special features which 
involve special phases of training, but the fundamental ideas 
enunciated in our drill regulations, small arms firing manual, field 
service regulations, and other service manuals remain a guide for 
both officers and soldiers and constitute the standard by which 
their efficiency is to be measured, except as modified in detail by 
instructions from these headquarters. 

" The rifle and bayonet are the principal weapons of the infantry 
soldier. He will be trained to a high degree of skill as a marks- 
man both on target range and in field firing. An aggressive spirit 
must be developed until the soldier feels himself, as a bayonet 
fighter, invincible in battle. 

" All officers and soldiers should realize that at no time in our 
history has discipline been so important ; therefore discipline of the 
highest order must be exacted at all times. 

" Training will be based on developing sound leadership in suc- 
cession in the squad or group, the platoon, the company, and finally 
the higher units." 

In the program of training promulgated by the fifth 
section of the American staff special provisions were made 
for the drilling of all units in view of open warfare, rather 
than elaborating the study of trench combat. This was 
quite according to the personal idea of General Pershing, 



Methods of Training 57 

and was impressed upon all divisional commanders, in- 
cluding those who were to return to the United States 
after completing their tour of observation in France, in 
order to proceed with the training of their divisions in 
America previous to transportation. A memorandum to 
this effect, given to the officers before their return to the 
United States, is quoted here : 

" The disposition to regard the introduction of a variety of new 
weapons to meet the special conditions of trench warfare as evident 
of a complete departure from all our former principles of combat 
should be constantly opposed and the attention of all officers should 
be fixed upon the ultimate object of all trench operations ; namely, 
warfare in the open conducted in all essential elements according 
to the principles found in our standard manuals. The doctrine 
taught by the General Staff of all the great armies in this war 
confirms this opinion which was naturally considered by the com- 
mander-in-chief before its promulgation and will be adhered to 
by him in directing the training of troops in France." 

General Pershing arranged with the Secretary of War 
that an absolute uniformity of training should be prac- 
ticed on both continents, and a series of cablegrams be- 
tween Chaumont and Washington were to make known in 
America the dominant ideas in vogue as well as any new 
technical procedures to be employed in France. 

In one of these cables the necessity of large spaces for 
the exercise of troops in the open was dwelt upon. 

Thus as may be seen General Pershing brought to all 
the questions of military instruction an attentive study and 
gave a vigorous impulsion to his training policies. Cer- 
tainly his educative influence was profoundly felt on both 
sides of the ocean. 

Nothing is more diffiicult than to lay down hide-bound 
rules governing the exact schedule of study to be followed 



58 The American Army in the European Conflict 

In a specified time, or to set precise dates for the instruc- 
tion of divisions not yet landed. Moreover some of these 
divisions came to France with their instruction well under 
way, others with the merest smattering obtained after 
a very short stay in the first training camps. It was, how- 
ever, decided that each division should complete Its train- 
ing in our country during three months and a half, which 
period was extended later. These training periods were 
roughly divided in three phases. 

During the first phase the training was followed in 
camps, artillery and infantry separate. During the 
second phase, instruction was carried on in the front-line 
trenches of a quiet sector, the infantry being seconded, 
when circumstances permitted, by its own guns. The 
last phase saw the infantry and artillery once more 
grouped in camp practicing concerted maneuvers with ar- 
tillery and infantry linked. 

The exact duration of each of these phases was de- 
termined according to the degree of preparation already 
reached by the division under observation before quitting 
America. Before Its arrival, each division was preceded 
by the officer to whom Its Instructions had been specifically 
entrusted. This officer was to at once place himself In 
touch with the Fifth section of the General Headquarters, 
where the completion of Instruction was studied and pre- 
pared. 

In order to perfect the training of those American 
units arriving in France General Pershing had recourse to 
the French and British armies with a view of obtaining 
instructors. 

To comply with these needs. General Petain detached 
to the service of the Expeditionary Forces not only offi- 
cers, non-commissioned officers acting as instructors and 



Camps 59 

liaison agents, but also three complete divisions; the 
Forty-seventh, Eighteenth, and Sixty-ninth, which were to 
be placed in turn beside the American units and serve as 
model. 

Thus the general ideas having been agreed upon, a doc- 
trine formulated, and certain measures definitely ad- 
mitted, it was necessary to open more camps and establish 
centers of instruction in view of perfecting the training of 
the divisions as fast as they arrived in France, as well as 
to develop the technical training of the prospective in- 
structors who were to officer the American units. 

It will be remembered that General Pershing and Gen- 
eral Petain, as soon as they 'had arrived at an understand- 
ing as to the future zone of action to be occupied by the 
Expeditionary Forces, decided upon the camp at Gondre- 
court for the training of the first division. 

It was accordingly in this village and in its outlying 
districts that the American infantryman established him- 
self after the French manner; that is to say, using as shel- 
ter the houses and farms of the rural inhabitants instead 
of the barracks and tents to which he was accustomed at 
home. 

Other camps were prepared for the troops who were 
expected to arrive in France in the near future. These 
were organized around Neufchateau not far from Gon- 
drecourt, but in this region the lodging possibilities were 
not sufficient to house all of these troops and recourse was 
had to French and American labor for the construction 
of large barracks. Similar camps capable each of lodg- 
ing an entire division, with training ground sufficiently 
spacious for all maneuvers, were soon to spread over a 
region comprised between Dijon, Toul, St. Dizier, and 



6o The American Army in the European Conflict 

Joigny so that many called this section of country the 
" American Zone." There, at the close of hostilities, 
twenty-one divisional camps could be counted. 

The commander-in-chief decided also upon the creation 
of two other categories of training areas, to be located 
one near the base ports, for the reception of the depot di- 
visions; another along the communication lines and in 
close proximity to them for the replacement divisions 
which it was unnecessary to establish in close proximity 
to the front. 

In all these centers the infantry was prepared for com- 
bat according to the plans laid down and programs elab- 
orated by the American general headquarters. Trenches 
were dug, wire entanglements set up, firing ranges in- 
stalled, and everywhere an intensive preparation was in 
progress. 

If it seemed relatively easy to provide adequate means 
of training for the infantry troops it was correspondingly 
difficult to secure proper facilities for the artillery, which 
service requires immense spaces for its firing practice. 

From the moment that the American participation had 
been decided upon, the French command had made ready 
and placed at the disposition of the American artillery 
the large camp of Valdahon, which was put in order to 
receive and instruct the artillery of the First Division 
from the time of its debarkation. Stables were pre- 
pared and the polygon arranged to suit the exigencies of 
modern ordnance. During this preparation General 
Pershing's officers were being brought in contact with ours. 

Various decisions were undertaken and precise rules 
laid down in order to assure the training of the Amer- 
ican artillery troops without loss of time. 



Camps 6 1 

As was stated in a memorandum published July 25, 
1917: 

" The technical training of the first artillery brigade which is to 
furnish the future instructors to the American troops is to be pur- 
sued according to the French system. When the period is ter- 
minated, another will be accomplished at the front. Then the 
brigade will be returned to its division in order to proceed with its 
unit to the practice of concerted maneuvers. 

" The general commanding the first brigade of artillery will 
assure himself of the attention given to the above prescriptions and, 
after studying the results, will make what proposals he deems op- 
portune." 

Persuaded that the transportation facilities would be 
rapidly ameliorated, and that the arrival of the artillery 
brigades would be effected sooner than had been fore- 
seen in the initial calculations, General Pershing decided 
to organize other camps and firing ranges at Coetquidan 
and Meucon in Brittany, and at Souge near Bordeaux. 

A stay of about two months was decided upon as the 
normal time which each brigade would pass in camp. 
The brigades were expected to arrive in France at the rate 
of three or four a month. ^"^ 

The installation of these camps was undertaken with 

1® The American artillery brigades arrived in Europe at the following 

rate: 

1917 August I 1918 June 8 

September o July 9 

October i August 6(a) 

1918 January i (a) September 5(a) 

February o October 3(a) 

March i November 2 

April o December o 

May 2 

That is to say thirty-three divisional brigades and six array corps 
brigades. 

(a) Included the brigades which had been transformed into corps 
artillery. 



62 The American Army in the European Conflict 

as much rapidity as the civihan and military labor, to- 
gether with that furnished by the prisoners of war, per- 
mitted. These camps were able to receive respectively: 

Coetquidan. — A first brigade in October, 19 17, and a 
second in November of the same year. 

Souge. — Two brigades in March, 19 18, and a third in 
May. 

Meiicon. — One brigade in March, 1918, and a second 
in April, 

For some time, when the American artillery was arriv- 
ing en masse, it was found necessary to utilize La Cour- 
tine and also the zones of Ornans, Redon, Bordeaux, 
Rennes, and Poitiers in order to begin the instruction of 
the new arrivals while waiting for a place to be vacated in 
the above-mentioned camps. 

Some time later, in July, 19 18, it was decided to utilize 
the camp of Courneau, evacuated by the Russian troops, 
and the chief of the American artillery raised the number 
of brigades to be simultaneously instructed at Souge up 
to three. 

These dispositions made it possible to form all the brig- 
ades without loss of time. 

After the month of October, 19 17, when the first 
brigade, whose instructions had been directed by French 
officers, was ready to quit camp, it was already possible 
to select twelve American officers capable, in their turn, 
of teaching the new arrivals of the second brigade. To- 
gether with a few French instructors a new training nu- 
cleus was thus formed. 

This method was continued with each divisional artil- 
lery and gave excellent results. 

It was also necessary to inaugurate training centers for 
the heavy artillery on tractors (army and army-corps ar- 



Schools 63 

tillery). These centers were established at Libourne, 
Limoges, Clermont, and Angers or in the immediate vi- 
cinity of these towns, where from three to four regiments 
of heavy artillery were placed in cantonments. Schools 
for the training of drivers were instituted with all the ac- 
cessories necessary for the pursuit of rapid training. 

Thanks to this system of taking a certain number of 
instructors out of the units whose training had just been 
completed it became possible for the Americans them- 
selves to aid in the military preparation of the units 
which were being constantly disembarked. But it was 
easy to foresee that, as time went on, these instructors 
would not be sufficient to handle the training of all the 
American units. It could also be presumed that all the 
instructors would not be thoroughly inoculated with the 
principles which the Chaumont headquarters was de- 
termined to instill into the troops and their chiefs. Nor 
could the application of this system provide for the neces- 
sary number of staff officers which would be required at 
the time of the formation of the big units. 

Taking also into consideration the lack of specialist 
training in every branch, it became clear that the best way 
to meet the difficulties of the situation was the creation 
of a large number of schools, where, to quote the terms 
of the report made by the training section at American 
headquarters, It would be possible to form " a staff of- 
ficer and a cook as well as a blacksmith." 

The plan for the organization of military schools in 
France had been submitted to General Pershing on Aug- 
ust 27, 1917, and was approved; It was only possible, 
however, to realize the project by degrees according to 
the arrival of instructors, material and students. 



64 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The general plan may be thus summed up : 

In each division training went on under the personal 
supervision of the general in command who exercised con- 
trol over the schools, and training centers established in 
his unit. 

In each army corps an instruction center to be organ- 
ized for the purpose of training replacements of all 
grades and commanders of all units. Each group of 
corps schools to Instruct commanders of proper grades 
for four combat divisions. 

For the entire army in France a center of Instruction 
known as " the army school " to be organized. This 
group was to include a general staff college as well as 
other centers for the preparation of instructors who 
were to perform their duty In the army corps. 

These army schools were placed under the direct juris- 
diction of the general headquarters In order that the doc- 
trine which would govern the instruction methods and 
combat tactics might be transmitted from the General 
Staff through these schools to all units of the army. 

For the base divisions centers were to be organized for 
the training of replacements and classes organized for 
specialist training. 

The army schools were to be established at Langres; 
those of the first corps at Gondrecourt; those of the sec- 
ond corps at Chatlllon-sur-Seine, and those of the third 
corps at Clamecy. 

General Petain and Marshal Sir Douglas Halg 
placed a certain number of officers and men at the disposi- 
tion of the American staff to aid in the formation of in- 
structing bodies of these schools. The German attack 
during the spring of 19 18 made It necessary slightly to 
modify the Instruction plan. Since the army corps were 



Schools 65 

called upon to operate at the front and their commanders, 
in consequence, were unable to maintain a personal super- 
vision over the training centers, which had been confided 
to their particular charge, it was decided that the Chau- 
mont headquarters should extend its zone of activity in 
order to include the direction of the army corps schools. 

Aside from this slight modification, the system of 
schooling, such as had been instituted when the American 
disposed only of 40,000 men on our soil, underwent abso- 
lutely no change up to the signing of the armistice, at 
which time our American allies had more than two mil- 
lion men in France and everything concerning the running 
of these schools was highly satisfactory. 

We shall first examine the list of army schools, then 
the corps schools, and subsequently the schools for the 
instruction of specialists. 

The army schools were listed as follows : 

Army general staff college: established at Langres ^'^ 
opened its doors on November 28th. It was destined to 
prepare student oflScers for the function of staff officers 
for corps and divisions. The course was of three 
months' duration. Each class comprised two hundred 
students from the rank of captain to that of colonel. It 
was found possible to graduate four entire classes from 
this school. A total of 777 officers were enrolled during 
the four courses and 554 of these were recommended for 
staff duty of various kinds. 

The college of Langres was under the supervision of 
General James W. McAndrew, who was later to become 
chief of staff of the American Expeditionary Forces. 

^^ All the schools herein mentioned were established at Langres unless 
otherwise specified. 



66 The American Army in the European Conflict 

General McAndrew was a specialist in all questions of 
military instruction; he succeeded in making the army 
college a model of its kind. He was careful to surround 
himself with the best instructors that the American, 
French, and British armies could supply. It may be said 
that this institution has had an indelible influence upon 
the fighting methods of the American army. 

Army school of the line: For the instruction of cap- 
tains and field officers in infantry tactics. The course 
lasted three months. Four classes were graduated, mak- 
ing a total of 497 officers. The first course opened Feb- 
ruary 4, 1918. 

Army infantry specialists' school: With the capacity 
of 1,200 students. In this establishment company offi- 
cers and non-commissioned officers were trained in the use 
of infantry weapons. Seven separate courses were con- 
ducted at the same time. They consisted in musketry 
and bayonet; automatic weapons; light trench mortars; 
37 mm. gun; observation and sniping; grenades; minor 
tactics. The first term began December 17, 19 17, the 
length of the course varying from two to four weeks. 
3,018 officers and 2,364 non-commissioned officers re- 
ceived instruction at this school during its existence. 

Army machine-gun school: Opened December 17, 
19 17, for the training of officers and non-commissioned 
officers in the use of machine guns. The course lasted 
four weeks. Fifteen classes were graduated up to Octo- 
ber 26, 191 8, making a total of 539 officers and 465 non- 
commissioned officers. 

Army engineer school: Where 300 officers and non- 
commissioned officers could be trained at the same time 
in the duties of the engineer troops. This school in- 
structed; 



Schools 67 

4,500 officers and non-commissioned officers in the bridge 
section. 

3,000 officers and non-commissioned officers in the camou- 
flage section. 

3,100 officers and non-commissioned officers in the mining 
section. 

2,800 officers and non-commissioned officers in the pioneer 
section. 

There was originally in this school a topographic sec- 
tion, which was later transferred to the army intelligence 
school, and a searchlight section, which was turned over 
to the army anti-aircraft school. 

Army signal school: Had a capacity of 400 students. 
179 officers graduated from the section for personnel of 
mobile units and 149 from the section of radio operators. 
Army sanitary school: Established with a view of 
training officers of the medical department in the duties 
of their specialties in the field. The course for dentist 
covered two weeks and for medical officers five weeks. 

516 student officers received instruction during the ex- 
istence of this school. 

Army gas school: A number of courses were here 
conducted varying from a two-hour course to a two-weeks' 
course for officers and non-commissioned officers who were 
to be used as instructors in the divisions. 

The number to pass through various courses was as 
follows : 

Officers Men 

Two-hour course i»247 30,918 

One-day course 1,682 15837 

Two-day course 516 8,657 

Six-day course 473 4>577 

Two-week course 43 8 



68 TJie Atnerican Army in the European Conflict 

Center of information for general officers: Was only 
open at certain periods when the military situation made 
it possible to group the generals and senior colonels in 
order to have them assist at lectures and courses on the 
recent war operations. Two courses only were com- 
pleted. Thirty-two officers were present. 

Center of artillery studies: The object of this course 
was to develop before the artillery and infantry brigade 
and regimental commanders the results and lessons con- 
tained in the recent operations. The length of the course 
when the military situation permitted them to take place, 
was three weeks. Nineteen students only were able to 
follow them. 

Army candidate school: With a capacity of 8,000 
students. The course lasted three months, and was di- 
vided into three separate sections: 

Candidates for commission in the infantry and cavalry. 

Candidates for commission in the engineers. 

Candidates for commission in the signal corps. 

It was originally planned to train candidates for com- 
missions in all branches here, but the increase in the num- 
ber of officers necessary called for the establishment of a 
separate school for artillery officers at Saumur and finally 
a separate school for infantry candidates at Valbonne. 
A total of 1 1,952 entered the Langres school. 3,242 (in- 
cluding 6^ marines) were commissioned for infantry; 
404 in engineers and 222 in signal corps, 2,354 (includ- 
ing 22 marines) infantry candidates, 823 engineer can- 
didates, and 143 signal candidates who completed courses 
successfully after cessation of hostilities were commis- 
sioned in the officers' reserve corps on the active list. 

Infantry candidates school (La Valbonne) : Could ac- 
commodate 21,000 students. The length of the course 



Schools 69 

was to be three months and the object to instruct selected 
soldiers for commissions in infantry. The school was 
planned to have classes of about 5,000 soldiers enter each 
month. 5,500 men entered with the first class on Octo- 
ber 18, 19 1 8, but with the cessation of hostilities on No- 
vember iith no more classes were started. 1,370 sol- 
liers of this first class were graduated and given commis- 
sions in the officers reserve corps on the inactive list. 

Army field officers' course of two weeks was created to 
train junior field officers in tactics and infantry weapons. 
Six classes amounting to a total of 476 officers took this 
course. 

Army anti-aircraft school: With varying capacity and 
course of from four to eight weeks. This was a com- 
bination school and training center of anti-aircraft per- 
sonnel in gun and machine guns and searchlights. The 
artillery section handled classes of forty officers and four 
batteries at a time. 

Army intelligence school: Instructed 138 officers in 
examining prisoners of war and captured documents, also 
ninety soldiers in restoration of photographs taken from 
aircraft. 

Heavy artillery school: At first installed at Haussl- 
mont near Mailly, was soon transferred to Angers, where 
it was In closer touch with the artillery school at Saumur 
and where buildings already existing and vacated by the 
French were suitable for an important center of Instruc- 
tion. Five hundred young officers of the heavy artillery 
were trained and taught the principles then governing 
their branches of the service. Those who were to join 
the railroad artillery perfected their training at the 
Mailly school while the others detailed to the motorized 
artillery were sent to Glen to complete their studies. 



"70 The American Army in the European Conflict 

This school also formed a certain number of specialists; 
orienters, telephone officers, radio officers, who followed 
a three weeks' course. A special tactical course was also 
conducted for field officers. 

Saiimur artillery school: Was open up to the end of 
March, 191 8, for reserve officers, second lieutenants, lieu- 
tenants, and captains who arrived from the United States. 
These officers graduated at the rate of one hundred and 
fifty a month and were sent to join the artillery brigades 
while these were pursuing instruction in camps. 

In March, 1918, it was decided to make use of the 
Saumur school for the formation of artillery officers 
raised from the ranks of non-commissioned officers and 
privates. These students came in part from the fighting 
forces and part from the United States. The average 
matriculation reached eight hundred a month. The stu- 
dents thus graduated joined (and these were the greater 
number) some formation of field artillery, the others 
heavy artillery regiments. 

From September, 19 17, to October, 19 18, Saumur in- 
structed about 4,000 officers. 

Tractor artillery school: Allowed 800 officers to per- 
fect themselves in the driving of heavy tractors. 

Tank school: Which constituted essentially a train- 
ing center for the personnel of both officers and men of 
tank units. It began operations on January 8, 19 18. 
The first tanks were received from the French Govern- 
ment on March 23d of the same year. 755 officers and 
9,275 men were trained in the various duties of the per- 
sonnel of the tanks units. 

The capacity of the three corps schools was 2,500 offi- 
cers and non-commissioned officers each. 



Schools 71 

A corps school comprised a group of schools, the func- 
tions of which were: 

(a) Instruction and training of platoon and company 
leaders. 

(b) Development of instructors in the use and tactical 
employment of infantry weapons. 

(c) Instruction of officers and non-commissioned offi- 
cers of the special services and of various specialists. 

The course of instruction at the corps school at first 
lasted five weeks, later being reduced to four weeks, and 
was applied in schools whose curriculum is indicated by 
their names. 

(a) Infantry practical school. 

(b) Infantry weapons school. 

1. Automatic Rifle Section. 

2. Grenade Section. 

3. Musketry and Bayonet Section. 

4. Sniping, Observation, and Intelligence. 

5. Battalion Scout Officers Section. 

6. Stokes Mortar Section. 

7. 37 Mm. Section. 

(c) Machine-gun School. 

(d) Engineer School. 

(e) Gas School. 
(/) Signal School. 

Aeronautical School (second corps only). 

In addition to the foregoing, sanitary schools were con- 
ducted for a while In the first and second corps. An 
aeronautical school was also conducted in connection with 
first corps schools, but was subsequently discontinued. 



72 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The first corps schools began work on October 15, 19 17, 
and conducted eleven complete courses before being dis- 
continued on December 21st, 1918. 12,535 students 
(officers and non-commissioned officers) graduated from 
the various courses. The second corps school were estab- 
lished in the latter part of January, 19 18, and the third 
corps school began September 2, 19 18. Both the second 
and third corps schools were still in operation at the time 
of the armistice. 

In addition to the foregoing, the following school or 
training centers were established where officers and sol- 
diers were given courses of instruction in special branches. 

FOR AVIATION 
American Balloon School at Meucon. 

Course of three weeks for observers (officers) . 

Course of ten days to two weeks for enlisted special- 
ists (radio, telephone, chart room, winch, ma- 
chine gunners) . 

American Elementary and Observation School at Tours. 

(Second Aviation Instruction Center.) 

Two months' course for aerial observation (pilots). 

Three weeks' course for observers. 

Third Aviation Instruction Center at Issoudun. 

Courses for pursuit and observation pilots. 
A three weeks' advance training; a five weeks' pur- 
suit training. 

Fourth Aviation Instruction Center at Avord. 

Instruction given by " Ecole d' Aviation Frangaise." 
Course three weeks. 



Schools 73 

Seventh Aviation Instruction Center at Clermont-Fer- 
rand. 

Training of day bombardment, pilots and bombers. 
Length of course, one month. 

Eighth Aviation Instruction Center at Foggia, Italy. 

Training pilots in day and night bombing. Length 
of course, six weeks. 

French and American Aerial Gunnery School at Cazaux. 
(Gironde.) 

Use of machine gun. Courses for pilots and ob- 
servers practically same. Three weeks. 

First Artillery Aerial Observation School at Coetquidan. 
For training of observers. Course, two or three 
weeks. 

Second Artillery Aerial Observation School at Souge. 
For training observers. Course, two weeks. 

Fourth Artillery Aerial Observation School at Meucon. 
For training observers. Course, two weeks. 

Fifth Artillery Aerial Observation School at Le Valda- 
hon. 

For training observers. Course, two weeks. 
(All of the artillery aerial observation schools were 
used to train artillery personnel in the work of 
aerial observation.) 

American Advance Artillery Observation School at Cha- 
tillon-sur-Seine. 

Conducted In connection with second corps aeronau- 
tical school. Advance artillery and infantry liai- 
son. Course, two weeks. 



74 The American Army in the European Conflict 

American Observation School for Artillery Officers at 
Saumur. 

Conducted in connection with artillery school. 
Length of course, three weeks. 

French Elementary Flying School at Chateauroux. 
(Indre.) 
Ninety students were instructed here in preliminary 
training by French instructors. Length of 
course, two months. 

Aerial Gunnery School at St. Jean des Monts. 

Combination French and American school. Pur- 
pose, use and application of machine gun in the 
air. Length of course, about ten days. 

FOR ORDNANCE 

Ordnance School of Instruction at Is-sur-Tille. 

Courses: 

{a) Artillery material. Three weeks. 

{b) Small arms and machine guns. Three weeks. 

{c) Ordnance stores. Two weeks. 

Ordnance Ammunition School at Jonchery. 

Course : Composition, storage, and handling of ar- 
tillery, trench mortar, and small arms ammuni- 
tion. Length of course, eighteen days. 

Ordnance Ammunition School at Foecy. 

Purpose and course same as at Jonchery. 

Ordnance School at St. Jean des Monts. 

Purpose: Training in use and maintenance of au- 
tomatic arms in connection with aerial armament 



Schools 75 

work. Course varied from four to eight weeks, 
according to preliminary training of students. 

Ordnance Experimental School at Langres. 
Miscellaneous school. 

FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE 
Gas Defense School at Chaumont. 

Course In gas defense. Length, six days. Capac- 
ity, 200 students. Usually for officers only. 

FOR POLICE DUTIES 

Military Police Corps Training Detachment at Autun. 

Training personnel for military police units. Ca- 
pacity, i,ooo. Length of course, two to three 
weeks. 

FOR TRAINING TRUCK DRIVERS 
Motor Transport School, Decize. 

To train officers and soldiers In the operation and 
repair of motor vehicles. Capacity, 1,500. 
Five separate courses, varying in length from two 
weeks for drivers to six weeks for mechanics and 
officers. 

FOR INSTRUCTION IN CARE AND USE OF PIGEONS 

Pigeon School, at Saizerais, length of course, one week. 

FOR INSTRUCTION IN MILITARY MUSIC 

Bandmaster and Musicians' School at Chaumont, length 
of course, eight to twelve weeks. 



76 The American Army in the European Conflict 

FOR INSTRUCTION OF OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS IN FRENCH 
SYSTEM OF HANDLING RAILROADS 

Railway Transportation School at Angers (length of 
course, 2 weeks). 

FOR INSTRUCTION OF CHAPLAINS REGARDING THEIR 
DUTY WITH TROOPS 

Chaplains' School at he Mans. 

A considerable time was necessary for the installation 
of all these schools on a running basis. While awaiting 
the opening of the above training centers, the Americans 
made a liberal use of our organizations, especially of our 
army schools, aviation, field artillery, heavy artillery, and 
railway artillery training centers. 

We may add that the American army was also repre- 
sented in the following inter-allied schools: 

At Rosoy-en-Brie, where the practice of circulation or 
road traffic was taught. 

At Fontainebleau, where training was given in tank 
maneuvers. 

At St. Dizier, where regulating officers were instructed. 

This enumeration contains only the schools whose char- 
acter was permanent and can give but an inadequate idea 
of the immensity of the task undertaken by the American 
command with a view to the necessary instruction of their 
rapidly increasing forces. 

When General Pershing had elaborated his plans, 
chosen the personnel who were to carry them out, and 
those whom he placed at the head of the most important 
services, when he had selected the zones of both front 



Headquarters at Chaumont 77 

and rear of his great army and decided upon the future 
theater of operations, he became impatient to group his 
staff in some locality nearer the battle-field where the 
chiefs of sections and the chiefs of divers active services 
might work in closer touch with one another. 

He fixed his choice upon the town of Chaumont, situ- 
ated not far from the end of his communication lines, 
in the very center of the various training camps and in 
close proximity to that portion of the front where his 
divisions were to take up certain trenches and where, ac- 
cording to all probability, the American troops under his 
command would strike their first blow. 

The American headquarters were established at Chau- 
mont during the first days of September, 19 17. Offices 
were installed in the barracks of the 109th French infan- 
try regiment; the officers were billeted in the dwellings of 
the citizens of this town. 



CHAPTER III 

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION 

ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF THE REAR 

When, on the first of February, 1917, the directors of 
the German policy declared a merciless and unrestricted 
submarine warfare, they were confident that American 
intervention would be practically Ineffective, and It must 
be confessed that, for a time, appearances were such as 
to give color to this theory. 

The vast operations necessitated by the transportation 
to Europe of an American army — men, horses, muni- 
tions, and supplies — seemed, if Germany succeeded in 
barricading the European Atlantic ports with fleets of 
submarines, a perilous and almost impossible undertaking. 

Moreover, although the immense stretch of American 
territory was rich in resources of all kinds, possessing rail- 
roads capable of tremendous activity, these resources and 
this activity had never been arranged with a view to mili- 
tary exploitation. The needs of a vast army in the field 
had never been foreseen. 

No system corresponding to the various organizations 
created in France during peace time governing supply, 
requisition, and military purchase had been even thought 
of. The output of the arsenals was extremely limited, 
that of the factories turning out war material had not 
been centralized and was already, to a large extent, ab- 
sorbed by the Allies. 

78 



Lines of Communication 79 

From the first day of mobilization, the railroads were 
seriously handicapped by the enlistment and embarkation 
to France of an important number of their personnel, and 
this was all the more serious when we consider that the 
great centers of production of the Middle West are linked 
to the ports on the Eastern coast by some twelve hundred 
miles of rail. 

The crossing of the Atlantic — three thousand nautical 
miles — appeared extremely difficult to the naval experts 
and, at this time, the shortage in tonnage was acutely felt. 
During April the German submarines had beaten all pre- 
vious records, having sent to the bottom 872,800 tons of 
allied and neutral shipping. 

The French ports, many of which were already con- 
gested by the traffic of the British services, could not offer 
rapid debarkation facilities to numerous troops and im- 
mense quantities of supplies. 

Although the French railroads were provided with 
trackage capable of supporting a greatly increased traffic, 
the rolling stock had greatly deteriorated, and the per- 
sonnel was so depleted after thirty-two months of war 
that it would have been impracticable to subject these re- 
sources to a heavier strain than they were already 
enduring. 

It was much the same in France for the resources of 
every kind which had been already so largely drained by 
the allied troops. What might happen if still another 
army were to add its demands to those of our own sol- 
diers? Such were the anxieties, such the questions which 
had to be met and faced in order to establish the lines 
of communication, and organize the new services of the 
rear necessary to prepare for the entrance of the Amer- 
ican forces on the scene. These brief remarks can give 



8o The American Army in the European Conflict 

but an inadequate idea of the gigantic task involved, the 
immense difficulties that had to be conquered. 

All the construction work, all the activities necessitated 
by America's entry into the war were to be developed in 
three entirely distinct sections. 

The first of these, some twelve hundred miles in length, 
covered the distance between the principal centers of pro- 
duction and the American seaports. 

The second, three thousand nautical miles in length, 
and including the Atlantic Ocean, was the scene of action 
of German submarine activities and was linked at either 
extremity by the American ports and those of the Allies. 

The third, some five hundred miles in length, separated 
the French ports from the battle front in Lorraine. 

Each of these sections must be separately dealt with, 
and as we desire more especially to dwell upon what we 
have ourselves observed, we shall give here but a sum- 
mary of the work accomplished in America and on the 
ocean, in order to more fully describe the immense or- 
ganizations realized upon the soil of France. 

In peace time, the American army was administered 
by five distinct services. 

The Quartermaster Corps supplied pay, food, forage, 
clothing, equipment, fuel, lodging, bedding, construction, 
and transportation. 

The service of Ordnance supplied armament and mu- 
nitions. 

The Signal Corps manufactured or purchased aviation 
material, and all the apparatus for telegraph, telephone, 
and optical signalling. 

The Engineer Corps and the Medical Corps furnished 
their own material. 



Activities in America 8i 

Between the sixth of April, 19 17, and the eleventh of 
November, 19 18, in spite of the fact that absolutely no 
plan of mobilization had ever been matured in peace time 
the total strength of the army was to pass from 190,000 
men to 3,665,000, 

These figures give a better idea than any description 
could do of the immense task entailed upon the separate 
services which were to deal with such large masses of ma- 
terial and men. Each service had to immediately reform 
and practically transform itself, increase effectives in an 
enormous proportion, enlarge their organization, and has- 
tily improvise the training of a specialized personnel. 

Thus the quartermaster corps developed between 
March, 1917, and November, 1918, to the extent of 220,- 
000 men: i.e., from 8,000 to 228,000. 

As to the methods employed by this service in dealing 
with a small army spread over an immense territory 
in comparatively petty detachments in peace time, they 
were unhesitatingly abandoned in the face of the new 
problems which had to be solved. The corps was com- 
pletely reorganized into seven different divisions: 

Clothing and equipage. 
Forage and fuel. 
Hardware and metals. 
Remount. 
Subsistence. 
Vehicles and harness. 
Motors. 

In order to obtain a methodical exploitation of the 
country's sectional resources and to economize railway 
transportation, the whole territory was divided into zones 



82 The American Army in the European Conflict 

generally marked so that each one should be able to sup- 
ply the troops which were to be stationed in its territory. 

Each zone was also to furnish its portion of supplies 
accumulated in the Atlantic seaports for shipment over- 
seas. 

Some idea may be formed of the size of these stores 
when it is considered that a permanent reserve of three 
months' supplies was to be constituted in France for the 
maintenance of the Expeditionary Forces. 

At the same time, the quartermaster corps undertook 
the erection of large buildings destined to receive both 
troops and material of all kinds. The first project in- 
cluded the establishment of sixteen groups of barracks 
capable of containing 40,000 men each. 

The difficulties encountered by the ordnance fully 
equaled those which were met and solved by the quarter- 
master corps. 

The declaration of war found the American army with 
a system of manufactures which was scarcely adapted 
even to the needs of peace time. 

Six hundred thousand Springfield rifles of the 1903 
model were on hand and the daily output of this arsenal, 
joined to that of the establishment at Rock Island, did 
not exceed seven hundred pieces. The army had only a 
few hundred machine guns of various models (Benet- 
Mercier, Colt, Maxim, and Catling), as none of these 
had been definitely adopted as a permanent standard for 
the American army. 

The number of field guns did not exceed 780 pieces of 
small and 1 14 of middle caliber. There existed no heavy 
field guns. 

Neither the government arsenals nor the private manu- 



/Activities in America 83 

facturers were equipped so as to be able to produce the 
requisite number of guns of American pattern. As to 
the manufacture of shells, the factories capable of turning 
out any considerable amount were taken up with filling 
the orders of the Allied governments. However, fortu- 
nately and mainly on account of these orders, the United 
States was prepared for an appreciable development In 
the output of gunpowder and explosives, and strides had 
been made in the production of nitric acid by fixation of 
atmospheric nitrogen. 

Thus, as we have seen, except for explosives the situa- 
tion of the ordnance service had to be completely revolu- 
tionized. Radical measures were necessary and were Im- 
mediately taken by the heads of this department. 

In order to utilize those factories which had been 
producing the Enfield rifle, adopted by the British army, 
a type of weapon, called model 19 17, was developed 
resembling the English model but whose bore was 
modified in order to use the Springfield cartridge, 
which latter America was able to turn out In vast 
quantities. 

Important orders were also given In France for Hotch- 
kiss machine guns and Chauchat automatic rifles, at the 
same time experiments were made with the Browning light 
and heavy machine guns. 

In June, 19 17, it was decided to adopt French material 
for the American field artillery. 

This decision greatly simplified matters, since it gave 
American factories time to transform and adapt their 
equipment, while the French industry, utilizing raw ma- 
terials imported from the United States, should manufac- 
ture the first thousands of guns required by the American 
Expeditionary Forces. 



84 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Some idea may be given of the development of the 
ordnance by the mere mention of the relative statistics of 
its operations for one year. 

In June, 19 17, this department transported 500 tons 
of manufactured goods and raw material. In June, 
19 1 8, this total was increased to 100,000 tons. 

When war was declared, American aviation was prac- 
tically non-existent. The total strength of the service, 
including officers and men, did not exceed 1,185. The 
number of machines was altogether Insignificant. Ex- 
perience gained on the Mexican border had proved that 
the types used were in no way adapted to the exigencies 
of modern warfare. 

The aviation section of the signal corps had therefore 
to make a choice among the various existing models, If 
necessary to create new ones, and organize its manufac- 
turing program from beginning to end. 

In May, 19 17, the " Council of National Defense " cre- 
ated the " Aircraft Production Board," and a commis- 
sion was sent to Europe in order to study the best types of 
war planes. 

Experiments were undertaken with a view to creating a 
powerful engine which might be turned out in large num- 
bers, according to the industrial methods of intensive 
production employed in America. 

The Liberty engine was finally adopted; but, while 
waiting the first output of these machines in the United 
States, orders were given for great numbers of training 
planes of old pattern, the first of which were delivered 
In June. 

In February, 19 18, the first American made war plane 
with a Liberty engine arrived In France. 



Activities in America 85 

The question of raw material presented immense diffi- 
culties. 

Europe had largely depended upon America to furnish 
fir wood and spruce. Battalions of woodcutters were or- 
ganized and set to work In the forests of the Pacific 
coast in which large quantities of those kinds of wood 
exist. 

Shortage of flax made it necessary to find some substi- 
tute possessing the qualities required for a fabric used 
for covering airplane-wings. A manner of weaving cot- 
ton tissue was speedily found which proved entirely sat- 
isfactory. 

Thanks to studies undertaken In the United States, a 
substitute was also found for castor oil as a high-grade 
lubricant, a mineral oil replacing the former was found 
equally satisfactory except for rotary engines. 

The rest of the work of the signal corps, the construc- 
tion and operation of telephone and telegraph systems, 
will be examined later, as will that of the engineer corps, ^ 
In connection with the organization of the lines of com- 
munication on French territory. 

But we must not leave the subject of the first measures 
of organization initiated In the United States without a 
short mention of the activities of the medical corps. 

Figures must again speak for us rather than a lengthy 
description. From the beginning of the war to the armis- 
tice the medical corps in America established hospitals 
with a capacity for 120,000 men and had under treatment 
1,400,000 patients, from August 30, 19 17, to August 30, 
1918. 

^ In the course of the war, the effectives of the engineer corps passed 
from 2,000 to 300,000 officers and men. 



86 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The sick death rate among the troops stationed in 
America was only 0.64 per cent., a remarkably low per- 
centage, considering that the army was composed of 
young recruits suddenly taken away from their homes and 
assembled in great numbers in hastily constructed camps 
and barracks. 

The gas mask designed by this service was so efficient 
that no case is known of a soldier using it that died from 
gas poisoning. 

In the space of seventeen months from June, 19 17 to 
November, 19 18, the American army transported from 
one continent to the other 2,080,000 men and 5,160,000 
tons of material. 

Four-fifths of the men and half the material were 
shipped from New York, and a quarter of the material 
from Newport News, Virginia ; the remainder almost en- 
tirely left from Baltimore or Philadelphia. 

The quartermaster corps and, after August 4th, the em- 
barkation section of the General Staff, shared in the honor 
of having organized the system of sea transportation. 

The first thing to be found was an adequate system of 
embarkation facilities. The docks of the Hamburg 
American line and the North German Lloyd at Ho- 
boken, seized at the beginning of hostilities, were imme- 
diately utilized. But as time went on, they were found 
inadequate, and other docks, including those of the Lam- 
port Holt Company, were added to the existing facilities. 

Two camps were established in the immediate vicinity 
of New York, Camp Merritt and Camp Mills, each cap- 
able of containing 40,000 men. An enormous general 
storage depot was constructed at Port Newark, another 
for engineer material at Port Harrison, New Jersey. 



Sea Transportation 87 

The large installations at Newport News were placed, 
like those of New York, under the command of a general. 
They included an organization camp for labor units and 
an embarkation center for animals. 

Thanks to the highly developed railroad system of 
America and to the excellent equipment of the ports, huge 
masses of men and material could be transported without 
too much difficulty to the navigation companies' piers. 

There remained the most difficult problem of all, on 
which we may say that the issue of the war in great part 
depended. Where could the ships be found that were to 
carry these men and this material? 

According to what schedule and in what order of pri- 
ority were the shipments to be carried out? 

The German navigation companies who had supplied 
the piers might also be expected to supply the first neces- 
sary ships, and the government immediately laid hands on 
interned enemy shipping to the extent of 460,000 tons 
deadweight, chiefly consisting of passenger ships. But in 
consequence of willful destruction of the machines by 
their German crews and in some cases owing merely to 
a long stabilization in port most of these ships needed 
repair and could not be counted upon as serviceable before 
autumn. 

It is also to be noted that even this large amount of 
tonnage represented little more than half of the allied 
and neutral shipping that had been sunk by enemy subma- 
rines during the month of April alone. Other measures 
of a drastic character had to be taken. 

The entire output of the American shipping yards was 
requisitioned, orders were largely given by the govern- 
ment to private firms. All this entailed considerable de- 
lay. In order to meet immediate needs all available 



88 The American Army in the European Conflict 

American merchant shipping was chartered; by the end of 
June the American army disposed in all of seven trans- 
ports and six cargo boats, totalling 94,000 tons; at the 
date of the armistice that figure had grown to 3,800,000 
tons. 

We shall examine elsewhere the methods employed 
during seventeen months to bring American tonnage up to 
the last-named figure. During the early period which at 
present occupies us, i. e., 19 17, the increase was rather 
slow, and in the course of the summer was almost en- 
tirely due to the chartering of American shipping. 

After the month of September, the greater number of 
interned German ships became available. The following 
monthly table gives the increasing total of cargo tonnage 
assigned to the service of the American Expeditionary 
Forces in France. 

June 48,000 September 223,000 

July 84,000 October 291,000 

August 125,000 November 460,000 

December 525,000 

The army which left American shores was to be organ- 
ized in France upon the arrival of its different elements. 

Consequently one and the same section of the General 
Staff was at first entrusted with the plans governing or- 
ganization and sea transportation. 

The following self-evident considerations were now to 
govern the priority of shipments. 

The exclusive transportation of combat troops would 
mean that the French services of the rear, already badly 
congested by the needs of the French army, would be still 
more strained by those of the American Expeditionary 
Forces. 



Sea Transportation 89 

To ship troops unaccompanied by adequate supplies 
would mean that they would have to subsist on the re- 
sources of the country of their destination. 

Three years of war had cut down the food supply of 
France to a degree that was on the verge of being peri- 
lous. The American command, well aware of the short- 
age existing in the month of April, 19 17, was extremely 
anxious to supply the American troops by means of 
American resources in order to leave France in complete 
possession of her own and also with a view to minimizing 
as far as possible the unavoidable rise in prices consequent 
on the supplying of still another army. But, on the other 
hand, the shortage in tonnage made it absolutely impera- 
tive for the American command to find in Europe the 
greatest possible amount of supplies of all sorts. The 
importance of this may be fully realized when one knows 
that the transportation of one horse from America to 
France requires ten tons of shipping. It is easy to see 
therefore the immense economy of tonnage entailed if 
the A. E. F. could find in France or England or Spain 
a few thousand animals. 

A close study of these difficulties led the high command 
to decide upon certain principles which, except in some 
unforeseen cases later mentioned, governed the execution 
of transport to Europe. 

The Expeditionary Forces were to be embarked in suc- 
cessive phases or series, each series consisting of an army 
of some three hundred thousand men, equipped with all 
necessary auxiliaries.^ 

2 The following table gives in a condensed form the composition of the 
six first phases. Divisions, the number of which is followed by an R, are 
replacement divisions. Numbers followed by a D are those of depot 
divisions. 



90 The American Army in the European Conflict 

In each phase the auxiliaries and services were to be 
transported ahead of the combat troops. 

First Phase 

Service of the Rear 83,482 

Army Troops R D 7.200 

First Corps (Divs. 1-2-2 6-3 2-4 1-42 i74."8 

Army Troops 10,400 

Total First Phase 275,200 

Second Phase 

Service of the Rear R R 73, "4 

Second Corps (Divs. 28-30-77-78-80-82) 178,114 

Army Troops 1 6,262 

Total Second Phase 267,490 

Total to date 542,690 

Third Phase 

Service of the Rear R R 52,124 

Third Corps (Divs. 3-4-5-6-33-35) 177,070 

Army Troops 17,054 

Total Third Phase 246,248 

Total to date 788,938 

Fourth Phase 

Service of the Rear 4*3,951 

Fourth Corps 177,070 

Army Troops 13,722 

Total Fourth Phase 231,743 

Total to date 1,020,681 

Fifth Phase 

Service of the Rear 27,174 

Fifth Corps 177,070 

Army Troops 5,856 

Total Fifth Phase 210,100 

Total to date " 1,230,781 

Sixth Phase 

Service of the Rear 16,618 

Grand Total (excluding Aviation and re- 
placements) i,2'4?,399 



Sea Transportation 91 

One month of supplies was to be sent with each con- 
voy. A reserve of three months' supplies was to be per- 
manently maintained in France for the total effectives 
landed; forty-five days' rations were to be kept in the 
vicinity of the ports, thirty days in the interior of the 
country, fifteen days at the front. 

Thus, the shipment of supplies would proceed auto- 
matically, and without any special application being made 
to Washington. 

On these principles, General Pershing's staff established 
a document of paramount importance, the " Priority 
Schedule," which was sent to the War Department and 
determined the order in which different organizations, 
personal and material, were to be sent to Europe. 

Military events naturally greatly modified this scheme. 
And the early sending of a division of infantry decided 
on moral grounds, was the first of a series of modifications 
that had to be made to the original priority schedule. 

This division of the regular army left America in sev- 
eral detachments. A convoy including fifteen ships and 
carrying 15,000 men and 16,000 tons of material and 
supplies set sail between June 12th and 17th for St. Na- 
zaire, arriving on the morning of June 26th. The voy- 
age, thanks to the extreme vigilance of the United States 
Navy, took place without loss. 

Admiral Sims had come to London during the early 
days of April in order to organize the protection of 
American ships in European waters. It was decided, 
after a very careful study had been made of the matter, 
that each convoy when six hundred miles from our coasts 
should be taken in charge and escorted by a flotilla of 
destroyers. 

In order, also, to evade an attack which might take 



92 The American Army in the European Conflict 

place in mid-ocean if a fast German cruiser succeeded in 
running the coast blockade, each convoy was accompanied 
from America by an armored-cruiser. The Seattle was 
the first of these to arrive with a convoy in European 
waters. 

The American navy accomplished during the period of 
hostilities a task of which we can here but mention the 
result. 

Out of more than five million tons of material sent 
from America to France only 79,000 tons were lost at sea. 
The total amount of American shipping sunk was 200,000 
tons, 142,000 of which was due to submarine attacks. 

We have thus rapidly sketched some of the measures 
taken in view of assembling in America and transport- 
ing across the ocean the vast masses of men and material 
of the Expeditionary Forces. We shall now in turn ex- 
amine the gigantic organization undertaken on French 
soil, which permitted their reception on arrival and al- 
lowed of their rapid forwarding at an ever increasing 
speed, to the battle-fields where the fate of the great war 
was being decided. 

The organization of the lines of communication and 
of the services of the rear of the American army was car- 
ried out in France, as had been the case in America and 
on the Atlantic, by a body of practical men, anxious to 
make the best of existing circumstances at the time of 
their arrival, to do things on a large scale, and to do them 
quickly. 

When news of the declaration of war reached Paris, 
Major Logan, head of the American military mission in 
France, and Captain Boyd, the United States military at- 



Lines of Communication in France 93 

tache, at once made every effort to gather all information 
which might make it possible for the government at 
Washington in the first place, and for the commander 
of the Expeditionary Forces in the second, to arrange, 
with full knowledge of prevailing conditions, the bases of 
their future organization. 

At this moment, both officers were entirely uninformed 
as to what character American intervention would take. 
And, in regard to the future activities of the great repub- 
lic, the most varied and contradictory rumors were cir- 
culated. 

Would America merely content herself with supplying 
the Allies with war material of various kinds? Would 
she send over detachments of volunteers or aviation 
troops? Would great armies be enrolled for combat on 
European soil? To none of these questions were the 
American military representatives in Paris furnished with 
an answer. The government of the United States had 
not made known any decision in these matters; possibly 
they were waiting, on their side, for the result of the in- 
quiries which the American military mission was to make 
in France. 

If in modern warfare the services of the rear are neces- 
sarily obliged to adapt their mobile organizations to stra- 
tegical exigencies, strategy, on the other hand, must also 
take into consideration certain prevailing conditions. 
Most particularly, it was advisable that the American 
army should profit, in so far as possible, by certain per- 
manent facilities and organizations existing on French 
territory at the time of its arrival. 

We have already observed to what great extent such 
material considerations shared in the decisions of the 
French and American supreme command when they de- 



94 The American Army in the European Conflict 

cided as to the future zone of action of the Expeditionary 
Forces. 

The military mission had the task in hand of determin- 
ing upon the selection of the most favorable ports for the 
debarkation of vast numbers of troops; they had also to 
decide how to supply these troops and where to assemble 
them upon arrival. 

During April and May, the American mission verified 
on the spot the information received from the French 
General Staff in regard to these questions and, accompan- 
ied by several French officers, among whom one of the 
writers, made an extensive tour of ports, railroad yards, 
hospitals, and storage depots of all kinds. Major Lo- 
gan and his associates thus got precise details on the re- 
sources at our command and the part which they might 
claim in their use. Often the field of study and selec- 
tion was extremely limited; this was especially the case in 
regard to our seaports. 

Those giving upon the Channel, as far as Cherbourg, 
inclusive, were being utilized up to their full capacity by 
the services of the British army and those of the French. 
Brest, which had never been utilized except as a naval 
base, had never been equipped with the facilities for han- 
dling a heavy trafl'ic. Neither did this port possess any 
basins provided with locks, so that the debarkation of 
men and freight could only be carried out by lightering. 

At St. Nazaire the conditions appeared more favor- 
able. The port was accessible at all times to ships draw- 
ing twenty-eight feet; it was supplied with two large bas- 
ins and, providing that certain measures were taken, was 
capable of a daily output of several thousand tons. 

At the time of the first German advance toward Paris 
in 19 14 the town had served as a base for the British 



Lines of Communication in France 95 

armies and 25,000 men had simultaneously been quar- 
tered in the extensive camps situated upon the neighbor- 
ing heights. 

Furthermore, there existed at St. Nazaire a remount 
depot which was very well organized and could contain 
3,000 animals. 

Unfortunately this port had several serious draw- 
backs. The piers were narrow, the warehouses few and 
far from capacious. The vicinity of habitations made it 
impossible to build new ones. The railroad lines on the 
piers were in poor condition, drinking water was scanty, 
and the port itself was very much congested. 

Nevertheless it was hoped that by developing the wa- 
ter-works undertaken by the British in 19 14 it would be 
possible to furnish the camps with water in sufficient 
quantity, and at the extremity of the Penhoet docks, close 
to Montoir, there existed extensive stretches of flat 
ground which would be excellently adapted to storage 
purposes. The French had already begun at this point 
the construction of a few warehouses. With adequate 
labor and rolling stock it seemed possible to repair the 
tracks on the piers and relieve the congestion of the 
port. 

We should also note that Nantes, situated at some 
forty miles from St. Nazaire, could dispose of three or 
four berths with twenty-five feet of water and correspond- 
ing warehouses. 

In the harbor of La Palice, the Americans could at 
once utilize two berths and a forty-ton crane. 

In the Gironde region, Pauillac possessed a long and 
narrow wooden pier only linked with the main railroad 
system by a single-track line. 

In order to utilize this, it was necessary to cross the 



c)6 Tlw American Army in the European Conflict 

Gironde on the only railroad bridge which exists at Bor- 
deaux and consequently add to the congestion already 
considerable at this point. 

The port of Bordeaux itself, situated on the left bank 
of the Gironde, a fact which, from the railroad point of 
view, presented the drawback mentioned for PauIUac, was 
already working at Its maximum capacity. 

On the other hand, at Bassens on the right side of the 
river and five miles downstream from Bordeaux, the 
French had begun, in 19 15, the construction of piers for 
the traffic of the Important powder factory situated at 
this point. In April, 19 17, the third berth was nearing 
completion and the possibilities of extension were, so to 
speak, unlimited. 

Furthermore, between Bassens and St. Suplice, In the 
vicinity of the main line to Paris, stretched vast ground 
favorable for the establishment of extensive camps and 
storage. It was evident that If the Americans were to 
have a base In the Gironde, Bassens was specially Indi- 
cated as Its center. Such was, generally speaking, the 
situation of the Atlantic ports. 

As to the Mediterranean ports they were not then to 
be thought of. The advisability to avoid an increase In 
the duration of the round trips, the intensity of subma- 
rine warfare, the necessity of not dispersing the ships 
then available for escort duty, all pointed to the advisa- 
bility of concentrating efforts on the Atlantic bases. 

Accordingly, It became evident that If America were 
ever to send a large army to fight In France the first base 
would be upon the Loire estuary, with St. Nazaire as main 
port, the second on the Gironde with Its main port at 
Bassens. 

Thus the starting point of the lines of communication 



Lines of Communication in France 97 

upon French territory were practically imposed by cir- 
cumstances and, their point of arrival having been decided 
upon by General Pershing as necessarily in the region of 
Lorraine, it only remained to select railway lines which 
were to link the American base ports with the combat 
zone and also to decide upon the location of the facilities 
which were to be established along those railway lines or 
in their immediate vicinity. 

The structure of the French railroad system was well 
fitted to the establishment of such a line of communication 
running from the southwest to the northeast, traversing 
the whole breadth of the country from the mouth of the 
Loire and the Gironde to the-upper valleys of the Marne, 
the Meuse, and the Moselle. 

The main line, running through Nantes, Tours, 
Bourges Nevers, Chagny, Dijon, and Is sur Tille (446 
miles) was at too great a distance from the front to serve 
for the transversal movements of the French troops and 
was comparatively uncongested. 

The stream of trafHc coming from Bordeaux could be 
branched on to this main artery either at Tours via 
Poitiers or at Vierzon or Bourges via Limoges- 
Chateauroux. 

A number of more or less large towns situated on 
these main railway lines offered important facilities al- 
ready existing, as well as buildings that might receive new 
organizations, the whole or part of which could be turned 
over to the American services of the rear. 

In those cases where it was necessary to erect new con- 
structions at different points of the road, considerable 
acreage of flat ground existed in close proximity to the 
line. 

Such in a general way was the sort of practical informa- 



98 The American Army in the European Conflict 

tion collected for General Pershing, and which was laid at 
once before him upon his arrival in Europe. 

As he reported himself to the Secretary of War: 

"... All these considerations led to the inevitable conclusion 
that if we were to handle and supply the great forces deemed essen- 
tial to win the war, we must utilize the southern ports of France 
— Bordeaux, La Palice, St. Nazaire, and Brest — and the compar- 
atively unused railway systems leading therefrom to the northeast. 
Generally speaking then, this would contemplate the use of our 
forces against the enemy somewhere in that direction, but the great 
depots of supply must be centrally located, preferably in the area 
included by Tours, Bourges, and Chateauroux, so that our armies 
could be supplied with equal facility wherever they might be serv- 
ing on the western front." 

Thus as we have seen the general organization of the 
rear of the American armies was rather a question of 
circumstance than of planning and the conclusions arrived 
at, as General Pershing aptly expressed it, were inevitable 
in the spring of 1917. 

In order to realize these projects the Americans 
were called upon for the greatest exposition of energy, 
acumen, and perseverance in their decisions, when once 
adopted. 

They went to work with a view of perfecting what 
already existed rather than to create entirely new facili- 
ties. Thus, upon the signing of the armistice, the num- 
ber of berths utilized by the American shipping in French 
ports, amounted to 98; 85 were of French construction 
and 12 only had been built entirely by the Americans. 

Although the output of our ports was small in 1917, 
they nevertheless did exist with their piers, their docks, 
and their locks usually in good condition. It was sufH- 
cient to prevent congestion — herein the American effort 



Services of the Rear 99 

was particularly efficacious — to equip them after more 
modern methods and to provide them with facilities for 
unloading and storage, with labor and rolling stock. 

One of the first duties of the commission of specialists 
sent to France in the month of June (among whom was 
Major Wllgus, ex-vlce-presldent of the New York Cen- 
tral), was to Improve conditions of the port of St. 
Nazalre. 

The United States Government was requested to send 
over a quantity of labor units and a large number of hoist- 
ing machines from seven to twelve tons. It was also de- 
cided, in order to meet the then very great difficulties in 
transportation facilities, to create a large storage depot In 
the vicinity of Montoir some four miles northeast of St. 
Nazalre, which was destined to receive the supplies until 
it was possible to transport them nearer to the front. ^ 
The plan Included a large number of warehouses provided 
with a system of receiving, classification, and departure 
yards branched at one end on the tracks of the port of St. 
Nazalre, on the other end on the main line: St. Nazalre 
— Nantes. 

The entire length of railway lines to be constructed was 
250 miles; the total capacity of the warehouses was to be 
over 14,000,000 cubic feet. 

In case the port of St. Nazalre should be found Inade- 
quate, a plan of docks was designed to be constructed on 
the Loire near Montoir. This was to Include eight 
berths with a constant draught of thirty feet. 

The shipbuilding yards at Penhouet, with their cranes 
of one hundred and fifty and one hundred and eighty tons, 
were admirably fitted for the debarkation of heavy loads, 

^ Montoir was also to serve as a permanent general storage depot for 
Base Section No. i. 



lOO The American Army in the European Conflict 

and several workshops for mounting locomotives and rail- 
road artillery were established there. ^ 

The 19th American regiment of engineers, consisting 
exclusively of skilled personnel, was to be utilized not only 
for the erection of the locomotives sent from the United 
States but also was expected to repair the French and Bel- 
gian locomotives. 

At St. Nazaire there was also established a shop where 
the automobile vehicles which had been sent in parts to 
economize tonnage were assembled. 

Nine camps with a total capacity of 40,000 men were 
established for the reception of passing troops as well as 
for those permanently assigned to the base. 

A filtering plant with apparatus for a daily flow of 
7,500,000 gallons was speedily established. 

At Savenay, also, large watertanks were constructed, 
with a capacity of 100,000,000 gallons in order to supply 
two hospitals each of 2,500 beds. This water was ob- 
tained from a small river at a certain distance from the 
town. 

Finally at Nantes the depots of St. Luce were con- 
structed and it was decided to double the Orleans rail- 
way line along the portion of the road where it was sin- 
gle-tracked; that is to say, from the Pont de la Rontonde 
to the Bourse. 

Thus equipped, the lower Loire became the American 
Base No. i. 

From the month of August, work was In progress on 
American Base No. 2, which was being prepared at Bas- 
sens. 

There, as we have seen, the French service of public 
roads and bridges had been constructing docks on the 

* The boiler of an American locomotive weighs twenty-three tons. 



Lines of Communication in France loi 

right bank of the Gironde; their plan included ten berths, 
and in May the third of these was approaching comple- 
tion. 

The French services agreed to turn over these docks 
to the Americans during the lapse of time necessary for 
the latter to construct new ones. On the other hand the 
Americans offered to share in the work which we had 
undertaken and agreed to construct ten new berths down- 
stream from the powder mill. 

The installation of the port of Bassens was thus to in- 
clude two quite distinct series of docks, each of which 
could handle ten ships: 

The French port of old Bassens partly of French, 
partly of American construction. 

The American port of New Bassens exclusively of 
American construction. 

The plans designed by Major Wilgus for the railroad 
system of the American Bassens was a model of perfec- 
tion and simplicity. 

The tracks formed a loop where circulation was always 
in the same direction. The cars arriving by the main 
line, Paris-Bordeaux, were at first sent to the receiving 
yards, whence, according to requirements, they were sent 
to the tracks established on the piers and alongside the 
warehouses, where they were loaded. Finally they con- 
tinued to the classification and departure yards and from 
there, toward St. Sulpice or more remote destinations. 

The facilities at Bassens were also to include a refrig- 
erating plant. The frozen meat being unloaded from 
the holds of the ships was to be subject to a second refrig- 
eration, which would be sufficient to allow it to be for- 
warded to Gievres in ordinary box-cars. It was thus 
possible to do without refrigerator cars. 



I02 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Just as the Montoir general storage had been estab- 
hshed in order to absorb the overflow from the port of St. 
Nazaire, it was decided to construct at St. Sulpice on 
the Paris line an immense depot for the reception and 
storage of suppHes which were unloaded at Bassens. 
Port and storage were to be linked by an independent rail- 
way established alongside the main line. 

Besides Bassens the other facilities contiguous to 
the Bordeaux base were to include camps for troops, 
a hospital center at Beau Desert containing 25,000 beds, 
depots for ordnance and quartermaster material respec- 
tively at St. Loubes, La Bastide, and Lormont, remount 
depots at Lormont and Merignac. 

On the whole it may be said that the two American 
bases in France were established on the same principles. 

In each were to be found, first a port of debarkation 
equipped along modern lines; second and next to the port 
to which was linked by an independent railroad line a 
general storage depot; Montoir for St. Nazaire, St. Sul- 
pice for Bassens. 

The depot has a double role; it should not only absorb 
the output of the port no matter what its volume might 
be, in order to avoid congestion, but also it should con- 
stitute for the intermediate zone a reserve from which 
supplies might be drawn according to requirements. 

Various organizations necessarily grouped themselves 
about this nucleus: camps, hospitals, bakeries, remount 
stations, workshops, assemblage and repair plants. 

It may be interesting to note here that the two great 
bases — St. Nazaire-Nantes and Bordeaux-Bassens — In 
the course of the war unloaded almost two-thirds of all 
the freight imported for the use of the American Expedi- 
tionary Forces, to be exact, 62.03 per cent. 



Lines of Communication in France 103 

These installations which were established in the other 
French ports, such as La Palice, Brest, Le Havre, Roche- 
fort, and Marseilles, were not nearly so Important and 
will be spoken of later. 

The transport difficulties were not by any means over 
when the personnel, animals, supplies, and material were 
landed and grouped in the various camps, remount sta- 
tions, and depots in the vicinity of the base ports — In 
fact they were only begun. Other problems remained; 
that of forwarding these masses of men and material to 
the front, and that of providing for their maintenance 
and adding to their numbers by drawing upon the local 
resources of the country. The following figures will 
Indicate that such resources were by no means negligible. 

Out of the 243,560 animals of which the Expeditionary 
Forces disposed during the war, 67,725 only, were Im- 
ported from America. And here, at the risk of antici- 
pating events, it seems indispensable for us to sketch some 
of the general prescriptions addressed to the services of 
the rear In view of their individual organization and in 
order to assure the coordination of their activities. In 
General Order No. 8 (dated July 5, 1917) the com- 
mander-in-chief already determined the precise duties of 
the organization which, seventeen months later, was to 
handle millions of men and distribute millions of tons of 
supplies and material. 

By the terms of this document, the chief of the line of 
communications was entrusted with the territorial com- 
mand In the whole zone of communications with the sup- 
ply, sanitary, telegraph, and telephone service and all con- 
struction work. 

On August 13th General Order No. 20 created prac- 
tically all services of the rear In France. The geograph- 



I04 The American Army in the European Conflict 

ical limits of the line of communication extended from 
the seaports to the railheads which served as base of 
supplies for the field transportation of the combat 
troops. 

It included three separate zones which were denomi- 
nated as follows: 

The Base Sections: The three first were created 
at St. Nazaire, Bordeaux, Le Havre (this latter base sec- 
tion being the agency for receiving and dispatching troops 
and supplies arriving in France at Channel ports via 
Great Britain) . 

The Intermediate Section: Whose limits were com- 
prised between those of the advance section and those of 
the " base sections." 

The Advance Section: Formed by the French zone 
of the armies. 

The line of communication was charged with the service 
of military railways including operation, maintenance, and 
construction. 

To begin with, the following lines of railroad were to 
be considered as military railways belonging to the line 
of communications, for the purpose of railway movements 
of troops and material and the use of existing facilities 
under French control. 

Saint Nazaire-Tours-Bourges-Dijon-Is-sur-Tille and 
points to the front. 

Bordeaux-Limoges-Bourges. 

Regulating station : Is-sur-Tille. 

The postal service and military police were also to form 
part of the line of communication. Brigadier-General 
R. M. Blatchford was appointed commanding general, 
line of communication. 

And here we must mention two other orders of the 



Lines of Communication in France 105 

commander-in-chief on account of the great importance 
of the new services which they organized: General Or- 
der No. 23 of August 20th estabhshed in Paris a general 
purchasing board with a general purchasing agent at its 
head. The general purchasing agent was to be the repre- 
sentative of the commander-in-chief with the various al- 
lied purchasing agencies; his duties were to coordinate 
and supervise all purchasing agents of the American Ex- 
peditionary Forces. 

General Order No. 37 of September 14th, established 
at headquarters a transportation department in charge 
of the operation, maintenance, and construction of all rail- 
roads and canals under American control, together with 
all constructive work to be undertaken on wharves, shops, 
and other buildings for railroad purposes. 

The chief of the transportation department was the 
director-general of transportation and was assisted by 
the following staff : 

(a) Deputy director, {b) engineer of construction, 
(c) manager of light railways, (d) manager of roads, 
(e) business manager, (/) general manager, (^) deputy 
director with each army commander. 

General Atterbury, ex-vice-president of the Pennsyl- 
vania Railroad, was appointed D. G. T. 

Colonel Wilgus was appointed deputy director. 

Thus during the summer of 19 17, under vigorous im- 
pulsion of American Headquarters, the general organiza- 
tion of the services of the rear was making speedy prog- 
ress. The organization was, however, still far from 
having the character of unity and centralization which it 
acquired later on. 

At the end of 19 17 the supply of American troops In 
France was divided into three phases: 



io6 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The procurement of supplies, their care and storage, 
their transportation. 

Responsibility for the first, lay with the chiefs of vari- 
ous supply departments (quartermaster, engineer, ord- 
nance, etc). It was accomplished by purchase or requi- 
sition in the United States or in Europe. 

The second was placed under the control of the general 
commanding the lines of communications, who was re- 
sponsible for the care and storage of supplies, material, 
and equipment, and for the construction, maintenance, and 
repair of all agencies necessary to accomplish this pur- 
pose. 

The third fell to the director-general of transporta- 
tion, who had charge of the unloading of freight and 
troops from ships at the points of debarkation, of the 
transportation of all troops and supplies by rail, and was 
responsible for the construction, maintenance, and opera- 
tion of such railroad lines and rolling stock as came within 
American control. 

And now, following the American line of communica- 
tion in France we will leave the zones of the bases in 
order to penetrate with our reader into the intermediate 
section before reaching that of the advance. 

This intermediate section would have had no reason 
to exist if the front of 19 17 was to be stabilized or if, 
between this front and the base ports, it had been pos- 
sible to count upon an absolutely regular working of the 
railways. In that case, nothing would have prevented 
the storage of supplies either in the zone of the advance 
or in the vicinity of the base ports. 

In practice it was quite otherwise. 

On the one hand, to accumulate vast stores in the army 



Lines of Communication in France 107 

zone would have been (without mentioning the constantly 
increasing dangers of aerial bombardment) running the 
risk of seeing these supplies fall into the enemy's hands in 
case of an even slight advance on his part, as occurred at 
the end of November after the battle of Caporetto, when 
the Italians lost vast quantities of supplies stored in close 
proximity to the front. 

On the other hand, if these stores were left in the im- 
mediate vicinity of the ports, and were only drawn from 
according to need, it would have meant the necessary risks 
and delays involved in war time in a continuous railroad 
transportation on a distance of five hundred miles. 

Consequently General Pershing decided, between the 
zone of the bases and that of the advance, to create a 
third one — the intermediate section, intended to play 
the role of a regulator for the shipments from the first 
and the requests made by the second. 

Moreover this intermediate section, covering^ as it did 
a stretch of the country where the armies had not been 
quartered, made it possible for the American services sta- 
tioned on its territory to procure by calling upon local 
resources certain supplies which it would have been Im- 
possible to obtain nearer the front. 

It was evident that the different services of the rear 
should have their large Installations In the viclnltv of 
the main embarkation lines which, starting from Bor- 
deaux and from St. Nazaire, utilized the same tracks 
from Bourges to Is-sur-TIlle. 

The quartermaster corns decided to establish remount 
depots at Selles-sur-Cher, Gievres, and Sougy; automobile 
acceptance and repair parks at Tour, Chateauroux, and 
Nevers; refrigerating and cold-storage plants at Tours, 
Gievres, Blols and Orleans, bakeries at Dijon and Gie- 



io8 The American Army in the European Conflict 

vres. At Tours there was organized a plant for the re- 
pair and salvage of clothes and equipment of all sorts, 
making possible immense economies of both money and 
tonnage. Motor service and overhaul parks were estab- 
lished at Paris, Tours, Romorantin, and Nevers. 

The principal depots and repair shops of the ordnance 
were installed at Mehun, Foecy, Gievres, Romorantin. 

The medical corps established hospitals in all the above 
localities and, besides, created important hospital centers 
in the region of the thermal stations of Auvergne (Le 
Mont Dore, La Bourboule, Royat, and Chatel-Guyon) . 

As to the engineers corps, charged with the construc- 
tion work (railroads, camps, barracks, hospitals, depots 
of all sorts) its activities extended over all the region 
where American soldiers were stationed. Its main de- 
pots were located at Chateauroux and Gievres. 

The signal corps began the construction of independent 
telephone and telegraph lines destined to connect the 
headquarters at Chaumont with Paris, Brest, St. Nazaire, 
and Bordeaux. 

The aviation section established a plan for a large pro- 
duction center at Romorantin. 

Of all these installations in the intermediate section, of 
all those that have been established by any army at any 
time and at any place in the course of the war, the most 
important from every point of view was the general in- 
termediate storage depot at Gievres. Constructed upon 
flat ground, adjacent to the railway line, Tours-Bourges, 
and fifty miles distant from Tours, it was destined to be 
the general storage depot of the intermediate section for 
engineers, medical, quartermaster, ordnance, and gas sup- 
plies. 

The depot itself, not counting the barracks and hos- 



Lines of Communication in France 109 

pitals annexed, consisted of a large number of warehouses, 
vast surfaces of open storage, a refrigerating plant, and 
the corresponding railroad yards. The definitive project 
included 243 miles of rail, of which 155 miles were stand- 
ard gauge road, 4,492,000 square feet of storage space; 
as for the refrigerating plant. It had a capacity of 5,200 
tons. 

Glevres, on account of its Importance and geographical 
situation, naturally became the main storage depot which, 
according to the words in General Pershing's report to the 
Secretary of War, permitted the American armies to be 
supplied with equal facility wherever they might be serv- 
ing on the western front. 

During the early days of the organization of the serv- 
ices of the rear, the line of demarcation between the Inter- 
mediate section and that of the advance was less definite 
than In the French system. 

As we have seen, the authority of the general com- 
manding the line of communications extended from the 
ocean ports to the points where supplies were delivered 
to the field transportation of the combatant field forces. 

The general commanding the advance section, of which 
Neufchateau was the headquarters, found himself 
charged with the establishment, construction, and opera- 
tion of all the camps, hospitals, remount depots, storages 
of all kinds situated In the French " Zone of the Armies " 
and placed under American control. He procured the 
necessary supplies either by means of local purchases or 
by requisitions on the rear and was in charge of their stor- 
age in the advance depots. 

According to the terms of the general order of August 
13th, he was supposed, with a view to comply with the re- 



no The American Army in the European Conflict 

quests of the fighting troops, to draw from the advanced 
depots the necessary amount of supplies, and forward 
them to the railheads; i. e., to the filling-up points of the 
" field transportation of the combat field forces." 

This simple system had the advantage of centralizing 
the responsibility to the utmost, and it sufficed for a long 
period during which the American troops were occupying 
the same billets and the same quiet sectors upon the Lor- 
raine front, but It was no longer sufficient for their needs 
when the large units were definitely formed and engaged 
in active operations. This sort of operation necessarily 
entails a very heavy transportation of men and material, 
a traffic of reenforcements, evacuations, and supplies in 
the course of which any undue delay may spell disaster. 

It is therefore essential that the army whose interests 
are involved should be able to present its demands, with- 
out intermediary, to an authority who has full powers and 
means to meet them. 

In the French organization this role is filled by the reg- 
ulating station to which the armies in the field ask directly 
for the transport of all kinds which they may require. 

After close study of the question General Pershing de- 
cided to adopt an analogous system for his armies. 

On December 12th, a general order prescribed that the 
troops in the zone of the armies should be supplied from 
the storage depots by means of regulating stations. The 
regulating ofl'icer — i. e., the oflRcer in charge of the reg- 
ulating station — was no longer under the orders of the 
general commanding the lines of com.munication, but was 
a member of the coordination section of the General Staff 
of the army or group of armies, supplied through his reg- 
ulating station. 

He drew the supplies from the depots of the lines of 



Lines of Communication in France 1 1 1 

communication, forwarded them to the refilling points 
(railheads), where they were turned over to the field 
transportation of the troops. Usually a separate train 
was provided for each division. 

The details of the formation, forwarding, and running 
of trains were arranged under his supervision and, accord- 
ing to his instructions, by a representative of the transpor- 
tation department; in short the Americans practically re- 
produced the French system and, as in our case, arranged 
that the military authority should work side by side with 
the seasoned railroad man. 

Moreover, the position of the American army, which at 
the beginning was called upon to act in close contact with 
the French armies, made it desirable, in so far as possible, 
to adopt a similar organization. 

The first American regulating station was established 
at Is-sur-Tille, far enough from the front to make it pos- 
sible to add to the station an important advance general 
storage depot, including a bakery with a daily output of 
300 tons of bread. 

The construction work carried out at Is-sur-Tille, which 
was entirely completed at the time of the armistice, is one 
of the most important undertaken in France by the Amer- 
ican engineers: The total length of tracks in the yards 
amounted to ninety-six miles (normal gauge). 

At almost the same moment, the American services de- 
cided to build a second regulating station at Liffol-le- 
Grand near Neufchateau, located nearer the front and 
destined to ultimately replace Is-sur-Tille which would, 
by that time, have become the general storage depots of 
the advance section, as Gievres was that of the intermedi- 
ate section. 

The construction of Liffol had been decided with the 



112 The American Army in the European Conflict 

French general headquarters, in the course of numerous 
conferences between Colonel Payot, director of the 
French service of the rear, and Colonel W. D. Connor, 
chief of the coordination section at American headquar- 
ters. 

It was understood that all the large Installations of 
the zone of the armies were to be interchangeable and 
might be used by any of the Allied armies, according to 
the turn which events might take. 

Thus each, while working ostensibly for his own army, 
was in reality working for every one. 

Naturally, the first installations of the advance section 
were established along the lines leading to the Lorraine 
front: general storage depots at Chaumont, Vlttel, Ba- 
zoilles, Liffol; motor transport parks at Vesoul, Epinal, 
Neufchateau, Gondrecourt, Toul; ordnance depot at VII- 
lers-le-sec; bakeries at Chaumont, Rimaucourt, Neufcha- 
teau, Vlttel; refrigerating plants at Is-sur-TIlle, Chatlllon, 
Epinal; remount depots at La Neuville, Bourbonne, 
Montlers-sur-Saulx, Nancy; forestry centers at Epinal, 
La Marche, Domgermain; hospitals at Chaumont, Neuf- 
chateau, Contrexevllle, Vlttel, and Toul. 

From the first days of the war, the American Govern- 
ment fully realized the immense importance which a good 
organization of railroad transportation would have for 
the Expeditionary Forces; consequently it had at once sent 
to France a commission of experts constituted by some 
of America's most competent railroad men. 

The principal members were Mr. William Barclay 
Parsons, who had built the first New York subway; Mr. 
W. F. Wilgus, ex-vice-president of the New York Central, 
and Mr. W. A. Garrett. 



Lines of Communication in France 113 

This commission found the railroad system of France 
in surprisingly good condition, but suffering from a short- 
age of rolling stock and labor that enormously reduced 
its transportation capacity; its first care was therefore 
to appeal to the resources of the United States. 

General Pershing, informed of the situation, at once 
requested Washington to send over to France a man per- 
fectly qualified by his experience to assume the general 
direction of railroad transportation, and in August, Mr. 
W. Atterbury, vice-president and general manager of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, arrived in Paris and at once set 
to work with Major Wilgus. 

Their general plan was to organize the transportation 
of the American Army in France along the same lines as a 
great railroad company and including all its usual 
branches; the only difference was that no anxiety existed 
as to the financial returns of the operation of the system. 

Let it be mentioned incidentally that, contrary to the 
legend which was currently circulated by the public and 
even in the newspapers, the Americans did not have to 
construct in France any important railroad line whatever. 
Practically only terminal and storage tracks were built 
by them. The only double main line constructed was 
five miles in length. It was established as a cut-off con- 
necting the main line of the P. L. M. Railroad south of 
Nevers, branching off near Challuy, crossing the Loire 
River, and rejoining the main line near St. Eloi. 

Other important projects included the addition of a 
third track on the Bassens-St. Suplice line, connecting the 
lines of the Orleans and state railroads at Nantes, and 
the laying of two additional tracks between Bourges and 
Pont Vert. 

In order to face the shortage of rolling stock, two 



114 The American Army in the European Conflict 

solutions presented themselves to General Atterbury: the 
first was importation from America, the other consisted 
in repairing, by means of American labor, the thousands 
of damaged French and Belgian locomotives and cars 
which were lying idle as a consequence of the lack of 
skilled workmen. 

In December, 19 17, both solutions were simultaneously 
taken up. 

The main repair shops were established at Nevers, 
Cercy-la-Tour, and Saumur. 

Regiments of American engineers were placed at the 
disposition of the transportation department. These 
were of three categories: 

1st. Construction Regiments. 

2d. Operation Regiments. 

3d. Shop Regiments. 

They were made up strictly of specialists in the differ- 
ent branches, officered by men who were, for the most 
part, civil engineers of great experience. Thus the class 
of work might be expected to be very high. 

We shall see later the process of transformation which 
was effected in this organization of which the bases were 
laid as early as the summer of 1917; but before leaving 
the subject of transportation, we must say a few words on 
that of the motor transport service which, during the 
war, was to bring such effective and ever-increasing aid 
to the overstrained railroads and attain greater and 
greater importance. The motor transport service was 
organized in each of the three sections of the line of 
communications by a general order dated December 8th. 

It included in the advance zone one park per army, in 
the intermediate section an intermediate group consisting 



Lines of Communication in France 115 

of several organizations, among which was found a cen- 
tral depot comprising the following sections: Supply, 
spare parts, main shops, salvage, main reserve park, and 
finally in the base zone a park established in the vicinity 
of each port of debarkation. This park was to receive 
all incoming motor transport vehicles and personnel, to 
organize the units, and afterward forward them to the 
organizations of the intermediate section, or, in case of 
emergency, directly to those of the advance section. 

Thus the reader who has patiently followed these long 
explanations may be able to form some Idea of the 
American services of the rear as they were established In 
France at the end of 19 17. 



CHAPTER IV 

FIRST APPEARANCE OF AMERICAN CONTINGENTS ON THE 
FRENCH FRONT THE FIRST, SECOND, TWENTY- 
SIXTH, AND FORTY-SECOND DIVISIONS 

During the conversations which took place between 
Marshal Joffre, the American Secretary of War, and the 
President of the United States, touching the forthcoming 
intervention of America in the European conflict, the 
marshal had dwelt upon the necessity of forming a large 
number of strong war units and also upon the urgency of 
the appearance of a first American contingent on French 
soil. It was considered that the early arrival of Ameri- 
can soldiers among our troops at the front would produce 
an extremely salutary moral effect. His suggestions 
were favorably received. 

Great diligence was displayed in the different offices of 
the War Department, and various units were rapidly 
grouped together to form one division. The i6th, i8th, 
26th, and 28th regiments of the regular army, which 
were then for the most part engaged upon the Mexican 
border, were incorporated into the First Division. 

This division, which was the first to respond to the call 
of the victor of the Marne, and to display the Stars and 
Stripes beside the tricolor, arrived in France on the 
twenty-sixth of June and disembarked under the eyes of 
General Pershing. 

The soldiers who composed it, volunteers as well as 

116 



First Division 117 

regulars, produced an excellent impression; we quote the 
remarks of a French spectator: 

" Orders are promptly executed, maneuvers are effected with 
skill, every one knows his place and his business. The operations 
of disembarking, gathering the small units, and marching to the 
barracks are carried out with discipline and order. The men are 
well set up, and seem perfectly at ease upon French soil ; with their 
khaki uniforms closer cut than those of the English, with their 
picturesque sombreros, and their eminently practical equipment 
they give the impression of cohesion. The soldiers appear to be 
strong, athletic, and healthy, and one has the feeling that the 
nerves of such a troop will act with force and precision at the hour 
of combat." 

General Sibert, an officer of engineers, who had been 
one of the most efficient among those who constructed the 
Panama Canal, was in command of the First Division. 
The two brigades were respectively under the orders of 
Generals Bundy and Bullard. 

Upon arriving, the troops at once took possession of a 
camp situated in close proximity to the port of St. 
Nazaire, and which had been prepared to receive them 
while awaiting the time when their cantonments would be 
moved nearer the front. 

Their sojourn, in fact, was not a lengthy one; on the 
fifteenth of July the division was entrained for the 
Gondrecourt area before going into the trenches for the 
first time. 

Meanwhile the Fourth of July, one battalion belonging 
to the Sixteenth Infantry carrying the flag of the regi- 
ment arrived in Paris, marched in defile before the 
President of the Republic, and received in the Court of 
Honor at the Invalides, the standards offered by the 
French Sons of the Cincinnati. Thence, traversing the 



ii8 The American Army in the European Conflict 

capital, amidst the acclamations of the Parisians, the first 
American soldiers who were to take up arms for their 
" second country " escorted the American Ambassador 
and General Pershing to the tomb of the friend of Wash- 
ington and gave utterance to the now historic, " Lafay- 
ette, nous voila." 

When the Sibert division took possession of their in- 
struction camp they occupied a line of villages stretching 
along the Saulx from Gondrecourt to Ligny-en-Barrois. 

Here, for the first time and contrary to custom, the 
American soldier did not pitch a tent, but was lodged 
after the French manner; that is to say, in the villages 
and adjacent farmhouses. He soon made himself quite 
at home in the barns of our peasantry. 

Each battalion disposed of its own drill ground, rifle 
range, trench system, and wire entanglements. Divers 
centers for the handling of grenades and other weapons 
were established at Mauvages while awaiting the installa- 
tion of army corps schools. Officers and men were to 
pass fifteen days at these training centers and, on return- 
ing to camp, were to act as instructors. 

The French Forty-seventh Division of " Chasseurs a 
pieds " was now placed beside General Sibert's division 
to serve as a sort of guide in these maneuvers. Every 
day lines of French and Americans were to be seen dig- 
ging trenches, practicing with trench weapons, handling 
rifles, or maneuvering in open ground. 

The First Division was without cannon, the artillery 
had gone to Valdahon to the firing school; but our 
" Chasseurs " had their own guns and were able to add 
some artillery instruction to the various lessons which 
their new comrades were eager to take advantage of. 

General Pershing was often present at these maneu- 



First Division 1 19 

vers. He always took occasion to express his opinion on 
the most practical methods of carrying on the fight. 
How often have we not heard him say: " Do not attach 
too much importance to trench warfare, mind your aim, 
have confidence in your rifle, and get expert with the 
bayonet." 

The aggressive conceptions of the commander-in-chief 
suited the caliber of his men, hardy and keen for action. 

For some weeks the Sibert division continued to profit 
by the experience of the French troops under a direct 
American command. This unit was reviewed on the 
eighth of September by President Poincare and M. Pain- 
leve. Minister of War, and as the departure for the front 
became more and more imminent. Marshal Joffre ap- 
peared at Gondrecourt to visit, before their entrance in 
the trenches, the first contingents which had answered his 
call. 

The spectacle was impressive and moving. After the 
defile he said a few words of welcome and Godspeed 
which were translated into English and met by the accla- 
mation of the American officers gathered around the 
French chief. 

A few days later, the division was moved to the sector 
of Sommervillers, east of Nancy. Successively the 
battalions went into line intercalated with the French 
units and backed up by their own artillery which had 
arrived from Valdahon. 

During the first days, the American batteries contented 
themselves with remaining in close touch with the French 
batteries which had been maintained in line. The French 
were entrusted with the direct covering of the infantry, 
but in case of attack, the Americans were to superpose 
their fire on that of the French, thus increasing the power 



I20 The American Army in the European Conflict 

of our guns without as yet assuming the difficult and 
delicate task of maintaining a constant liaison with the 
infantry troops. 

Later on, as they became more expert in the field, the 
American batteries replaced the French and assumed the 
direct responsibility of liaison with their own infantry. 

General Sibert's division was distributed as follows: 
The 1 8th Infantry Regiment, flanked by the canal Marne- 
Rhine and fronting toward Parroy, held the right end 
of the sector. Proceeding from south to north the i6th, 
26th, and 28th regiments filled up the position, the left 
of the latter extending to the village of Arracourt. 

It was at this point that the Americans fired their first 
shells into the German lines and captured, In the vicinity 
of Bures, their first prisoner. This honor fell to the 
I 8th Infantry Regiment. Here also they met with their 
first losses; during a German raid against that portion 
of the front held by the i6th Regiment.^ After a violent 
bombardment the enemy succeeded in reaching the first- 
line trenches where a desperate struggle ensued. During 
this hand-to-hand fight the Germans succeeded In captur- 
ing a few prisoners. 

Soldiers and officers were eager to avenge this assault 
by one of equal vigor. Plans had been made, the men 
had prepared their attack which was about to be executed, 
when the division received orders to leave the sector. 
Nevertheless, the American soldier had already been able. 
In the course of numerous reconnoissances and scouting 

1 The tomb of the first American killed in action was erected by sub- 
scription from the communes and the department of Meurthe et Moselle. 
The prefect of this department placed a Lorraine cross near the village 
of Bathelemont upon which is the following inscription: "Here rest the 
first soldiers of the United States to fall on the soil of France in the 
cause of Justice and Liberty." 



First Division 121 

parties, to demonstrate his superiority over his enemy 
when they came to blows. 

The last elements of the Sibert division were relieved 
on the twenty-first of November, and the whole unit was 
once more assembled at Gondrecourt to resume training. 
This time the instruction was of a different order, being 
limited almost entirely to concerted maneuvers in the 
open, and, when this second period was completed, the 
Americans were judged capable of holding alone a divi- 
sional sector. 

The First Division, of which General Bullard now took 
command, was accordingly established with its head- 
quarters at Menil-la-Tour, north of Toul, where the First 
Brigade, commanded by General Duncan, and reenforced 
by a large portion of artillery, relieved the French 
Moroccan division. The front thus occupied bordered 
the southern Woevre and stretched from the " Bois 
Carre," east of Seicheprey, to a pond in the vicinity of 
Bouconville village. 

Here, framed in with the Thirty-second French Army 
Corps, the First Division soon made the enemy feel its 
presence. The artillery was extremely active, daring 
patrols operated nightly, as much with a view to " getting 
their hand in " as with the intention of taking prisoners. 

The first of March, a German storming party consist- 
ing of 240 picked men from the " shock troops " and with 
all the material necessary to successfully carry out this 
kind of operation, attacked the " Bois Carre " which was 
held by a company of the i8th Regiment. The Ameri- 
cans, who had foreseen the attack, had taken the neces- 
sary precautions, so that the enterprise completely failed 
and the enemy left in our lines seventeen dead, several 
prisoners, a machine gun, and a flame thrower. 



122 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The First Division had thus already acquired the 
reputation of being a troop whose fighting value could 
be relied upon, and was soon to give even more positive 
evidence of the stuff Its men were made of. 

Some days later, when the Germans were carrying out 
their attack on the British right and were progressing 
toward Amiens, the division was withdrawn from the 
Woevre sector and transported by rail to the zone of 
active operations. 

The Second Division, commanded by General Bundy, 
was the second to perfect its military training upon our 
front. Formed like the First of regiments belonging to 
the Regular Army but to which a large number of recruits 
had been added, ^ this division had received its training 
on French soil. Having scarcely landed, it was immedi- 
ately directed to the Bourmont zone and there, under the 
same conditions which we have described for the sister 
division. It prepared Itself for active warfare. It was 
pronounced ready for combat about the middle of 
January, 191 8, and directed to the portion of the front 
comprised between the Spada Gap and les Eparges. 

General Bundy's post of command was established at 
Sommedieue, near that of the chief of the Tenth French 
Army Corps, which was to frame In the American con- 
tingents. 

From the moment of entering the line the men of the 
Second Division gave proof of courage and tenacity. On 

- Including a brigade of marines composed of two regiments which had 
arrived in France with the First Division, one of these had been training 
with General Bullard's troops, while the other was engaged in work on 
the line of communication where there had been a shortage in labor. 
The Second Brigade of the Second Division was made up with two 
regiments of regulars. 



Second Division 123 

several occasions the French command was obliged to 
moderate the ardor of these fresh troops. It was notice- 
able that every time an American division appeared in 
the front line to gain experience in what had been con- 
sidered a " quiet zone " the calmness sought for was im- 
mediately broken up and the sector at once became 
animated; the foe was kept constantly on his mettle. 
Reconnoissances were multiplied, patrols were sent out 
in force every night, and on both sides raids were 
organized. 

Two companies of the 9th Regiment had been attacked 
near Mezey by a German battalion. This position held 
by the Americans presented many difficulties; moreover, 
when the French held the same ground in January, 19 18, 
there had been serious question of abandoning it as too 
precarious. 

The bombardment which preceded the German attack 
was particularly violent. A rolling barrage of great in- 
tensity accompanied the first assaulting waves which, on 
April 15th, at half after midnight succeeded in reaching 
the advanced outworks. The enemy's fire had scarcely 
ceased when the Americans emerged from their shelters 
with remarkable daring, and engaged in a desperate 
struggle calculated to give a splendid idea of their fighting 
qualities to their more experienced adversaries. In the 
blackest darkness all the ground for a moment occupied 
by the foe was reconquered. Seventy-two Germans dead 
were counted and on the American side there were but 
seven killed and nineteen wounded. When the roll was 
called ten men and a corporal were indeed missing, but not 
for long. Carried off as prisoners, at a given signal the 
little band, before reaching the German lines, turned upon 
their captors, seized their rifles, and made such good use 



124 The American Army in the European Conflict 

of them that they had little difficulty in regaining their 
own lines safe and sound. 

The division whose turn now came to appear at the 
front was the Twenty-sixth, composed of National Guards 
recruited among the New England States. The chief of 
this division, General Clarence Edwards, his staff, and a 
small number of officers alone belonged to the Regular 
Army. 

They had arrived in France at the end of October, 
1917, and had been sent to Neufchateau, where, in con- 
junction with the French Sixty-ninth, they completed their 
training after the same methods as their predecessors. 
We should, however, remark that at that period the 
American general headquarters of Chaumont was able to 
give particular and close attention to the progress of in- 
struction of the troops, to correct the points of training 
which had been defective, and that the last comers were 
able to profit by the experience of the first divisions which 
had gone before. 

When Infantry and artillery were pronounced ready 
for trench work — that is to say, on the ninth of February 
— the Twenty-sixth Division passed into the organization 
of the French Eleventh Army Corps which, at this date, 
occupied a large sector north of the Alsne bordering the 
Chemin des Dames. 

This portion of the front, the " Couvrel " sector, had 
remained relatively calm since the attacks of October, 
1 9 17. The entry Into line of the American troops en- 
livened things considerably. 

The French units were no sooner replaced than Gen- 
eral Edwards' troops were subjected to a fierce localized 
attack which they succeeded In repulsing, showing them- 



Twenty-Sixth Division 125 

selves on this occasion particularly tenacious; In resisting 
a bombardment of thirty hours, during which the German 
batteries rained thousands of toxic shells on the ground 
defended by the io2d Infantry Regiment. 

Numerous detachments from the Twenty-sixth Division 
were called upon to illustrate their offensive quality by 
frequent raids into enemy territory. One of these opera- 
tions, executed by Franco-American troops, was so well 
conducted that twenty-two men and two German officers 
were brought back, without the Americans having lost a 
man. 

General Pershing had been following with closest atten- 
tion each new occasion upon which contact was established 
between American troops and the enemy. For, although 
he attached but a reasonable importance to the loss or 
gain of a small trench element, each new enterprise of 
the sort served to test more vital things, whether he had 
been right In his previsions and justified in his decisions 
concerning the proper training for his soldiers. These 
events demonstrated that his estimation as to the daring 
and value of the American soldier in action had been per- 
fectly correct. 

During this period he was constantly at the front, visit- 
ing the trenches in order to form a personal Impression of 
the morale of the troops, and from each new expedition 
he returned with a favorable one. 

The faults which might be noted were those of men 
who were as yet somewhat green, and who showed excite- 
ment, agitation, sometimes an excess of zeal, but who 
were self-confident and strong In their conviction of being 
able to down their opponents. 

The onlooker visiting the American advance posts was 
struck by the care and attention of the men on watch; 



126 The American Army in the European Conflict 

their gaze remained constantly fixed upon the enemy's 
line. As to the trenches, they were well kept up, the 
shelters clean and comfortable. At this period the 
American detachments, with their effectives still com- 
plete, were always able to dispose of a large number of 
workers, whereas the French were, after four years' 
heavy losses in the war, sadly lacking in workers. 

In the beginning the American soldier was tempted to 
consume his cold provisions without waiting to have them 
cooked, but placed In contact with our troops he speedily 
acquired our habits In this regard and brought forward 
his field kitchens after the French fashion as close as 
possible to the firing line. 

When the commander-in-chief or his chief of staff made 
a surprise visit to the sector they passed by the different 
parts of command established along the roads which lead 
to the trenches. It was rare, during these visits, for them 
to encounter any commander In one of these posts, for the 
oflUcer in charge was usually himself inspecting the front 
in closer proximity to the foe. These rear posts were 
generally occupied merely by an ofl^cer on day duty. This 
was quite as It should be. General Pershing and General 
Harbord were glad to note the full consciousness of re- 
sponsibility shown by their subordinates, whom they were 
sure to find at an early hour In the most advanced lines 
or near the batteries. It was noteworthy that the Ameri- 
can oflicer not only fully realized his duty as commander, 
but understood that his role consisted also In the no less 
important one of instructor, especially among a large 
number of Inexperienced troops. 

During the whole period of training within view of the 
enemy the general headquarters at Chaumont remained 
in constant touch with the divisions thus engaged in 



Twenty-Sixth Division 127 

sector; an officer of the operation section of the general 
headquarters detached with each unit remained in tele- 
phonic communication with the chief of staff. 

Nor were General Pershing and his divisional com- 
manders content merely with a close surveillance of their 
own troops. They were eager also to study and take 
advantage of French experience. Each time an impor- 
tant operation was projected on our side, General 
Pershing, at once informed, hastened to the scene of 
action. Those generals, also, whose troops were still 
in America, each put in three or four weeks in visiting 
our front to personally get in touch with the most modern 
warfare. 

On the twenty-first of August, General Pershing, placed 
in an advanced observation post, followed the entire 
operations on both sides of the Meuse. 

He found himself beside General Corvisart, whom he 
had known long before in Manchuria, and who was now 
commanding the Sixteenth Corps. 

It was under their eyes that our troops carried the 
woods of Avocourt, the Mort-Homme-Hill, the Cor- 
beaux, and Cumieres woods, seized the villages of Champ 
and Neuville, taking 4,000 prisoners and inflicting heavy 
losses on the troops of General von Etzel, who, by one 
of the curious coincidences of war, had also known Gen- 
eral Pershing during his stay in Kuroki's army. 

On the twenty-third of October General Pershing 
again watched our soldiers during a desperate assault 
against the powerful positions of Allemant and La Mal- 
maison and that same day, accompanied by General 
Franchet d'Esperey, he traversed the battle-field, hardly 
as yet entirely conquered, in order to study the immediate 
effects of our artillery fire, which, on that occasion, had 



128 The American Army in the European Conflict 

been the most precise, heavy, and efficacious of the entire 
war. 

A few days only had passed since the entry into line of 
the Twenty-sixth Division when the Forty-second also 
was pronounced sufficiently prepared to take contact with 
the enemy. Consequently, General Menoher, who was In 
command, was placed with our Seventh Corps and it was 
in the ranks of this French force, whose front extended 
from Baccarat in the Vosges to the forest of Parroy, east 
of Luneville, that the Forty-second in turn received its 
baptism of fire. 

The Americans distributed their regiments and dis- 
posed them in depth formation, back by their own ar- 
tillery, among the brigades of the Seventh Corps. 

General Menoher's headquarters were established at 
Luneville. 

The elements of this division had been recruited'among 
the National Guard belonging to twenty-six different 
States of the Union. They had already been obliged to 
interrupt their instruction several times since arriving in 
France. 

In order to decongest the rear of the Lorraine front 
where a heavy enemy offensive was expected, the Forty- 
second Division had been transported from the region of 
Vaucouleurs to that of St. Blin near Neufchateau, and 
later to that of Rolanpont not far from Langres. Never- 
theless, in spite of these interruptions in training, General 
Menoher's division proved to be nowise inferior to those 
which had preceded it. 

The trenches in the portion of the front where they 
were now engaged were sufficiently distant from those of 



Forty-Second Division 129 

the enemy to permit patrolling parties and scouting 
squads to circulate between the lines. 

Our allies profited by numerous occasions of this sort 
to carry out successful operations, and they were ex- 
tremely anxious to make some raids in force which were 
stopped by lack of munitions. 

When compelled to renounce an independent action of 
this sort they would endeavor to participate in French 
raids, and we have seen American officers up to the rank 
of colonel accompany our troops, penetrate into the enemy 
trenches among our own soldiers, and even bring back 
prisoners. 

In its turn the Forty-second Division was fiercely at- 
tacked. On the night of March 4-5th a company of the 
1 68th Regiment posted near Badonvillers was assailed by 
an enemy greatly superior in force and advancing in four 
storming parties. The preparatory bombardment had 
been particularly violent and had allowed the enemy to 
penetrate into the American lines. After a fierce hand- 
to-hand struggle where rifle, automatic pistol, bayonet, 
and even knife played a part, the enemy was forced to 
retire without having made a single prisoner. The 
American casualties were thirty-two of whom twelve were 
killed including the company commander. 

Some days later, when the i68th Regiment penetrated 
into the enemy lines, they found a paper upon one of the 
German dead acknowledging the failure of the raid of 
March 4-5th and containing the statement that the en- 
counter of that day had cost the Germans fifty men. 

General Pershing was visiting this portion of the front 
when the defenders of Badonvillers were leaving their 
trenches in the first line for a rest position. Men and 



130 The American Army in the European Conflict 

officers, although covered with mud from top to toe, thin, 
weary from loss of sleep during many nights, marched 
past their commander-in-chief with such a fine carriage 
and appearance that nothing could have given a better 
promise of what might still be expected from soldiers of 
this mettle. 

Mr. Baker, Secretary of War, with a laudable zeal and 
a complete indifference to danger which would have done 
credit to a seasoned trooper, also visited the trenches 
where the American divisions under heavy bombardment, 
were becoming expert in the use of arms. On the nine- 
teenth of March he inspected both the Forty-second and 
the First Divisions. His great desire was to be in close 
touch with the new life of the American soldier, and to 
make him feel that, after all, home was not so far away, 
to learn from his own mouth his present needs and his 
present desires. 

" Tell me what you want and I will see, when I go 
back to Washington, that you get it. Criticize what is 
faulty in organization or victualing, I am here to see 
that it may be improved," said he to the private soldier 
in the trench as well as to the battalions assembled at 
the rear. 

He neglected no opportunity of seeing all that was 
possible, when presenting himself to the French command 
in the various regions visited. He heard everywhere the 
same story: unanimous praise for the courage and vigor 
of the American troops. 

On March 20th he inspected the Second Division near 
Dieue, and would have continued further had he not been 
obliged to leave the front on account of important busi- 
ness which made his presence in London necessary. He 
was on his way to England and was consulting with Gen- 



Twenty-Sixth Division 13 1 

eral Petain at Compiegne, when, on the morning of the 
twenty-first the Germans launched their formidable attack 
against the British armies. 

Thus on the day of this offensive, the Americans had 
four divisions at their disposal; that is to say, about 
100,000 men already in the trenches who had seen active 
warfare and were in contact with the enemy. But as we 
shall see in the next chapter, the actual aid rendered by 
America during the German onslaught was not to remain 
limited to this number. 

Before entering upon a description of the fighting dur- 
ing the spring and summer of 19 18, we must not fail to 
mention here the repulse of a considerable German force 
in the southern Woevre front which could scarcely be nar- 
rated elsewhere. Though it occurred somewhat later 
than the events above described, it could hardly be classed 
among operations of such magnitude as those recounted 
in the following chapters. 

The Twenty-sixth Division which had been withdrawn 
from the Chemin des Dames on the eighteenth of March, 
was ordered to replace the First Division, when this 
latter, leaving the sector of Menil-la-Tour, north of 
Tours, was rushed to the defense of our lines then closely 
menaced by the great German attack. 

This relay was effectuated on the night of the second — 
third of April. 

The Twenty-sixth found itself stretched out as far as 
the Ailly Wood in the defensive position left by the 
Bullard division. On the twentieth of April, after an 
intense bombardment with shells of all caliber, which cut 
communication between front and rear, the 259th Ger- 
man regiment in full force, backed by two or three com- 



132 The American Army in the European Conflict 

panics of the 258th Reserves, and troops selected from 
the best shock battalions, violently assailed the Americans 
in the vicinity of Seicheprey. 

Fighting lasted all day and even into the twenty-first. 
After a fierce struggle, during which the I02d Regiment, 
the same which had endured the gas attack on the Chemin 
des Dames, bravely sustained the shock, the part of the 
village of Seicheprey that the Germans had captured was 
rapidly reconquered and the entire first line was reoccu- 
pied. 

The losses were: Killed, 2 officers 56 men; wounded, 
5 officers 140 men; missing, 5 officers 221 men. 

An immediate inspection of the ground gave a clear 
idea of the violence of the struggle. Forty-one German 
corpses together with a great quantity of equipment of all 
sorts encumbered the ground. Grenades, mortars, hel- 
mets hastily abandoned bore witness to the disorder of 
the retreat of the attacking forces, under the strong 
pressure of the counter-stroke so unexpectedly dealt by 
these new and comparatively inexperienced American 
troops. 



CHAPTER V 

PARTICIPATION OF AMERICAN FORCES IN THE SPRING 
DEFENSIVE AND IN THE SUMMER COUNTER-OFFEN- 
SIVE OF 19 1 8 

Toward the end of March, when the rapid German 
advance on Amiens and Montdidier assumed a menacing 
character, the AlHes at length agreed to entrust the future 
conduct of war operations to a single head. 

An attempt had already been made in this direction, 
but the scheme was discussed only to be abandoned after 
the Franco-British offensive of April, 19 17, when General 
Nivelle, for a certain period, commanded the large com- 
bined forces engaged in this operation. And subse- 
quently, every time a similar project for the unification 
of command was suggested, the idea met with disfavor on 
the part of the British, and found few partisans in Italy. 

Among the Americans, on the contrary, the plan met 
with unqualified approval, and they lost no opportunity 
to aid in putting it into effect. 

From the time of his arrival in France General Persh- 
ing had been a warm advocate of a unified high command 
among the Allies, and Colonel House, during one of his 
brief visits to the Continent, discreetly seconded the 
measure, and many officers who arrived with the Expedi- 
tionary Forces expressed surprise that the plan had not 
already been realized. 

Whole-hearted participation In the War Council at 
Versailles was indeed undertaken, but chiefly with the 

133 



134 The American Army in the European Conflict 

hope that the sincere effort of the American delegates 
would eventually bring about the desired end, without 
which these practical soldiers could see but a faint chance 
of victory.^ 

Great, then, was the joy expressed at Chaumont and 
In Washington when news was received on March 27th 
that the choice of a generalissimo had at last been made 
and that General Foch had been raised to the supreme 
command of the Allied forces on the Western front. ^ 

The news was hardly official when General Pershing 
hastened from his headquarters to those of General Foch 
at Clermont-sur-Oise, where a short but memorable meet- 
ing took place on the twenty-eighth of March. General 
Pershing, with a magnanimous self-effacement which must 
ever redound to his honor, placed the American forces 
under his command at the unqualified disposal of the new 
commander-in-chief of the Allied armies. 

Illustrating, as it did, the complete concurrence of our 
most recent associate in the plan for the general welfare 
of the coalition, General Pershing's action met with uni- 
versal approbation. 

This rapid and far-reaching decision was all the more 
to the American general's credit in that It was so com- 
pletely opposed to any selfish or ambitious interest. 

Up to this time the commander-in-chief had carefully 
safeguarded the autonomy of the Expeditionary Forces. 
His policy had been to develop an American army whose 

^America was represented in the Supreme War Council by General 
Tasker H. Bliss, former chief of staff of the American Army. 

2 When President Wilson learned of the unification of the Allied com- 
mand, he expressed his satisfaction in the following words: 

To General Foch: May I not convey to you my sincere congratulations 
on your new authority? Such unity of command is a most hopeful augury 
of ultimate success. We are following with profound interest the bold 
and brilliant action of your forces. WooDROW WiLSON. 



Spring Defensive 135 

unity should tend to bring out the qualities of the Ameri- 
can race to the best advantage, and, while desiring to see 
his own men profit by the hardly gained experience of 
the Allies to which end he studied eagerly the best 
strategical and tactical methods in use on the French and 
British fronts — he had jealously maintained the absolute 
integrity of the American Army. 

In view, however, of the exceptional gravity of the 
situation, so suddenly developed, General Pershing did 
not hesitate to interrupt the accomplishment of the task 
he had assigned himself nor to turn over to the supreme 
allied command all the forces then at his disposal. 

With that foresight which comes from a thorough 
psychological knowledge of his men, he recommended to 
General Foch the advisability of employing the American 
troops, as far as possible, in large units and of avoiding 
their distribution in small fractions. 

For although the method of a so-called amalgam be- 
tween French and American troops had been freely sug- 
gested as the best manner of conducting future operations, 
General Pershing wisely considered it as prejudicial to 
the best service of American troops in action. He there- 
fore suggested that no detachment, inferior In number to 
the regiment or brigade, should be incorporated in a 
French organization. It was also his wish that no step 
should be taken which might complicate the task of re- 
grouping his scattered contingents into an American Army 
at the earliest moment compatible with the exigencies of 
the situation. 

In compliance with General Pershing's desires thus 
frankly expressed, it was decided to group the American 
forces after the following system : 

Those divisions which already possessed their quota of 



136 The American Army in the European Conflict 

artillery and their own services were to go into action as 
a whole. 

Those which lacked some proportion of material, but 
which had benefited by a fair amount of training and 
seemed physically fit, were to be utilized by regiment or 
by brigade framed in with a French division. 

Those whose training was still inadequate were ordered 
to speed up preparation and carry on their instruction in 
a quiet sector of the front, thereby making large numbers 
of trained French troops, occupying such sectors, avail- 
able for action. 

To Generals Petain ^ and Pershing, acting in closest 
unison, was confided the difficult task of arranging the 
details of this complicated organization and, in con- 
formity with their first step in its execution — the First 
Division, which had been holding a quiet sector in the 
region of Toul, was relieved on April 2, 191 8, by the 
Twenty-sixth and shortly after was ordered to entrain for 
the scene of active combat. 

Since March 21st German activity had been very 
marked on the section of the front toward which the First 
Division was directed, and events of exceptional gravity 
had occurred. 

Indeed, by March 26th, the enemy had crossed the 
Somme south of Peronne, and at the end of the month 
their line more than took in Noyon, Lassigny, Mont- 
didier, Bray-sur-Somme, and Bapaume. From this im- 
portant sector the Fifth British Army had been hurled 
back by the enemy's lightning advance and practically 
annihilated. The situation appeared critical. How- 

* Although General Foch was In command of the Allied forces, ma- 
teriel dealings were directly carried on between General Petain, com- 
mander in chief of the French army, and General Pershing, commander 
in chief of the American expeditionary forces. 



Spring Defensive 137 

ever, from the twenty-third of March on, French units 
had been able to intervene and prevent further progress 
on the part of the enemy. The transportation of troops 
had been speeded up by every possible means, and it was 
hoped that a crisis had thereby been avoided. 

Our troops took over the defense of the sector up to 
the Hne of the Somme, leaving both banks of the river to 
the guard of the British armies which still remained intact. 

By the time the First American Division had detrained 
in the vicinity of Meru-Pontoise, the situation of the 
Allies was already looking more hopeful. General 
Fayolle, at the head of the group known as the " reserve 
group of armies," held the enemy in check, with the First 
French Army under General Debeney facing east on the 
line from Villers-Bretonneux to Montdidier, while the 
Third Army (General Humbert) was fronting north be- 
tween Montdidier and Noyon. 

Back of this group. General Micheler's Fifth Army- 
was placed in reserve in the zone between Beauvais, Meru, 
and Pontoise, barring the road to Paris. 

This army of General Micheler's was to serve as a 
reservoir from which General Fayolle might draw fresh 
relays of troops; it also served as a sort of training school 
for the new units assigned to it and was called upon, in 
this capacity, to prepare the First American Division for 
the new system of semi-open warfare which was being 
inaugurated at the front.^ 

To this Fifth French Army the American division was 
accordingly confided immediately after having been de- 
trained. Mention has already been made of this 

^ The Fifth Army was at the disposition of General Petain. 



138 The American Army in the European Conflict 

splendid unit, the first of the kind which America had pre- 
pared for action.* 

We have described its training at Gondrecourt and also 
its first contact with the enemy while operating in the 
Luneville sector. We have observed its stay in the 
southern Woevre, between the Bois d'Ailly and the Bois 
Mortmare at the time when it held this sector of our line 
unassisted. 

Both physically and morally, the First Division now 
appeared in perfect fighting trim; at its head was General 
Bullard, a future army commander. Most of the majors 
and captains who surrounded him were, before the end 
of the war, to be regimental commanders or hold im- 
portant positions in the General Staff. Most colonels 
in command of regiments at this time were future divi- 
sion commanders; the chief of artillery was to be at the 
head of an army corps before the lapse of many months. 

Presenting as it does so fine an example of perfect 
unity, splendid fighting spirit, and high morale, this unit, 
which produced such a number of high ranking officers, 
may be profitably studied. 

* Order of Battle of the First Division at the date of May i, 1918. 

Major-General Robert L. Bullard, Division Commander 

First Infantry Brigade Second Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Geo. B. Duncan Brigadier-General B. B. Buck 

l6th Infantry Regiment 26th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel John L. Hines Colonel Hamilton Smith 

l8tli Infantry Regiment 28th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Frank Parker Colonel Hanson E. Ely 

First Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General C. P. Summerall 

5/// Artillery Regiment 

Colonel Dwight E. Aultman 

6th Artillery Regiment 

Colonel Cortland Parker 

7/// Artillery Regiment 

Colonel L. R. Holbrook 



spring Defensive 139 

The rumor no sooner became current that a few days 
only remained for training and preparation than every 
one redoubled their efforts. The whole division worked 
feverishly, great activity was shown in picking up the 
latest " tips " which, at such a moment, always filter 
through the front lines. One and all were keen after 
the latest bits of information, centralized and spread by 
the staff of General Micheler's army, and no sooner did 
a French liaison officer appear on the horizon than he was 
beset for an account of the new warfare without trenches 
which had now begun. 

Fields, roads, and farmyards are now the scene of 
more or less important maneuvers, during which special 
care is always given to the testing and study of every 
method of signalling. 

The division realized at once the paramount Importance 
of adequate linking between artillery and infantry units 
by means of telephone, visual signalling, panels, rockets, 
flashlights, all of which were practiced. General Sum- 
merall, commanding the divisional artillery, personally 
supervised these exercises, constantly visiting the smaller 
infantry units in order to assure himself that nothing was 
left undone which might keep the infantryman thoroughly 
informed of the methods which the artillery would be 
called upon to use in battle to maintain communication 
between the two branches of the service. 

According to his ideas, every commander of a more or 
less Important artillery unit, whose mission was to sustain 
or protect the advance or retreat of the Infantry, had to 
keep In constant touch with the officer commanding the 
infantry unit involved, through a series of relaying posts 
organized according to the lay of the land, but generally 
stationed some six hundred yards apart. 



140 The American Army in the European Conflict 

These posts consisted of one officer or non-commis- 
sioned officer; several telephone operators, signallers, 
skilled repairers, runners, and even sometimes cyclists. 
Each post was provided with all the equipment necessary 
for the speedy transmission of messages. Thanks to this 
system of relays — a veritable human chain — the ar- 
tillery and infantry were effectively linked during action. 
As the first division possessed a large number of non- 
commissioned officers and men, both in artillery and in- 
fantry formations, it was easy to establish a very strong 
liaison organization, and to It both General Bullard and 
General Summerall attribute in no small measure the suc- 
cess of the First Division. 

One difficulty remained, however, by no means easy to 
overcome and which study could not remedy. This was 
the scarcity of horses. 

All the batteries were short of animals and many of 
those on hand were in poor condition. This situation 
•caused grave anxiety to the artillery commander and the 
officers of his staff. Fodder was scanty and arrived at 
Irregular intervals; an epidemic of mange, frequent under 
such circumstances, made serious Inroads, and It was Im- 
possible to invent any means of bettering the situation, 
of which the American high command was, of course, fully 
aware. 

It must suffice to remark here, that the same sense of 
patriotic duty which made it necessary and right to keep 
the American headquarters thoroughly Informed as to the 
unsatisfactory state of the artillery horses, made it equally 
natural and laudable to conceal It from the French com- 
mand. The Americans did not wish to give General 
Micheler any reason for declaring the division unready 



spring Defensive 141 

for action and postponing an entry into the fight for which 
every one was eager. 

At last, after a combined maneuver, at which General 
Pershing and the commander of the Fifth Army were 
both present, the First American Division was declared 
" ready and fit for action." Marching orders were 
issued on April i6th, and the following day, after having 
been thrilled by a stirring address from the commander- 
in-chief the division set forth upon the road to join the 
Sixth French Corps. ^ 

In the meanwhile, and somewhat to the disappoint- 
ment of the eager American troops, the news from the 
front was steadily becoming more and more reassuring. 
The enemy's line now seemed almost stabilized, with the 
exception of the front toward Hangard-en-Santerre and 
Villers-Bretonneux where these villages were still chang- 
ing hands, but the Intensity of the fighting was decreasing 
as it approached Montdidier. 

It seems due to his American comrades that one of the 
writers of these pages should here recount some of the 
negotiations with which he was, at this time, entrusted. 

As the American troops were nearing the sector of 
Mesnil-St. Firmin they became aware that they were be- 
ing sent to a comparatively quiet portion of the front held 
by the First Army. At once several American ofiScers 
came to beg their French comrade to use all his Influence 
with the French military authorities, in order to obtain a 
change of orders which would direct the division into the 
vicinity of Hangard-en-Santerre which was still the scene 
of desperate fighting. 

5 The Sixth Army Corps was relieved a few days later by the Tenth. 
Thus General Vandenberg had control of the operations in this sector 
during the American operations which are here examined. 



142 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The sector which General Debeney had assigned to 
the American troops (Villers Tournelle-Mesnil St. 
George near Montdidler) was, on the contrary, if not 
altogether quiet, at least apparently stabilized, and the 
front confided to the division did not exceed three miles 
in length. 

The enemy had ceased his infantry attacks, but con- 
tinued to use his powerful artillery in a prolonged, harass- 
ing fire or in violent concentrations upon certain points. 
He seemed determined, while resigned to making no 
further advance, to hold every inch of ground in his pos- 
session, especially the heights of Cantigny, dominating the 
valley of the Avre which he had crossed. From those 
heights he enjoyed a commanding position, and one which 
gave him every advantage for concealing the movements 
of his troops. 

The mission entrusted to the First Division was not, 
however, a strictly passive one. General Bullard's men, 
while organizing the sector for a strong defense, had 
orders to assume a semi-aggressive attitude which might 
make their presence felt and to prepare for an offensive 
action should orders for attack be issued. We are fully 
justified In declaring here that the First Division acquitted 
itself admirably of this dual role. 

Hardly had the troops deployed on the ground allotted 
to them than the men began vigorously to " dig them- 
selves In." One brigade occupied the first positions, the 
other was held In reserve. Three lines of trenches with 
communications were at once established, battery em- 
placements were prepared, others perfected, advantage 
being taken of every hollow of the ground. 

The artillery lost no time In assuming an aggressive 
attitude. General Summerall's brigade, reenforced by a 



spring Defensive 1 43 

regiment of French 75's, fired not only all the shells 
allotted to it by the American command, but also all the 
ammunition which they could obtain, " due to exceptional 
circumstances," from the French ai^thorities. 

The opposing batteries immediately came to grips. 
Concentrative and destructiv^e fire thundered with equal 
violence from both sides. But gas shells were employed 
with a frequency which we unfortunately were unable to 
rival, as the Germans, at that time, disposed of ample 
supplies of yperite. 

Toward May 15th, the American gunners began to 
secure a distinct advantage, and the hour when the in- 
fantry was to have Its turn was not now far distant. 

General Bullard had received orders to storm the im- 
portant position of Cantigny, as the capture of this for- 
tified village would wrest from the enemy a dominating 
point of vantage, and. If successfully carried out, would 
even endanger his line on the left bank of the Avre. At 
the same time, it would provide the Americans with ad- 
vantages for observation into the deep valley of this river 
which runs winding from Montdldier to the vicinity of 
Amiens. 

The plan of attack, as conceived by the division com- 
mander and elaborated by his youthful staff, was sub- 
mitted to the French high command, and it may readily 
be inferred that the pupils here proved equal to the 
masters, for no changes In the original plan were sug- 
gested. And It now remained only to carry out the first 
attack with limited objectives to be undertaken by Ameri- 
can troops on our front. 

General Pershing appeared on the eve of battle to in- 
vestigate the operation plans and await the result of this 
first experiment. 



144 The American Army in the European Conflict 

On the twenty-eighth of May, shortly after daybreak, 
following a powerful artillery preparation brief and well 
directed, the rolling barrage began to thunder, sweeping 
the ground in front of the advancing waves of Infantry, 
and striking progressively further and further as the foot 
soldier pushed forward. 

Some French tanks, mingled with the assaulting troops, 
skilfully aided in their progress. In short, the attack, 
carried through absolutely according to schedule, was a 
complete success with all objectives reached. 

The spectacle, as witnessed from the advanced artillery 
observatories, was of Impressive grandeur; nor could 
there be any doubt as to the conclusion which must in- 
evitably be drawn by those who were there to see It. 

The American army had brought into the field not 
numbers only, but real technical value and tactical skill. 
It was easy to deduce from this experience that American 
infantry was more fitted for an attack carried out in 
depth than for one with limited objectives. The regi- 
ment which took Cantlgny held the position with diffi- 
culty, being subjected to a heavy bombardment entailing 
pretty severe losses. The net results of the day were, 
however, greatly in excess of the most sanguine expecta- 
tion. Three hundred prisoners were counted. 

The enemy, infuriated at finding his forces hurled from 
an Important position by young and hitherto Inexperienced 
troops, resolved to regain his lost ground, and at once 
ordered a powerful counter-attack. The two columns 
which were charged with this enterprise were caught 
under the withering fire of the Franco-American guns, 
and practically annihilated. 

The little village of Mesnil-St. Firmin, divisional head- 
quarters, was for a few days the scene of extraordinary 



spring Defensive 145 

animation. Not only was General Pershing present to 
extend his congratulations to the troops, but all the com- 
manders of neighboring French divisions and army corps 
also added their fehcitations. Hardly had those who 
were stationed in close proximity arrived upon the scene, 
than the French commander-in-chief made his appearance, 
followed by the Premier, M. Clemenceau, both eager to 
assure their American associates of the profound admira- 
tion which such a success had inspired throughout the 
land.^ 

The conquered position was immediately consolidated; 
but, as is customary after an affair of this sort, the enemy 
guns hammered for several days against the ground re- 
cently occupied. Then after a slight let-up in the bom- 
bardment, the sector once more assumed the normal calm 
of a stabilized front. 

On June 5th, however, there was such a strong re- 
crudescence of activity upon the German side that It led 
to the belief that a fresh and powerful offensive was about 
to be launched against our lines. 

The losses to which the First Division was subjected 
during the Cantigny affair comprised 45 officers, of whom 
13 were killed and 1,022 men, of whom 185 were killed. '^ 

* The Twenty-eighth Regiment of the First Division was mentioned in 
the following terms in the orders of the French Army after the battle of 
Cantigny: 

" This regiment is animated by a magnificent aggressive spirit. On the 
twenty-eighth of May it attacked under the orders of Colonel H. E. Ely 
with irresistible dash a strongly fortified position, reached all objectives, 
and held all the ground gained." 

^ The average daily losses in this sector were twenty-five men, which 
losses may be considered inevitable, considering the necessity of the 
defensive organization which had to be created under the enemy's guns. 
During these days given up to digging entrenchments, the troops displayed 
qualities of zeal and courage which are beyond praise. 

One colonel whose post of command had been subjected to continuous 
bombardment refused to quit his position which he maintained during 



146 The American Army in the European Conflict 

General Bullard's division continued to occupy the 
Mesnil-St. Firmin sector, which they hastened to improve 
from the defensive standpoint, and which later extended 
as far as Grivesne. The officers were now anxious to 
give their men a well-deserved rest and to give the benefit 
of their experience to their troops upon the training 
ground and thus prepare them for future and more im- 
portant attacks. 

There seemed every reason to believe that the First 
Division would be speedily relieved, especially as the 
Second had now recently arrived in the immediate neigh- 
borhood, and was expected soon to replace the sister unit. 

Transferred on May 8th from the Eparges-Spada 
front, this unit had entrained near Bar-le-Duc and had 
been transported to billets near Chaumont-en-Vexin, in 
order to perfect its training. 

Like its fellow, the Second Division now passed into 
the ranks of the Fifth Army, where it at once produced a 
like excellent impression. 

Although it perhaps lacked a little of the cohesion of 
its predecessor, General Micheler, in watching the 
maneuvers, was perhaps even more struck by the fighting 
spirit of General Bundy's men and their aptitude for 
aggressive action.^ 

The division commander, whom we shall find later on 

fifteen days under a rain of shells of all calibers as well as gas bom- 
bardment. During this period his lieutenant-colonel was killed. 
" Order of Battle of the Second Division at the date of June i, 1918. 
Major-General Omar Bundy, Division Commander 
Third Infantry Brigade Fourth Infantry Brigade, Marines 

Brigadier-General E. M. Lewis Brigadier-General J. G. Harbord 

gth Infantry Regiment Sth Regiment, Marines 

Colonel Leroy Upton Colonel A. Catlin 



Spring Defensive 147 

at the head of an army corps, was justly proud of his two 
infantry brigades. 

One of them (the Fourth) was already famous in 
America as the " Marines." It was made up of the 5th 
and 6th regiments forming the Fourth Brigade, and may 
be compared to our French Colonial infantry. These 
picked troops were under the command of General Har- 
bord, recently chief of staff to General Pershing, whose 
name will frequently recur in these pages not only as a 
first-rate leader of men in the field but also as an able and 
expert organizer. 

The other brigade (the Third) under General Lewis, 
whom we shall find at the close of hostilities in command 
of a division. Included the 9th and 23d regiments of 
regulars. Admirable in their " tenue " it was easy to see 
that these men were eager to rival the famous marines. 

The artillery brigade, whose equipment was now 
complete and which also had the good luck to possess 
horses in fair condition, was commanded by General 
Chamberlaine, later head of the Railway Artillery 
Reserve. 

Thus constituted, the Second Division was marching by 
road to join the First French Army, when, on the night of 
May 29-30th it suddenly received order to deflect from 
its course and to proceed rapidly toward Lizy-sur-Ourcq. 

23d Infantry Regiment 6th Regiment, Marines 

Colonel Paul B. Malone Colonel W. C. Neville 

Second Artillery Brigade 

' Brigadier-General W. Chamberlaine 

I2t/i Artillery Regiment 

Colonel M. McCIoskey 

ISt/i Artillery Regiment 

Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Davis 

lyth Artillery Regiment 

Colonel A. J. Bowley 



148 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The infantry was to be moved by trucks, the artillery by 
rail. 

General Bundy ordered his brigade commanders to re- 
port at Meaux where they would receive further Instruc- 
tions. 

Grave and unforeseen events had Indeed taken place, 
and the Second Division together with other French units 
were suddenly called upon to face a new Invasion. 

On the morning of May 26th, the English and French 
divisions in line on the Chemln-des-Dames had been un- 
expectedly attacked and thrown back. 

The retreat of our Sixth Army and the rapid advance 
of General Von Boehm's Seventh Army operating In the 
vicinity of Solssons, and General Von Below's First 
Army, the left wing of which extended almost to Rhelms, 
placed our lines In serious peril. 

The towns of Solssons, Fere-en-TardenoIs, and the vil- 
lages on the Marne from Chatillon to Chateau-Thierry, 
successively fell into the enemy's hands. A front of 
thirty-five miles, extending from the last-named locality to 
the neighborhood of Fontenoy-sur-AIsne, was thus con- 
stituted facing the French capital. This moving front 
once more menaced Paris, distant some fifty miles only, 
and which was daily subjected to long-range artillery fire 
and nightly to frequent air raids. General Mangln's 
Tenth Army faced the northern part of this line; the 
French Sixth Army the southern section. 

Such were the circumstances under which the Second 
American Division was called upon to deploy along the 
northern bank of the Marne, astride of the main Parls- 
Metz highroad and given the honor (this expression 
figures In the American daily report of operations) of 
barring the enemy's access to the capital. 



Spring Defensive 149 

If the troops of General BuUard had been, as we have 
seen, the first great American unit to inaugurate the war 
of semi-movement, those of General Bundy were about to 
inaugurate genuine open warfare. No trench was dug on 
the terrain of their future exploits. 

At Meaux, General Bundy's brigade commanders re- 
ceived new instructions, but under the circumstances 
which prevailed, these were necessarily modified more 
than once. In the streets, great disorder reigned. A 
heavy aerial bombardment had taken place the night be- 
fore. The roads leading to the town were encumbered 
with the retreating and advancing troops. Convoys of 
peasants, seeking refuge from the invading hordes, 
blocked the ways. In fact to the uninstructed and non- 
military observer, we seemed to be again facing the con- 
ditions which had been witnessed before the first battle 
of the Marne. 

When we consider the enormous difficulties with which 
General Bundy's troops were confronted, the uncertainty 
of debarkation at the designated points, multiplicity of 
counter-orders, all the troubles inherent to the relief of 
forces who speak different languages and the ignorance 
prevailing in regard to the enemy's exact whereabouts, we 
may be astonished at the comparative order with which 
the Second Division was deployed and made ready for 
action. 

The troops were at first held in reserve behind the 
French Forty-third Division, but on the second of June 
they went through and took contact with the enemy upon 
a wide front of some seven miles. One regiment (the 
Twenty-third) belonging to the Third Brigade and about 
two battalions of the marines had been detailed to fill a 
gap in the French line near Coulombs. But on the fourth 



150 The American Army in the European Conflict 

of June these units were reassigned to the American divi- 
sion which, at that time, occupied a front not exceeding 
five miles in length.^ 

During these first sanguinary engagements, the fighting 
toolc the form of infantry skirmishes, while the artillery 
sought its positions and stored its ammunition. The 
American troops at once gained the upper hand, and, 
thanks to the accuracy of their rifle fire and to their 
superiority in attacking with the bayonet, they bent back 
the German line, taking Bouresches, but leaving the 
enemy in possession of the environs of Vaux, Bouresches 
railway station, Belleau Wood, and Hill 126, south of 
Torcy. 

The two American brigades found themselves in close 
proximity. General Harbord with his post of command 
at the Ferme des Loges, held a two-mile front north of the 
Paris-Metz road; General Lewis, with his post of com- 
mand at Domptin held the portion of the line extending 
from this highroad to Hill 204, the latter not included. 
The infantry regiments were, generally speaking, disposed 
in depth; usually one battalion was in line, one in reserve, 
while the third formed part of the " divisional reserve." 

General Chamberlaine's artillery had been reenforced 
by two regiments of French 75's and one group of 155's. 

Such was the situation when General Bundv, whose post 
of command had been transferred from Montreuil-aux- 
Lions to the Genevrois Farm, began, under the orders of 
the Twenty-first Army Corps a methodical attack aiming 
at the capture of several fortified positions. 

9 When the Second Division arrived this sector was already occupied 
by the Twenty-first Army Corps under General Degoutte and belonged 
to the Sixth Army with headquarters at Trilport. On June 15th, General 
Degoutte took over the Sixth Army and General Naulin was charged with 
the command of the Twenty-first Corps, which was replaced on June 21st 
by the Third Corps under General Lebrun. 



spring Defensive 151 

The first of these objectives was the Belleau Wood, 
which presented a vast mass nearly rectangular in shape, 
and apparently thickly planted everywhere with lofty 
trees. The border of the forest facing the Americans 
extended for about 1,100 yards, concealing behind its 
thick screen of foliage many clearings and hollows over- 
grown with brush and underwood; scattered among these 
thickets were to be found large rocks and bowlders which 
offered veritable strongholds on which the enemy had 
mounted machine guns and under which he had installed 
shell-proof retreats in the form of natural caves and 
grottoes. 

The Germans had taken advantage of the natural 
strength of this position and had organized it artificially 
with method and rapidity. Nevertheless, on the morning 
of June loth, the Second Division, after bombarding the 
whole of Belleau Wood, carried a portion of it by assault. 

In the course of the artillery preparation and during 
the infantry advance. General Chamberlaine's guns fired 
40,000 rounds, of which 12,000 were large-caliber shells, 
so that, when the American troops succeeded in gaining 
a footing in an important section of the wood, a large 
number of German dead were found, and 100 prisoners, 
together with many machine guns, were captured. A 
very successful day. On the eleventh the central part of 
the wood was taken, together with 400 prisoners and 37 
machine guns. 

The enemy at once attempted to repair the breach 
made in their line by launching two strong counter-attacks 
on the twelfth and on the fifteenth. 

It is very likely, also, that offensive actions were at- 
tempted by the Germans on the fourteenth and nineteenth, 
but on these two occasions the assaulting waves were not 



152 The American Army in the European Conflict 

actually seen by us, so that the enemy's Intentions can be 
only guessed at. Many movements were observed, both 
on his first and second line, and some aggressive action 
was manifestly contemplated. After violent artillery fire 
from both sides the original lines remained unchanged. 

At any rate, from the nineteenth of June the Germans 
seemed to have renounced any intention of retaking 
Belleau Wood and contented themselves with reenforcing 
the troops who still held the northern part of the position. 

On the morning of the twenty-first, the marines under- 
took to mop up this corner. Confident in their unsup- 
ported strength and individual courage they attempted to 
storm this stronghold without any serious prepara- 
tory bombardment. But they had underestimated the 
strength of the enemy's defenses and they failed. On 
the twenty-fifth the operation was resumed with other 
methods. 

The infantry was withdrawn for some distance, thus 
permitting the artillery to sweep with its fire the enemy 
first line. The result was a complete success; the narrow 
strip of woodland which constituted the Germans' last 
defense In Belleau Wood was captured In fine style to- 
gether with 309 prisoners. American casualties were 
slight.^o 

10 The marine brigade was mentioned in the orders of the Sixth Army 
in the following terms: 

Fourth Brigade Infantry (Marines). 

Thrown into a battle already in progress, and on a front which was 
being violently attacked by the enemy, at once proved itself to be a unit 
of the very highest class. No sooner entered into line than the brigade 
in conjunction with the French troops checked a fierce assault upon an 
important section of our position and at once began a series of offensive 
operations, in the course of which, thanks to the brilliant courage and 
dash, the vigor and tenacity of its men who were discouraged neither by 
fatigue nor losses, thanks to the energy of all its officers, and thanks 
especially to the personal action of Brigade Commander General James G. 



spring Defensive 153 

In the course of these operations, General Harbord's 
brigade had taken many prisoners and given the foe a 
high opinion of the fighting quahty of the American 
troops. This fact was confirmed by frequent conversa- 
tions with German captives, who had had disagreeable 
personal experience of the vigorous methods of the Ameri- 
can soldier in action and who appeared much impressed 
by his work. Chance also placed in our hands a German 
army bulletin containing an interesting report upon the 
quality of the Second American Division of which the fol- 
lowing is a translation: 

" The Second American Division must be considered a very 
good one and may even perhaps be reckoned as a storm troop. 
The different attacks on Belleau Wood v\^ere carried out w^ith 
bravery and dash. The moral effect of our gunfire can not seri- 
ously impede the advance of the American infantry. The Ameri- 
cans' nerves are not yet worn out. 

" The qualities of the men individually may be described as 
remarkable. They are physically well set up, their attitude is 
good, and they range in age from eighteen to twenty-eight years. 
They lack at present only training and experience to make for- 
midable adversaries. The men are in fine spirits and are filled 
with naive assurance ; the words of a prisoner are characteristic — 

' WE KILL OR WE GET KILLED.' " 

The marines had hardly completed their conquest ^^ 
when General Lewis' staff began to work out a plan for 

Harbord, every effort was crowned with success. In close touch with one 

another both regiments with their machine-gun battalion realized during 

ten days of incessant fighting (from the second to the thirteenth of 

June, 1918) over extremely difficult ground, an advance varying from 

1,500 to 2,000 meters on a four kilometer front, capturing important 

material, taking over 500 prisoners, inflicting severe losses upon the 

enemy, and seizing two strongholds of paramount importance: the village 

of Bouresches, and the strongly fortified position of Belleau Wood. 

11 Sixth Army. General orders. tr j .. t „ o 

■' Headquarters, June 30, 1918. 

In consequence of the brilliant conduct of the Fourth Brigade of the 



154 The American Army in the European Conflict 

the capture of Vaux Village. It may be considered as a 
model of its kind. 

It was not possible to carry out this operation before 
July 1st as it necessitated the shifting from left to right of 
the battle-field of an entire artillery regiment. But, at 
this date, the village was easily carried. 

The preparatory bombardment was formidable, the 
advancing lines of infantry followed the rolling barrage 
at a distance of less than a hundred and fifty yards. Six 
hundred prisoners were taken, and the losses were quite 
insignificant when compared with the results achieved. ^- 

Up to the tenth of July, on which day it was relieved by 
the Twenty-sixth Division ^^ arriving from the Woevre 

Second Division, U. S., in the taking of Bouresches and the important 
stronghold of Belleau Wood, hotly contested by the enemy in force, the 
general in command of the Sixth Army has decided that henceforth official 
documents concerning this action shall replace the name of Belleau Wood 
by that of Wood of the Marine Brigade. 

^- Following the capture of Vaux village, the Third Brigade was cited 
in general orders of the Sixth Army as follows: 

" During the operations north of the Marne between June i and July 2, 
1918, this brigade, stimulated by the energy of its commander. General 
Lewis, and brilliantly led by its officers, careless of the heavy losses 
sustained, advanced valiantly and carried Vaux in a fierce hand-to-hand 
combat, also the Wood of La Roche, giving a splendid sample of aggres- 
sive spirit, abnegation and contributing in no small measure to the victory 
which caused the enemy to evacuate French territory and eventually 
constrained him to ask for an armistice." 

13 Order of Battle of the Twenty-sixth Division at the date of July 
10, 1918. 

Major-General Clarence R. Edwards, Divisional Commander 
Fifty-first Infantry Brigade Fifty-second Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Peter E. Traub Brigadier-General Chas. H. Cole 
loist Infantry Regiment 103d Infantry Regiment 

Colonel E. L. Logan Colonel Frank M. Hume 

I02d Infantry Regiment 104th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel J. H. Parker Colonel Geo. H. Shelton 

Fifty-first Artillery Brigade 
Brigadier-General D. E. Aultman 



spring Defensive 155 

front, the Second Division had been engaged for over a 
month in ceaseless lighting; 8,500 sick and wounded had 
been sent to the rear during this time and 1,250 dead had 
been left on the field. Its mission was more than ful- 
filled; the enemy's advance had been stopped and the 
maintenance of his positions seriously menaced by the 
taking of Vaux, and Bouresches and the Belleau Wood 
where 1,400 prisoners had been captured. The casual- 
ties of the enemy were large and distributed among five 
divisions, which in their entirety or in detachments had 
been successively opposed to the Second Division. 

An American journal of operations now before us esti- 
mates that the commencement of the German withdrawal 
on July 1 8th was a direct consequence of the action above 
described. There is excellent reason to sustain this 
opinion. 

Dating from July 4th at noon, the Second Division was 
transferred to American command. The First Army 
Corps (General Liggett) with his headquarters at 
Chateau de Lagny, then reheved the Third French Army 
Corps. 

This First American Army Corps ^^ created by general 

loist Artillery Regiment 
Colonel J. H. Sherburne 
I02d Artillery Regiment 
Colonel Morris E. Locke 
losd Artillery Regiment 
Colonel P. D. Glassford 
1* Order of Battle of the First Army Corps (American) at date of 
July 4, 1918. 

Major-General Hunter Liggett, Corps Commander 

Colonel Malin Craig Chief of Staff 

Major George Grunert Chief of the First Section (G-i) 

Lt.-Col. R. H. VV^illiams Chief of the Second Section (G-2) 

Colonel A. E. Barber Chief of the Third Section (G-3) 



156 The American Army in the European Conflict 

orders dated January 15, 1918, had, up to that time, been 
operating at Neufchateau with administrative control 
over the First, Second, Twenty-sixth, and Forty-second 
Divisions while these units.were stationed in the respective 
sectors that have already been described. 

The First Corps was now to administer the First, 
Second, Third, Fourth, Twenty-sixth, and Twenty-eighth 
Divisions. When General Liggett took over the tactical 
command of the front held by the Second American and 
the One Hundred and Sixty-seventh French Divisions, the 
artillery of the First American Corps under General 
Lassiter relieved the artillery of the French Third Corps. 

American participation in the defensive battle of June, 
191 8, was not, however, confined to the First and Second 
Divisions. 

The Third Division also (General Dickman) ^^ was 
hurriedly thrown into the melee and afforded powerful 
assistance. 

This unit was completing its training in the Chateau- 

15 Order of the Third Division at date of May 31, 1918. 

Major-General Joseph T. Dickman, Divisional Commander 
Fifth Infantry Brigade Sixth Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Fred W. Sladen Brigadier-General C. Crawford 
4th Infantry Regiment 30th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Halstead Dorey Colonel Edmund L. Butts 

yth Infantry Regiment 38th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel T. M. Anderson Colonel Ulysses G. McAlexander 

Third Artillery Brigade 
Colonel Wm. M. Cruikshank 
loth Artillery Regiment 
Colonel Chas. Rees Lloyd 
l8th Artillery Regiment 
Colonel Otho W. B. Farr 
y6th Artillery Regiment 
Colonel W. C. Rivers 



spring Defensive 157 

villain area (near Bar-sur-Aube) when orders arrived 
to relieve the Twenty-sixth American Division in the 
southern Woevre sector. Preparations to this effect were 
well under way when new orders were received transfer- 
ring it to the disposal of the French high command. 

In conformity with these new instructions, the division 
began to move on May 31st. The infantry entrained for 
Provins-Montmirail; while those elements which were 
provided with motor trucks were directed toward Conde- 
en-Brie by road. The division was as yet without its en- 
gineer regiment, nor was the artillery to be available for 
another month. 

Hardly had General Dickman's troops detrained, when 
the division was assigned to the group of armies of the 
Center. Thence it passed under the command of the 
Sixth Army which, in turn, ordered the Third Division to 
reenforce the Thirty-eighth French Army Corps whose 
front extended from Chateau-Thierry to Dormans. 

The first detachment of the Third Division to go into 
action was the motorized seventh machine-gun battalion. 
Without making any halt at Conde, as it was supposed to 
do, the battalion pushed on directly to Chateau-Thierry 
where it arrived on the evening of May 31st. 

The following morning, mixed with General Mar- 
chand's troops, it gave signal service in repulsing an 
enemy attack delivered in the town of Chateau-Thierry, 
by keeping the vicinity of the bridge over the Marne under 
constant fire, and effectually preventing the passage of the 
river at this point. 

The Fifth and Sixth Infantry Brigades which composed 
this division went into action successively, generally 
battalion by battalion. Posted above Chateau-Thierry, 
the troops facing the enemy dug themselves In and pre- 



158 The American Army in the European Conflict 

pared to hold the ground obstinately. Those posted 
downstream were placed in the second line guarding the 
passage over the different bridges. 

Thus the division after June ist was split up. But the 
separate units were extremely active, and all gave an 
excellent account of themselves in hardy scouting, daring 
patrol duty, and audacious minor operations, as well as 
by their vigor in trench construction while occupying the 
second lines. 

The 7th Infantry Regiment, for example, after holding 
part of the front assigned to the Thirty-eighth Corps, was 
transferred to the One Hundred and Sixty-fourth Division 
to guard the bridge near Nanteuil. Thence it passed 
under the orders of General Bundy, who made use of it 
to relieve, for a few days, one of the regiments of marines 
which had been In action at Belleau Wood. 

The 30th Infantry Regiment shared with the Tenth 
French Colonial Division, in the attack on Hill 204 west 
of Chateau-Thierry. Nor did the division commander 
remain inactive. General DIckman was placed by Gen- 
eral de Mondeslr at the head of a reserve which the com- 
mander of the Thirty-eighth Corps had organized behind 
the lines. He later took command of the American 
troops grouped in the center of the Thirty-eighth Corps, 
between Hezy and Chlerry. This detachment had, at 
this moment, the strength of a full brigade, spread out on 
a front of five miles and afterward it became important, 
serving, as it did, for a nucleus around which the Third 
Division was regrouped after having lost. In the course 
of these operations near the Marne, 34 officers and 822 
men killed or wounded. 

In describing the role played by the First Division in 
the Cantlgny sector, we have attempted to Indicate the 



Summer Counter-Offensive 159 

part taken by the Americans in those operations which 
finally checked the first German drive of the spring of 19 18. 
In recording the actions of the Second and Third Divi- 
sions in the Bois-de-Belleau sector and along the Marne 
we have shown the assistance given by the American 
Expeditionary Forces to the allied cause in the affairs 
which finally brought the enemy's second offensive to a 
standstill. It now remains to examine in what manner 
the American troops took part in the counter-offensive 
which compelled the enemy, for a second time, to abandon 
the banks of the Marne. 

The general plan of the battle is well known. It con- 
sisted for us in an obstinate resistance along the front held 
by the fourth and fifth French armies (from the Argonne 
to Chateau-Thierry on the Marne) during the German 
attack. Once the enemy forces were sufficiently engaged, 
we were ourselves to assume the offensive, and with the 
Tenth and Sixth Armies break through the German right 
flank. 

The Forty-second and Third American Divisions, with 
several units of the Twenty-eighth, took part in the 
strictly defensive action of July 15th. 

The First, Second, Fourth, and Twenty-sixth Divisions 
were part of the forces engaged on July i8th when the 
attack was launched and afterwards cooperated in the 
exploitation of the victory. 

The Third, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, Forty- 
second, and Seventy-seventh Divisions came into line in 
the course of the fight. 

On the fifteenth of July, when the enemy started their 
general attack from the Argonne to the Marne, precisely 
within those limits where the French command expected 



i6o The American Army in the European Conflict 

them to strike, the American troops were disposed as 
follows: 

The Forty-second Division ^^ in the region near 
Suippes was placed in support of the One Hundred and 
Seventieth and Thirteenth French Divisions. The de- 
fensive system of this Champagne sector included a first 
position which was not to be occupied in force, the de- 
fenders being authorized at certain points to withdraw 
should the enemy's pressure become intense; an inter- 
mediate position, where energetic resistance must be of- 
fered, and a third, which must be held at all costs. The 
artillery, under cover of this third line, reenforced the 
batteries of the two French divisions which, at the start, 
were placed in the first -and Intermediate positions while 
the American division held the third position with its two 
brigades in line (the Eighty-third on the right behind the 
French One Hundred and Seventieth Division, the 
Eighty-fourth Brigade on the left behind the Thirteenth 
French Division) . 

16 Order of Battle of the Forty-second Division on July lo, 1918. 
Major-General Chas. T. Menoher, Division Commander 
Eighty-third Infantry Brigade Eighty-fourth Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General M. J. Lenihan Brigadier-General R. A. Brown 
165th Infantry Regiment l6ph Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Frank McCoy Colonel Wm. P. Screws 

l66th Infantry Regiment l68th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Benson W. Hough Colonel E. R. Bennet 

Sixty-seventh Artillery Brigade 
Brigadier-General C. McKinstry 

I^Qth Artillery Regiment 
Colonel Henry J. Reilly 
iSOth Artillery Regiment 
Colonel R. H. Tyndall 
J 51st Artillery Regiment 
Colonel George E. Leach 



Summer Counter-Offensive i6i 

These dispositions, made when the Forty-second Divi- 
sion entered the line on July 5th were altered subsequently 
because of the German attack having been delayed longer 
than was expected. Three American battalions were 
transferred to the intermediate position; and thus posted, 
the Forty-second Division, on July 15th, met the German 
onslaught. 

Meanwhile on the Marne the Third Division, now en- 
tirely reassembled, and in possession of its own artillery 
reenforced by two battalions of French 75's, two of 105's, 
and one of 155's was stretched along the Marne from 
Jaulgonne to the immediate vicinity of Chateau-Thierry 
(from Mezey to Nesles inclusive). 

The four regiments of the division were ranged, fol- 
lowing their line from right to left, thus : the Thirty- 
eighth, Thirtieth, Seventh, and Fourth. Each one had 
detached a battalion to constitute a reserve for the divi- 
sion and also for the corps reserve of the Thirty-eighth 
French Army Corps to which the American division was 
still assigned. 

General Dickman, whose post of command was at the 
Chateau de la Doultre, had placed his troops in depth 
formation on two positions of which we need only examine 
the one nearest the enemy. It consisted of numerous 
trench elements in front of which individual holes for 
snipers had been dug. 

His right covered by our One Hundred and Twenty- 
fifth Division, his left by our Thirty-ninth Division, Gen- 
eral Dickman was in readiness to prevent the enemy at 
all costs from crossing the Marne. Eastward, and on 
the southern bank of the river, there still remained some 



1 6*2 The American Army in the European Conflict 

American detachments from the Twenty-eighth Divi- 
sion. ^'^ 

This latter had been spHt up since its arrival from the 
British front; when it detrained in the region of Gonesse 
one brigade was assigned to the Thirty-ninth French Divi- 
sion, the other to the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth. 
General Muir remained with his staff near the commander 
of the Thirty-ninth French Division. His Fifty-fifth 
Brigade was mingled with the One Hundred and Twenty- 
fifth Division during the attack of July 15th, four Ameri- 
can companies being placed in the front line with French 
troops. The remainder were engaged in organizing and 
holding a second position. 

Such were the conditions under which the American 
troops withstood the shock on July 15th. 

General Petain came to personally inspect the front on 
which an assault was expected and during the course of 
his visit he particularly dwelt on the advantage of dispos- 
ing the troops — artillery as well as infantry — in depth. 

^^ Order of Battle of the Twenty-eighth Division at the date of 
August I, 1918. 

Major-General Charles H. Muir, Division Commander 

Fifty-fifth Infantry Brigade Fifty-sixth Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General T. W. Darrah Brigadier-General Wm. Weigel 
109th Infantry Regiment llith Infantry Regiment 

Colonel M. D. Brown Colonel Ed. C. Shannon 

Iioth Infantry Regiment Ii2th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel George M. Kemp Colonel Geo. C. Richards 

Fifty-third Artillery Brigade 
Brigadier-General Wm. G. Price 
lo^th Artillery Regiment 
Lieutenant-Colonel A. V. Crookston 
Jo8th Artillery Regiment 
Lieutenant-Colojiel E. St John Greble, Jr. 
109th Artillery Regiment 
Colonel Asher Miner 





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Summer Counter-Off ensive 163 

He recommended also that the combatants should 
take up their eventual fighting positions before the 
beginning of the attack. " No maneuvering under fire " 
said he more than once while discussing the plan with the 
generals in command of the army groups, armies, and 
army corps assembled to meet him. 

At the front occupied by the Forty-second Division the 
enemy succeeded in reaching the intermediate position 
only toward 7 A. M. The three American battalions re- 
pulsed a succession of attacks, one battalion of the One 
Hundred and Sixty-sixth as many as seven. Two com- 
panies of the One Hundred and Sixty-seventh joined with 
two French companies in a brilliant counter-attack on two 
centers of resistance in the intermediate position which 
had temporarily fallen into the enemy hands, but which 
was recaptured. On the whole line the Germans were 
driven back to the first positions upon which the artillery 
at once directed a violent fire. 

By 1 1 130 A. M. the Eighty-third Brigade threw for- 
ward another battalion on the intermediate position in 
reenforcement of the One Hundred and Seventieth Divi- 
sion, and the Eighty-fourth Brigade, in turn, detached 
two companies from the i68th Regiment in support of 
our Thirteenth Division. 

In this glorious affair the Forty-second Division had 
engaged over five battalions and the American troops re- 
ceived the unqualified congratulations of all the French 
commanders with whom they had served. 

General Gouraud, commanding the Fourth Army, Gen- 
eral Naulin commanding the Twenty-first Corps — of 
which the Forty-second Division formed a part — were 
much struck with the brilliant behavior of the American 
troops. 



164 The American Army in the European Conflict 

As for General Menoher, who was to have taken com- 
mand of the sectors belonging to the One Hundred and 
Seventieth and Thirteenth Divisions, as well as that of 
his own, if the day had gone against us, and If the enemy 
had succeeded In forcing our troops back upon the third 
position, he did not have to set his staff to work that day 
on defensive projects but merely observed, from an ad- 
vanced post of command on the battle front, the splendid 
work of his men and contented himself afterward, with 
extending to them their due meed of praise. 

It may be Interesting to give below the opinion of one 
of our own French liaison officers who witnessed the ac- 
tion and who thus sums up his Impressions of the Ameri- 
can fighting qualities : 

" The behavior of the American troops was perfect, and elicited 
the admiration both of our officers and men ; calm under bombard- 
ment, supporting with great endurance hardships and privations, 
tenacious in defense and ardent in counter-attack, they show^ an 
evident desire for hand-to-hand combat. These qualities, which I 
have personally observed, have been commented on by all my 
comrades. 

" The American artillery behaved splendidly under fire; though 
the losses were heavy, they had fine opportunities, firing at times 
directly at such visible objectives as columns of marching infantry 
or artillery. 

" The French commanders in the artillery divisions highly 
praise the work of the gunners of the Forty-second Division, re- 
marking that the firing was prepared with care and executed with 
vigor." 

In the meantime, on the front of the Third Division, 
the enemy was subjected also to a severe defeat. 

The systems of defense utilized on the Marne were, 
however, altogether different from those employed by the 



Summer Counter-Off ensive 165 

general commanding the Fourth French Army, On the 
southern bank of the river the success of the day was 
mainly due apparently to the fire of the individual infan- 
tryman, who, posted in front-line trench elements or in 
separate holes, aimed as coolly as if each man were prac- 
ticing upon his own rifle range. The automatic pistol and 
bayonet were used in the course of certain counter-attacks 
carried out sometimes by companies, sometimes by 
platoons. 

It must be added that the artillery played an effective 
part in the fight, but this was less striking to the observers 
than was the infantry action. The guns filled the small 
ravines and larger valleys with a rain of shells so that the 
enemy was unable to concentrate any important bodies of 
men or to press forward toward the river under cover. 
At no point did he, indeed, succeed in crossing the Marne 
in force. The attempts made by him to throw bridges to 
the opposite bank were foiled by our artillery fire, his 
boats were almost everywhere stopped by the sharp- 
shooters, and where small elements were able to filter into 
our lines, they were not capable of penetrating far, be- 
cause they were not reenforced. 

On the extreme right, the 38th Infantry Regi- 
ment, in a loop of the Marne near Mezey, where the 
Surmelin Brook joins the river, made a particularly fine 
record. Attacked simultaneously on front and flanks by 
enemy troops, who were afterward found to belong to 
six different regiments, the 38th repulsed repeated 
assaults, threw the enemy back into the Marne, and 
captured 600 prisoners. The evening following this 
brilliant action a French ofl^cer who had witnessed It 
wrote as follows : 



1 66 The American Army in the European Conflict 

" The youthful soldiers of the 38th Regiment did their job 
finely, showing themselves quite equal to our own best troops. 
Having received orders to hold on at any cost they got killed only 
after having accounted for at least three times as many of the 
enemy and succeeded in maintaining the integrity of their front. 

" The rifle fire from the railroad line was directed as accurately 
as during a maneuver. A certain first sergeant of Company H 
verified the sights and pointed out the objectives. We estimate at 
over a thousand, the German bodies which remained before our 
lines. 

" The grit of the oflScers, platoon commanders especially, was 
admirable; one second lieutenant, shot through the chest, remained 
at his post all day refusing to allow himself to be relieved until 
he was wounded a second time. One company commander refused 
to propose his men for any recompense for exceptionally dis- 
tinguished service, stating that he would then have to recommend 
all, since each man had fought like a hero. To sum up: These 
soldiers, if they profit as they surely will by this experience, must 
count as first-class troops from whom their officers may require 
anything. 

" Colonel McAlexander, commanding the Thirty-eighth In- 
fantry, showed himself to be a remarkable leader, cool-headed and 
efficient. He is liked and respected by men of whom he, on his 
side, has every reason to be proud." 

In the sector adjoining General Dlckman's division the 
four companies of the Fifty-fifth Brigade who were In the 
first line had a hard fight and were compelled to fall back 
on their reserves. In this region the enemy succeeded In 
crossing the river near St. Algnan and Chapelle-Monto- 
don. Two battalions belonging to the Fifty-fifth Brigade 
(Twenty-eighth Division) counter-attacked with great 
vigor. 

On July 1 6th and the days following the enemy at- 
tempted to renew the offensive but entirely without suc- 
cess; he had been definitely checked. 

Although the American casualties were heavy they were 



Summer Counter-Off ensive 167 

more than compensated by the results achieved. On the 
evening of the fifteenth the Forty-second Division re- 
ported 1,200 wounded or gassed and 400 killed. 

America had thus contributed 50,000 men in this purely 
defensive battle which was imposed upon us by the enemy. 

Three days later, when we in turn assumed the offen- 
sive, 100,000 more Americans were to be found in line, 
and this number, already imposing, must be again doubled 
in order to justly estimate America's effort at this epoch 
of the war. 

It is indeed impossible to draw a hard line of demarca- 
tion between the attack of the eighteenth of July and the 
pursuit which was its natural consequence. We must 
therefore, while relating the part played by the Expedi- 
tionary Forces in our first counter-offensive, take into ac- 
count the share they had later in the exploitation of our 
success. Consequently, we must add to the 100,000 com- 
batants of the First, Second, Fourth, and Twenty-sixth 
Divisions who were in line on the morning when the battle 
started the 1 25,000 more belonging to the Third, Twenty- 
eighth, Thirty-second, Forty-second, and Seventy-seventh 
Divisions who came into action during the pursuit of the 
enemy to the Vesle. 

At this critical moment of the war's history America 
came forward with all her might and we may incidentally 
mention that the commander-in-chief of the Expeditionary 
Forces needed no persuasion to make him comprehend the 
urgency of the vast operations which the Allies were con- 
templatino^. But we may more thoroughly appreciate the 
responsibility which, like a true chief, he personally 
shouldered when we have made clear the Individual situa- 
tion of each division enumerated above. 



1 68 The American Army in the European Conflict 

General Pershing was always in favor of an offensive 
strategy and he was strongly of the opinion that at the 
present time a powerful counter-offensive was the only 
course open to the Allies; he had already, on the twenty- 
second of June, explained his theories to the French high 
command and the prime minister, and expressed his will- 
ingness to take his full share In the task before them. 

That his task was not an easy one may be seen as we 
rapidly pass in review the different American units at the 
date of July 17th; that is to say, on the eve of our great 
counter-offensive. 

The First Division was in good form. It had left the 
Cantigny-Grivesnes front on July 8th and was perfecting 
its training and resting in the region of Beauvals. The 
last days spent in the trenches between Amiens and Mont- 
didier had been comparatively quiet, the calm of the sector 
only being broken by an occasional exchange of artillery 
fire. General Summerall was in command of the divi- 
sion, having replaced General Bullard promoted to the 
Third Corps command. 

The Second Division, on the contrary, had been fighting 
steadily for forty days and had hardly been relieved and 
concentrated near Montreuil-aux-Lions in order to pro- 
ceed to the rear when, on the fifteenth, it received orders 
to remain in the vicinity of its former battle-ground, and 
to hold itself in readiness for a strong enemy attack. 
This could not therefore be considered a fresh division. 
Moreover it had just changed hands. General Harbord, 
the victor of Belleau Wood, having recently replaced 
General Bundy, appointed to the command of an army 
corps. 

The Third Division had sustained the fierce onslaught 



Effectives Engaged 169 

of July 15th. Although the losses had not been par- 
ticularly severe, all its units had been engaged In hard 
fighting, and one regiment, the 38th, had been badly cut 
up. The division still remained on the positions It had 
held in face of the German attacks. 

The Fourth Division had been brought down from the 
British front at the time when it had seemed advisable to 
increase the density of our troops in the region between 
Chateau-Thierry and Paris. It had been at once broken 
up and divided among the Thirty-ninth and One Hundred 
and Sixty-fourth French Divisions with the double pur- 
pose of receiving practical training and at the same time 
strengthening these French units. Its infantry had had 
but few occasions to drill, the sojourn in Flanders having 
been less than one month; Its artillery was still in the 
training camps. 

The Twenty-sixth Division was where we left it on July 
loth, in the Torcy Belleau sector, where It formed the 
right wing of the First American Corps. Its attitude, 
as we have seen, although aggressive, had not caused it 
an abnormal number of casualties, so that we may count 
General Edwards' division as being still in good fighting 
condition on July 17th. 

The Twenty-eighth Division, like the Fourth, passed 
from the British to the French front and, in greater 
degree than the latter, had suffered from hasty and nu- 
merous displacements. Up to the moment of going into 
action, the troops had not been able to become entirely 
conversant with massed evolutions. Neither before leav- 
ing America nor after arriving In Europe had there been 
much time for maneuvers or fire-practice. The troops 
who chiefly made up this unit were Pennsylvanian Na- 
tional Guards who had been employed upon the Mexican 



170 The American Army in the European Conflict 

border and this division still lacked its artillery brigade. 
Two battalions had been subjected to rather severe losses 
during the German attack of the Fifteenth, and four of 
its companies had seen hard fighting during the retire- 
ment of the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Division, 
in which they had been placed as reenforcement. 

Nevertheless the morale was good, and General Muir, 
" Uncle Charlie " as his men called him, was impatient 
to see his division once more assembled and engaged in 
action. After July 15th, the brigade which had been 
detailed with the French One Hundred and Twenty-fifth 
Division rejoined the Fifty-ninth Brigade and the Twenty- 
eighth Division was once more reconstituted. 

The Thirty-second Division was made up of National 
Guard elements from Michigan and Wisconsin, and came 
from the Alsace front, where it had been engaged in 
operating with the French Fortieth Army Corps. 

Arriving in France on the twentieth of February, the 
men had been trained for three months in camps situated 
in the Interior of the country and for the past two months 
had been enabled to complete their military instruction 
in a quiet sector. The divisional artillery joined them 
on the eighteenth of May.^* 

IS Order of Battle of the Thirty-second Division on the first of 
August, 1918. 

Major-General William G. Han, Division Commander 
Sixty-third Infantry Brigade Sixth-fourth Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General W. D. Connor Brigadier-General Ed. B. Winans 
l2Sth Infantry Regiment 127th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Wm. V. Morrow Colonel C. R. Langdon 

126th Infantry Regiment 128th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Jos. B. Westnedge Colonel Robert McCoy 

Fifty-seventh Artillery Brigade 
Brigadier-General LeRoy G. Irwin 
iiQth Artillery Regiment 
Colonel C. B. McCormick 



Effectives Engaged 171 

The Forty-second Division, which we have just seen 
resisting all the enemy attacks directed against it up to 
July 15th, was, in spite of heavy losses, in excellent con- 
dition and occupied the trenches from which it had re- 
pulsed the enemy. 

The Seventy-seventh Division had arrived In France 
on April 13th and was included with the troops which 
were sent to the British front for training. On June 
1 6th It was ordered to proceed to Rambervlllers and 
thence, four days later, was placed In the Baccarat sec- 
tor, where It was joined by the divisional artillery. Gen- 
eral Duncan had had therefore the advantage of forty 
days' trench experience to prepare his men for more 
active warfare. ^^ 

Such was the Individual condition of each American 
unit on July i8th at which date their participation in 
our counter-offensive was to begin. 

I20th Artillery Regiment 

Colonel Carl Penner 

147th Artillery Regiment 

Colonel Boyd Wales 

1^ Order of Battle of the Seventy-seventh Division at the date of 
August 19, 1918. 

Major-General George B. Duncan, Division Commander 
/5Ji/ Infantry Brigade J54th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier Gen. E. Wittenmyer Brigadier-General E. M. Johnson 
Sosth Infantry Regiment Soyth Infantry Regiment 

Colonel W. R. Smedberg, Jr. Colonel Isaac Irwin 

306th Infantry Regiment So8th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel G. Vidner Colonel N. K. Averill 

I52d Artillery Brigade 
Colonel Manus McCloskey 
304th Artillery Regiment 

Colonel R. N. Briggs 

305th Artillery Regiment 

Colonel Fred C. Doyle 

306th Artillery Regiment 

Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Smith 



172 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The general situation may be summed up as follows: 
The American command had at its disposal to begin and 
carry on the attack nine divisions. One fresh and that 
had already given an excellent account of itself in ac- 
tion : The First Division. Two very good divisions 
which had just been subjected to hard fighting: The Forty- 
second and Twenty-sixth. Two which were incomplete, 
lacking cohesion and training: The Fourth and Twenty- 
eighth. Two still suffering from hard and recent fight- 
ing: The Second and Third. Two others which had 
occupied quiet sectors but had not yet been engaged in 
active fighting: The Thirty-second and the Seventy- 
seventh. 

In order to grasp the individual part taken by each 
of these units in the great counter-offensive started on 
July 1 8th and continued well into the month of August, 
let us describe the battle-front from north to south and 
from west to east, along that semicircle where the Sixth 
and Tenth French Armies were drawn up from Fontenoy- 
sur-Aisne up to a point above Chateau-Thierry on the 
Marne. Such a method seems logical, since it will show 
us first the decisive action undertaken by the Tenth Army 
which broke through the German front, then the subordi- 
nate action of the Sixth Army, whose movements were 
regulated upon those of General Mangin's forces. 

The role of the Tenth Army was to rupture the enemy 
lines between the Aisne and the Ourcq, and to push ahead 
in the direction of Fere-en-Tardenois, while the Sixth 
Army conforming to this movement should advance its 
left wing. 

General Mangin had at his disposal the First and 
Second American Divisions, which he assigned to the 



Summer Counter-Off ensive 173 

Twentieth French Corps, whose commander, General 
Berdoulat, organized his front from left to right as fol- 
lows: The First American Division; the Moroccan Di- 
vision; the Second American Division. 

General Pershing had requested that the American 
divisions might be maintained side by side. He would 
even have preferred to group them into one purely 
American army corps, and in view of this junction he 
had ordered General Bullard to transfer his headquarters 
from Remiremont and proceed to the scene of the active 
operations which were about to begin. 

But the commander of the Third Corps ^^ was only 
able to arrive in the zone of concentration on the sixteenth 
of July and with a greatly reduced staff; furthermore, 
General Pershing's desire could not be carried out on 
account of the rapidity of events. General Bullard 
therefore acted as assistant to General Berdoulat and 
was placed in administrative control of the First and 
Second American Divisions. 

It was on the sixteenth of July that these two units 
then in process of transportation got their orders from 
the Twentieth Corps. ^^ The First Division, coming 
from the Froissy-Beauvais region, was being concentrated 
behind the French line, the infantry having been trans- 
ported in motor trucks. The Second Division, which 

20 Composition of the Third American Corps Staff at the date of 
July 16, 1918. 

Major-General Robert L. Bullard, Corps Commander 

Brigadier-General A. W. Bjoranstad Chief of Staff 

Lieutenant-Colonel Lorenzo D. Gasser Chief of G-i 

Lieutenant-Colonel Offnere Hope Chief of G-2 

Lieutenant-Colonel Francis W. Clark Chief of G-3 

21 It was not until July 15th at 2 p. M. that the general commanding 
the Third Corps learned of the offensive between the Aisne and the 
Ourcq which was about to be started. 



174 The American Army in the European Conflict 

had been brought from Montreuil-aux-Lions, the mounted 
troops by road, the dismounted troops on trucks, was 
only assembled on the dark and rainy night of the 
seventeenth to the eighteenth of July. By a curious and 
picturesque coincidence of war time, these trucks were 
driven by Anamite soldiers. Thus the ancient civiliza- 
tion of Asia was conducting young America to the battle- 
field. 

The placing of the attacking waves was effectuated 
with great difficulty. Several battalions belonging to the 
marine brigade were forced to take the " double quick " 
for a mile or so in order to get ahead of the blocks of 
ammunition trucks which encumbered the paths through 
the forest. On the evening of the seventeenth the cross- 
roads of Nemours, in the Villers Cotterets Forest, af- 
forded a curious spectacle. On the torn-up roadway 
three files of wagons, caissons, ammunition trucks, lorries, 
and tanks moved slowly and heavily forward. The 
American infantrymen in their yellowish tunics, much 
darker in color when the troops belonged to the marine 
brigade, clambered in Indian file along the embanked 
ditches which border the roadway or pushed through the 
undergrowth of the adjacent forest. At every cross- 
road, serious blocks occurred in this multifarious traflUc 
testing the patience and address of the French gendarmes 
and the American military police. 

As for the artilleryman of the American forces he 
displayed an initiative quite equal to that of his infantry 
comrade. While the latter pressed on through the wood- 
land bypaths, the gunners pushed their cannon forward 
across country, reconnoitered the positions prepared the 
previous day and got ready to open fire according to 
maps, plans, and calculations made on paper, strict orders 



Summer Counter-Off ensive 175 

having been issued that not a shot must be fired before 
the general attack. 

Nevertheless, In spite of the fact that no ranging had 
been possible, when the hour of the assault came the 
artillery was ready with a rolling barrage, thereby assur- 
ing the early success of the day. In fact all the diffi- 
culties incident to the taking up of these positions were 
quite forgotten when, at 4.35 A. M., July i8th, the entire 
front of the Tenth Army began to push forward. 

The First Division, to which were added a French 
75 mm. regiment and forty-eight Schneider tanks, now 
began its impressive advance. The four regiments 
each had certain elements in the first line and were 
echeloned in depth. 

The Second Division also was reenforced by a 75 mm. 
regiment and had fifty-four St. Chamond tanks. The 
brigades were placed one behind the other and took the 
field in splendid order. A few units which had not been 
able to collect their machine-gun sections, nowise em- 
barrassed by the lack of their own weapons, threw them- 
selves upon those of the enemy and fought through the 
entire day with the material they had so dashingly con- 
quered! 

The intention of the Twentieth Corps commander had 
been to advance in three successive bounds from the 
line of departure, situated on the fringe of the Villers 
Cotterets Forest to a line running approximately from 
north to south and passing through the villages of Sa- 
conin, Missy-aux-bols, and Chaudun. Thus the Soissons- 
Parls highroad would have fallen into our hands, while 
that of Soissons-Chateau-Thierry would have been se- 
riously threatened. 

At 7.45 A. M., the two American divisions on the right 



176 The American Army in the European Conflict 

and left wing, with the Moroccan division occupying the 
center, had attained the second objective, each division 
covering a front of a mile and a quarter. 

In the course of the day, as the offensive went on, 
the Americans succeeded in everywhere keeping their 
line level with that of our valiant Colonial troops when 
they did not get beyond them. At an early hour they 
were ready to carry the guns forward in support of the 
infantry advance which now bit deep into the enemy line. 

In the evening. General Summerall's soldiers had 
reached the Soissons-Chateau-Thierry road and General 
Harbord's men were on the western outskirts of Ville- 
montoire and Tigny. 

On the following days the attack was resumed along 
the entire front of the Tenth i\rmy and the American 
divisions once more distinguished themselves by the ardor 
of their fighting spirit. 

The Second Division in its turn reached the Soissons- 
Chateau-Thierry road southeast of Villemontoire. 

The First Division, which was obliged to slacken speed 
so as to enable the neighboring division on the left to 
come up, then seized Berzy-le-sec, the Buzancy Mill, and 
reached the edge of the village of Chierry. 

It is estimated that 10,000 men and officers were killed, 
wounded, or evacuated. But in spite of the fact that the 
losses were numerous this fight may be considered one 
of the most brilliant of the entire war, especially when 
we compare the casualties with the trophies wrested from 
the enemy. 

On July 20th, when the Second Division left the field, 
and on the 24th, when the First Division was, in its turn, 
relieved, the latter carried with it 3,300 prisoners and 



Summer Counter-Off ensive 177 

71 cannons: the former 2,950 prisoners and 75 cannons. 

The American soldier had fully justified the confidence 
of his commander-in-chief; the infantry had been splendid 
in attack, obstinate in its sustained effort, and excellent 
in marksmanship. But the passage of the lines had been 
difficult and arduous, the long pauses upon ground freshly 
conquered and subjected to sharp enemy fire had been 
trying to these inexperienced troops, more especially to 
the Second Division, already severely tested by a long 
night march before entering into action. To sum up, 
each new experience proved that the American army pos- 
sessed increasing qualities of audacity and skill; its apti- 
tude for attack was more and more evident. 

The Third Corps was withdrawn and sent to rest at 
the Chateau de Valliere near Morte Fontaine. 

The First and Second Divisions, now once more re- 
joined by their respective artilleries — which had been 
obliged to remain some time on the battle-field after the 
relief of the infantry — were regrouped in the regions 
respectively of Dommartin-en-Goele and of Nanteuil-le- 
Haudouin. 

Further south, on the front of the Sixth Army, three 
regiments of the Fourth Division took part in the general 
attack with the same fortune which attended their com- 
rades of the Thirty-ninth and One Hundred and Sixty- 
fourth French Divisions. The 47th Regiment was held 
in reserve on a second position. 

On the front assigned to our Thirty-ninth Division, the 
39th Infantry Regiment shared in the taking of Norroy 
on the eighteenth and continued to advance, attaining 
on the nineteenth the three successive objectives assigned 



178 The American Army in the European Conflict 

to it. It was relieved on the same night by French 
troops. 

Along the front of the One Hundred and Sixty- 
fourth Division, the entire Eighth Brigade, although split 
into separate groups, took part in the offensive. 

On the eighteenth the Franco-Americans captured 
Hautevesnes at five A. M., Courchamps at eleven; later, 
according to General Gaucher's report, they reached 
Chevillon " with splendid dash." On the nineteenth the 
advance was continued, and Priey first, then the farm La 
Grenouillieres were taken by the combined forces. The 
Americans were relieved on the night of the twenty- 
second after having participated in the storming of 
Sommelans, Petret, and Bois de Bonnes. 

On the twenty-fourth the Fourth Division was re- 
grouped behind the fighting line. 

This division was not, however, to remain long at rest. 
It was obliged the same day to detach the 47th Regiment 
to mop up the Chatelet Wood. The 39th Regiment, 
which occupied a position between Lacroix and Joncourt, 
was also detached from this division. 

The next day another regiment, the 58th, was given 
to support a French corps, and these three regiments 
did not rejoin their division until July 29th. From this 
date on the Fourth Division will be found solely with 
the First American Corps in whose ranks it figures after 
August 3d.2- 

Southward, near the apex of our offensive, we find 
the First American Corps, having on its left the One 

22 The Fourth Division before relieving the Forty-second Division, de- 
tached several battalions in support of this unit. Thus it was that troops 
of the Forty-seventh were mixed with thxjae of the Forty-second Division 
during the severe attack on Sergy. 



Summer Counter-Off ensive 179 

Hundred and Sixty-seventh Fr-ench Division, and on its 
right the Twenty-Sixth American Division. ^^ This corps 
took part In the attack of July i8th. While the French 
were engaged before Torcy the Americans seized upon 
the village of Givry, Belleau, and the station of Bou- 
resches. 

South of Monthiers, the enemy had installed a great 
number of machine gun nests which made our progress 
most difficult and during the two days immediately fol- 
lowing the first successful operations the advance was 
quite limited, but on the twenty-first the whole front 
of the American Army Corps went forward some three 
miles and a half, attaining the region of Epieds-Trugny. 

On the twenty-fourth a new forward bound of three 
miles carried General LIggett's line up to Beuvardes; 
from the twenty-fourth to the twenty-sixth the advance 
was slow but steady. 

The Forty-second Division, relieving the Twenty-sixth, 
extended Its front In order to take In that of the One 
Hundred and Sixty-seventh French Division. From this 
time until the Vesle was reached, the First American 
Corps had but one division in line. 

On July 28th still another three miles' advance was 
recorded In the course of which the Ourcq was crossed 
on a two mile front and the farm of Meurcy and the 
village of Sergy taken. After debouching from this 
river a strong enemy resistance was encountered; the 
Americans ran up against a veritable mass of automatic 
rifles. A strenuous fight ensued, during which the village 
of Sergy many times changed hands. 

In the yellow wheat-fields which covered the slopes 

23 On the twenty-second, the Fifty-sixth Brigade of the Twenty-eighth 
Division relieved the right brigade of the Twenty-sixth Division. 



i8o The American Army in the European Conflict 

adjacent to the Meurcy farm, along the heights above 
Fere-en-Tardenois, bordering the little mud road between 
Sergy and " the Poplars " and on the hills extending 
from these trees down to Cierges, General Liggett, on 
visiting the scene of action, found the bodies of his own 
men not twenty yards from the German lines; the khaki 
uniforms were stretched beside the greenish tunic of the 
emperor's troops up to the very entrenchments of the 
enemy machine guns where these men had met in a death 
grapple. 

On August 2d the advance was again resumed. On 
the third, when the Fourth Division relieved the Forty- 
second, the American troops passed almost without re- 
sistance through Dole Forest and the Vesle was reached. 
At the same time the Franco-British contingents of the 
Tenth Army had attained the heights of Grand Rozoy, 
thus facilitating the American advance. 

The river was crossed on August 6th. The First 
Corps Headquarters saw the Fourth Division relieved 
by the Seventy-seventh and, on August 13th were placed 
in reserve at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. 

During twenty days of unremitting pursuit, an ad- 
vance of twenty miles had been achieved by this army 
corps on an average front of two miles and a half, 674 
prisoners were taken from twelve different German di- 
visions. Seven cannons and 230 machine guns were 
counted. 

Still further south and slightly to the east we find 
the Thirty-eighth French Corps posted along the Marne 
with the Thirty-ninth French and the Third i\merican 
Divisions in line, the Twenty-eighth Division being held 
in reserve. 

On this section of the front no unit was engaged in 



Summer Counter-Off ensive i8i 

the action of July i8th. Not until the night of the twen- 
tieth to the twenty-first, when the enemy yielded to the 
pressure coming from the west, did General Mondesir 
push his troops forward. 

Then in close pursuit of the enemy's rear guards the 
Third Division crossed the Marne and took Brasles, 
Gland, Mont-St. Pere, Charteves, and Jaulgonne. The 
vigorous pursuit was only interrupted when prolonged 
machine gun resistance was met with. 

In the course of this northward march, a brigade of 
the Twenty-eighth Division relieved the Thirty-ninth 
French, then in its turn the Thirty-second American 
Division replaced the Third Division, which, severely 
tried, went to rest and recuperate near the Marne. 

The entrance of the Thirty-second Division (July 27th) 
increased the activity of the sector and hastened progres- 
sion. 

On August 1st, the Thirty-eighth French Corps, con- 
sisting now of only American units advanced toward the 
Vesle with the Thirty-second Division in line, the Twenty- 
eighth in support,-^ and the Third in reserve. 

Under such circumstances it became natural to confide 
the direction of operations to an American officer and 
accordingly General Bullard assumed command. On 
August 4th, when the line reached up to Fismes, the head- 
quarters of the Third American Corps was established 
at Coulanges. 

After this American Army Corps had lined up on 
the Vesle, it extended out rightward relieving the Fourth 
French Division with part of the Twenty-eighth. 

On August 6th the Thirty-second Division encountered 
serious resistance when attempting to debouch north of 

24 This division had a few elements in the first line. 



1 82 The American Army in the European Conflict 

the Vesle. It was withdrawn after severe fighting and 
relieved by the Twenty-eighth Division which was now 
completely deployed. 

From this time up to their ultimate departure from 
the Vesle region a monotonous period of stabilization, 
followed, interrupted occasionally by sharp attacks whose 
object was to establish solid bridgeheads on the northern 
bank. These operations were long, laborious, and costly. 
The enemy launched a succession of fierce counter-attacks 
and General Bullard had difficulty in maintaining his ad- 
vanced posts on the northern side of the river. 

On August 13th when the Seventy-seventh Division 
came into line and the First American Corps was with- 
drawn, the Third Corps extended leftward in order to 
take into its sector this new American unit. 

Supported on the right and left by French troops and 
having the Seventy-seventh and Twenty-eighth Divisions 
in line and the Thirty-second in reserve. General Bullard 
endeavored to enlarge his bridgeheads on the Vesle and 
to gain a footing on the plateau between this river and 
the Aisne. 

The artillery duel was particularly fierce at this point; 
patrols advanced with difficulty and certain daring raids 
were made without any appreciable result being achieved. 
Bazoches and Fismettes changed hands many times. 

It now became necessary either to await, in depth 
formation, for the enemy to exhibit any sign of giving 
ground or to secure sufficient artillery reenforcements to 
enable a strong and methodical attack on the enemy's 
heavily garrisoned position. 

The formation adopted by General Bullard was prac- 
tically: Four battalions at the advanced posts; eight 
battalions on the positions of resistance; twelve battalions 
back of the barrage line. 



Summer Counter-Ofens'ive 183 

On September seventh the Twenty-eighth Division was 
relieved and, on the following day, the Third Corps was 
withdrawn from this front and at precisely the same mo- 
ment the enemy began to loosen his grasp of the heights 
between the Aisne and the Vesle. An advance was 
started especially toward Bazoches. The successful at- 
tacks which were taking place at this time on the Franco- 
British front near the Oise had contributed to ameliorate 
conditions on the Vesle, and General Bullard upon leav- 
ing his position turned over to the Sixteenth French Corps 
a greatly improved situation. We must not omit to 
mention that during August the Third Corps had re- 
ceived two regiments of its own artillery. 

While the Third Corps was enga^^d in these opera- 
tions the Thirty-second Division which haJ been with- 
drawn from the front on August 7th in ordtx to be 
placed in rest positions along the Ourcq, suddenly re,- 
ceived marching orders on the night of the twenty-second 
and twenty-third of August and was transported by truck 
to Vic-sur-Aisne, where it was placed at the disposal of 
the Tenth French Army. 

General Mangin at once sent it into action on August 
27th, beyond Tartiers and with Juvigny as objective. 

The Sixty-third Brigade, which was deployed in the 
first line, advanced boldly to the vicinity of Juvigny, cap- 
turing more than 500 prisoners. However, in spite of 
several attempts, it was found impossible to take the 
village, and at this point the Fifty-fourth Brigade re- 
lieved the Sixty-third and, taking advantage of an ar- 
tillery preparation which had continued for several days, 
seized Juvigny, where they found 700 unwounded pris- 
oners. The advance was resumed on the day following. 



184 The American Army in the European Conflict 

This same brigade, reenforced by one battalion and a 
machine-gun company (from the 125th Regiment and 
lent by the Sixty-third Brigade), succeeded in gaining 
ground toward Terny-Sorny. 

The next day they continued to press the enemy hard 
and attained the road from Soissons to Coucy-le-Chateau 
in the immediate neighborhood of Terny-Sorny. The 
machine-gun company of the 125th Regiment captured 
a German machine-gun company on ground east of 
Juvigny and also seized a battery of 105 mm. abandoned 
by the enemy alongside the highroad. 

The rapid progression of the Thirty-second Division 
was continued by the Moroccans of our Second Division, 
who went through the Americans and followed up their 
success. 

For s''.. ral days longer the Thirty-second Division re- 
mained in support of our colonial troops; then, after 
havmg been cited by General Mangin in his Tenth Army 
orders, this division was, like other American troops, 
withdrawn from the Soissons region. 

With the departure of the Third Army Corps from 
the Vesle sector and that of the Thirty-second Division 
from the Soissons region our narrative of the summer 
counter-offensive of 191 8 is naturally brought to a close. 

We cannot, however, terminate our recital of the 
American share in the July counter-offensive without say- 
ing one more word in regard to the masterly manner 
in which General Pershing handled his large and growing 
formations, and in calling attention once more to his firm 
and decided policy in these matters. 

Each time that he saw an occasion of incorporating 
two separate brigades into one fighting division he did so. 



Summer Counter-Off ensive 185 

Whenever it was possible to place two American divisions 
side by side he at once arranged that they should be 
formed into an American Army Corps. 

His activity in this direction might specially have been 
observed during the first days of August, when, at La 
Ferte sous Jouarre, he himself supervised the organiza- 
tion of his contingents into the First American Army. 

From this time on the American forces were week by 
week augmenting in number, new units were daily being 
disembarked in our ports and sent into instruction camps. 
The lines of communication, so difficult in the beginning 
to establish, were now rapidly being perfected and the 
moment was evidently near when military action on a 
vaster scale than that hitherto contemplated might be 
looked forward to. 

The keen foresight and military intuition of General 
Pershing were not at fault In his rapid estimation of the 
new conditions and the modifications brought about by 
recent events. He realized at once that America was 
called upon to center her energies In a new theater of 
war and that operations more difficult and more impor- 
tant than those which he had had In contemplation upon 
the Vesle front were about to develop in quite another 
sector. 

These considerations led him temporarily to abandon 
his project for the building up of an essentially American 
army on the Vesle and turn his attention to centralizing 
elsewhere command of the troops available for combat. 

In order to strike a decisive blow at a vital spot of 
the German line it was necessary to group together the 
American fighting divisions which had so gallantly won 
their laurels In Champagne. 

Their presence was now required elsewhere no less 
than the personal direction of the commander-in-chief. 



CHAPTER VI 

ORGANIZATION OF THE MAIN SERVICES OF THE EXPEDI- 
TIONARY FORCES CHIEF OF ARTILLERY TANK 

CORPS CHIEF ENGINEER AIR SERVICE SIG- 
NAL CORPS MEDICAL DEPARTMENT QUARTER- 
MASTER ORDNANCE CHEMICAL WARFARE 

INSPECTOR GENERAL JUDGE-ADVOCATE 

Practically all the heads of the main services of the 
American Expeditionary Forces were for a few months 
at least stationed at the Chaumont headquarters. In 
making this decision and assembling together in the zone 
of armies the administrative departments and sections of 
his general staff, the commander-in-chief had a very im- 
portant object in view. It was his intention, in so doing, 
to give to the organizations which were to handle his 
army a unity both of views and of methods which could 
only be acquired through daily work undertaken in com- 
mon. He desired to see the chiefs of all the main serv- 
ices of supply fully conversant with the requirements of 
the field combat troops and with the demands of the 
General Staff. On the other hand it was his wish that 
all the staff officers selected by him — and who for the 
most part were new to their work — should be thoroughly 
acquainted with the details of the operations and output 
possibilities of the services of the rear. 

He foresaw the day when it would be necessary to 
separate them; in fact, he was quite decided not to allow 
his headquarters to become top-heavy. He would de- 

i86 



Alain Services 187 

cide when the time came, according to circumstances, 
whether it would be better to move his staff nearer to 
the front or rather maintain it at Chaumont and transfer 
the administrative departments to the rear. 

On February 16, 191 8, his decision was taken. The 
line of communication, the headquarters of which was 
established at Tours — was thoroughly reorganized and 
assumed the title of " Services of Supply " shortened to 
S. O. S., a name practically equivalent to our " Direc- 
tion Generale de L'Arriere " or rear service. This was 
divided into eleven sections or departments: Quarter- 
master, Medical Corps, Engineer Department, Ord- 
nance, Signal Corps, Air Service, Chemical Warfare, 
Transportation Department, Motor Transport Service, 
Provost Marshal,^ General Purchasing Board. 

General Pershing maintained at his headquarters the 
departments of the Inspector General, of Artillery, of 
Tanks, and finally that of the Judge-Advocate. 

The departments established at Tours were to desig- 
nate the necessary number of officers who were to repre- 
sent them at Chaumont in order to remain in touch with 
the heads of the sections of the General Staff. 

Thus the number of officers stationed at headquarters 
was considerably diminished and the staff of the com- 
mander-in-chief, while maintaining a general supervision 
and control over the services of supply, was placed in 
a position where it could turn most of its attention to 
strictly military operations. 

The General Staff was thus freed from the petty an- 
noyances, delays, and discussions which form a necessary 
part of business routine when the directive departments 
are placed in too close proximity to the executive. The 

1 Later transferred to general headquarters. 



1 88 The American Army in the European Conflict 

latter were now grouped together under a single head — 
the general commanding the S. O. S. — who remained 
alone responsible to the commander-in-chief for the 
working of the services of the rear. According to the 
excellent expression of the American regulations: 
The armies in the field found themselves freed from 
every preoccupation other than that of defeating the 
enemy. 

If we were to imagine that our direction of the rear 
services in France were to be transferred to the Ministry 
of War in Paris instead of operating at headquarters, 
and afterward, that the Ministry of War thus supple- 
mented should be placed under the direct control of the 
commander-in-chief of the French armies we would evoke 
an organization similar to that created by General Persh- 
ing. - ^ ^ 

Before beginning to study the methods and working of 
what we shall denominate American " services " it is very 
important to observe that this designation covers a num- 
ber of organizations whose ways and principles are very 
widely divergent. 

Some of these possess a considerable range including 
the disbursement of funds specifically appropriated for 
their requirements. Not only do they organize and in- 
struct their own personnel, but they are also authorized 
to procure for themselves, either by purchase in Europe 
or through requisition in the United States, the divers 
materials needed in order to carry on their activities. 
Others, on the contrary, confine themselves to the train- 
ing and employment of their personnel, and the neces- 
sary material required by them is furnished by different 
departments; from the French point of view they are 
" arms " rather than " services." 



Artillery 189 

The American artillery belongs to this latter category. 

Of all the constituent elements of which modern 
armies are made up the artillery is the most complex as 
to organization, training, and equipment. 

Three questions call for the closest attention on the 
part of its chiefs: Personnel, horses, and material. In 
the American Army the responsibility for these two latter 
actually rests on the quartermaster and on the chief of 
ordnance. But although the troops themselves which 
constituted the artillery of the Expeditionary Forces, 
were drawn from the United States, by far the greater 
part of its horses, guns, and munitions were purchased 
in France and in Great Britain. It was therefore neces- 
sary, once the troops were disembarked, to undertake 
the formation of units. This was the first and most im- 
portant duty of the service of artillery. 

The chief of this service was entirely responsible for 
the training and organization of all the units up to the 
time that they were assigned to the division, army corps, 
or armies to which they normally belonged. But they 
were only turned over to these when t?he batteries, bat- 
talions, and regiments had acquired a degree of instruc- 
tion that enabled them to give a good account of them- 
selves on the battle-field. It was therefore the duty of 
the chief of artillery to establish all the camps, firing 
ranges, and schools that were necessary for the training 
of oflicers and men. Finally, for all matters pertaining 
to artillery he acted in the capacity of technical adviser 
to the commander-in-chief. 

Thirty-one divisional brigades of artillery, seven regi- 
ments of army corps artillery, giving a total of some 
7,500 officers and 197,000 men, have thus been trained 
and made ready for combat under the direction of the 



190 The American Army in the European Conflict 

chief of artillery of the American Expeditionary Forces. 

These services were divided into four sections: Field 
artillery; heavy artillery; material; information and in- 
telligence. 

The first section was a very important one. It con- 
trolled the training of all the field artillery including 
not only the batteries of 75's, but also the regiments of 
155 mm. howitzers which formed part of the divisional 
artilleries. 

The principles of organization and the general pro- 
gram of training had been laid down by General March, 
and when he left France for the United States upon his 
appointment as chief of the General Staff, the instructions 
left by him were followed without any modifications 
worth mentioning. 

The field artillery section was in charge of the tech- 
nical inspection of all units engaged in active operations 
and was to follow very closely all the evolutions of 
artillery tactics. It also supervised the work of the 
school for tractor driving that had been established at 
Le Blanc, with a view to the motorization of the regi- 
ments of 155 mm. howitzers. 

The duties of the second section concerning the units 
of heavy artillery (155 mm. guns and heavier calibers) 
and also trench artillery were the same as those of the 
field artillery section. The section of material had con- 
trol of all studies and work pertaining to the upkeep 
and proper adaptation of the material at the front, to 
the equipment of those units which were in training camps 
or actually engaged in combat, to the perfecting of the 
existing material and the creation of new types, to the 
arranging and equipment of the organization centers, 
and finally to the establishment of schools. This service 



Artillery 191 

also directed the activities of the ordnance as far as 
manufacturing artillery material was concerned. 

The section of information centralized all intelligence 
concerning allied or enemy artillery. It spread all neces- 
sary information by means of a bulletin which it published 
and widely distributed among all the artillery organiza- 
tions. 

As soon as a unit of field or heavy artillery was ready 
for combat, it was removed from the direct control of 
the chief of artillery. Thus certain regiments and bri- 
gades were placed at the disposition of the general com- 
manding the artillery of the First Army at a time when 
that army had not yet been organized. 

This was also the case for the railroad artillery in 
training at Mallly which was turned over to General 
McGlachlin, commanding the artillery of the same First 
Army long before the Saint-Mihiel operation was actu- 
ally begun. 

General Pershing considered this system advantageous 
in that It gave the artillery command of the First Army 
a longer time in which to prepare for Its important func- 
tions. 

The American railroad artillery, placed at first under 
the orders of General Coe, then under those of General 
Ghamberlalne, comprised on October ist, 191 8, two bri- 
gades, of which one only had received its material, and a 
detachment of naval gunners. 

The brigade that was fully equipped, the Thirtieth, 
possessed sixteen 240 mm. (9.4-inch) guns, thirty-two 
of 194 mm. (7.6-Inch) , twelve of 320 mm. (i2:6-inch), 
two of 340 mm. (13 :4-Inch) , four of 400 mm. guns ( 16- 
inch) . 

All these guns and howitzers were of French model and 



192 The American Army in the European Conflict 

for the most part were utilized in the two great American 
offensives of the fall of 191 8. The detachment of naval 
gunners assigned to the railroad artillery was under com- 
mand of Rear-Admiral Plunkett and manned five Amer- 
ican fourteen-inch guns. 

The American artillery trained and commanded by 
such chiefs as Generals Hinds, McGlachlin, and Lassiter 
always comported itself in a manner deserving all praise 
and earned the admiration of those French artillerymen 
who were privileged to find themselves by its side in com- 
bat. 

The quickness of its evolutions, taking up battery posi- 
tions, and changes of firing objectives, the care and vigor 
shown in the preparation and execution of fire, gave it at 
once a marked superiority over the German artillery, 
and this the enemy himself was compelled to acknowledge 
on several occasions. A German document which is at 
present before our eyes states that their troops feared 
American artillery on account of " the power and ac- 
curacy of Its fire." 

It should be incidentally mentioned that for a long 
time before America came into the war modern methods 
of artillery fire had been thoroughly studied and widely 
discussed In the military circles of the United States. A 
new theory had been developed which rejected the system 
of brackets in range firing, considering that this was a 
method which involved a great expenditure both of time 
and ammunition. This new school warmly advocated 
the immediate attempt at a direct hit. They considered 
that the solution of this problem was to be found in the 
careful establishment of preliminary calculations, as well 
as In the perfecting of sighting apparatus which, according 
to their ideas, should be made so as to indicate the amount 



Tank Corps 193 

of distance by which the hit had missed the target, and not, 
according to prevaiHng systems, merely whether the shot 
had been too long, too short, too much to the right, or to 
the left. 

Possessing as it did a nucleus of officers having a very 
great technical ability, provided with observers who not 
only on the ground, but also in the air, gave proof of an 
absolute contempt for danger, manned by crews who were 
full of aggressive ardor, confidence in their material, and 
lavish in expenditure of ammunition, the American ar- 
tillery never ceased for one instant to make its presence 
felt in the most brilliant manner upon the battle-field, 
where it proved itself a most redoubtable adversary for 
the German batteries. 

The tank service created in France during the present 
war did not, of course, exist in the American Army. 

Immediately upon the entry of the United States into 
the war the Washington authorities took up the question 
of organizing this new branch of the service, the im- 
portance of which appeared to be rapidly increasing. 

Prior to the arrival of the American Expeditionary 
Forces, the American military mission in Paris had, by 
direction of the chief of the War College, investigated 
and submitted a report under date of May 21, 19 17, 
giving the latest British and French technical and tactical 
ideas on the use of tanks. 

The French, at that time, had only two types of tanks; 
the St. Chamond and the Schneider. Neither were tanks 
in the sense of later development. They were, more 
properly speaking, artillery carriers. They had numer- 
ous defects, suffered from frequent hitches in the engine, 
progress over rough ground was difficult, their vulner- 



194 The American Army in the European Conflict 

ability was great, and their field of vision narrow. At 
this time the French had under construction a light tank 
of the Renault type, designed for employment in very 
close contact with the infantry. 

The British, on the contrary, preferred the heavy tank 
to be used far In advance of the first line of skirmishers. 

Upon his arrival In France General Pershing made very 
thorough Investigations Into this subject. The result of 
his study led to the conclusion that the American Expedi- 
tionary Forces should be equipped with two types of tank, 
a heavy type and a light one. His representative at 
the Inter-Allied Committee was instructed accordingly. 
Negotiations undertaken with the British Government 
had a satisfactory result as far as heavy tanks were con- 
cerned. Choice was definitely made of a powerful model 
called "Mark 8," which was neither more nor less than 
a Renault tank greatly augmented In size and provided 
with a Liberty engine. The American Government ap- 
proved of this decision, and decided that 1,500 Liberty 
engines were to be reserved for a like number of tanks, 
the latter to be constructed In Europe by October i, 19 18. 

In the meanwhile, negotiations were undertaken with 
the Renault firm with a view to manufacturing their light 
tank In the United States, as It appeared to possess ex- 
cellent fighting qualities. On December 23, 19 17, 
Colonel Rockenbach, since promoted to the rank of 
brigadier-general, arrived at general headquarters and 
was detailed as chief of the tank corps. 

As far as heavy machines were concerned, the only 
course open to him was to approve what had been done 
previous to his arrival. It was evident that a long period 
must necessarily elapse before the time when the United 
States would be in a position to manufacture such engines 



Tank Corps 195 

and their equipment. He therefore decided to limit 
orders to the manufacture of the Anglo-American model, 
"Liberty No. 8." 

As to the light tanks the French Renault model was 
definitely adopted with some minor improvements: addi- 
tion of a bulkhead separating the gun room from the 
engine, so that the crew would not run the danger of 
being burned, and of a self-starter; the machine was to 
hav^e its gasoline tank double-cased with a felt interlining 
one inch thick so that, if penetrated by a bullet, there 
would be no leakage of gas. It was also to be equipped 
with an interchangeable mount, so that the same tank 
could carry either a machine gun or a 37 mm. gun 
(1.5 inch). 

The organization of units, as far as personnel was con- 
cerned, was based on the idea that war could be won only 
by taking the offensive for prolonged periods; therefore 
the tanks must have an organization providing reliefs so 
that the crews who fought one day would not be required 
to go into action the next; it was therefore necessary, back 
of the companies, battalions, and brigades, to have re- 
placement units able to step in as substitutes for ex- 
hausted or disabled men. 

A revised project for a combat tank corps was ap- 
proved by the general headquarters on February i8th, 
and, by the War Department on the twenty-first of 
March. It provided for the necessary headquarters 5 
battalions of heavy - and 20 of light ^ tanks, repair, sal- 
vage, and depot organizations, training centers, and re- 
placement companies in France equal to twenty-five per 

2 The heavy battalion consisted of 69 combat and 4 signal tanks, 
giving a total of 146 6-pounder guns and 584 Hotchkiss machine guns. 

^ The light battalion was composed of 72 combat and 4 signal tanks, 
having an armament of 30 37 mm. guns and 42 Hotchkiss machine guns. 



196 The American Army in the European Conflict 

cent, of the combat forces. Twenty-five per cent, more 
were to be kept in reserve In the United States. 

By July, the importance of tanks was becoming ever 
greater and an increase of five heavy battalions was au- 
thorized, these to be organized with already projected 
battalions into ten brigades each consisting of one heavy 
battalion, two light battalions, one repair and salvage 
company. All tank corps troops were classed as head- 
quarter troops and were to be allotted to armies accord- 
ing to the nature of the ground on which operations were 
to take place. Allotment for an army was normally: 
Army tank corps headquarters, five brigades, one heavy 
artillery ordnance mobile repair shop. 

Each group of the above composition was to have at 
its disposal one training center. This organization was 
to give a total of 750 heavy fighting tanks, 1,450 light 
fighting tanks with a reserve of fifteen per cent a month. 

Such were the plans; circumstances, as we shall see, 
considerably modified their execution. 

In June, 191 8, the Inter-Allied Tank Committee which 
periodically met at Versailles, had reached the conclusion 
that it would be impossible to count upon the Importation 
from the United States of any considerable number of 
American-made tanks before 19 19. The French then 
undertook to equip two American battalions with light 
tanks, the British agreed to equip the battalion that had 
completed Its training in England with heavy tanks, pro- 
vided that it should be attached, for operation, to the 
British armies in France. 

These three battalions were the only American tank 
units to appear on the battle-field prior to the close of 
hostilities. 

The Three Hundred and Fourth Brigade, consisting 



Chief Engineer 197 

of the two light Renault battalions, took a glorious share 
in the Saint-Mihiel battle and in the operations between 
the Meuse and the Argonne. 

The Three Hundred and First Battalion, equipped with 
British tanks, was engaged in constant fighting on the 
British front. From September 29th to October 23d it 
took part in many attacks and behaved in a way to de- 
serve the unqualified praise of the British high command. 

On the day of the armistice, the tank corps of the 
Expeditionary Forces disposed of 755 officers and 9,222 
non-commissioned officers and men, all of whom were 
thoroughly trained. The material on hand consisted 
altogether of 36 British heavy tanks of three different 
models, and of 208 French tanks, all of the Renault type. 
The first American-made machines arrived In France 
only in the last days of November. 

Thus, the end of hostilities prevented the tank corps 
from giving full measure of its value. Nevertheless, the 
personnel had already had sufficient time to impress both 
friends and enemies with their intrepid conduct on the 
battle-field and their technical skill in handling such com- 
plicated machines. 

The duties of the engineer service of the American 
Expeditionary Forces "* as determined by General Order 
No. 31, dated February 16, 1918, and, as they were — 
with a few minor changes — to remain up to the end of 
the war, were as follows: Mines, field fortifications, 
surveys and maps not otherwise assigned, searchlights, 
engineer supplies, engineer depots, storehouses, and shops, 
water supply and installation, supply of electric light and 
power, supply of personnel and material for gas, etc. (this 

^Brigadier-General Taylor was at the head of this service. 



198 The American Army in the European Conflict 

service was later taken over by the chemical warfare 
service), construction and repair (except that assigned to 
the transportation department), technical inspection of 
engineer organizations, sewage disposal plant and opera- 
tions, camouflage. 

During active operations the engineer service was 
divided into the department of construction and forestry, 
the department of military engineering and engineering 
supplies, the department of light railways and roads. 

The first of these took charge of all construction of 
ports, depots, camps, hospitals, railroads, production of 
lumber for construction, and fuel. 

Under the able direction of General E. Jadwin, one of 
the builders of the Panama Canal, the engineer corps 
executed, both in England and France, Innumerable works 
of which the most important were undertaken at Montoir, 
St. Sulplce, Gievres, described In the chapter dealing with 
the Line of Communications. 

At the date of the armistice American engineers were 
at work on some four hundred projects and employed 
150,000 men, consisting of 100,000 Americans, 33,000 
civilians of divers nationalities, 17,000 German prisoners. 

Work In the ports included the construction of docks 
with the warehouses thereon, railroad connections, and 
lighters. 

Storage comprised supply depots in the Intermediate 
and advanced sections, special ammunition and aviation 
depots, coal storage yards, gasoline and oil stations, motor 
transport parks, remount depots, veterinary hospitals, 
refrigerating plants, bakeries, and salvage depots. 

In the provision of shelter for troops 16,000 barracks 
were erected capable of housing 742,000 men. When 
the armistice was signed, space in hospitals had been pro- 



Chief Engineer 199 

vided for 280,000 beds or 14.02 per cent, of the entire 
strength of the Expeditionary Forces. 

Lumber production commenced in December, 19 17, and 
was increased until in October, 19 18, eighty-one sawmills 
were in operation. The total production to May i, 
1919, amounted to 217,884,337 feet board measure of 
lumber, 3)955)678 railroad ties, 2,954,563 piling and 
round products, and 431,147 cords of fuel wood. 

Road work in the S. O. S. except in the advance section, 
was executed by the department of construction and for- 
estry. Previous to the armistice, over three hundred 
miles of roads were repaired and ninety miles of new 
roads constructed. 

The light railway operations of American Expedi- 
tionary Forces began in August, 1917,^ when the 12th and 
14th Regiments of engineers, immediately on their ar- 
rival in France, were sent to take over the maintenance 
operations of certain sixty centimeter lines in the British 
sector of the front. From this time on, the work of the 
division spread gradually throughout the front-line area, 
and with the entry of American combat troops in 19 18, it 
became an important factor in operations. At the date 
of signing the armistice, the division of light railways 
had under its control about 1,400 miles of sixty centi- 
meter track. Of this total 170 miles had been originally 
constructed by the French, but rebuilt by the A. E. F. ; 
140 miles had been entirely built by the A. E. F., and 
1,090 miles had been taken from the Germans. 

The road-service section of this department operated 
exclusively in the advance section; at the close of active 
operations the total troops it employed amounted to 
28,260 men. 

^ This service was directed by General McKinstry. 



200 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Among the numerous subdivisions of the special en- 
gineer services, the following should be particularly men- 
tioned. 

The Camouflage Section was authorized on December 
4, 19 1 7. Its main installations were located at Dijon, 
Paris, and Nancy. More than 3,000,000 square yards 
of camouflage material were produced by these work- 
shops. 

The Searchlight Service had some advanced elements 
in France as early as August, 19 17, but was actually or- 
ganized only in the early part of 191 8. At the close of 
hostilities, it had at the front a regiment of ten companies 
split up into operating units of i officer and 50 men each. 
Searchlight troops were charged with the defense of con- 
gested forward areas and of important advance S. O. S. 
installations. During the Argonne-Meuse operations 
these troops effectually sealed with their lights an area 
covering approximately 390 square miles stretching 
northwest from Dieulouard. 

The 37th Engineers, Colonel T. H. Dillon command- 
ing, authorized in December, 19 17, was responsible for 
the installation, operation, maintenance, inspection, trans- 
fer, and salvage of all stationary, electrical, and mechani- 
cal plants other than those controlled by staff departments 
or other services not included within the engineer depart- 
ment. 

The Water Supply Service was charged with water sup- 
ply in the zone of the armies. It also investigated the 
underground water possibilities in the areas where Ameri- 
can hospitals, depots, or camps were to be located. A 
considerable number of wells were drilled at various 
points. 

A special Geological Section was organized in 191 8. 



Chief Engineer 201 

It supplied data to the staff and to the services on geologi- 
cal conditions at and near the front, and also compiled 
information on French, Belgian, and German coal, iron, 
and other mineral resources. 

The varied and important works carried out in France 
by the American engineer service required enormous 
quantities of material; 3,948,101 short tons altogether; 
1,606,332 tons were procured through importation from 
the United States, the rest, i. e., 2,341,569, was almost en- 
tirely supplied in France. A certain portion of purchases 
were, however, made in England, and some others on a 
smaller scale in Switzerland and in Spain. Portugal sup- 
plied 600,000 railroad ties. Important contracts were 
drawn up in Paris by the representative of the service of 
engineers in the General Purchasing Board. And in this 
connection it may be interesting to mention a fact which 
shows the elasticity of the American services in dealing 
with divers circumstances. Take for example the ques- 
tion of cement supply. At first it was brought from 
French, English, Swiss, and Spanish mills. Later on, 
three French cement mills were leased from their owners 
by the American Expeditionary Forces and operated en- 
tirely by American engineer troops. In addition, four 
other French mills were supplied with coal and labor in 
return for the cession of a portion of their output. 

Every one profited in a combination of this kind. The 
French manufacturer was no longer confronted with the 
possibility of seeing his mill remain inactive on account of 
shortage in labor or fuel. By manufacturing itself, the 
American engineer service found the best guarantee 
against delayed production or poor quality of material. 
Finally, on the other side of the Atlantic, the services in 
charge of sea transportation were freed from the anxiety 



202 The American Army in the European Conflict 

caused by the shipment of the 215,000 tons of cement 
which the American engineers had found in Europe. 

This is merely one instance selected from a large num- 
ber of equally striking ones. We believe it to be of 
interest illustrating as it does the way in which this great 
department, thanks to the elasticity of its methods, was 
able to face all difficulties, and to justify the high reputa- 
tion which American engineers have always enjoyed in 
Europe. 

General Pershing had thoroughly taken into account 
the importance of the air service; from his personal 
studies of aviation in the British and French armies he 
was able to form an idea of the ever-increasing develop- 
ment of aerial warfare. From the time that his head- 
quarters were organized at Chaumont he entrusted Gen- 
eral Kenly, with Colonel Mitchell as his assistant, with 
the duty of laying down the first organization projects, of 
preparing contracts for material, and of directing the 
training and recruiting of the personnel.^ 

When General Kenly was called upon to perform other 
duties in the United States he was replaced by General 
Foulois. Towards the middle of January, 19 18, the new 
chief of the American air service distributed his depart- 
ment among eight sections, some of which were located 
at Chaumont (interior services, administrations, opera- 
tions), some at Paris (technical section, supplies), and 
some at Tours (training, personnel, aerostatics). 

At the end of February, the Chaumont sections were 
transferred to Colombey-les-Belles, near Toul, and there 
only remained at American headquarters three officers 

^ The contracts were made by Colonel Boiling, killed on the battle- 
field March 25, 1918. 



Air Service 203 

belonging to the air service who were charged with liaison 
duty between their service and the sections of the General 
Staff. 

In the early part of June, when American aviation en- 
tered into a period of active production and operations, 
General Pershing slightly altered its organization. 

General Patrick, appointed to the post of chief of air 
service at Chaumont, was especially in charge of the or- 
ganization of aviation units. 

The training sections remained at Tours; those con- 
cerned with the production of material were stationed in 
Paris. 

The services in the advance section were directed by 
General Foulois, whose headquarters were established 
first at Colombey-les-Belles, later at Toul. 

With a view to explaining as clearly as possible the 
necessarily complicated question of organization of the 
American air service, we shall examine first the steps 
taken to secure material, then those relating to the re- 
cruiting and training of personnel, and finally we shall 
observe the manner in which material and personnel were 
brought together to form the aviation units, and how the 
latter were provided with the organizations necessary for 
supplying repairs. To conclude, we shall see what use 
was made of them during action. 

During 19 17 large contracts for machines and motors 
were drawn up by the American Government with manu- 
facturers in the United States. The machines which 
were ordered belonged to the following foreign types ^ 
(not including instruction planes) : 

7 To this list may be added the two-seater Lepere pursuit plane, the 
construction of which was stopped by the armistice before it was com- 
pletely under way. 



204 ^ ^^^ American Army in the European Conflict 

Pursuit plane, Bristol and S. E. V. 

Day bombardment and observation, De Haviland 

IV and IX. 
Night bombardment, CapronI and Handley-Page. 

In January, 191 8, it was believed that the following 
machines would be available by July ist: 

2,000 Bristol. 

5,560 De Haviland IV or IX. 

1,250 Caproni and Handley-Page. 

As to the engines, 22,500 Liberty motors had been 
ordered including, 2,500 for the navy. 15,000 were to 
be delivered by the end of May. 

These provisions were not, however, realized. As is 
generally known, these figures did not sufl&ciently take 
into account the difficulties involved in starting such manu- 
factures on so gigantic a scale, and the anticipated results 
were far from being achieved. 

In fact the first planes of American make arrived in 
France only in May, 191 8. By July ist some two hun- 
dred of the De Haviland IV type were available. The 
first one arrived at Colombey-les-Belles on July 4th. At 
that date, beside the engines which formed part of a 
constructed machine, there were a very limited number 
of replacement engines. 

The lengthy delays which had to be reckoned with in 
the importation of American-made airplanes had not 
been overlooked by the heads of the American air service 
In France, and from the start every endeavor was made 
to palliate the shortage by purchase in Europe. 

The contracts signed with the French Ministry of 
Aeronautics provided for the delivery of a certain num- 



Air Service 205 

ber of antiquated models which might nevertheless be used 
by the air squadrons which were engaged in training, as 
well of some machines of recent model (Spad, Salmson, 
Breguet, and Nieuport 28) for the squadrons engaged in 
actual fighting. 

As a result of the very considerable requirements of 
the French aviation at that time, the delivery of planes to 
the American services was at first subjected to certain 
delays; but from the month of May on, they were made 
with great regularity. From the entry of the United 
States into the war up to the date of the armistice, the 
air service of the American Expeditionary Force received 
in all 6,364 airplanes, 3,210 of which were service and 
3,154 instruction machines: 

4,874 supplied from France, 
258 supplied from England, 
19 supplied from Italy, 
1,213 supplied from America and which were all 
of the De Haviland IV type and pro- 
vided with Liberty engines. 

Furthermore, 870 replacement Liberty engines were 
sent from the United States. 

The American pilots were of two categories : 

The first class arrived from America already possess- 
ing a good elementary notion of their work and having 
obtained an R. M. A. license. 

The second category was recruited from the forces of 
the American Army in France and at once received ele- 
mentary instruction either in Chateauroux (in the 
French school) or at the American school at Tours. 
Both classes were given final complementary instruction 



2o6 The American Army in the European Conflict 

at Issoudun, with the exception of those which, being 
destined for bombardment duty, were sent for a course 
of special instruction to Clermont-Ferrand. 

In the month of January, 191 8, 40 pilots graduated 
from Issoudun with a thorough knowledge of their busi- 
ness; in April of the same year, 270 were ready for 
service. In all, from November, 19 17, to the signing 
of the armistice the Issoudun instruction center formed 
2,200 pilots while that of Clermont turned out 279. 

The observers also came from two categories: 

Those coming directly from America, where they had 
received a summary training, were for the most part at 
once sent on to Tours for preparation in their specialty.^ 
From Tours the observers intended for bombardment 
went to complete instruction at Clermont-Ferrand, while 
those destined to " observation," properly speaking, ter- 
minated their course at Chatillon-sur-Seine and in the 
artillery instruction camps. A certain number were also 
sent to complete a course of aerial gunnery at Cazeaux 
first, and at St. Jean des Monts — dating from June, 
1918. 

Other observers were recruited directly in the American 
Expeditionary Forces. Up to October i, 1918, when 
General Foulois took command of the air services in the 
zone of the rear the recruiting of the latter class of ob- 
servers presented many difficulties. After that time a 
fair number of good observers were selected among the 
officers who had recently graduated from Saumur. Ob- 
servers of the latter category, who were exclusively in- 
tended to carry out artillery observation work, perfected 
their training — as was also the case for certain graduates 

^ Some were sent directly to Chatillon-sur-Seine. 



Air Service 207 

of the Tours school — in the training centers of Coetqui- 
dan, Souge, Meucon, Valdahon. 

The school at Tours graduated 876 aviators, Chatillon- 
sur-Seine 400 observers, of all arms; Clermont-Ferrand 
328 bombardment observers; the artillery training centers 
trained 150 artillery observers taken from the Expedi- 
tionary Forces. 

In the beginning the formation of aerial squadrons was 
carried along the following lines : 

The personnel and material which were to form the 
observation and bombardment units were concentrated at 
Amanty. The squadrons which were at first equipped 
only with planes of antiquated type continued their train- 
ing up to the time when planes of more modern type be- 
came available. Training was permitted with these new 
machines, up to the departure for the front; during that 
period expert observers and pilots helped in the instruc- 
tion of those more recently arrived. Up to the latter 
part of January, 19 18, a French squadron was stationed 
at Amanty and assisted in the training of the American 
units. By April ist five squadrons had thus been or- 
ganized; four for observation, one for day bombardment. 

Pursuit squadrons were organized after the same prin- 
ciples. But their personnel and material were assembled 
at Epiez. By April 15th, four units of that type had 
been formed. 

It must now be recalled that already and even long 
before the entrance of America Into the war, an American 
aerial unit had been fighting In France whose name will 
be forever remembered In the history of aerial warfare: 
The Lafayette squadron. 

Consisting almost entirely of American personnel, this 



2o8 The American Army in the European Conflict 

unit was Incorporated into the American air service with 
the number 103, after the French personnel heretofore 
attached to it had been replaced entirely by Americans. 

It continued, however, its service in a French combat 
group up to June, 19 18, when it was transferred to the 
first American combat group. 

From April, 191 8, on, the methods according to which 
air-service units had been organized, were modified. The 
personnel and material which were destined to the make- 
up of new squadrons whatever the ultimate destination 
of the unit might be, were assembled at Colombev-les- 
Belles. There they remained for a period of about three 
weeks, during which time they perfected training and 
afterwards departed for the front. 

Thus up to the date of the armistice the following units 
were organized: 

20 pursuit squadrons (five groups), 
6 day bombardment squadrons (two groups), 
I night bombardment squadron,® 

18 army or army corps squadrons, 
3 instruction squadrons. 
Total, 48. 

Twelve of these were equipped with American-made 
planes; besides, on November 11, 19 18, six squadrons — 
three for pursuit and three for observation — were in 
process of organization at Colombey-les-Belles. 

The general system for supplies and repairs adopted by 
the American air service was based on two principles: 

Firstly: To establish at the rear a big assemblage and 
repair shop whose duty was to mount the planes which 

^ This squadron was never actually employed on account of the 
armistice. 



Air Service 209 

were sent from America in separate parts and to execute 
important repairs. This shop was organized at Romo- 
rantin on a large scale. The body and engines imported 
from the United States were thoroughly looked over and 
definitely mounted. The machines were equipped in 
machine guns, in photograph and telegraph apparatus; 
they were then subjected to tests, after which they were 
sent to the front. Airplanes that had been seriously 
damaged at the front were thoroughly overhauled in these 
shops. Out of a total of 1,213 De Haviland IV planes 
received from the United States by November, 19 18, 
J, 087 were mounted at Romorantin, and 628 were for- 
warded from there to the front. In the course of the 
same period the Romorantin shops repaired 308 machines. 

At Orly an important " acceptance " park was estab- 
lished for the tests of airplanes purchased in Europe — 
3,300 planes went through their tests at this place. On a 
certain date, 91 machines were sent to the front by the 
reception park at Orly. This is believed to be a record 
in operations of this kind. 

Secondly: To establish in the zone of advance and for 
each army and for each pursuit or bombardment group, a 
park intended to do ordinary repairs and ensure the daily 
supply of fighting units. Behind these parks were to be 
established a certain number of air depots whose role 
was to execute more important repairs and to supply 
completely mounted planes. Finally " aerial reception 
centers " were to group the material intended for dis- 
tribution to the air depots, while the schools were to re- 
pair their damaged planes by means of their own re- 
sources. 

As a matter of fact, the army and group parks were 
never organized. 



2IO The American Army in the European Conflict 

Out of the five air depots contemplated, only one 
(Colombey-les-Belles) , which started operations in the 
month of April, was actually completely organized. 

At the date of the armistice it had overhauled 237 
planes, and held 298 ready for employment. 

Four aerial reception centers had been foreseen. One 
was begun at Is-sur-Tille, but was never brought to com- 
pletion; it was afterward replaced by a large depot, the 
construction of which was begun at Latrecey in August, 
19 1 8, and was well under way at the time of the armistice. 

Thanks to the value of American pilots the air service 
of the American Expeditionary Forces was able to render 
excellent service in all the branches of aviation which 
called for audacity and skill. The pursuit squadrons 
scored as well on the American front as on those of the 
French and British armies a very great number of vic- 
tories.^'^ 

The bombardment squadrons also greatly distinguished 
themselves in the attack of enemy rear organization.^^ 

The technical training of observers (employment of 
wireless telegraphy, photography, use of machine gun) 
has always been excellent. ^^ 

From a tactical point of view great difficulties were 
encountered by the Americans in the work on the " plan 
directeur " on account of their ignorance of the metric 
system. 

Two pursuit squadrons were engaged at the British 

^^753 planes and 71 enemy balloons were brought down. Total losses 
of the aviation of the American Expeditionary Forces, 357 planes. 

11 American bombardment squadrons executed on the Western front a 
total of 150 raids in the course of which 115 tons of high explosives were 
dropped on the enemy. 

^2 18,000 photographic negatives were taken and 585,000 reproductions 
made. 



Air Service 211 

front from March to September, 19 18. From January 
to the end of August all other American units were en- 
gaged on the French front as soon as organized: the pur- 
suit squadrons individually at first, afterward, incorpo- 
rated in groups, took a very brilliant part in the defense 
of the Lorraine front, and later in the operations on the 
Marne and Aisne. The bombardment squadron No. 96 
was employed in the blockade of the mineral basin of 
Lorraine. The observation squadrons were, as soon as 
ready, assigned to American divisions, and later to army 
corps; they took part in the operations carried out in the 
Vosges, in Lorraine, and were afterward engaged with the 
first American Army Corps in the region of Chateau- 
Thierry. 

When the first American Army was organized all the 
aviation units then available were assigned to it, i. e. : 

3 pursuit groups (12 squadrons), 
Bombardment squadron No. 96, 
2 army squadrons, 
9 army corps squadrons. 

These forces were naturally insufficient to carry out 
the amount of aerial warfare involved in such extensive 
operations as the Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offen- 
sives, therefore French aviation units to the extent of 
some fifteen artillery squadrons and one night-bombard- 
ment group returned, on this occasion, to the American 
Expeditionary Forces the powerful assistance which they 
had given to the French air service in the operations on 
the Marne. Moreover the French aerial division par- 
ticipated in the activities of the American aviators. As 
soon as American squadrons had been formed in sufficient 
numbers, the French units were turned back to their nor- 



212 The American Army in the European Convict 

mal destination. At the date of the armistice the aviation 
of the three armies which then composed the American 
Expeditionary Forces exclusively consisted of American 
units. ^^ 

Aerostation followed a development parallel to that of 
the aviation. However, it should be mentioned that al- 
most all its material was imported from the United States, 
and that it always was available in sufficient quantities to 
meet requirements. 

The observers, part of whom were recruited in the 
artillery brigades and trained in the centers of Valdahon, 
Meucon, Coetquidan, La Courtine, Clermont-Ferrand, 
Le Courneau, Mailly, and in the beginning at Vadenay 
while the others underwent a preliminary course of train- 
ing in America and afterward perfected their Instruction 
at Souge, always gave most complete satisfaction. 

The balloon companies were grouped by fours in 
America, and upon their arrival in France went Into train- 
ing schools where observers were assigned to them; after- 
ward they were sent to the front. 

The first American balloon company appeared at the 
front in Lorraine in February, 191 8. 

When the first American Army was organized fifteen 
balloon companies were assigned to it, all of which had 
been engaged with American divisions and army corps on 
different parts of the French front. 

This number being Insufficient, some ten French com- 
panies were in the beginning assigned to the First Army, 
and afterward turned back to the French command as 
soon as American companies became available for service. 

At the date of the armistice there existed in France a 

IS General William Mitchell, well known to his French comrades for 
his admirable energy in action, commanded the active operations of the 
American aviation. 



Signal Corps 213 

total of thirty-five companies, twenty-four of which were 
at the disposal of the fighting forces. 

In all 295 balloons were received; 20 had been supplied 
by France, 275 came from the United States. 

Of all the component parts of a large army obliged to 
organize itself at the same moment as it goes into action, 
perhaps the most difficult to handle and engage is the serv- 
ice of aviation. The material as well as the mode of 
employment were constantly being modified in the course 
of the war. The big units, i. e., the pursuit and bom- 
bardment groups, can only be thoroughly efficient if the 
squadrons of which they are composed are absolutely 
conversant with concerted maneuvers and possess pilots 
and observers fully qualified by their tactical and technical 
training. 

To conclude, it must be mentioned that no time 
whatever was lost, since General Pershing always gave 
the allied armies the assistance which was consistent with 
the means which he had at hand, lending American ma- 
chines to fill up the losses in the French aerial ranks while 
waiting for the formation of, strictly speaking, American 
units. 

To the Signal Corps of the American Army falls the 
work of providing methods and means for the communi- 
cation of intelligence for military purposes by telegraph, 
telephone, radio, or otherwise; and also of providing the 
personnel for the construction necessary to these com- 
munications as well as for their operation. 

Its sphere of activities extended from seaport to front. 

It had representatives as well in every territorial zone 
of the rear as in the main fighting units — armies, army 



214 The American Army in the European Conflict 

For practical purposes the work of the signal corps 
may be divided into two fields which we will in turn 
examine: 

First: The construction, operation, and maintenance 
of every sort of electrical communication from base ports 
through the zones of the S. O. S. up to the front. 

Second: Communication by every practicable means 
within and between the units of the fighting forces. 

The jirst of these requirements rendered necessary the 
provision of a network of lines of communication be- 
tween ports, depots, hospitals, aviation centers, and train- 
ing camps; in short, a complete system on a large scale 
connecting all points where units or offices of the Ameri- 
can Expeditionary Forces were located. 

This called for the construction, installation, and 
operation of telegraph, telephone, and radio equipment 
analogous In every way to that necessary In commercial 
systems such as those in the United States. 

The facilities which the French were able to place at 
the disposal of the signal corps were early found to be 
inadequate, and signal corps lines built with American 
material by their own personnel were constructed In 
steadily Increasing numbers. 

From the twenty-fourth of June, 19 17, when the signal 
corps commenced Its function, up to the first of May, 
19 19, there had been over 40,000,000 local telephone 
calls and upward of 1,350,000 long distance telephone 
calls handled by its services. 

Since the signal corps telegraph system began Its work 
on August 9, 19 1 7, there have been handled more than 
12,000,000 telegraph messages. 

The long distance telephone and telegraph system 
which they constructed were entirely maintained by a 



Signal Corps 215 

signal corps personnel. In addition 19,800 miles of 
leased wires were also maintained by it. 

Although the main duty of the signal corps is to pro- 
vide communication, a large part of its activity had to do 
with Its own supplies. These consisted of all the imple- 
ments and material for constructing lines of communica- 
tion, including equipment of central stations and telegraph 
offices, as well as all the instruments and apparatus used 
for signaling in combat. Finally, the signal corps was 
charged with meteorological and photographic services to 
the entire army, and supplies for these activities were 
under its control. 

The second field of activity of the signal corps was 
concerned with the provision of tactical units fully 
equipped and trained in the use of every practicable 
method of signaling promptly and despite enemy inter- 
ference, with the interception of enemy communications 
and the location of enemy radio stations, whether on the 
ground or on airplanes. The interception of communi- 
cations and the location of radio stations of the enemy 
was done by carefully trained personnel working with 
special apparatus in cooperation with the intelligence sec- 
tion of the General Staff. The utility of this organiza- 
tion, by means of which we were able to learn the enemy's 
plans in advance, and to gain valuable information upon 
the character and distribution of his units in the battle 
line, is to-day widely known. 

At the time of its greatest activities the signal corps 
operated In Europe 14,854 telephone stations and 396 
exchanges. The total length of wire employed for 
telephone or telegraph purposes was 13,000 miles 
— over five times the length of the terrestrial 
meridian. 



2i6 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The construction and operation of such a system called 
for a personnel possessing a very high degree of technical 
skill. Most of it came from the personnel of the tele- 
phone and telegraph companies in the United States. 

Units of the signal corps were of two types : 

telegraph battalions, 
field signal battalions. 

A telegraph battalion consisted of lo officers and 212 
men; they were very completely equipped. 

They were charged, in the zone of the S. O. S. with 
construction and maintenance of the pole lines and buried 
cable lines generally established along roads and railroads. 
Telegraph battalions attached to armies and army corps 
installed telephone and telegraph systems connecting 
headquarters in the zone of the armies. Since most of 
the personnel of these battalions had been engaged on 
similar work in civil life, no very extensive or special 
training had been necessary for them, aside from that 
of a military character. 

Field signal battalions were especially charged with 
service at the front. One of them was assigned to each 
army, army corps, or division of infantry. 

It is interesting to say a few words about their organi- 
zation. They consisted of; 

I headquarters and supply section.. 3 officers 29 men 

I wire company 3 officers 75 men 

I radio company 3 officers 75 men 

I outpost company 5 officers 280 men 

Total, 14 officers 495 non-commissioned officers and 
men. 

The headquarters and supply section performed the 



Signal Corps 2 1 7 

administrative services of the field signal battalion. It 
distributed accumulators and carrier pigeons. 

The wire company installed, maintained, and operated 
telephone and telegraph systems from division head- 
quarters inclusive to, but not including, regimental head- 
quarters. Besides it was prepared to handle all forms 
of visual signaling when other means failed. 

The radio company installed and operated radio sta- 
tions at brigade headquarters, division posts of command, 
and at those of the artillery battalion. It also operated 
the wireless ground telephone sets and listening sets, as 
well as gonio stations installed in the division area. 

The outpost company was divided into: 

I headquarters detachment, i captain and 20 men 
4 regimental platoons each of i lieutenant and 
65 men. 

The headquarters detachment was available for the 
purpose of strengthening the regimental platoons when 
necessary. 

During the period of trench warfare, each regimental 
platoon was permanently assigned to a regiment of the 
division. In open warfare the outpost company was 
divided into two sections, which were charged with main- 
taining the liaison between brigades and regiments. 

The training of this personnel for signaling in combat, 
especially the training of the different groups of the field 
signal battalions, was carried on partly in the United 
States and partly at signal corps schools, in training areas, 
and in quiet sectors of French front. Besides learning 
the duties of a soldier, each man was to gain an intensive 
knowledge of his own special functions, also a well- 
grounded experience in signaling generally. While sig- 



2i8 The American Army in the European Conflict 

nal corps troops are not combat units, they endured all 
the dangers incident to combat and gave repeated 
examples of their courage and resourcefulness under the 
enemy fire. 

The first members of the signal corps to reach France 
arrived on June 13, 1917. Besides the chief signal offi- 
cer, Colonel Russell, ^^ there were six officers, six soldiers, 
and two civilians. On November i, 19 18, the total 
reached 1,462 officers, 33,038 soldiers, and 323 civilians, 
including women telephone operators. 

One of the chief accomplishments of the signal corps 
during the war was the successful equipment of combat 
divisions with the special signaling apparatus required in 
modern warfare. Much of this apparatus, especially 
radio equipment, was new to America, and consequently 
had to be found in Europe. Approximately four and a 
half millions of dollars were spent on material purchased 
in France. 

The telegraph and telephone equipment was imported 
from the United States. In order to minimize the effect 
of the submarine warfare on the supply of these most 
important materials, shipments were made in ten-mile 
lots. Each ten-mile lot of material contained everything 
for that distance of line ^* and was loaded on a separate 
ship. 

The signal corps operated seven supply depots and three 
army parks when the armistice was signed. The total 
tonnage of supplies received amounted to approximately 
100,000 tons, 62,000 being from the United States, 
37,000 from France, and 1,000 from Great Britain, 

13 Colonel (afterward General) Russell was chief signal officer through- 
out the entire war. 

1* With the exception of poles which were obtained in France. 



Medical Department 219 

From December i, 1917, to November i, 1918, the 
signal corps photographic division exposed in the field 
and developed in its laboratory seventy-five miles of 
original moving-picture films. 

In the course of the war the signal corps had recourse 
on a large scale to the resources of France. In this con- 
nection it is perhaps sufficient to mention radio and radio- 
goniometric equipment. Let us incidentally recall the 
fact that the allied armies made a constant appeal to 
French industry for the supply of photographic cameras, 
and of all high grade optical glass. 

This being said, we will be the more at liberty to 
acknowledge that upon one point — and a very important 
one — we have everything to learn from the American 
signal corps. We mean in the organization and opera- 
tion of the telephone system. No one that has had occa- 
sion to put in a call from Coblenz to Bordeaux from 
Chaumont to Brest or to London on the American lines 
will, in our opinion, contradict this statement. It may be 
remembered that the personnel and material on these lines 
were the same as those which, in the United States, en- 
sured communication by telephone between New York and 
San Francisco. 

What may we suppose are the reasons for American 
superiority in this branch? Are they to be found in a 
better quality of material, in greater professional skill 
on the part of the operators? Are they due to better or- 
ganization, or more efficient methods of operation? 

We will leave it to our own technical specialists to seek 
the answer to the above questions. 

When the first elements of the American Expeditionary 
Forces arrived in France, their chief surgeon, Colonel 



2 20 The American Army in the European Conflict 

(later Brigadier-General) Alfred E. Bradley, found him- 
self confronted with a very heavy task. 

The soldiers from the United States, very recently 
drafted, were about to enter into active operations in a 
country the climate of which was very different from their 
own; they were furthermore quartered in billets, a thing 
entirely new to them. Therefore not taking into account 
the casualties arising from enemy action it was certain 
that the sick rate among the troops would be fairly high. 
On this account it was necessary to foresee and organize 
a very important system of hospitalization. 

As was natural most of the large buildings in France 
which would have been appropriate to such a service, 
were already utilized for the requirements of the allied 
armies. It was therefore necessary to erect new shelters 
and the material for the construction of barracks was in 
those days very scarce. 

As soon as the United States had declared war. Colonel 
Wadhams, then a member of the American Mission of 
Observers, had approached the French Minister of Public 
Health in regard to the measures to be taken. In close 
cooperation with Chief Surgeon Castelli (French Army) 
he had made very thorough investigations of the facilities 
which, by cutting down their own requirements In every 
way, the French service could place at the disposal of the 
American Expeditionary Forces. 

From that time on, a period of constant and Intimate 
cooperation was initiated between the medical authorities 
of the two armies; the results were of the most satisfac- 
tory character. 

We must here limit ourselves to a description of the 
activities of the American medical corps in Its opera- 
tions carried on from February, 191 8, under the sue- 



Medical Department 221 

cessive direction of Generals Bradley, Ireland, and 
McGraw. 

As every one knows, sanitary organizations are divided 
into two main categories: Those which are mobile and 
follow all the displacements of the troops to whom they 
are attached; the others which are fixed and naturally 
offer greater advantages for the treatment of patients. 

The chief surgeon, whose headquarters were at Tours, 
was especially preoccupied with questions pertaining to 
general organizations, to personnel, supplies, and the es- 
tablishment of fixed hospitals intended for the care of 
patients coming from the French front or from other 
points. 

Although his authority extended to all American sani- 
tary formations in Europe, by reason of the great distance 
which separated his headquarters from the front, it was 
necessary for him to delegate to a deputy stationed at 
headquarters the portion of that authority which had 
more especially to do with the armies in the field. 
Colonel Wadhams was appointed to that very important 
position. He was made a member of the fourth section 
of the General Staff, and, in the name of the commander- 
in-chief, coordinated all medical activities at the front. 

In the American Army the medical department was or- 
ganized by divisions at the headquarters of each of those 
units, a lieutenant-colonel belonging to the medical corps 
was in charge of all the sanitary personnel operating with 
the division. Under his orders was the divisional sani- 
tary train consisting of: 

4 ambulance companies, ^^ 
4 field hospitals, ^"^ 

^^ Three automobile and one horse-drawn ambulances. 
^6 Three automobile and one horse-drawn ambulances. 



222 The American Army in the European Conflict 

I medical supply unit, 
I mobile laboratory. 

Each ambulance company had fifteen vehicles, twelve 
ambulances and three trucks. The field hospitals were 
equipped with tents and an important material trans- 
ported on trucks or wagons; each of them could take care 
of 216 patients. Thus the divisional sanitary train had 
a total strength of 50 officers and 901 enlisted men. 

Besides each regiment disposed of a medical detach- 
ment ^" the sanitary train of the army corps comprised, 
not including, of course, the sanitary formations of the 
division : 

3 field hospitals, 

3 ambulance companies. 

The army sanitary train, besides the sanitary forma- 
tions of the corps, included in the army, comprised: 

4 field hospitals, 

4 ambulance companies. 

Besides, the army surgeon disposed of: 

2 evacuation hospitals,^* 
I mobile hospital ^^ 

per division included in the army. 

Furthermore the chief army surgeon disposed of 
mobile surgical and degassing units, several sections of 
army ambulance service, convalescent depots, medical 

^'' Seven surgeons and 48 enlisted men by infantry regiment. 

1* These were generally established under tents and had a capacity of 
500 to 1,000 beds; they were well equipped and were able to undertake 
surgical operations of the greatest delicacy under the most favorable 
conditions. 

19 Established along the same lines as the French auto-surgical 
ambulances. 



Medical Department 223 

supply parks, field laboratories, special operating teams 
(shock, gas, etc.) and hospital trains for the evacuation of 
patients to the rear. 

At the time of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the facili- 
ties controlled by Colonel Stark, army surgeon of the 
First Army, approximated 30,000 medical department 
personnel. When an American soldier was wounded in 
the firing line, he was at first taken to the battalion or 
regimental first-aid station which was the most advanced 
post of the sanitary service. From there he was trans- 
ferred to the ambulance bandaging station, which was In- 
stalled at the extreme limit of the zone accessible to motor 
transportation. Men who were only slightly wounded 
came unaided to this station, the others were carried by 
stretcher bearers. From there the wounded were trans- 
ported to the sorting station which was directed by one of 
the field hospitals of the divisional sanitary train. 

Slight cases, especially those affected with " psycho- 
neurosis " or shell shock, were held at the sorting station; 
the more serious cases were divided among the other 
three field hospitals of the division. From there the 
sanitary train belonging to the army corps reenforced, in 
case of emergency by ambulance companies belonging to 
the army, transported them to a mobile evacuation hos- 
pital, both of which were army organizations; they were 
then placed on board hospital trains and taken to the base 
hospitals of the interior. 

It had been agreed in principle that, when American 
troops were to take over a sector at the front, they would 
take charge of all existing French formations and pro- 
vide for the care and evacuation of their own patients. 
The hospitalization of the American Army was therefore 
organized upon this basis. 



2 24 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Practically, some difficulties were encountered. As a 
consequence of the German drive of March, 191 8, which 
compelled the high command to engage American divi- 
sions on different points of the front, the working of this 
system was extremely complicated. The American medi- 
cal corps was not in a position to supply evacuation hos- 
pitals and hospital trains to all American divisions who 
were Isolated among the French armies. It was there- 
fore found necessary to receive American patients in 
French sanitary formations, and to evacuate them in 
French hospital trains toward the interior. It was 
agreed that as soon as their state of health would per- 
mit, these patients should be transferred from the French 
hospitals which had received them to the nearest Ameri- 
can hospital. On the other hand, American hospitals 
receiving French patients were to transfer them as soon 
as possible to French sanitary formations. As a whole, 
and notwithstanding the difficulties arising out of the 
difference In languages, these arrangements worked In a 
most satisfactory way. Nevertheless It seemed desirable 
that the Americans might, as soon as practicable, be in 
a position to provide for the entire care and evacuation 
of their own patients from the time when a sector of the 
front should be definitely assigned to them. This was 
the case from date of August, 19 18, before the battle of 
Saint-Mihiel. From that time on, the American Army 
itself provided for the care and evacuation of Its own 
sick and wounded. 

In some cases at Chateau-Thierry, In Champagne, and 
later on in Flanders, It was even possible to establish 
American evacuation hospitals in the rear of those Ameri- 
can divisions which were fighting in the ranks of French 
armies. 



Medical Department 225 

Difficulties were experienced in securing hospital trains. 
The American medical department was, however, able to 
purchase twenty-one of these: Two in France, nineteen 
in England.-" 

But this number was insufficient to meet the require- 
ments of the Expeditionary Forces during the summer and 
fall of 19 1 8. It was therefore necessary for the French 
Government to place at the disposition of the American 
medical department a very considerable number of hos- 
pital trains. In the latter period of the war the number 
of such French trains in the American service was forty- 
five. 

We must now leave the zone of the armies and deal 
with medical corps activities In the Interior. The organi- 
zation was adapted to the zone of the rear in base, inter- 
mediate, and advance sections. 

In each a section chief surgeon controlled the existing 
permanent sanitary formations: Base and American 
Red Cross hospitals, convalescent depots, laboratories, 
stores, centers of muscular reeducation, shops for repair 
of sanitary material, workshops for erection of sanitary 
automobile material, schools for medical and surgical 
specialties. As has already been said, the French au- 
thorities had put at the disposal of the medical depart- 
ment all available permanent constructions and barracks. 
Moreover, the French engineers gave great assistance by 
drawing up plans for such establishments and laying down 
railway tracks. 

The number of beds thus made available Increased 
rapidly. Following figures Include only those permanent 

20 Each of these trains was capable of transporting from 300 to 400 
stretcher cases. 



226 The American Army in the European ConfUct 

hospitals located in the interior; those with the armies 
being temporary installations are not mentioned. 

The week ending November 7, 19 18, saw the greatest 
number of patients in A. E. F. hospitals, when a total of 
190,888 beds were occupied. On the day the armistice 
was signed, there was a total of 283,553 beds in the hos- 
pitals of the interior. On the same date there were in 
operation 153 base hospitals, 66 camp hospitals, and 12 
convalescent camps. From December 11 to December 5, 
191 8, the total number of beds was increased to 296,835. 
The construction and installation work under way was to 
raise that figure to 423,772 normally, and 541,000, in 
case of emergency. 

At the time of the armistice, the American medical de- 
partment in France had grown, so that there were with 
the Expeditionary Forces 16,407 medical officers, 8,593 
nurses, and 126,231 enlisted men. Moreover, there 
were in the United States nearly as many more awaiting 
transportation to France. 

The medical supplies on hand were sufficient to meet 
all requirements. Let us mention in passing: 190,280 
pounds of sulfuric ether, 275,075 gallons of alcohol, 
1,135 gallons of iodine, 41,372,640 gauze bandages, 
3,081,727 first-aid packets. At the close of hostilities, 
the American medical department had most successfully 
overcome all the difficulties Incident to the beginning of 
operations, and it may be unhesitatingly affirmed that 
should the war have been continued It would certainly 
have been in a position to provide, under the best and 
most comfortable conditions, for the care and hospitaliza- 
tion of the large number of casualties which might reason- 
ably be expected from the very rapidly growing combat 
Strength of the American armies. 



Quartermaster 227 

We have seen, in a preceding chapter, how numerous 
were the duties devolving upon the quartermaster corps. 
During the process of organization which took place in 
the Expeditionary Forces the quartermaster corps was 
called upon to drop certain of its attributions and take 
over others. 

It may be remembered that as early as September, 
1917, the organization of the transportation department 
had taken from the quartermaster corps the burden of 
railway transit. Later on, the D. G. T. [Director Gen- 
eral of Transportation] also took charge of operations of 
base ports. Finally, in February, 191 8, the motor trans- 
portation service was, in its turn, made independent. 

At the time when its chief. Quartermaster General 
Rogers, ^^ transferred his headquarters to Tours, the 
duties of the quartermaster corps were as follows: 

Payment of personnel and general disbursements, sub- 
sistence, fuel and forage, clothing, remount service, 
laundries and baths, disinfection of clothing, salvage ser- 
vice, quartermaster shops, depots and storehouses, cold 
storage and refrigeration, graves registration service, in- 
spection of quartermaster activities. To these manifold 
duties were later added: Garden service, all disinfection 
for troops in the zone of advance with the exception of 
that carried out in hospitals, finally, organization of rail- 
head supply units. 

In order to carry out so many divers and important 
functions, General Rogers had organized his central office 
as follows: 

21 General Harry L. Rogers was appointed quartermaster general of the 
United States Army on July 22, 1918. He remained in France up to the 
end of the war, and left Tours on January 31, 1919, to take over his new 
post in Washington. 



228 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The inspection service reported on such matters as sup- 
ply of divisions, finance, conditions of remount service, 
bakeries, etc. This important work was carried out by a 
varying number of traveling Inspectors. 

The administrative section Included the handling of all 
records, mail, telegrams and cablegrams, precedent and 
research, and administrative action on contracts. 

The personnel division handled all matters pertaining 
to the quartermaster personnel, such as organization of 
new units, including labor formations. 

The finance division included the supply to disbursing 
officers of the funds which they controlled. Instructed these 
officers In the nice legal points of their studies, and ad- 
justed certain classes of claims. 

The accounting division Included the examination and 
analysis of accounts — property and funds — and audit 
of subsistence returns of the quartermasters in Europe. 

The supplies division. The most important of the 
chief quartermasters organizations, its activities being 
divided into fifteen sub-branches: Miscellaneous, cloth- 
ing, subsistence, bakeries, animal-drawn transportation, 
traffic, traveling-officers, supplies and stationery, fuel, 
forage, cold storage and refrigeration, administration, 
garden service, storage and warehousing, gasoline and oil. 

Quartermaster supplies were provided from three dif- 
ferent sources : requisition in the United States, purchase 
made directly in France, by the purchasing agent of the 
quartermaster, contracts made with the French and Brit- 
ish governments. 

The salvage service operated in France seventeen 
depots and shops with a personnel of 150 officers and 
17,000 male and female employees.-^ It ran the shops 

22 Sixty-seven per cent, of the day shifts were composed of French- 
women. 



Quartermaster iic) 

for recuperation of fats, laundries, and disinfecting 
plants, finally it took charge of the sanitation of battle- 
fields, a service in which tens of thousands of men were 
employed simultaneously. 

The remount division, with a strength of 400 officers 
and 8,000 enlisted men, operated sixteen depots at the 
date of the armistice. 

The graves registration service included the acquisi- 
tion, maintenance, and control of cemeteries; identifica- 
tion of the dead; registry of burials, and correspondence 
with relatives of deceased soldiers. 

All these services were again subdivided into numerous 
branches; such division of labor being necessitated by 
the immense volume of work involved and the need 
of having tasks so apportioned as to secure intelligent 
supervision, by commissioned heads of various 
branches. 

Many of these officers were men who, in civil life, 
were accustomed to handling extensive business opera- 
tions, and were usually speciahsts in the branches as- 
signed to them. 

The quartermaster corps was represented in the vari- 
ous sections of the services of supply by a chief quarter- 
master on the staff of the commanding general of the 
section. Armies, ^^ army corps, "^ and divisions ^^ each 
had their quartermasters on the staffs of their respective 
commanders. 

Such were the general lines of an organization which, 
at the close of hostilities, provided for the supply of 
2,000,000 men, and operated a total of 844 installations 
distributed among 267 different localities. 

23 Members of G-4. 

24 Members of G-4. 

25 Members of G-i (division headquarters had no G-4). 



230 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Let us glance at the results achieved. 

The bakeries which were distributed in sixty-seven 
towns had a daily output of 1,000 tons of bread. Seven- 
teen refrigerating plants were in operation with a ca- 
pacity of 10,000 tons, fifteen others, with a capacity of 
16,000 tons, were under construction or projected. 
Fifty-eight quartermaster corps gardens had produced, 
up to November 15, 191 8, approximately 75,000,000 
pounds of vegetables at a cost (not counting the labor 
of enlisted men) of about one-third of the prevailing 
prices, 

A total of 1,016,622 tons of coal had been imported 
from England between October i, 19 17, and October 
31, 191 8. The shipment of British coal for the A. E. F. 
had grown from 28,338 tons in October, 1917, to 
207,630 tons in October, 191 8. There were eight cold 
storage yards in the A. E. F. with a total capacity, ulti- 
mate storage, of 1,219,000 tons. 

The gasoline and oil storages established in the vi- 
cinity of the base ports had a total capacity of 6,323,290 
gallons; those in the intermediate section a capacity of 
2,300,290 gallons. There was a total of twenty-seven 
storage and distribution stations in operation with sixty- 
six similar installations projected. Finally, seven French 
depots and oil refineries were utilized by the Expedition- 
ary Forces. The strongest deliveries to the army serv- 
ices were made in October, 1918: 9,675,200 gallons to 
the motor-transport service; 1,458,600 to the aviation; 
374,900 gallons of kerosene to the bulk of the services; 
150,000 gallons of castor oil and 503,600 pounds of 
grease. 

The service of remounts had been confronted with 
grave difficulties originating in the lack of sea tonnage 



Quartermaster 231 

and the scarcity of animals on the European markets. 
A total number of 243,560 horses and mules were de- 
livered to the A, E. F. : 136,114 were bought or requisi- 
tioned in France; 21,259 came from Great Britain; 
18,462 from Spain; 67,725 had been imported from the 
United States. 

Up to the date of November 11, 1 9 1 8, there had been 
imported to France 145,000 tons of hay, 215,000 tons 
of oats; 17,300 tons of bran. 

The salvage service, created on January 16, 191 8, 
secured results which it is worth while to mention. The 
percentage of salvage recoveries from articles shipped 
to depots requiring both renovation and repair aggre- 
gated 91 per cent, up to December 31, 19 18. The re- 
maining 9 per cent, was largely used as raw material in 
patching, mending, and renovation. 

The total cost of the operations of the salvage service 
as compared with the value of output of depots and 
shops was 1 1 per cent. 

The total value of the output of the service up to 
January 31, 1919, was $85,469,573.41. 

We cannot better sum up the accomplishments of the 
salvage service of the A. E. F. than by quoting the fol- 
lowing lines extracted from the report of its chief, Colonel 
T. B. Hacker: 

" What was in former wars a distinct liability has developed 
into a tremendous asset. Tonnage space and raw materials have 
been conserved and an unlimited field opened for the utilization 
of by-products heretofore regarded as waste." 

The graves registration service installed in France 
more than two hundred military cemeteries. They are 
scattered all over the country from the historic battle- 



232 The American Army in the European Conflict 

fields of Chateau-Thierry and the Argonne to the base 
ports on the Atlantic coast. The most important of 
these are located at Romagne-sous-Montfaucon, near 
Beaumont-sur-Meuse, and in the immediate vicinity of 
Paris near the Mont Valerian. There are also eighty- 
five American military burying grounds in England, a 
similar number in Italy and Belgium, and a few In north- 
ern Russia. 

The quartermaster personnel of 16 officers, 12 field 
clerks, and 10 enlisted men who landed in Liverpool on 
June 7, 19 1 7, had grown on December 15, 19 18, to 
4,229 officers and 96,541 enlisted men. These figures 
do not include about 600 officers and 18,000 enlisted 
men transferred to the motor-transport corps and about 
300 officers and 13,000 enlisted men transferred to the 
transportation department. 

The total amount disbursed by the quartermaster corps 
of the Expeditionary Forces from the time of the arrival 
of the first troops in France up to, and including, Feb- 
ruary 28, 19 19, was approximately $568,444,000. 

The ordnance department supplied to the American 
Army Its armament and munitions. It was charged with 
the choice or design of all types and models and with 
their procurement either by purchase or by manufacture 
in its own arsenals. It was responsible for the Issuing 
of material to the troops and for Its inspection and main- 
tenance. 

We will not give here a list of different materials per- 
taining to the ordnance (examined elsewhere) ; but limit 
ourselves to the mention of tractors, tanks, mobile repair 
shops, and all machinery necessary for the maintenance of 
ordnance material In the field. 



Ordnance 233 

During the war, the different types of material were 
determined in Washington, but the ordnance department 
of the Expeditionary Forces was very frequently con- 
sulted; it acted in the capacity of a technical adviser for 
the Washington authorities; and ensured liaison with the 
allied governments. 

The establishment of the ordnance department In 
France dates from the middle of June, 19 17, when Gen- 
eral (then Lieut. -Colonel) Williams, to-day chief of 
ordnance in Washington, arrived with General Pershing. 
The organization has been subject to a few rather un- 
important changes; we will here give a description of its 
definite form; that is, the one it had from May, 19 18, 
to the armistice. The department was grouped into five 
main divisions: 

administration, 

requirements, 

supply, 

construction and maintenance, 

engineering. 

The Admimstration Division was charged with record- 
ing and filing correspondence, auditing of all ordnance 
accounts, publication and distribution of bulletins of in- 
formation and orders, and execution of the general ad- 
ministration of the oflUce of the chief of ordnance. 

The requirements division was charged with prepara- 
tion of all schedules for ordnance material and the plac- 
ing of requisitions with the ordnance purchasing officer. 
It was also charged with the compilation of the various 
monthly reports required, and the complete record and 
follow up of requisitions placed, and the tonnage allotted 
to the ordnance. 



234 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The supply division was charged with the supervision 
of all depots for the receipt, storage, and issue of ord- 
nance material, and for their efficient and safe operation; 
with the maintenance of stocks and the preservation of 
material in the depots, with a maintenance of relations 
with forces in the field necessary for the satisfactory 
supply of their needs. 

The construction and maintenance division controlled 
the provision and maintenance of buildings and their 
equipment, also the supervision of construction and the 
actual work of upkeep and repair. Construction, how- 
ever, was performed by the engineer corps. The di- 
vision was further charged with the installation, inspec- 
tion, and maintenance of machinery for the shops and the 
mobile and semi-permanent ordnance repair shops at- 
tached to line organizations: and finally cooperated with 
the salvage corps in the repair and salvage of ordnance 
material. 

The engineering division was entrusted with the work 
of advising and instructing other divisions in all tech- 
nical matters relating to procurement, handling, storage, 
and transportation of ordnance stores and supplies; with 
investigation of causes of defects in ordnance material, 
and determination of the necessary remedy; with the 
conduct of research work and tests at proving grounds; 
with the handling of matters of design, determination of 
types, developing of new or modification of old mate- 
rial; with the preparation of technical pamphlets, draw- 
ings, and charts; with preparation of tables of spare 
parts. It had another role of great importance in the 
work of instructing personnel. 

The task of supplying the Expeditionary Forces in 
armament. In ammunition, in spare parts, coming both 



Ordnance 235 

from Europe and from the United States, was perhaps 
the most difficult that confronted any administrative de- 
partment of the American Army. The list of items in- 
cluded in ordnance supplies amounts to 32,000 articles. 
Ordnance material was divided into eight homogeneous 
groups with a special organization, office, and record sys- 
tem for each group. Incoming requisitions were broken 
up into group issue orders, each one of which covered 
only the material listed under one group. The system 
of " automatic supply " was adopted for the procure- 
ment of ordnance material; it involved the maintenance in 
France of a three months' supply of all kinds of mate- 
rial and spare parts. This method, which seems simple 
as a general theory, proved extremely difficult when ap- 
plied to this special branch of the service. It is com- 
paratively easy to foresee what will be the consumption 
of canned goods in an army of 1,000,000 men during a 
specified time; it is, on the contrary, extremely difficult to 
determine how many rounds of ammunition of different 
calibers will be consumed or how many machine guns 
will need replacement or repair. 

Nevertheless, the ordnance established " automatic 
supply tables " computed for each article, in the number 
of units necessary to supply 25,000 men for one month, 
allowing a liberal percentage for losses in transit or in 
storage. But, on account of the intensity of military 
operations and of the importance of unforeseen require- 
ments put in by units in the field, the system was never 
completely brought into application. 

The ordnance has never operated any manufacturing 
plant in France; the material of the A. E. F. was pur- 
chased in Europe or Imported from the United States. 
On the contrary, at the time of the armistice it had sev- 



236 The American Army in the European Conflict 

eral erection, repair, and charging plants in operation, 
or in process of construction. 

Its most important installation — not completely fin- 
ished at the close of the war > — was the repair shop at 
Mehun-sur-Yevre, the plans of which were drawn up to 
meet the requirements of an army of 2,000,000 men. 
There also existed an advance shop at Is-sur-Tille, and 
twenty-two installations of lesser importance. 

In the field, repairs were made by means of mobile 
repair shops belonging to two types: a heavy and a light 
one. Those of the first type were equipped with 3-ton 
trucks (called tool room, air compressor, and forge 
trucks respectively) and five 5-ton trailers of the machine- 
shop type (called lathe, welding set, drill press, shaper, 
and milling machine trailers). They were assigned to 
the brigades of heavy army artillery and to tank units. 
Repair shops of the light type somewhat less important 
were assigned to army and army-corps artillery parks 
and to divisions of infantry. 

Eight heavy mobile ordnance repair shop organiza- 
tions and twenty-five of the lighter sort were working at 
the time of the armistice. 

Almost all artillery material and ammunition used by 
the Expeditionary Forces were procured in France and 
to a much smaller extent in Great Britain. Only a few 
heavy guns and 109 75 mm. were imported from the 
United States by November 11, 1918. A few figures 
here will give an idea of the importance of the contracts 
made in Europe by the ordnance department: 

3)^35 75 mm. (3-inch) guns in France, 
1,190 155 mm. (6-inch) howitzers in France, 
2,550 Stokes mortars in Great Britain. 



Ordnance 237 

Deliveries were made at a satisfactory and regular 
rate. By November 30, 191 8, the actual deliveries were: 

1,978 75 mm. guns, from France, 

346 guns and 814 155 mm. howitzers, from 
France, 

209 8-inch howitzers, from Great Britain, 
1,597 3-inch mortars (Stokes), from Great Britain, 

559 6-inch Newton mortars, from Great Britain. 

Over 10,000,000 rounds of 7;; ^^ and 1,250,000 rounds 
of 155 ^"^ were in the same lapse of time delivered to the 
American Forces. 

Now, to the question of portable weapons. France 
supplied 4,658 Hotchkiss machine-guns and 40,000 
Chauchat automatic rifles. These contracts were made 
to meet the requirements pending the time when the 
United States should have a suflicient output of Browning 
light and heavy machine-guns (two weapons which may 
be considered as being by far the most perfect at present 
in existence), which were imported in great quantities 
after the summer of 19 18. 

Not including the portable weapons with which Amer- 
ican soldiers were equipped in the United States and which 
they carried with them when they came to France the 
ordnance department secured as well in America as in 
Europe a total of 93,326 machine guns, 600,000 rifles, 
and 75,000 automatic rifles. 

The very large contracts made in Europe were only 
rendered possible thanks to the activity displayed by the 
ordnance department in securing from America the enor- 
mous quantity of raw materials necessary. In the period 

264,111,000 have been fired. 
2^ 760,000 have been fired. 



238 The American Arviy in the European Conflict 

between April i, 191 8, and the armistice only, a total 
of 440,000 tons were actually imported in France. 

The war came to an end before the ordnance depart- 
ment had had a chance to see great numbers of American- 
made guns firing against the enemy American-made am- 
munition. 

Nevertheless its role has been a very useful one. The 
chiefs who were at its head had the merit of foreseeing 
the delay which must, of necessity, elapse between the 
entry of the United States into the war and the time when 
their system of war material manufacture would reach 
a sufficient output. 

They seized the right moment to adopt materials of 
allied make, and among these they always selected the 
best. 

The recruiting of ordnance personnel was of necessity 
rather difficult. American industry had not turned the 
bulk of its activities toward intense production of war 
material. The army of the United States had nothing 
to compare with the excellent personnel of gun repairers 
and skilled artificers that the French artillery had trained 
in peace time. 

Hardly had hostilities begun when a very active cam- 
paign was undertaken in the American universities and 
factories with a view to bringing about enlistment of a 
personnel whose technical knowledge and professional 
skill would furnish to the ordnance, officers, non- 
commissioned officers, and soldiers that it so much 
required. 

The great factory owners, civil engineers, overseers, 
skilled workmen thus enlisted generally underwent a 
course of training in ordnance arsenals. They were 
afterward formed into provisional units which, on their 



Chemical PFarfare 239 

arrival in France, were broken up and distributed by de- 
tachments in the installations where want of personnel 
was most acutely felt. Let us incidentally recall the 
fact that, in the course of the summer of 19 18, hardly 
any personnel except infantry troops were transported 
from America to France, which fact greatly handicapped 
ordnance activities in Europe. 

On the day of the armistice the total strength of the 
department present in France was only 1,803 officers and 
12,205 enlisted men. 

However, the very high technical skill and efficiency 
of this personnel made up in a certain measure for their 
small numbers. 

No sooner had he arrived in France than General 
Pershing gave orders with a view to the organization of 
the chemical warfare service, the growing importance 
of which was daily demonstrated by the military opera- 
tions under way. 

On July 5, 19 1 7, the service of engineers was charged 
to supply personnel and material for gas and flame offen- 
sives and the medical corps for gas defensives. All gas 
shell and other similar material were to be supplied by 
the ordnance. 

On September 3, 1917, the gas service was made an 
independent organization. Its chief, Lieut. -Colonel 
Fries, later brigadier-general, was charged with every- 
thing concerning chemical warfare, as well for offensive 
as for defensive purposes, organization and training of 
personnel, supply and conduct of operations. 

One regiment, called 1st Gas Regiment (formerly 
30th Regiment of Engineers) was organized. It com- 
prised: 



240 The American Army in the European Conflict 

8 headquarters, 

2 Stokes companies, 

4 Cylinder and Livens projector companies. 

It was later increased to six battalions each of three 
companies. 

On March 5, 1918, the chemical warfare service, the 
headquarters of which were then at Tours, was reor- 
ganized into three main divisions: 

military, 

technical, 

production and supply. 

On June 3, 191 8, considering the ever-growing impor- 
tance of chemical warfare, General Pershing recom- 
mended to his government that a special service intended 
for this kind of war be established in the National Army. 
On June 28th the War Department authorized the or- 
ganization of the " Chemical Warfare Service." The 
gas service of the Expeditionary Forces became the over- 
seas division of the new formation, with a total author- 
ized strength of 916 officers and 7,624 enlisted men, and 
was increased on October 8, 1918, to 1,315 officers and 
17,205 enlisted men. The war came to an end before 
the latter increase had been realized. 

Two general orders dated May 27, and July 2, 19 18, 
organized the details of the operations of the chemical 
warfare service in the A. E. F. Army, army corps, and 
divisions; gas officers were to be appointed by the chief 
of the service. 

Regimental and battalion gas officers were to be 
chosen by the unit commanders among those having fol- 
lowed special courses instituted at the gas school. 



Chemical Warfare 241 

The chief of chemical warfare procured material either 
through requests made from the other services (quarter- 
master and ordnance) through requisition from the 
United States, or through purchase in Europe. 

He had representatives in the general purchasing board 
and on the inter-allied committee for chemical warfare 
supplies organized on March 6, 19 18. 

Important deliveries of gas masks {mark M 2) were 
made by France; 400,000 respirator boxes were pur- 
chased in Great Britain. 

Supplies were stored in central depots, ^^ whence, ac- 
cording to requisitions made by regulating officers, they 
were forwarded to army depots established in the zone 
of field operations. At the time of the armistice these 
central depots had on hand, among other items, 1,850,- 
000 respirator boxes, 4,095 projectors, 36,468 Livens 
cylinders, and 39,105 Stokes trench-mortar bombs filled 
with aquinite and Collongite. 

Manufactures organized in Europe by the American 
service of chemical warfare were not yet greatly devel- 
oped at the end of the war: 2,000 cylinders were filled 
with gas at Pont-de-Claix : a mask salvage plant was in 
operation at Chateauroux, 200,000 Connell canisters had 
been produced in England. 

As for shells, bombs, and grenades, the service limited 
its activities to the supply of gas envelopes; that is to 
say, the projectiles themselves being supplied by the 
ordnance. Twenty per cent, of all projectiles that were 
being produced in the United States at the close of hos- 
tilities, up to and including, 220 mm. shells were filled 
with gas. This proportion was to be increased to 25 
per cent, after January i, 1919. 

-8 The most important of these were established at Montoir, St. Sulpice, 
and Gievres. 



242 The American Army in the European Conflict 

A chemical laboratory for the study of technical prob- 
lems was established at Puteaux, Sag paste, an excellent 
preventative for mustard gas burns, was turned out there. 

Near Chaumont, the service had at Its disposal an 
experimental field for the tests pertaining to allied or 
enemy chemical warfare material. 

A school for officers was annexed to it; the course, 
which was of varied duration, was at the time of the 
armistice being followed by 228 officers. 

American gas troops took a most active part In the 
great military operations that developed between June, 
191 8, and the armistice. 

On the Marne and the Vesle from June 30th to Sep- 
tember 1 8th, they utilized among others, 229 Stokes 
thermit bombs, 718 smoke bombs, and executed eight 
Important gas projector attacks. 

During the Meuse-Argonne offensive, six companies 
of the 1st Gas Regiment were assigned to the First 
Army, and organized Into three battalions. They em- 
ployed 1,185 Stokes smoke bombs, 1,345 Thermit bombs, 
489 gas bombs, 236 Livens cylinders, 130 of which were 
filled with gas and 206 with high explosives. As the at- 
tacks progressed, more and more gas was used, the confi- 
dence of attacking troops in the units of the gas service 
was constantly proved by the requests sent in ever-in- 
creasing numbers for the collaboration of the personnel 
of the gas service in their attacks. 

More cannot be said in proof of the value of this serv- 
ice and the skill and courage of its personnel. 

The inspector-general' s department is a very ancient 
institution in the United States Army, having been or- 
ganized in 1775 under General Washington. 



Inspector General 243 

Its sphere of activity extends over every branch of 
military affairs excepting purely tactical operations. 

According to existing regulations, inspectors exercised 
a comprehensive and general observation over all that 
pertains to the efficiency of the army: camps, billets, 
transportation, clothing, armament and equipment, ac- 
counts, supplies, morale of the troops. They condemn 
unserviceable property, verify money accounts, expendi- 
ture of public funds, and report as to irregularities dis- 
covered, making suggestions as to the correction of de- 
fects coming under their observation. They also under- 
take special investigations when required. 

It is easy to conceive of the importance of the part 
played by such a department In an organization of the 
size of the Expeditionary Forces whose activities cov- 
ered so many points of our territory. Therefore, twice 
In succession, General Pershing was led to increase the 
scope of these activities. 

On November 9, 19 17, he authorized the Inspector- 
general to give all orders which might be found necessary 
to secure prompt correction of any Irregularities or de- 
ficiencies noted at Inspection of troops. On June 5, 19 18, 
when the American Army entered the period of active 
operations on a large scale, he charged the Inspector gen- 
eral with the supervision of discipline throughout the 
American Expeditionary Forces. 

In the course of the great offensive which marked the 
ultimate phase of the war, the Inspector generals were 
to keep the high command constantly informed touching 
the fighting value of the troops at the time when they 
entered the field of battle or were withdrawn from the 
fight. 

The department was during the entire course of the 



244 The American Army in the European Conflict 

war commanded by General Brewster; it was organized 
by army, army corps, and division. 

Divisional inspectors were to keep in touch with troops 
engaged in line; thus they reported only upon such facts 
as they had personally observed, and their daily reports 
kept the high command most exactly informed as to the 
material and moral conditions of the troop and their 
leaders. 

In the American Army, the activities of the judge- 
advocate are very much the same as those of the " Service 
du Contentieux et de la Justice Militaire " in the French 
Army. 

General Bethel, who was at the head of this depart- 
ment during the whole war, organized his central office 
at Chaumont in five sections. The first considered gen- 
eral questions of military law and administration, the 
application of war legislation, matters of naturalization, 
and repatriation. It supplied private and gratuitous 
legal advice to members of the Expeditionary Forces. 
The second section supervised the work of the field judge- 
advocates, reviewed the. proceedings of general courts- 
martial, and sat upon disciplinary questions and those 
connected with the administration of military justice. 

The third section was concerned solely with those cases 
of conviction by military courts which involved the penal- 
ties of dishonorable discharge, the dismissal of an officer, 
or death. 

The fourth section was concerned with the legal aspects 
of army finance, with questions of purchase and supply, 
contracts, accounts, claims, pay and allowances, Insur- 
ance, and workmen's compensation. 

The fifth section studied and advised upon questions 



Judge Advocate 245 

of international law, the interpretation of treaties and 
international agreements, matters of foreign law, of re- 
lations with the Allies and the enemy, prisoners of war, 
and the military occupation. 

With troops in the field, each army had its army judge- 
advocate, each corps a corps judge-advocate, and each 
division normally two judge-advocates. 

In the zone of the interior, there was a judge-advocate 
of the S. O. S. stationed at Tours, under whom operated 
judge-advocates for each of the sections of the S. O. S. 
He was also the director of the renting, requisitions, and 
claims service. 

Before terminating this chapter it may be of interest 
to point out two important features of the administration 
of military justice by American courts-martial. The 
first consists in the power wielded by the authority which 
prescribed the reunion of a court-martial to modify, but 
only in a mitigating sense, any sentence that does not 
involve death penalty or dismissal from the army. 

The other one involves the very frequent application 
of suspension of pay, this kind of punishment being very 
effective by reason of the high pay rates in the American 
Army. 

In order to complete this summary description of the 
main administrative departments existing in the A. E. F. 
at the close of hostilities, three more ought to be men- 
tioned here : 

The Military Board of Allied Supply, the General Di- 
rection of transportation, and the motor transport serv- 
ice. 

But the first of these, by reason of Its regional ac- 
tivities, was very closely linked to the territorial organiza- 



246 The American Army in the European Conflict 

tion of the service of supplies. The second whose main 
duty consisted in connecting the advance section, the inter- 
mediate section, and the base section, had its activities 
spread all along the American lines of communication. 
The third, forming as it did the complement and pro- 
longation of the service of railways, naturally falls under 
the subject of this latter treated elsewhere and conse- 
quently these three branches are grouped together in 
Chapter XI under the heading, " Development of the 
Lines of Communication.'^ 



CHAPTER VII 

SITUATION OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AT THE 
BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER, 1918 

During the first days of September, General Pershing 
found himself at the head of an army of 1,400,000 of 
whom 1,000,000 at least were combatants. 

But if we wish to form a real idea of the strength 
of the Expeditionary Forces at this time, these numbers 
require careful commentary. For, as may be easily un- 
derstood, the commander-in-chief could onlv dispose in 
the active offensive operations. Imminent at this date, of 
those units already organized and sufficiently trained. 

Should the war be prolonged, the number of divisions 
would, of course, constantly increase. The arrival of 
troops was being effectuated practically without either 
delay or serious hindrance. Thanks to the application 
of the system of replacements which had been adopted, 
no great diminution In the strength of the fighting units 
could be foreseen. It was easy for General Pershing 
to establish with relative accuracy, after the following 
manner, the exact military situation of his forces. To 
those divisions which, after having already fought, were 
withdrawn from the line In order to rest and incorporate 
the replacements automatically furnished by the divisional 
depots, were to be added those divisions not yet engaged 
but whose training was or was about to be terminated. 
General Pershing had also to take into account the actual 
position of his troops and their employment either in the 

247 



248 The American Army in the European Conflict 

rear or in the advance zone. This situation, such as it 
appeared in the early days of September, we shall en- 
deavor to place before the reader. 

On the twenty-second of August, at which time the 
commander-in-chief contemplated forming a purely Amer- 
ican Field Army composed of his First and Third Corps, 
placed side by side upon the Vesle, the army headquarters 
were established at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, thence trans- 
ported to Neufchateau, where they awaited the occasion 
to direct the operations which were to be attempted by 
the American troops. 

As yet no one had been designated to take command 
of the first field army, and this, for reasons which may 
easily be explained: up to this time, the numerous ac- 
tivities in which American troops had been engaged were 
carried on with units which, in size, were never superior 
to a division or at most a corps. No American chief 
had, as yet, been obliged to grapple with the difl^iculties 
and complications entailed by a command over a very 
extensive front, where obstacles to communication and 
supply in a foreign land were added to all those inherent 
to active combat. 

The situation was particularly delicate for the first 
American army chief who should be called uoon to face 
it, especially as the French Government had asked and 
obtained from America, at the moment of the spring 
offensive, the placing of infantry transport at the head 
of the priority schedule, to the detriment of anv other 
arm or service. The diflSculties and responsibilities of 
the chief of the first field army, thus deprived of part of 
the resources necessary for the life of an army, were 
bound to be very great. General Pershing considered 



• <W%E***»' 



O^^O' 







American Effectives in September, igi8 249 

that he alone should assume such an onerous burden, and 
reserved to himself the direct command of the first Amer- 
ican Army which was now to take the field. ^ 

Already seven army corps existed or were in process of 
formation : 

The First Corps, under General Liggett, which had 
already taken part in active operations in the Marne and 
Vesle campaigns, and was at this time between Salzerais 
and Toul. This corps possessed Its organic artillery and 
a portion of its services of the rear. 

The Second Corps may be simply noted here as operat- 
ing upon the British front. General Read, who was in 
command, had established his headquarters at Fruges 
where he administered the American divisions which were 
in line or else undergoing instruction In the British zone. 

The Third Corps, commanded by General Bullard, 
still remained at Chateau-de-Fresnes, south of the Vesle, 
from whence they were soon to be transported to Soullly, 
near Verdun. Like the First, the Third Corps had al- 
ready been proven; like it it also possessed its own artil- 
lery and other services, and might therefore be considered 
as ready for action. 

The Fourth Corps of much more recent formation was 
under the orders of General Dickman, former com- 
mander of the Third Division; his staff was newly as- 

^ Order of Battle of the First Army at the date of September i, 1918. 
General John J. Pershing, Army Commander 

Colonel Hugh. A. Drumm Chief of Staff 

Colonel A. B. Barber Chief of the First Section 

Colonel Charles L. Hall Chief of the Second Section 

Colonel R. McCleave Chief of the Third Section 

Colonel J. L. DeWitt Chief of the Fourth Section 

Colonel Lewis H. Watkins Chief of the Fifth Section 



250 The American Army in the European Conflict 

sembled at Toul with supervision over operations in the 
southern Woevre sector.^ 

The Fifth Corps had been for several days at Benoite- 
Vaux, near Dieue-sur-Meuse. Its chief, General Cam- 
eron, lately at the head of the Fourth Division, during 
operations between the Marne and Vesle, had but re- 
cently constituted his staff. ^ 

The Sixth Corps which was at Bourbonne-les-Bains 
recently organized and consequently not ready for action. 
It was commanded by General Bundy, lately at the head 
of the gallant Second Division which had checked the 
enemy before Chateau-Thierry.^ 

The Seventh Corps was operating in the Vosges under 
General Wright, formerly commanding the Fifth Corps, 
with headquarters at Remiremont. This Seventh Corps 

- Order of Battle of the Fourth Army Corps at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Major-General Joseph T. Dickman, Commanding the Army Corps 

Colonel Stuart Heintzelman Chief of Staff 

Major James Ulio Chief of First Section, G i 

Major Joseph Stillwell Chief of Second Section, G 2 

Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Haskell Chief of Third Section, G 3 

3 Order of Battle of the Fifth Army Corps at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Major-General George H. Cameron, Commanding the Army Corps 

Brigadier-General W. B. Burtt Chief of Staff 

Lieutenant-Colonel Albert W. Forman Chief of First Section, Gi 

Lieutenant-Colonel George M. Russell Chief of Second Section, G2 

Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. Emerson Chief of Third Section, G3 

4 Order of Battle of the Sixth Army Corps at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Major-General Omar Bundy, Commanding the Army Corps 

Brigadier-General Briant H. Wells Chief of Staff 

Colonel Charles H. Bridges Chief of First Section, G i 

Lieutenant-Colonel S. T. Mackall Chief of Second Section, G2 

Colonel George F. Baltzell Chief of Third Section, G 3 



American Effectives in September, igi8 251 

was formed from elements of the old Fifth Corps whose 
place It took.^ 

General Wright's administrative supervision extended 
over all the American forces under instruction or occupy- 
ing sectors in the rear of the French eastern group of 
armies. 

In fine, out of seven army-corps staffs, we may con- 
sider that two were immobilized — the Second upon the 
British front; the Seventh on the front of our eastern 
group of armies — and the Sixth was not, for the mo- 
ment, capable of being utilized. Consequently, we can- 
not count it at this time, more than four army corps ready 
for active service upon the Lorraine Front; namely, 
the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth. 

Among the divisions which could be considered at this 
time as fighting units; that is to say, which had partici- 
pated in action or occupied the trenches for a sufficient 
period to have become accustomed to being under fire, 
and which had also the advantage of possessing their 
own artillery services, fourteen could be counted upon 
in the action which was shortly to take place. 

Three on the Fesle, where they formed part of the 
Third American Army Corps, the Twenty-eighth, Thirty- 
second, and Seventy-seventh. 

Three in defensive sectors in the southern Woevre 

5 Order of Battle of the Seventh Army Corps at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Major-General William W. Wright, Commanding the Army Corps 

Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Johnson Chief of Staff 

Lieutenant-Colonel Ward S. Dabney Chief of First Section, Gi 

First Lieutenant James W. Barney Chief of Second Section, Gz 

Captain John H. Prentice Chief of Third Section, G3 



252 The American Army in the European Conflict 

region north of Nancy: the Eighty-second,^ Eighty-ninth," 
and Ninetieth;^ only the first of these possessed its ar- 
tillery. But in order to hasten the entry of the two lat- 

6 Order of Battle of the Eighty-second Division at the date of September 
1, 1918. 

Major-General William P. Burnham, Commanding the Division 
163d Infantry Brigade 164th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General M. D. Cronin Brigadier-General J. R. Lindsey 
325th Infantry Regiment 327th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Walter M. Whitman Colonel Frank D. Ely 

326th Infantry Regiment 328th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel John C. McArthur Colonel H. B. Nelson 

157th Artillery Brigade 
Brigadier-General C. D. Rhodes 
319th Artillery Regiment 
Colonel E. d'A Pearce 
320th Artillery Regiment 
Colonel H. C. Williams 
321st Artillery Regiment 
Colonel Clarence Deems, Jr. 

"^ Order of Battle of the Eighty-ninth Division at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Brigadier-General Frank L. Winn, Commanding the Division 
(This division had not yet received its artillery). 

177th Infantry Brigade 178th Infantry Brigade 

Colonel James H. Reeves Brigadier-General T. G. Hanson 

353d Infantry Regiment 355th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Conrad S. Babcock Colonel James D. Taylor 

354th Infantry Regiment 356th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Americus Mitchell Colonel L. M. Nuttman 

8 Order of Battle of the Ninetieth Division at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Major-General Henry T. Allen, Commanding the Division 
(This division had not yet received Its artillery). 

179th Infantry Brigade l8oth Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General J. P. O'Nell Brig.-Gen. V. S. McAlexander 

357th Infantry Regiment 359th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Ed. T. Hartman Colonel W. A. Cavanaugh 

368th Infantry Regiment 360th Infantry Regimert 

Colonel E. M. Leary Colonel H. C. Price 



American Effectives in September^ igi8 253 

ter Into line, the organic artillery destined for the Ameri- 
can divisions operating with the British could be assigned 
to these units. 

Eight withdraivn from the front for rest and instruc- 
tion had taken part in the operations of July and August 
or had been engaged in active sectors. These included 
the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth,^ the Twenty- 
sixth, Thirty-fifth,^*^ and Forty-second. 

8 Order of Battle of the Fifth Division at the date of September i, 1918. 
Major-General John McMahon, Commanding the Division 

Qth Infantry Brigade loth Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General J. C. Castner Colonel Paul B. Malone 

§oth Infantry Regiment 6th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel F. B. Hawkins Colonel Henry J. Hunt 

6lst Infantry Regiment llth Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Hugh D. Wise Colonel John B. Bennet 

5th Artillery Brigade 
Brigadier-General C. A. F. Flagler 
iQth Artillery Regiment 
Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Hollingsworth 
20th Artillery Regiment 
Colonel Brooke Payne 
2ist Artillery Regiment 
Colonel H. MacMaster 
10 Order of Battle of the Thirty-fifth Division at the date of September 
1, 1918. 

Major-General Peter E. Traub, Commanding the Division 

6gth Infantry Brigade 70th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General N. F. McClure Brigadier-General Chas. 1. Martin 
ISyth Infantry Regiment ISQth Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Clad. Hamilton Colonel Kirby Walker 

IjSt/i Infantry Regiment 140th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel George P. White Colonel Pierce A. Murphy 

60th Artillery Brigade 
Brigadier-General L. G. Berry 
128th Artillery Regiment 
Colonel F. M. Rumbold 
I2Qth Artillery Regiment 
Colonel Karl D. Klemm 
130th Artillery Regiment 
Lieutenant-Colonel James E. Wilson 



2 54 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Four divisions more were placed on the Vosges front 
either framed in with French troops or brigaded with 
French divisions. They were the Thirty-seventh,^^ 
Ninety-second,^^ Sixth, ^^ and Twenty-ninth. 

The Thirty-seventh and the Sixth expected to receive 
their artillery in the middle of September, whereas that 

" Order of Battle of the Thirty-seventh Division at the date of 
September i, 1918. 

Major-General C. S. Farnsworth, Commanding the Division 

(This division had not yet received its artillery). 

73d Infantry Brigade 74th Infantry Brigade 

Brig-Gen. C. X. Zimmerman Brigadier-General W. P. Jackson 

145th Infantry Regiment 147th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Sanford B. Haubery Colonel F. W. Galbraith 

146th Infantry Regiment 148th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel James N. Pickering Colonel J. A. Lynch 

12 Order of Battle of the Ninety-second Division at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Major-General Charles C. Ballou, Commanding the Division 

(This division had not yet received its artillery). 

183d Infantry Brigade 184th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General M. H. Barnum Brigadier-General Wm. H. Hay 

Sdsth Infantry Regiment 36yth Infantry Regiment 

Colonel V. A. Caldwell Colonel James A. Moss 

366th Infantry Regiment 368th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Ralph B. Parrott Colonel Fred R. Brown 

13 Order of Battle of the Sixth Division at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Major-General Walter H. Gordon, Commanding the Division 

(This division had not yet received its artillery). 

Ilth Infantry Brigade 12th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Wm. R. Dashiell Brigadier-General James B. Erwin 

51st Infantry Regiment 53d Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Isaac Newell Colonel F. G. Stretzinger 

52d Infantry Regiment 54th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Ernest V. Smith Colonel M. Crowley 



American Effectives in September, igiS 255 

of the Twenty-ninth ^^ was only to be furnished at the 
end of the month. 

As to the five divisions distributed in the British zone, 
two — the Twenty-seventh and the Thirtieth — were 
engaged in active operations, after which, regrouped and 
reorganized, they were to constitute the Second Corps 
when this was to operate with the British. The Thirty- 
third,^^ Seventy-eighth,^^ and Eightieth having practically 

1* Order of Battle of the Twenty-ninth Division at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Major-General Charles G. Morton, Commanding the Division 
(This division had not yet received its artillery). 

57/A Infantry Brigade 58th Infantry Brigade 

Colonel Milton A. Reckord Brigadier-General H. H. Bandholtz 

IlSth Infantry Regiment 115th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Harry C. Jones Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. R. Pope 

114th Infantry Regiment Il6th Infantry Regiment 

Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Buttle Colonel A. J. Harris 

15 Order of Battle of the Thirty-third Division at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Major-General George Bell, Commanding the Division 

(This division had not yet received its artillery). 

65th Infantry Brigade 66th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Edw. L. King Brigadier-General Paul A. Wolf 

129th Infantry Regiment ^Slst Infantry Regiment 

Colonel E. A. Myer Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn 

130th Infantry Regiment I32d Infantry Regiment 

Colonel J. v. Clinnin Colonel Abel Davis 

16 Order of Battle of the Seventy-eighth Division at the date of 
September i, 1918. 

Major-General James H. McCrae, Commanding the Division 

(This division had not yet received its artillery). 

iSSth Infantry Brigade is6th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Mark L. Harsey Brigadier-General James T. Dean 

309th Infantry Regiment 311th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel John M. Morgan Colonel Marcus B. Stokes 

310th Infantry Regiment 312th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Walter C. Babcock Colonel Alvord V. P. Anderson 



256 The American Army in the European Conflict 

completed their training were ready to be withdrawn 
from the British zone and sent to rejoin the bulk of the 
American contingents at the French front, should General 
Pershing think fit. Accordingly at the end of August 
orders were given to that effect. 

The Thirty-third was sent near Esnes (in the Verdun 
district), the Seventy-eighth to Bourbonne-les-Bains, the 
Eightieth ^"^ to Chatillon-sur-Seine. 

One colored division (the Ninety-third) was split up 
and distributed among the French forces, a regiment or 
two by division. ^^ 

The six depot divisions were to serve as a reservoir 
to be drawn upon for filling up the ranks of the fighting 
units, and need simply be noted here; they were the 
Thirty-ninth, Fortieth, Forty-first, Seventy-sixth, Eighty- 
third, and Eighty-fifth. 

Six more divisions recently disembarked had just 
begun training; these were the Ninety-first,^^ Seventy- 

1^ Order of Battle of the Eightieth Division at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Major-General Adelbert Cronkhite, Commanding the Division 
(This division had not yet received its artillery). 

iSQth Infantry Brigade i6oth Infantry Brigade 

Brig.-Gen. George H. Jamerson Brigadier-General Lloyd M. Brett 
317th Infantry Regiment 319th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Howard R. Perry Colonel Frank S. Cochon 

3iSth Infantry Regiment 320th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Ulysses G. Worillow Lt.-Col. Ephraim G. Peyton 

IS The 369th Infantry reenforced the French One hundred Sixty-first 
Division; the 370th the French Fifty-ninth Division; the 371st and 372d 
reinforced the One hundred Fifty-seventh French Division. 

1^ Order of Battle of the Ninety-first Division at the date of September 
1, 1918. 

Major-General William H. Johnston, Commanding the Division 
(This division had not yet received its artillery). 

l8lst Infantry Brigade l82d Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General J. B. McDonald Brigadier-General F. S. Foltz 



American Effectives in September, igi8 257 

nmth,2° Thirty-sixth, 2^ Seventh, ^^ Eighty-first,^^ and 
Eighty-eighth. 2* 

The Ninety-first was expected to be ready in mid-Sep- 
tember, and capable, if General Pershing so decided, to go 
directly into line without passing through that prepara- 
tory school of combat, the quiet sector. 

361st Infantry Regiment ^dsd Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Wm. D. Davis Colonel H. LaT. Cavanaugh 

S62d Infantry Regiment 364th Infantry Regiment 

Lt.-Col. J. B. Woolnough Colonel Geo. MacD. Weeks 

20 Order of Battle of the Seventy-ninth Division at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Major-General Joseph E. Kuhn, Commanding the Division 
(This division had not yet received its artillery). 

157th Infantry Brigade 158th Infantry Brigade 

Brig.-Gen. Wm. J. Nicholson Brigadier-General K. H. Noble 

313th Infantry Regiment 315th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Claude B. Sweezey Colonel Alden C. Knowles 

314th Infantry Regiment 316th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel Wm. H. Oury Colonel Oscar J. Charles 

21 Order of Battle of the Thirty-sixth Division at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Major-General William R. Smith, Commanding the Division 
(This division had not yet received its artillery). 

yist Infantry Brigade ysnd Infantry Brigade 

Brig.-Gen. Pegram Witworth Brigadier-General John A. Halen 

141st Infantry Regiment 143d Infantry Regiment 

Colonel W. E. Jackson Colonel John S. Hoover 

I42d Infantry Regiment 14.4th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel A. W. Bloor Colonel Wm. K. Wright 

22 Order of Battle of the Seventh Division at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Brigadier-General C. H. Barth, Commanding the Division 
(This division had not yet received its artillery). 

13th Infantry Brigade 14th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General C. H. Barth Brigadier-General Lutz Wahl 

55th Infantry Regiment 34th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel J. V. Heidt Colonel Fred. L. Munson 

56th Infantry Regiment 64th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel W. O. Johnson Colonel E. A. Lewis 



258 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The Seventy-ninth could be expected to undertake ac- 
tive operations at about the same time. 

The Thirty-sixth had arrived in France only in the 
last days of July and could hardly be ready for active 
service before October. The three other divisions which 
figure in this enumeration — that is to say, the Seventh, 
Eighty-first and Eighty-eighth — were only sent into 
camp at about the middle of August and could not be 
counted on before the latter part of October. 

To sum up the situation: General Pershing might count 
upon having at the end of August, ready for active serv- 
ice, one field army staff, four army corps staffs, fourteen 
divisions able, in case of necessity, to take the field. 
These divisions possessed their artillery. Four divisions 
might, in case of emergency, also take part in the battle 
since they already were in sectors and were expecting to 

23 Order of Battle of the Eighty-first Division at the date of September 
1, 1918. 

Major-General Charles J. Bailey, Commanding the Division 
(This division had not yet received its artillery). 

16 1 St Infantry Brigade i62d Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General G. W. Mclver Brigadier-General M. McFarland 

321st Infantry Regiment 323d Infantry Regiment 

Col. Frank Halstead Colonel Thomas A. Pearce 

322d Infantry Brigade 324th Infantry Regiment 

Colonel L. T. Richardson Colonel G. W. Moses 

24 Order of Battle of the Eighty-eighth Division at the date of September 
I, 1918. 

Major-General William Weigel, Commanding the Division 
(This division had not yet received its artillery). 

175th Infantry Brigade 176th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General M. B. Stewart Brigadier-General W. O. Beach 

349th Infantry Regiment 35^st Infantry Regiment 

Colonel G. Sturdevant Colonel H. B. Crosby 

3S0th Infantry Regiment 3S2d Infantry Regiment 

Colonel H. J. Price Colonel Clyde E. Hawkins 



American Effectives in September, igi8 259 

be joined by their artillery before the end of September. 
Three divisions might be transferred from the British 
front and two more, whose instruction was almost fin- 
ished (the Ninety-first and Seventy-ninth) could be con- 
sidered as utilizable in case of necessity. 

The following month, four fresh divisions might 
be expected to leave camp for the fighting line; conse- 
quently America could calculate on placing 600,000 com- 
batants in the field during the first days of September, 
100,000 more at the end of this same month or, at the 
latest, during October. 

In order to complete this enumeration, we should also 
say a word on the situation of the artillery in the Ameri- 
can Army. 

At the date of which we are speaking, fifteen brigades 
— that is to say, the organic formations of fifteen divi- 
sions — had quitted their training camps and were ready 
to support their infantry in battle. By modifying the 
ultimate designation of some of these units — as was done 
In certain divisional formations, and reenforcing the di- 
visions ready for combat on the French front with certain 
artillery brigades which had been destined to divisions 
operating on the British front, or with those whose di- 
visions were not scheduled to participate In the forth- 
coming battle, It was found possible to bring into line 
for the great offensive which General Pershing was about 
to undertake almost the total artillery forces of which the 
American Army at this time disposed. 

During the month of September, nine more divisional 
artilleries might be expected to quit camp, after their 
first phase of training. If they were able to find the req- 
uisite number of horses, and, during the month of Octo- 
ber, three more brigades might be counted upon. 



26o The American Army in the European Conflict 

The heavy artillery of the American forces which was 
sufficiently trained to enter the field comprehended seven 
regiments, of which four were armed with the long 155 
G. P. F., two with the 8-inch Anglo-American guns, 
and one with the British 9.2 inch guns. 

The railroad artillery which was now also In readiness 
was constituted by one entire regiment and a portion of 
two others. 

Taken together, all the above-mentioned units — 
staffs, divisions, infantry, or artillery regiments — might 
be said to share in the same qualities and possess the 
same defects. 

Eager for combat, sufficiently instructed, and absolutely 
decided to win, their equipment was necessarily inade- 
quate. They lacked horses, transport wagons, trucks, 
ambulances, all the rolling stock, in short, and those ac- 
cessories which, in previous wars, were found cumber- 
some to the fighting units, but which were now essential 
in the kind of warfare which the Americans were about 
to carry on. 

The larger the unit, the more it must necessarily suffer 
from a shortage such as we have mentioned. The divi- 
sion better able to suffice to itself could, when it was 
possible to reenforce it with a fraction of French artillery, 
superposed upon the groupings of the American batteries, 
sustain a lengthy action. But in the army corps the non- 
divisional elements found themselves in a much more pre- 
carious position and in the First Army the same difficult 
situation was to be found as has been noticed in the army 
corps, only more aggravated. 

The commander-in-chief of the Expeditionary Forces 
found himself therefore face to face with a condition of 



American Effectives in September, igi8 261 

things resulting from the early decisions which had been 
taken under the stress of circumstances made necessary 
by the military happenings of the spring of 19 18. At 
which time, as we have seen, the French and British au- 
thorities requested the American Government to hasten 
the transport of infantry troops to the detriment of any 
other form of service. The lack of horses was now felt 
to an alarming degree. The United States had held 
over those which were ready to be embarked and France 
was no longer able, by requisition, to furnish the necessary 
number. 

Thus It Is easy to understand — and upon this remark 
we may terminate this chapter — the American Expedi- 
tionary Forces disposed of a splendid offensive instrument 
In the early days of September, but one which lacked, If 
it were to give Its full measure of success, certain essential 
organs, and the larger the unit the more this want was 
felt. This condition of things was particularly aggra- 
vated In the army corps and In the field army. 



CHAPTER VIII 

the american army during the general offensive 

september-november, i918. (battle of st. 

mihiel operations between meuse and 

argonne) 

From the time the Sixth French Army reached the 
Vesle, the enemy made manifest his intention of clinging 
to his positions on the right bank of this river, and it soon 
became evident that the Franco-American troops under 
General Degoutte would have to mark time for a certain 
period on this part of the front. 

Although the American commander-in-chief had ex- 
pected personally to take over the direction of the army 
In this sector, thereby relieving the French Sixth Army by 
a fresh allied contingent; in view of the circumstances 
which indicated a let-up of active operations hereabout 
and a tendency toward stabilization, his attention was 
naturally turned elsewhere, and, since the foe Intended 
holding firmly to his center it became clear that good 
strategy on our side demanded a maneuver on the wings. 

General Pershing naturally turned toward the St. 
Mihiel salient. 

For more than a year, a plan affecting this section of 
the front had been projected by the Chaumont head- 
quarters, studied and discussed between the French and 
American commanders, and even touched upon during the 

262 



September Offensive 263 

second interview between Generals Petain and Pershing 
at Compiegne in June, 19 17. The idea was therefore 
by no means a new one. 

It now presented a triple advantage: that of extending 
the front of our attack; that of giving an appropriate 
objective to the American troops of whom many were 
still inexperienced, and finally, to turn the bulk of the 
Expeditionary Forces into a portion of the front which 
was in direct line with its communications by road and 
rail, which covered its depots, its training camps; in short, 
which was in close touch with the various centers of 
American activity. 

All these points being in its favor, the plan encountered 
unanimous support; it remained merely with the hig.h 
command to arrange the details and fix the day for the 
great assault. 

Marshal Foch, who wished to give the enemy a mini- 
mum time to recuperate from the effects of the blows 
already dealt him in other theaters, desired that the 
attack on the St. Mihiel salient might be undertaken as 
soon as practicable. 

General Petain and General Pershing shared these 
views, more especially as the autumnal rainy season was 
near at hand when the plains of the Woevre, the scene of 
future maneuvers, would be transformed into a vast 
swamp unfavorable to troop movements. 

As to the possible extension which ought to be given to 
this affair, opinions differed somewhat. 

The American general contemplated lining up his forces 
on the southern Woevre front east of St. Mihiel and on 
the Meuse Heights north of St. Mihiel, debouching from 
these two separate starting points and seizing afterward 
by a surprise attack — his two masses united — the 



264 The American Army in the European Conflict 

second German position known as the Hindenburg Line. 
Thus he would find himself in a position to threaten not 
only the mineral basin of Briey, but also the adversary's 
communication lines in this neighborhood. 

The French high command considered limiting the 
offensive action to the taking of the Hindenburg Line. 

The allied high command reduced the plan in order to 
take in less distant objectives. Marshal Foch did not 
wish to see the American Army engaged too far in a 
direction so divergent from that on which he intended 
action, as he soon might have need of the cooperation of 
American troops at another point. ^ 

The prerogatives appertaining to each individual com- 
mander during these operations arranged themselves as a 
matter of course. Thanks to the attitude of General 
Pershing and his devotion to the greater good of the 
cause, all minor difficulties were smoothed away. In the 
same spirit which had caused him to accept a command 
under General Fayolle when he was to direct limited 
operations on the Vesle front, he now willingly placed 
himself under the orders of the commander-in-chief of the 
French armies. From the first days of September a 
most close and intimate cooperation between General 
Petain and General Pershing was established. All de- 
cisions were rapidly taken and in complete accord. 

Following is an enumeration of some of the arrange- 
ments made to facilitate the heavy task imposed upon 
the American commander-in-chief who, at this moment, 
was obliged not only to elaborate and to execute the plans 
under contemplation, but also to create an entire army, 

1 Already on the second of September, Marshal Foch had confided to 
General Pershing his intention of including the American forces in his 
projected offensive between Verdun and Rheims. 



September Offensive 265 

improvise its staff and services, and that during the lapse 
of one month's time. 

One French officer was charged with the liaison be- 
tween Generals Pershing and Petain in order to expedite 
the solution of the many questions which constantly arose. 

The eastern group of armies, and more especially the 
Eighth French Army, were to furnish the services — rear 
and supplies — which were lacking to the American forces 
operating in the Woevre. 

In the same manner, the Second French Army was to 
furnish what was essential to the American contingents 
operating on the Meuse Heights in the vicinity of Les 
Eparges and Combres. 

The Second Colonial Corps, maintained at a strength 
of three divisions, was to remain posted before St. Mihiel 
in order to link the two American attacks which were 
scheduled for the same day. 

A fourth French division was also placed under Gen- 
eral Pershing's orders to take part in the offensive near 
Les Eparges. 

Still more French effectives were turned over to the 
Americans on this occasion. 

580 French 75 mm. guns, 

793 heavy cannons and mortars of various calibers, 

182 trench mortars, 

273 tanks, ^ 

192 airplanes. 
Added to these, we may reckon the independent aerial 
division which operated with the Americans during the 
action of September I2th.^ 

2 Thirty-four Schneider, thirty-six St. Chamond, and the rest Renaults. 
The American Army disposed of 144 Renault tanks manned by their 

own crews. 

3 The aerial division included 550 airplanes. The American aviation 



266 The American Army in the European Conflict 

General Pershing was also authorized to employ a con- 
siderable number of automobile trucks which were held 
in reserve near Toul and Bar-le-Duc.^ 

With these resources added to those of the American 
Army, General Pershing was enabled to mount a power- 
ful offensive; he could dispose of four French divisions, 
twelve American divisions, 2,900 guns. 

The operations were to be kept extremely secret. The 
commander-in-chief had concealed his departure from La 
Ferte-sous-Jouarre and had not allowed his change of 
intention concerning his taking over the command on the 
Vesle to be known. Rumors were spread tending to in- 
dicate that the Americans were preparing important con- 
centrations in High Alsace, near Belfort. General 
Pershing had chosen Ligny-en-Barrois as his own head- 
quarters, but he installed temporarily his chief of staff. 
General Drumm, at Neufchateau with all his services, 
and, in order to give weight to these fictitious maneuvers, 
he made frequent appearances at Chaumont and was also 
seen in the Vosges. 

Equal care was taken to mask the heavy troop concen- 
trations which were being executed around the St. Mihiel 
salient. The nearer they approached, the greater were 
the precautions taken. Infantry and artillery columns 
marched by night. In the daytime, men, horses, and 
material were concealed in the woods. 

On August 30th, General Pershing took command of 
the First American Army sector, extending over fifty 
miles from Port-sur-Seille, on the right bank of the 
Moselle, to Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes, near Verdun. 

was under the orders of Brig. General William Mitchell and disposed of 
610 machines which could be utilized on the St. Mihiel front. 

* In his report to the Secretary of War, General Pershing graciously 
acknowledged the aid which we had brought on this occasion. 



H 
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^ 



Battle of St. Mihiel 267 

Naturally, this line was but thinly held. Every precau- 
tion was taken not to awaken -the suspicion of the foe by 
any ostensible change upon the front. The relief of the 
troops who were not to participate in the attack was 
effected as late as possible. Numerous artillery for- 
mations were placed in battery positions during the nights 
immediately preceding the attack. But some important 
artillery reenforcements had to be placed on their posi- 
tion beforehand, so as not to block the roads, and when 
it was known that the difficulties attending their emplace- 
ment would be too great to be rapidly overcome. 

At the time, the First American Army entered upon 
the scene of action, its staff was at Ligny-en-BarroIs, 
having arrived as late as possible in order not to excite 
suspicion. As we have already remarked above, all 
plans and documents which such an action called for had 
been elaborated at Neufchateau. 

Remarkable work was accomplished by General 
Drumm, chief of staff of this First Army, and also by his 
collaborators who had been chosen scarcely a month 
before. No unforeseen or disagreeable accidents checked 
the troop movements either by rail or by road. During 
these concentration marches, 500,000 men and important 
material had reached the zone of operations. 

As for the numerous " plans of employment " which 
were necessary to carry out this attack, enough may be 
said in praise of their value and precision when we state 
that those presented to General Petain were neither criti- 
cized nor modified in the slightest degree by him. 

The plan of attack conceived by General Pershing in- 
cluded three distinct operations: 

Firstly: A main attack starting from the line Fey-en- 
Haye-Xivray, which should advance in three successive 



268 The American Army in the European Conflict 

bounds from south to north, clean up the plain of the 
Woevre as far as the line passing through the villages of 
Vigneulles, St. Benoit, and Jaulny. This operation was 
confided to the First and Fourth American Corps. 

Secondly: A secondary attack starting from the 
Meuse Heights between Mouilly and Tresauvaux, di- 
rected toward the southeast was, at the end of this maneu- 
ver, to bring the assailants up to the front of Tresauvaux- 
Vigneulles, where contact would be established with the 
left wing of the main attack. This secondary operation 
was to be launched by the Fifth American Corps. 

Thirdly: A general demonstration was to be made 
all along the enemy front included in these attacks; that 
is to say, around the entire point of the salient from 
Xivray to Mouilly, passing through Apremont, St. 
Mihiel, La Morville, and Seuzey. This was to be en- 
trusted to the Second Colonial Corps (French) which 
was to cover both the left flank of the main attack and the 
right flank of the subsidiary one. 

The converging of the two attacks as they closed in 
from behind on the eastern slopes of the Hauts-de-Meuse, 
would naturally liberate the town of St. Mihiel, important 
both on moral and tactical grounds. 

This plan had many advantages. Even in case only 
one of the American attacks was successful, the town of 
St. Mihiel and the heights of the Meuse would be freed. 
In case of a complete success, the entire defensive organi- 
zation of the enemy from his front lines in the salient 
reaching back far into the Woevre plain would fall into 
American hands. In both alternatives, the Paris- 
Nancy railway would be disengaged and made ready for 
traffic. 

In order to execute this plan, the First Army, under 



Battle of St. Mihiel 269 

the direct orders of General Pershing, was distributed as 
follows : 

On the southern face of the salient at the extreme 
right of the front of attack we find the First Corps under 
General Liggett's orders, the same chief, with the same 
staff, whom we have already seen operating on the Ourcq, 
the Marne, and the Vesle. Only his commanding officer 
of artillery was changed, General Lassiter having 
passed on to the Fourth Corps artillery, being better ac- 
quainted with the ground covered by that section of the 
attack. A French officer. General Vincent, had replaced 
General Lassiter at the artillery direction of the First 
Corps. Headquarters were at Saizerais, and the corps 
comprised the Eighty-second, Ninetieth, Fifth, and 
Second Divisions, lined up from Port-sur-Seille to Limey 
with the Seventy-eighth Division which was held in re- 
serve near Dieulouard. The Eighty-second Division, 
although deployed, took no part in the initial assault. 
Astride of the Moselle near Pont-a-Mousson, this divi- 
sion simply covered the right flank of the general offen- 
sive. On the thirteenth of September, we will find its 
left wing moving forward in order to conform to the 
advance of the main forces. 

The Fourth Corps was linked to the First, being placed 
on its left. General Dickman, whom we have seen di- 
recting the Third Division during recent engagements on 
the Marne and the Ourcq, was In command and had taken 
up his headquarters at Toul.^ His corps stretched from 
Limey to RIchecourt and comprised the Eighty-ninth, 
Forty-second, and First Divisions in first line, and the 
Third Division in reserve, near Royaumelx. 

5 An advanced post of command had been organized in the village of 
Royaumeix. 



270 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Further west came the Second Colonial French Corps, 
under General Blondlat (headquarters, Ernecourt), its 
Thirty-ninth Division holding all the line between Riche- 
court and St. Aignant; its Twenty-sixth Division stretch- 
ing from the latter to the Selouze Wood on a ten-mile 
front, taking in the point of the salient as well as the 
town of St. Mihiel; its Second Cavalry Division was be- 
tween the Selouze Wood and Mouilly Village. Of the 
three aforenamed units, the Second Cavalry Division 
alone was sufficiently concentrated and capable therefore, 
as we shall see, of taking an efficacious part In the general 
offensive. 

Proceeding to the northward, we find the Fifth Ameri- 
can Corps with General Cameron in command. His 
activities as chief of the Fourth Division during the eigh- 
teenth of July offensive has been already described. 

General Alexandre, detached from our Twentieth 
Corps, had charge of the artillery. 

The Fifth American Corps (headquarters, Ancemont) 
comprised the Twenty-sixth American, the Fifteenth 
French, and the Fourth American Divisions holding the 
Mouilly-Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes front. The latter was 
to take a limited part in the general attack, its mission 
consisting merely in covering the left flank of the troops 
marching toward Vigneulles, and operating small raids in 
the Woevre toward Fresnes and Manheulles. 

The army held in reserve two divisions, the Thirty-fifth 
at Iviverdun and the Ninety-first at Void. We should, 
however, remark that the Eightieth Division at Prouville 
and the Thirty-third near Verdun were not engaged at 
this moment in any action and, if necessary, could be 
called upon. We may therefore consider these two divi- 
sions as part of the army reserve. 



Battle of St. Mihiel 271 

The artillery was split into three large groupings which 
corresponded approximately to the fronts occupied by the 
three American attacking corps. 

The northern grouping which supported the Fifth 
Corps offensive was commanded by General Alexandre. 

The two southern groupings were under the direct com- 
mand of General McGlachlin who also controlled Gen- 
eral Chamberlaine's railroad artillery. The fire of the 
southern groupings was intended more especially to sup- 
port the advance of the First and Fourth Corps. 

The resources of the staff were severely tested during 
this attack, with its complicated material and wide troop 
movements. In order to carry it through, General 
Drumm and his associates were obliged to study the con- 
dition of the roads and transport facilities in the two 
French Army groups contiguous to the American zone of 
operation and also to take into consideration the severe 
regulations governing, at that moment, the transports by 
rail. All these difficulties served more effectually to 
demonstrate the zeal and ability with which General 
Pershing's staff managed these vast preparations. 

Let us now glance beyond the lines. 

Facing the army enveloping the St. Mihiel salient and 
observing from east to west, the enemy order of battle 
seemed on the twelfth of September, as far as could be 
judged, the following: Two Hundred and Fifty-fifth 
Division, Seventy-seventh Reserve Division, Tenth Divi- 
sion, Fifth Landwehr Division and One Hundred and 
Ninety-second Division, then the Thirty-fifth Austro- 
Hungarian Division, and finally the thirteenth and 
eighteenth German Landwehr divisions. 

Since the beginning of the month, numerous troop 
movements had been observed in the enemy's rear. 



272 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The examination of prisoners led us to believe that the 
evacuation of the St. Mihiel salient was contemplated and 
had even perhaps begun. 

Under these circumstances, rapid action was impera- 
tive. The order to attack was given by General Pershing 
after having consulted with General Petain as to the hour. 
He also asked the opinion of his subordinates as to 
whether a preliminary bombardment would be advisable 
and whether it should be of long or short duration. He 
then retired to his office alone and shortly after gave 
orders that the attack would commence on the following 
morning, September twelfth, at five A. M. for the First 
and Fourth Corps who were stationed in the Woevre and 
who were to march northward toward Thiaucourt and 
St. Benoit, at eight o'clock for the Fifth Corps, whose 
action was to take in the Meuse heights. 

All the assaults were to profit by a four-hour prepara- 
tory bombardment. General Pershing deemed this bom- 
bardment necessary both for the demoralization of the 
foe and the preliminary destruction of his solid and 
numerous redoubts. He also authorized a few shots dur- 
ing the afternoon of the eleventh in order to find the 
range which would enable the 75-millimeter batteries to 
adjust on the morrow their rolling barrage. 

When the twelfth of September dawned, the com- 
mander-in-chief sought an advantageous post of observa- 
tion on a high plateau overlooking the Woevre, and there 
he was joined by the Secretary of War, Mr. Newton D. 
Baker. 

The mist which mingled with the smoke prevented a 
view of the troops moving across this moist plain, but on 
all sides of the vast battle-ground and above the clouds 
overhanging the Woevre, there could be perceived long 



Battle of St. Mihiel 273 

trails of sparks which flowered in stars of green and 
yellow, code rocket signals sent up by the first infantry 
assault waves and which cried out to the supporting ar- 
tillery: "Lengthen your fire, our objectives have all 
been reached." 

Although the enemy was expecting an attack in the 
near future, he was greatly surprised when the bombard- 
ment really began. He had supposed that his retirement, 
which the high command was preparing, would be 
effectuated before the American attack. In reality, the 
abandonment of the St. Mihiel salient had been for a 
long time in contemplation. Orders had even been given 
to bring many of the heavy ordnance to the rear and 
dispose the field guns in depth formation. The retreat, 
thus begun, was on certain points being effectively carried 
out when the American gunners opened fire on trenches, 
villages, strongholds, and roads both on front and rear 
on batteries and the wooded areas. The long-range 
guns attained the railway station of Metz. The enemy, 
completely immobilized, was obliged to interrupt his 
movement of retreat and face the attack to the best of 
his ability. 

The assault was indeed superbly carried out. Al- 
though the tanks had a hard time in the inextricable sys- 
tem of trenches which four years of occupation had 
accumulated on this ground, the foot soldier went over 
the top in great style. The barbed wire, considerably 
rusted, was easily severed by the soldiers with the aid of 
wire-cutters. Often complicated entanglements were 
leaped or scrambled over without having been destroyed. 
The advance was accomplished with such remarkable 
rapidity that the charges prepared in view of destroying 
the enemy's defenses were not even exploded. 



274 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The general progression was made without any un- 
toward accident. Vigneulles, the goal where the two 
American attacks were to converge, was first entered by 
patrols of the Twenty-sixth Division (Fifth Corps) and 
then occupied in force by the First Division (Fourth 
Corps). This march of General Dickman's left wing, 
where the First Division was operating, may be taken 
as a model of a well-conducted attack. The divisional 
artillery, whose accurate fire accompanied the infantry 
advance, was pushed forward at an early hour, one 
battalion of artillery accompanying each regiment. The 
telephone wires linking the front and rear were progres- 
sively unrolled so that the commander of the First Divi- 
sion was kept in touch with his first-line battalions as they 
marched northward. 

It would be unfair to dwell only upon the role taken by 
the First and Twenty-sixth American Divisions in these 
vast operations, and pass over in silence what was accom- 
plished by other units. The Second Division seized 
Thiaucourt in a splendid rush; the Ninetieth Division 
drove the enemy out of the Norroy quarries which were 
reputed impregnable. The Fifth Division, thanks to a 
well-conceived maneuver, executed practically without 
losses, stormed Vieville-en-Haye. The Eighty-ninth 
Division, deploying from the Mort-Mare Wood, attacked 
Euvezin and Bouillonville; the Forty-second Division cap- 
tured four villages among which were included Essey and 
Pannes. The Fifteenth French Division showed much 
tenacity In the attack on Eparges and Combres; as to our 
Second Division of dismounted cavalry, it progressed all 
the way to Dompierre-aux-Bois, taking more than 2,500 
prisoners and only losing 130 men, of whom but 14 were 
mortally wounded. 



Battle of St. Mihiel 275 

The American Army harvested that day an important 
booty — 16,000 prisoners, 443 guns of all calibers, and 
an immense quantity of war material. Very few losses 
were suffered, consisting of some 7,000 men, of whom the 
greater number were but slightly wounded. 

To the tangible results above enumerated may be 
added the immense moral effect obtained by this bril- 
liant action. The strength of the American Army thus 
proved, heartened and encouraged men, officers, and staff 
of all the Expeditionary Forces. 

In the same measure, these qualities were recognized 
by the common enemy, who was correspondingly dis- 
couraged. 

The German high command was indeed much struck by 
the manner in which the ensemble of the action had been 
carried out. Here Is the account given by the general 
headquarters of the beaten German Army, regarding the 
conduct of the victors of September 12th: 

" Three French divisions and at least nine American divisions 
took part in the attack under General Pershing's orders. How^ 
many divisions remained in reserve we have not ascertained. 
Among those counted, three (First, Second, and Forty-second) 
were first-class attacking troops; two (Fourth and Twenty-sixth) 
were good fighting troops which had already done good work in 
other important affairs; three (Fifth, Eighty-ninth, and Ninetieth) 
had been in line on other sections of the front before, having been 
opposed to our detachment, and one in reserve, the Thirty-fourth, 
had not yet been brought into line. 

" The attack was preceded by an artillery preparation lasting 
four hours to which was added a short bombardment with trench 
mortars. 

" The batteries fired with great precision, not only on our first 
lines but also on our rear communications. 

" The principal attack was directed against the face of the 
salient between Richecourt and Fey-en-Haye, on a ten-mile front. 



276 The American Army in the European Conflict 

" Eight American divisions with one French took part in the 
assault. 

" The enemy advanced to a point north of Thiaucourt, thus 
rendering our tenure of the St. Mihiel salient impossible. As a 
result of this situation we received orders to leave the positions 
and to retire on our Michael line (Hindenburg) which was done 
according to instructions. 

" The Americans proved clever with their machine guns and are 
tenacious in defense and depend much on these instruments which 
they possess in great number. 

" The artillery preparation preceding the assault was ably con- 
ducted, and the artillery was well directed — the gunners suc- 
ceeding in changing objective in minimum time and with great 
precision. The linking between artillery and infantry was done 
without fault. If the infantry encountered a nest of machine 
■guns, they rapidly retreated to the rear and a renewed fire was 
immediately started against our machine-gun emplacements. 
Many tanks took part or were ready to take part in the action; it 
was unnecessary, as the masses of infantry had already made 
victory certain." 

On September 13th, in the morning, General Pershing 
and General Petain entered St. Mihiel side by side. They 
had scarcely crossed the Meuse on a rough wooden bridge 
hastily thrown over the river near the spot where stood 
the old stone arches blown up in 19 14, than the civil por- 
tion of the population, which had remained in this locality 
since the beginning of the war, received them with en- 
thusiastic greetings. The streets were hung with flags, 
even the ruins were bright with bunting in honor of these 
two liberators. What seemed even more extraordinary 
to the inhabitants, cut off as they had been from all news 
of political events, was the appearance among the Ameri- 
cans of their Secretary of War, anxious to follow the 
operations and to investigate the extent of the damage 



Operations Between Meuse and Argonne 277 

caused to our towns and country by the enemy's occupa- 
tion.*^ 

In the last house at the end of the town, pillaged like 
the rest and in lamentable plight, he noticed on a bare 
wall one engraving still suspended. This engraving rep- 
resented General Lafayette. 

In the United States, the victory of St. Mihiel will be 
long remembered and history will recount that here, on 
this foreign soil, four thousand miles from home, was 
seen for the first time so powerful an American army. 
The battle of St. Mihiel will gradually efface the memory 
of Gettysburg where Lee, less adroit than Pershing, tried 
to strike at the apex of a triangle, instead of sapping it at 
the base, and as time goes on these forces, 500,000 strong, 
drawn from South and North united in a common effort 
will cause the discords of the past to be forgotten. 



During the first days of September, General Pershing 
had also to prepare, on another part of the front, a 
vaster operation and set on foot an attack whose execu- 
tion entailed more serious diflficulties. 

In view of these extensive operations, it became neces- 
sary to change the center of gravity of the American 
forces immediately after the Woevre attacks, and make 
it possible to take the offensive between the river Meuse 
and the Argonne forest. 

The Fourth French Army was to give battle on almost 
the whole of its front at about the end of September — 
from the Aisne opposite Servon as far as the Suippe. 

^ The " Grande Rue," in olden days the name of the principal street 
of the town, now bears the title " Rue du General Pershing." 



278 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Westward, the Fifth French Army, profiting by this 
operation, was to gain ground in a turning movement 
west and north of Rheims. 

Marshal Foch desired the Americans to take the 
offensive toward the east, thus prolonging the line of 
attack and to advance in the direction of Buzancy and 
Sedan. These orders, as Interpreted and transmitted 
by General Petain to the Fifth and Fourth French Armies 
and the First American Army, caused a new line-up of 
General Pershing's forces. 

In order to break through the front at the point where 
the Americans were about to strike, as well as to be able 
to rapidly exploit the ground gained toward Buzancy and 
later toward Sedan, it was necessary to place important 
effectives in line, the more numerous where the quality of 
the troops was not presumably of the best. 

It was necessary to select the divisions which were to 
be left on the newly conquered Woevre front, designate 
those asked for by the French command in order to re- 
enforce General Gouraud's attack, and eliminate those 
who, whether on account of Insufficient training or lack of 
transportation, were judged incapable of fighting. It 
was considered possible to bring into the theater of 
operations fifteen divisions of which three at least might 
join the rest some days after the initial attack, if this 
battle were to take place, as was contemplated, on the 
twenty-second of September, 1918. 

A close study of the front, of the nature of the offen- 
sive about to be undertaken, the extent of the ultimate 
objectives, decided General Pershing to engage, from the 
first, nine divisions. These were naturally chosen from, 
among those whose entry into line might take place with- 
out too great difficulties in transportation and concentra- 



operations Between Meiise and Argonne 279 

tion and without hindrance to the operations already 
under way. 

The nine divisions which were to take an initial part in 
the future offensive were accordingly selected rather by 
necessity and circumstances than by a free choice in the 
matter. 

We desire here to underline the immense effort fur- 
nished by General Pershing and his staff to set this attack 
on foot. A glance at the effectives about to come into 
line is therefore essential 

Out of these nine divisions, three alone possessed their 
own artillery services and had participated in active opera- 
tions. Two had been occupying quiet sectors during less 
than two months, another had experienced but ten days 
of trench life, still another only sixteen days, and two 
divisions had never been under fire. 

Considering that at the last moment contingents coming 
from the severely tried region of the Aisne and Marne 
had to be completed with green troops we may suppose 
that among the future combatants there were more than 
100,000 men who had not yet been at the front. 

Four of these nine divisions were only made acquainted 
with their artillery on the battle-field. We may add that 
the lack of proper transport facilities and horses rendered 
the troops inelastic, for the units possessed but 70 per 
cent, of the animals and wagons which should normally 
complete their war equipment. 

The divisions ultimately placed in reserve with army 
and corps possessed more experienced troops, but even 
they lacked their own services, their batteries having been 
taken to reenforce the divisions ranged in the first line. 

General Pershing was obliged to test the capacity of 
his contingents to the utmost. It was also difficult to find 



28o The American Army in the European Conflict 

the requisite number of officers for these units. Once 
again, circumstances necessarily influenced his decisions. 

The Third Corps was brought from the Aisne front, 
and, from the St. Mihiel sahent, General Pershing 
transferred the First and Fifth Corps. He thus pro- 
cured a staff direction which, though lacking in knowledge 
of the ground on which they were to work, possessed ex- 
perience of active operations. 

Such was, at this time, the situation of the American 
effectives. The numerical aid brought us by our new ally 
was greater than could have been expected. 

General Petain, without waiting for the St. Mihiel 
affairs to be concluded, had placed at the disposition of 
the American commander-in-chief the staff services of the 
Second French Army whose front stretched from the 
Meuse heights to the Argonne and took in Verdun.'^ 

This staff was to attend to the execution of the plan for 
transport and concentration, ordering into the immediate 
vicinity of the front lines the infantry and artillery which 
were to take part in the battle. 

The American divisions which were to participate in the 
initial assault, with the exception of those already in line, 
were first to be posted in the rear of their ultimate posi- 
tion, masked by a thin curtain of men in horizon blue 
uniforms. These were to remain in place up to the night 
preceding the attack, when they were to disappear, leaving 
to the soldiers in khaki the possession of the parallels 
from which their surprise was to be launched. 

By the twenty-second of September, the French Second 

^ The placing of the forces above enumerated on the Meuse-Argonne 
front necessitated the withdrawal of eleven divisions, French or Italian, 
and the entry into line of fifteen American divisions sustained by a 
powerful artillery. All these movements had to be executed between the 
fourth and twenty-fourth of September. 



operations Between Meiise and Argonne 281 

Army, whose name Is Immortally associated with that of 
Verdun, had quitted the front of its past exploits, and 
General Pershing's lines extended as far as la Harazee in 
the Argonne Woods. The American First Army, con- 
taining, nevertheless, several French units, was now es- 
tablished on a seventy-mile front. 

When all the shifts necessary for the future attack and 
the installation of troops on the conquered Woevre posi- 
tion had been made, the American Army was disposed as 
follows : 

General Dickman's Fourth Corps, with its right across 
the Moselle at Port-sur-Seille, its left at Le Chauffour-en- 
Woevre, had in line the Ninetieth, Seventy-eighth, and 
Forty-second Divisions. In reserve, it held the Fifth. 
Thus Its effectives were formed exclusively of American 
units. ^ The Seventh Division was on the march to re- 
join the corps whose headquarters were Installed at Menil- 
la-Tour. 

From Le Chauffour to Menil In the Woevre, the 
Second Colonial Corps, minus one French division (the 
Twenty-sixth) but plus the Twenty-sixth American Divi- 
sion, was commanded by General Blondlat with his head- 
quarters at St. Mihiel. 

Continuing northward, the Seventeenth French Corps, 
with headquarters at Fort Regret, held the Verdun salient 
from Mesnil to the Meuse. 

The First American Division, placed behind and 
slightly westward of the Seventeenth French Corps, may 
be considered in this Instance as filling the role of corps 
reserve while awaiting the arrival of the Twenty-sixth 
French Division coming from the Second Colonial Corps. 

8 The sixty-ninth French division prolonged the Fourth Corps along 
the right wing and was later included in the American First Army. 



282 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Finally, from Meuse to La Harazee, all along the 
future front of attack, we find the forces disposed as 
follows : 

To the right, on the Meuse-Malancourt front, the 
Third Corps with General Bullard's headquarters at 
Rampont, having in line the Thirty-third, Eightieth, and 
Fourth Divisions, in reserve the Third Division. 

In the center, on the Malancourt-Vauquois front, the 
Fifth Corps with General Cameron at Ville-sur-Cous- 
sances, held in line the Seventy-ninth, Thirty-seventh, and 
Ninety-first Divisions, in reserve the Thirty-second Divi- 
sion. 

To the left, on the Vauquois-La Harazee front, the 
First Corps, with General Liggett's headquarters at 
Rarecourt, held the line with the Thirty-fifth, Twenty- 
eighth, and Seventy-seventh Divisions, In reserve the 
Ninety-second.^ 

During the actions between the Meuse River and the 
Argonne Forest begun on the twenty-sixth of September 
and continued until the armistice, these three corps occu- 
pied the same relative positions. The Third Corps al- 
ways advanced with its right flank along the river; the 
First Corps operated with its left engaged in the wooded 
Argonne region in liaison, more or less close, with the 
Fourth French Army; the Fifth Corps always occupied 
the center of the line of battle. 

The general reserve of the army was composed of three 
divisions: the First in the neighborhood of Blercourt, the 
Twenty-ninth near Osches, and the Eighty-second in the 
Clermont-en-Argonne region. 

^ The artillery of the First American Corps had been concentrated 
under the orders of General Walch, detached from the Seventeenth 
French Corps. 



operations Between Meuse and Argonne 283 

On September 25th, the Fifth Cavalry Division 
(French) had been placed at the disposal of the First 
Army commander, receiving orders to proceed during the 
night of the twenty-fifth to the Passavant neighborhood 
close to the future field of action, and from whence it 
could be ready to intervene, if necessary, in the coming 
battle. 

The Franco-American artillery, whose fire was to 
second the attack, comprised army batteries and the rest 
of the artillery divided between the corps and the 
divisions. 

The army artillery under General McGIachlln was 
grouped in five commands, the names alone indicating 
their normal sphere of activity: 

The Verdun command, 

The Meuse command, 

The Aire command, 

The Aisne command, 

The command of railway artillery. 

The groups of Verdun, Meuse, Aire, and Aisne, in all, 
disposed of 340 pieces of all calibers from the 145 mm. to 
the 270 mm. The railway artillery under General 
Chamberlaine counted 40 pieces, varying from 305 to 
400 mm. 

The divisional and corps artillery attained in round 
numbers 2,400 guns of which 1,000 were 75's. These 
numbers do not include the trench mortars of small 
caliber. The Franco-American artillery, if lined up, 
could have placed a cannon at every ten yards. 

As the woods of Cheppy and Malancourt were at the 
center of the American attack and the Argonne Forest at 



284 The American Army in the European Conflict 

its left, this permitted an economy of fire in these regions 
to the advantage of progress in the open ground. 

Thus it can be said that the Americans were well fur- 
nished in artillery. The corps posted in the Woevre and 
on the Meuse heights, which covered the right flank of 
this attack — that is to say, the Fourth American Corps, 
the Second Colonial, and the Seventeenth French — had 
not been deprived of their guns to any notable extent, so 
that they were able to help the main offensive by prolong- 
ing the fire on their own fronts and also by making, on the 
day set for the assault, numerous raids in enemy terri- 
tory.^*^ 

Such were the dispositions taken when the night of the 
twenty-fifth fell. It was impossible to prepare the attack 
for an earlier date. Besides this date accorded with 
that on which the Fourth French Army would be ready to 
take the offensive. Consequently General Petain gave 
the order to attack on the morning of the twenty-sixth 
from Meuse to Suippe, on a front of some forty-five 
miles. According to his idea the French Army advancing 
northward would approach the American forces with its 
right; on the other hand, the flow of the Meuse River 
would oblige the Americans in their march toward Buz- 
ancy to incline to their left. Thus the two masses would 
find themselves in touch at the Grand Pre Pass, while 
pursuing their mutual advance toward Mezieres and 
Sedan. The common object of the two armies was to 
throw the enemy across the Meuse and force him to beat 

i" The French artillery placed at the disposal of the American forces for 
these operations consisted of: 

75 mm. cannons Heavy cannons Trench mortars 

September 26 456 1,002 254 

October 14 132 607 48 

November i 300 319 48 



operations Between Meuse and Argonne 285 

a retreat through the Ardennes where the lack of roads 
and communications would oblige the Germans to a more 
accentuated and perilous withdrawal. 

The French high command founded its hopes espe- 
cially upon the American troops in this combat, for it 
was to be supposed that the Fourth Army would meet 
with enormous difficulties in crossing the Aisne if General 
Pershing's troops had not succeeded, as they passed up 
the right bank of the river, in freeing the passage at cer- 
tain points. It might also be foreseen that the enemy 
would make a particularly fierce resistance between the 
Meuse and Argonne, as this was the vital point of their 
line. 

The front of the Fourth Army's attack did not extend 
to the Aisne Valley, and as the American front was 
limited to the Argonne, the commander-in-chief of the 
French forces constituted, between the river and the 
forest, a liaison detachment which included two infantry 
regiments, of which one (the 368th, colored troops) came 
from the Ninety-second Division. The artillery was 
French. 

This detachment was to link the two attacks and neu- 
tralize the western fringes of the Argonne. 

Let us now return to the First American Army. On 
the twenty-second of September, headquarters (advanced 
echelons) were installed at Souilly. There the special 
train of the army commander was side-tracked and in the 
offices which had successively served Generals Petain, 
NIvelle, Guillaumat, and HIrschauer, great activity 
reigned. In spite of all the diligent endeavor which we 
ourselves can testify to. It was materially Impossible, as 
we have already explained, to prepare an attack before 
September 25th. 



2 86 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Work went on night and day in the staff offices; the 
same lamps which lighted General Barescut's map during 
the heroic months of the Verdun defense now for many 
nights served to illuminate that of General Drumm. 

General Petain had not set any hour for the attack, nor 
fixed the duration of the preparatory bombardment, judg- 
ing that on so extensive a front the simultaneity of assault 
was not a necessary condition of success. He left each 
army commander free to determine the hour on which 
each would set their troops in motion, and left to each, 
also, the mode of preparing his artillery attack. 

General Gouraud ordered a six-hour bombardment; 
General Pershing prescribed a three-hour preparation, 
and he also authorized his field artillery — as he had done 
at St. Mihiel — to verify the range of their barrage on 
the day of the twenty-fifth. In case of necessity, he even 
permitted his counter batteries to act six hours before the 
general attack. 

The Seventeenth Corps and the Second Colonial, to- 
gether with the Fourth American, were all to execute 
some deep raids from the Meuse Heights north of Ver- 
dun to Pont-a-Mousson on the Moselle — these were to 
be preceded by a six-hour bombardment in conformity 
with the plans of the Fourth French Army. 

The enemy order of battle was at this time known. 
He had eleven divisions in an extended line fronting the 
Americans posted on the Woevre and Meuse Heights 
who were not to participate in the attack. Five divisions 
only held the front between Meuse and Argonne against 
which the main assault was to be directed. 

Eleven divisions (of which four were in process of re- 
constitution) were reported in the Metz region, so that 
it was easy to conclude that the enemy, much shaken by 



operations Between Meuse and Argonne 287 

the fight at St. Mihiel, feared an American attack in the 
Woevre even more than an offensive in Champagne. He 
had, however, along a front which extended from the 
Meuse to Rheims, disposed his forces in depth, officers 
and soldiers had been warned by their high command 
against a Franco-American offensive announced for the 
twenty-ninth of September. 

As much to facilitate the study of this battle which, 
beginning on September 26th, finished only with the 
armistice, as to obtain a clear account of proceedings from 
reports of those officers who participated in the divers 
phases of this great operation, the American high com- 
mand decided to divide the action into three distinct 
periods. We shall naturally adopt, with slight modifi- 
cations as to the length of each phase, this perfectly logi- 
cal division. 

In the first phase, we shall include the initial attack 
and the advance which brought the American infantry, 
engaged well ahead of its artillery, in contact with the 
enemy reserves. This brief and brilliant period may be 
designated as the " Success of late September." 

The second phase is that of a perpetual combat during 
which the Americans, although they gained ground only 
foot by foot, continued steadily to advance, wearing out 
the enemy and enlarging the front of attack. This 
period covered the whole following month and we may 
call it the " Incessant fighting of October." 

The third and last phase is naturally that of the 
"pursuit." Beginning on November ist by a general 
assault, the first American Army, reconstituted in view of 
a definite operation, conducted a regular advance in con- 
stant touch with the enemy, which forced him back until 
the eleventh of November, at which date, and for reasons 



288 The American Army in the European Conflict 

entirely independent of the will of the soldier, a speedy 
termination of hostilities was reached. 

Let us take up our narrative where we broke off when, 
after a bombardment of three hours, perhaps the most 
violent of the war, and which carried unprecedented con- 
sternation .into the enemy ranks, the American infantry 
attacked on the morning of September 26th at 5.30. 

Advancing, as we have previously seen them do, close 
upon the rolling barrage, the troops rapidly traversed the 
furrows formed by the abandoned trenches, ground honey- 
combed with shell-holes, overturned by a rain of shot dur- 
ing four years when it had been constantly battered by 
both sides and to which the British have given the name 
of " No Man's Land." With almost equal celerity they 
crossed the first enemy lines and the auxiliary defenses 
which, although bristling with barbed wire, were but 
thinly manned. 

On the entire front, the second lines were reached and 
held, In spite of fierce enemy resistance, becoming more 
and more accentuated as the waves pressed on. The 
Americans pushed forward, attaining a four-mile advance 
at points where the defense had been particularly strong, 
and as much as six miles, where the German machine guns 
had made less havoc in the advancing ranks. 

During the first day the troops had taken the villages 
of Drillancourt, Septsarges, Culsy, Malancourt, Very, 
Cheppy, and Varennes. 

Unfortunately, toward the center, the advance of the 
Fifth Corps was checked before it had attained Mont- 
faucon. Great difficulty was experienced in debouching 
from the Malancourt and Cheppy Woods. The Infantry 
which had traversed these thickets was no longer in force 




Operations between Meuse and Argonne 



Meuse-Argonne Battle (First Phase) 289 

sufficient to scale the redoubtable heights upon which this 
village is perched. The tanks in many spots had difficulty 
in getting into the enemy lines, in others they rendered 
excellent service, preceding the infantry and doing good 
work not only on the twenty-sixth but also during the 
following days.^^ 

On the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth, the attacks 
continued along the entire front of the First Army, where 
considerable progress was made. Montfaucon, Epinon- 
ville, Charpentry, and Apremont were taken. The three 
army corps either attained or passed beyond the objectives 
which they had been assigned. 

Such violent infantry combats were engaged for the 
possession of these latter strongholds that General 
Pershing thought best to organize defensively the line 
Gercourt — Drillancourt — Bois-Jure — Dannevoux — 
Namtillois — Eclisfontaine-Charpentry — Montblain- 
ville — Apremont. 

The first bound, which inaugurated the lengthy combat 
between Argonne and Meuse, had been effected with 
rapidity and precision. Success crowned the American 
efforts; the enemy had lost during the last days of Sep- 
tember all his first and second positions, he had been con- 
strained to retreat without shelter into the open country, 
and he had lost 9,000 prisoners and left more than 100 
cannons in our hands. 

If we may judge by the number of troops which he had 
thrown into the fight in order to back up his units which 
had sustained the shock of the twenty-sixth of September, 
we may suppose that his anxiety had been extreme. The 
following divisions successively passed before the Ameri- 

i^The number of tanks of which the American Army disposed on 
September 26th was 381, of which 239 were French. 



290 The American Army in the European Conflict 

can front: Second Landwehr, Thirty-seventh Reserve, 
Fifth Bavarian Reserve, Seventy-sixth Reserve, Fifty-sec- 
ond Division, so that on the thirtieth of September, at the 
conclusion of this first phase, the forces of the defender 
were about equal to those of the assailant. 

General Pershing, on his side, was obliged to relieve the 
Thirty-seventh Division by the Thirty-second and the 
Seventy-ninth by the Third. 

The cavalry could not be utilized, as no opportunity 
was given for operating in open country. The aviation, 
on the contrary, had been extremely active in spite of bad 
weather conditions. Often flying extremely low, the 
aviators were able to report on the infantry advance and 
the defensive arrangements of the enemy. ^^ 

The liaison detachment had encountered many obstacles 
to its progress between the Aisne and Argonne; the 
Fourth Army had realized the advance expected of it 
by the high command. 

During this first phase, the young American Army, even 
that portion which had not before seen fire, had justified, 
by its fine qualities of energy and dash, the most sanguine 
hopes of all who had felt confidence in its future. 

Would it now add qualities of endurance and tenacity 
to those already exhibited ? Would it be easily adaptable 
to the exigencies of an incessant battle in open country 
and In the woods? The study of the second phase of 
this combat may give us the answer to these questions. 

The first bound which the Americans had made during 
the initial days placed the infantry on an advanced line 

12 The aviation service of the First American Army comprised, at this 
date, 660 machines manned by American pilots and 180 machines manned 
by French pilots. 



Meuse-Argonne Battle (Second Phase) 291 

fronting a multitude of German machine guns, installed in 
depth formation, and which were hard to destroy without 
the support of cannon. 

In every hollow or thicket on the fringe of every wood, 
the foot soldier came up against these deadly weapons, 
backed by countless others. Progress was slowed up, 
and just at the moment when the infantry had most need 
of artillery support, the guns were checked by the diffi- 
culties of changing their emplacements. 

The rain-soaked ground was deep in mud and extremely 
slippery, so that to draw the guns across country was 
practically impossible. 

Moreover the zone which included the old defense sys- 
tems of trench warfare was like the No Man's Land 
above described, filled with ridges and shell-holes. 

All transportation and artillery movements were thus 
obliged to keep to the roads which were far from 
numerous, and it was scarcely possible for each army 
corps to have at its exclusive disposition even one narrow 
way permitting a continuous line of travel. 

At the spots where the roads crossed the abandoned 
trenches, it was necessary to make bridges, inclines, etc., 
in order to permit passage. The American engineers and 
our territorial battalions vied with each other, night and 
day during many weeks, to better the condition of the 
ways which linked the network of roads between front 
and rear. Blocks in the traffic rendered the supplying of 
the troops precarious and checked the movements of the 
allied artillery. 

The American military police, charged with the main- 
tenance of order, circulation, and transport, came against 
all sorts of obstacles, augmented by the essential ones of 



292 The American Army in the European Conflict 

language, climate, ignorance of the ground. We who 
have seen the Americans overcome so many of the diffi- 
culties placed in their way, should do justice to the efforts 
made by them under these circumstances. 

Every one worked with zeal and ardor. The artillery, 
so as not to block the roads, often put a crew of men at 
the wheels of the stalled cannon and succeeded thus in 
helping the heavy pieces through No Man's Land, thereby 
accomplishing the first forward bound of their batteries. 

The commander-in-chief himself again set the example 
of activity, hurrying forward the repairs, hastening from 
one command post to the next in order to push on the 
fighting. 

The enemy, on the contrary, as he retreated farther 
and farther back, found himself in easier ground, where 
traffic on the roads was only interrupted by the harassing 
fire of the American batteries. 

By the time the second phase of combat had begun in 
the zone of the First Army, circulation was once more 
normally established and permitted the steady advance of 
artillery and prompt arrival of munitions. 

We have already called attention to the fact that only 
a small number of American divisions which took part in 
this affair disposed of their own artillery. It was not 
until the very day of attack that some of the infantry was 
linked, for the first time, with its supporting guns. The 
difficulties of a divisional artillery called upon to re- 
establish communications with a green infantry from the 
advanced positions attained after their first forward 
bound may be easily imagined. 

In spite of all these obstacles, at which we have only 
hinted because a complete enumeration would be imprac- 
ticable, there was no let-up in the fighting. It became a 



Meuse-Argonne Battle (Second Phase) 293 

question merely as to which opponent would be able to 
wear out his adversary. During all October, the Ameri- 
cans hammered away at the German positions, gaining 
ground foot by foot, now bombarding, now attacking the 
machine-gun nests, now organizing a general attack which 
would at least immobilize the foe if not pierce his line. 

The commander-in-chief had ordered a general attack 
for October 4th. The day was a hard one and progres- 
sion limited. 

On the right, the Third Corps advanced at an oblique 
angle toward the west up to the Brieulles-Cunel road, 
where it was checked. 

At the center, the Fifth Corps seized the village of 
Gesnes, but could not proceed beyond. 

Toward the left, in the winding Aire Valley and on the 
wooded slopes of the Argonne, the First Corps realized 
a two-mile advance. 

On the seventh of October, this same corps took 
Chatel-Chehery and went forward as far as Cornay, 
where on the following day the Americans penetrated. 
After this new advance, it became evident that the enemy 
was strengthening his defense so as to render It impos- 
sible to pierce his lines on the section of the front where 
the First Army was now engaged, and it was easy to 
foresee that the process of wearing him out would be a 
long one. 

General Pershing thoroughly understood the situation. 
He had discussed the phases of the combat with General 
Petain and had decided to widen his attacking front by an 
action which should be confided to the Seventeenth French 
Corps operating on the right bank of the Meuse. 

Accordingly, General Claudel received orders to attack 
between Beaumont and Samogneux, and to push forward 



294 The Avierican Army in the European Conflict 

on the crest separating the Meuse basin from the Lolson 
Valley. 

The Seventeenth Corps, already reenforced with the 
Twenty-sixth French Division, had at its disposal the 
Twenty-ninth American Division and most of the ele- 
ments of the Thirty-third Division engaged west of the 
river on the wing of the Third Corps, and which could 
cooperate usefully in this action. 

In order to give General Claudel a greater facility to 
carry out his operation, the front of attack was limited 
on the right by Beaumont and the Thirty-third French 
Corps was interpolated between this village and Menil 
where the Second Colonial Corps had established its left. 
General Leconte, chief of the Thirty-third Corps, thus 
took direct command of the Tenth and Fifteenth French 
Divisions and established his headquarters at Belrupt. 

The Seventeenth Corps was ready to attack on October 
8th, thus participating in the larger operations which 
General Pershing had planned. 

On the eighth and ninth, the German positions were 
once more subjected to a violent bombardment from the 
Argonne to and beyond the right bank of the Meuse. 

On the Seventeenth Corps front, progress was made as 
far as the Haumont Wood; 3,000 prisoners were cap- 
tured, but the attack which had gone smoothly at the start 
encountered the same obstacles as had already been met 
with on the left bank. 

The enemy, strongly entrenched In the Cosenvoye and 
Haumont Woods, made a deadly use of his machine-gun 
concentrations, so that the fight was particularly arduous 
and sanguinary. 

The Third Corps penetrated as far as Brieulles, while 
the Fifth Corps captured Fleville. 



Meuse-Argonne Battle (Second Phase) 295 

On the tenth, the advance was continued, following an 
enveloping movement which was executed in conjunction 
with the Fourth Army, and thanks to which the entire 
Argonne Forest fell Into our hands. 

General Gouraud's right wing had reached the con- 
fluence of the Aisne and the Aire. 

The historian desirous of finding the most dramatic 
episodes of the war would have to seek them in Argonne. 
From September 26th to October loth, the Americans 
fought in these wooded regions with a courage and a 
tenacity worthy of their French predecessors who In the 
terrible months of 19 15 had held in the Grurie, at Baga- 
telle, Marle-Therese, and the Four-de-Paris. 

We will give but an example : Following the attacks 
of early October, six companies belonging to the 308th 
Regiment and commanded by Major Whittlesey were cut 
off from the Seventy-seventh Division and surrounded by 
an enemy force superior in number. Officers and men re- 
fused to surrender. After four days of resistance and 
privations during which their own airplanes succeeded in 
dropping a few loaves of bread, but during which a rain 
of bullets and shells came from every direction and caused 
heavy losses, this handful of brave troops succeeded In 
maintaining their position until their comrades forced a 
passage to their relief. 

The operations were now amplified on almost every 
front. The addition of the Thirty-third French Corps 
brought the number of army corps under the direct orders 
of General Pershing up to seven. A large number of 
American divisions had been engaged in other theaters, 
and the chief of the American forces now decided to form 
a second army. 

His staff resources recently augmented with the 



296 The American Army in the European Conflict 

graduates from the school of Langres, were now sufficient 
to form the headquarter services of the extensive units 
about to be constituted. 

The First Army, which had so brilliantly fought under 
his orders, capturing more than 30,000 prisoners, now 
passed to General Liggett, who took command on 
October 12th. 

On the same day, General Bullard was placed in com- 
mand of the Second American Army, and at the head of 
this new formation he established headquarters at 
Toul. 

The First Army continued to include the Thirty-third 
and Seventeenth French Corps, the Third, Fifth, and 
First American Corps. It proceeded to carry out its 
offensive mission remaining, however, stationary on its 
right wing.^^ 

The Second Army maintained a comparatively passive 
attitude between Port-sur-Seille and Menil-en-Woevre, 
where from right to left we find in line the Fourth Ameri- 
can Corps and the Second French Colonial Corps. The 
Sixth American Corps, in process of formation at 
Saizerais, was attached to this army. 

We have seen with what method and logical sequence 
the commander-in-chief of the American forces grouped 
his units and disposed his staffs, in order to better his or- 
ganization and prepare an American sector constantly 
spreading and acquiring daily a more national character. 

General Pershing had shown no hesitation in assuming 
the responsibility of a direct command at a time when 
there was every reason to be anxious in regard to the 

^3 General Maistre, commanding the French Central Army group, was 
charged with coordinating the action of the First American Army and 
that of the Fourth French Army. 



Meuse-Argonne Battle (Second Phase) 297 

success of his enterprise. Any doubt as to the final out- 
come was at present laid to rest. He knew that he might 
rely upon his two army commanders and content himself 
with a general supervision of the fighting forces. His 
headquarters, those of an army group, were established 
at Ligny-en-Barrois, and from this moment all the Ameri- 
can operations were carried on under his immediate sur- 
veillance, and under the supreme authority of Marshal 
Foch. 

Consequent upon the promotions of Generals Liggett 
and Bullard, General Dickman now took command of the 
First American Corps, General Summerall that of the 
Fifth Corps, and General Hines that of the Third Corps. 

The First Army continued to exercise pressure on the 
enemy front, thus provoking the fall, one by one, of the 
strongholds maintained by the enemy machine guns. 

On October 14th, a general attack was launched, meet- 
ing, however, with a veritable dike of machine-gun fire. 
In spite of this the First Corps succeeded in taking 
St. Juvin and penetrated with certain elements into 
Grandpre. 

The Kriemhilde position, last line of the enemy's de- 
fense, was attained. 

On the eighteenth, fighting was particularly violent to 
the east of the Meuse and in the Caures and Ormont 
Woods, where our Seventeenth French Corps fought with 
admirable tenacity. 

On the twenty-third, the Third and Fifth Corps 
reached the line of Bantheville; divers local actions and 
reconnoitering raids procured the army valuable informa- 
tion, all of which tended to show that the enemy, while 
still continuing a desperate resistance, was meditating an 
eventual retreat. 



298 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Accordingly, General Liggett decided to regroup his 
forces in order to produce a more vigorous and coordinate 
effort. Persuaded that a strong pressure exerted along 
the entire front would obtain a striking result, he hastened 
to place his troops in posture to deal the enemy a hard 
blow and to follow up his advantage. 

Believing the moment of a German withdrawal nearer 
than it actually proved to be, he even gave directions and 
marching orders to his five corps in case of this 
eventuality. 

The Thirty-third Corps was to engage upon the Etain 
Road, the Seventeenth on Damvillers, the Third, Fifth, 
and First toward Stenay, Beaumont, and Stonne. The 
indispensable relief of certain units proceeded in order 
that the commander might have at hand an instrument 
capable of dealing the final blow. 

The Eighty-second and Forty-second Divisions, which 
had both been subjected to heavy losses, were withdrawn. 
The artillery was completely reformed, the number of 
field guns considerably augmented, many heavy guns sup- 
pressed. Everything was prepared for pursuit after the 
enemy line had been broken, on the last day of October, 
when we may date the termination of the second phase of 
the combat between the Meuse and the Argonne. 

It is difficult to follow the progress of a battle which 
took place on such a vast area, over broken ground and 
which covered thirty consecutive days. An idea may be 
had of the extreme severity of the conflict if we examine 
the effectives lined up by both adversaries. 

At the beginning of the second phase, the Americans 
had in line between the Meuse and Argonne eight divi- 
sions (from October 23d to November, their front was 
held by seven divisions only). To these American con- 



Meuse-Argonne Battle (Third Phase) 299 

tingents, eleven German divisions were opposed. By a 
clever utilization of their effectives the Americans sent 
twelve of these nev/ or reconstituted units into line while 
the enemy on his side deployed twenty-one divisions. 

In allowing for the difference between the effectives of 
an American unit and a similar German one, it may be said 
that the Americans during the long process of *' wearing 
out " the adversary possessed an approximately equal 
number, and constantly maintained the upper hand. The 
incessant fighting of October had enabled them to bring 
in 7,000 prisoners and 50 cannons which increased the 
booty taken by the first army since the St. Mihiel offensive 
to 32,000 prisoners and 600 guns. The number of 
prisoners alone thus greatly exceeded the number of 
Americans killed. 

Neither -during this second phase of the conflict, nor 
during the first, did the cavalry division, stationed near 
Rinarville with a view to pushing forward should a breach 
be made, have the opportunity of taking part in these 
encounters. The cavalry quitted the American sector on 
October 24th. 

During the last days of the month, the Thirty-third 
French Corps was also withdrawn from the American 
command, but its divisions remained in line, merely pass- 
ing under the orders of the Seventeenth French Corps. 

The First Army was ready for the decisive stroke and 
from the first of November we may date the beginning 
of the third phase of the Meuse-Argonne battle. 

The French Fourth Army, stationed on the left wing, 
waited only the order for attack. The Third Corps held 
in line the Fifth and Ninetieth Divisions. The Fifth 
Corps, the Eighty-ninth and Second Divisions; the First 



300 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Corps, the Eightieth, Seventy-seventh, and Seventy-eighth 
Divisions. This battle order remained unchanged during 
the first five days of pursuit. 

Men and officers were keen for the fight, the morale 
was extremely high; news had come of the liberation of 
the Belgian coast, of the crossing of the Hindenburg 
Line by the British who had taken Lille, and of the 
French occupation of Laon. Many methods of prosecut- 
ing a war of movement had been successfully experi- 
mented during the periods of rest. The men had 
practiced marching and maneuvering by night. The 
small units had learned how to advance in columns along 
the roads to penetrate into the villages without firing a 
shot and to surprise the defenders. With his recent 
training in the use of cold steel, the American infantryman 
was eager for a chance of employing his bayonet. 

The attack began at 5.30 A. M., after a two-hour 
preparation by the artillery. The plan was to seize the 
heights of Cunel and those to the north of Andevanne by 
a clever turning movement, during which maneuver the 
right wing was to deliver the principal effort. The plan 
took in Bayonville and Chemery, the village called Sivry- 
les-Buzancy and a portion of the Loges Forest. 

Even more distant objectives were indicated in the or- 
ders; Buzancy, Barrlcourt, and Boult-au-Bois where the 
lines would come in touch with the French Fourth Army. 

The maneuver was carried out just as projected. The 
Third Corps on the right seized Aincreville, Doulcon, and 
Andevanne; the Fifth, in the center, conquered Landres- 
Saint-Georges, Bavonville and Chemery; the First, which, 
at the left, had met with an obstinate resistance south of 
Champigneulles near the " Bois des Loges " advanced 
little. But, excepting on the front of this corps, the 



Meuse-Argonne Battle (Third Phase) 301 

enemy made only a feeble reaction and his artillery had 
remained practically silent. 

The first day's success encouraged General Liggett to 
vigorously pursue the offensive. Orders were given to 
take a strong grip on the foe and hurl him into the Meuse. 

The Third Corps was to push toward Stenay, the Fifth 
Corps toward Beaumont, the First Corps toward Rau- 
court. On the other side of the river, the Seventeenth 
French Corps was to multiply attacks with the object of 
forcing the Germans to loosen their grip on the Meuse 
Heights to which they were still obstinately clinging. 

On the second of November, the First Corps found 
its front freed by the advance of the American right and 
seized Thenorgues as well as Buzancy. 

The next day, the Third Corps reached Halles, the 
Fifth Fosse and Nouart, the First Authe and St. 
Pierremont. 

The long-range guns, keeping up with the advance, took 
under their fire the railway junctions of Montmedy, 
Longuyon, and Conflans. The American advance seemed 
to be breaking up the last resistance. The Germans were 
obliged to pass the bulk of their forces to the right bank 
of the Meuse, abandoning an accumulation of material so 
as not to embarrass their rapid retreat. The trees bor- 
dering the road were cut down to obstruct the passage of 
the pursuing troops. 

On November 4th, the Third Corps reached the Meuse 
between Villefranche and Stenay and, crossing the river, 
established two solid bridgeheads level with Brieulles and 
Clery.i^ 

1* The Fifth American Division was the first to cross the Meuse, foot 
bridges being established at Brieulles and Clery, notwithstanding a forci- 
ble enemy resistance. 



302 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Then came the turn of the Fifth and First Corps to 
reach the river in the vicinity of Mouzon and Bazeilles, 
near Sedan. In this retreat, the enemy abandoned 250 
cannons and 2,000 machine guns. 

On seeing that General Hines's troops had crossed the 
river, the adversary yielded ground before the Second 
Colonial Corps, whose staff had now replaced that of our 
Seventeenth. Hard fighting took place on these last ram- 
parts of the Meuse Heights south of Stenay; we had 
the best of it and on the Tenth the final advantage 
was gained. The enemy was hurled back into the 
plain. 

This same evening, General Liggett ordered the First 
Army to cross the Chiers, and to gain the line Montmedy- 
Longuyon-Spincourt-Etain. 

This movement was already in process of execution 
when, on the eleventh of November, at 1 1 A. M., the ar- 
mistice brought hostilities to an end. 

At this date and at this hour, the line of the American 
sector extended from Port-sur-Seille to Sedan, passing 
through Vandieres and Bezonvaux, thence bordering the 
eastern edge of the Meuse Heights, continued north- 
ward through the Woevre, and rejoined the Meuse at 
Mouzay, followed the river up to the vicinity of Sedan 
where it came in touch with the right of the Fourth 
French Army. 

The First American Corps no longer having frontal 
space between the corps of General Summerall and the 
Fourth Army was withdrawn to the vicinity of Chierry. 

The booty of the First Army now included 37,000 
prisoners and 850 guns.^^ 

IS 16,000 prisoners and 450 cannon taken at St. Mihiel. 9,000 prisoners 
and 100 cannon taken during first phase. 7,000 prisoners and 50 cannon 



Meuse-Argonne Battle (Third Phase) 303 

The American front from Seille to Meuse, near Sedan, 
on the eleventh of November, 19 18, was held by fifteen 
divisions of which two were French. Opposite the Ger- 
mans maintained in line thirty-eight divisions often incom- 
plete, and lapping over one another in such a manner that 
identification was rendered extremely difficult which 
proved the confusion in which the enemy's forces had 
been thrown. 

The Americans had engaged twenty-two divisions in 
the operations, which we called the battle between Meuse 
and Argonne as well as in the fighting which took place on 
the right bank of the Meuse. Fifteen divisions went 
twice into line.^® 

The French cooperated in this action to the extent of 
six divisions, two of which went into line twice. They 
also furnished the artillery material, tanks, aviation, and 
divers rear services of which we have already spoken. 

During these engagements, the Americans lost 100,000 
men. Among this number many were sent to the rear for 
slight wounds, many for illness, as the season had been 
rainy, cold, and unwholesome. 

taken during second phase. 5,000 prisoners and 250 cannon taken during 
third phase. 

The American Army captured during the whole war 49,841 German 
prisoners and 833 Austrian prisoners (statistics of the general headquar- 
ters). 

1^ American divisions engaged: 

First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Twenty-sixth, Twenty- 
eighth, Twenty-ninth, Thirty-second, Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, Thirty- 
seventh, Forty-second, Seventy-seventh, Seventy-eighth, Seventy-ninth, 
Eightieth, Eighty-second, Eighty-ninth, Ninetieth, and Ninety-first. 

Among these the following were engaged more than once: 

First, Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, Thirty-third, 
Thirty-fifth, Thirty-seventh, Forty-second, Seventy-seventh, Seventy- 
eighth, Seventy-ninth, Eightieth, Eighty-ninth, and Ninetieth Divisions. 

Seventy-eight German divisions were engaged either as a whole or in 
part on this same front. 



304 The American Army in the European Conflict 

While the First Army was engaged in this constant 
fight, the Second Army unceasingly harassed the enemy 
along a wide front. From Port-sur-Seille on the right 
bank of the Moselle as far as the village of Fresnes-en- 
Woevre, General Bullard multiplied his concentrations of 
fire and organized raids and " soundings " in order to fix 
the enemy and seek to know his intentions. 

By November 8th, he was ready to take the offensive 
on both sides of the Rupt-de-Mad and to advance two 
brigades in the direction of Gorze and Chambley, when 
the order for a general attack reached him. 

The high command supposed that the enemy was pre- 
paring to retreat in this region. 

From the tenth to the eleventh of November (at 
eleven o'clock) the troops sounded the enemy from Port- 
sur-Seille to Fresnes-en-Woevre ; after a series of com- 
bats the advanced posts of the adversary were pushed 
back, and a resistance was encountered which prevented 
any serious advance. 

At the extreme right of the Second Army, the Sixth 
Corps penetrated with its Ninety-second Division (col- 
ored) into the woods of Frehaut, Voivrotte, and Chemi- 
not. At the center, the Fourth Corps advanced close to 
the edge of Monplaisir Farm and Bonseil Wood, while, 
to the left, the Seventeenth Corps (French) took Butgne- 
ville, St. Hilaire, Chateau d'Aulnoy, and part of the vil- 
lage of Marcheville. 

During these operations several hundred prisoners 
were captured. 

General Pershing, acceding to the request of the com- 
mander-in-chief of the French forces, had detached on 
October ist two divisions in reenforcement of the Fourth 



General Offensive of Septe ruber— November, igi8 305 

Army. The Second and Thirty-sixth played an impor- 
tant part on General Gouraud's front. The Second Di- 
vision, after two brilliant assaults, took the " Blanc- 
Monts," and having repulsed furious counter-attacks, car- 
ried the village of St. Etienne. 

The Thirty-sixth Division relieved the Second on Octo- 
ber 9th, and in its first experience under fire supported a 
violent bombardment without flinching, subsequently par- 
ticipating in the pursuit of the enemy, now in full retreat 
toward the Aisne. 

The Second Division, after operating with the Fourth 
French Army, was scarcely regrouped when it was again 
engaged upon the American front. 

According to Marshal Foch's orders, two more divi- 
sions, the Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first, which had both 
taken part in the first attacks between the Meuse and the 
Argonne, were transported by rail and engaged with the 
two French Army Corps operating In Belgium. 

The Thirty-seventh Division had scarcely detrained 
near Ypres when It was sent at once into battle, reaching 
the Escaut which was crossed In its pursuit of the enemy. 
As for the Ninety-first Division, It also reached the river 
and later penetrated in Audenarde. 

To conclude our hasty enumeration of the many deeds 
of prowess performed by these various American divi- 
sions and to give a fair idea of America's effort on the 
Continent at this time, we should also give a brief account 
of those divisions which operated in the British lines. 
This narrative will be found in the tenth chapter. 

The armistice surprised the American forces at the mo- 
ment of success, and just as a new operation was about 
to be attempted. 

General Pershing had proposed to Marshal Foch, who 



3o6 The American Army in the European Conflict 

agreed with his view, to take the oiiensive between the 
Meuse and the Moselle, march with his First Army to- 
ward Longwy, while his Second Army should essay 
to reach the Briey region. 

Orders to this effect had been already given. 

In addition six American divisions had been placed un- 
der General Bollard's orders to prolong the right of the 
Second American Army on the eastern bank of the Mos- 
elle. Thus General Bullard's offensive and that which 
General Mangin was about to undertake with his Tenth 
Army in the Sarre basin would be linked. 

Had the project been carried out, thanks to this con- 
certed maneuver — the forts of Metz would have prac- 
tically been invested by American troops. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE MARCH TO THE RHINE 

General Orders France, November 12, 1918. 

No. 203 

The enemy has capitulated. It is fitting that I address myself 
in thanks directly to the officers and soldiers of the American Expe- 
ditionary Forces who by their heroic efforts have made possible 
this glorious result. Our armies, hurriedly raised and hastily 
trained, met a veteran enemy, and by courage, discipline, and skill 
always defeated him. Without complaint you have endured inces- 
sant toil, privation, and danger. You have seen many of your 
comrades make the supreme sacrifice that freedom may live. I 
thank you for the patience and courage with which you have en- 
dured. I congratulate you upon the splendid fruits of victory 
which your heroism and the blood of our gallant dead are now 
presenting to our nation. Your deeds will live forever on the most 
glorious pages of America's history. 

Those things you have done. There remains now a harder 
task which will test your soldierly qualities to the utmost. Succeed 
in this and little note will be taken and few praises will be sung; 
fail, and the light of your glorious achievements of the past will 
sadly be dimmed. But you will not fail. Every natural ten- 
dency may urge toward relaxation in discipline, in conduct, in 
appearance, in everything that marks the soldier. Yet 3'ou will 
remember that each officer and each soldier is the representative in 
Europe of his people and that his brilliant deeds of yesterday per- 
mit no action of to-day to pass unnoticed by friend or by foe. You 
will meet this test as gallantly as you have met the tests of the 
battle-field. Sustained by your high ideals and inspired by the 
heroic part you have played, you will carry back to our people the 
proud consciousness of a new Americanism born of sacrifice. 
Whether you stand on hostile territory or on the friendly soil of 

307 



3o8 The American Army in the European Conflict 

France, you will so bear yourself in discipline, appearance, and re- 
spect for all civil rights that you will confirm for all time the pride 
and love which every American feels for your uniform and for you. 

John J. Pershing, 
General, Commander in Chief. 



In such terms did General Pershing, while thanking 
his troops on the morrow of the armistice, exhort them to 
show themselves worthy of their past record during the 
period which was about to begin after the German capitu- 
lation. 

Would the American forces during their march toward 
the Rhine bridgeheads be obliged to engage in fresh com- 
bats? The hypothesis was scarcely probable. The en- 
emy had undergone a series of costly defeats and had 
been in constant retreat, leaving 400,000 prisoners in the 
hands of the Allies. 

The resisting force of the imperial armies seemed defi- 
nitely broken. 

The haste shown by the enemy's high command to ac- 
cept the terms of the armistice of November nth in- 
dicated that they considered their cause as irrevocably 
lost. 

It seemed unlikely that the American advance should 
encounter any very severe opposition; some minor col- 
lision might, of course, occur, for the German forces were 
rapidly disintegrating and getting beyond their officers' 
control, but considering the delay which had been allowed 
them for their retirement, no such trouble was expected. 

According to the terms of Marshal Foch's instruc- 
tions the victorious armies were to halt upon the line 
which they had attained on November nth and remain 
there six days before continuing their forward march. 



March to the Rhine 309 

This delay having elapsed they were to move forward 
and reach by two days of march a second line on which 
they were to remain until the twenty-first of November. 
Thence, proceeding by four more stages, they were to 
reach the boundary which separates Germany from Bel- 
gium, Luxembourg, and Alsace-Lorraine, and there await 
new orders. 

During these successive advances, the importance of 
the effectives maintained in the first line, as well as the 
distribution of the troops in depth along the line of march, 
were to be determined by the breadth of front allotted to 
each army, the number and condition of the roads, sup- 
ply facilities, etc. Orders were given each army to be 
prepared to assume the offensive, if necessary, within a 
maximum delay of forty-eight hours. 



We have seen in the preceding chapter, the line at- 
tained by the American troops on the morning of Novem- 
ber I ith. The front toward which they were directed on 
the seventeenth — six days after the armistice — was 
marked by Longwy, Audun-le-Roman, and Briey. After 
the 2 1 St, they were to proceed toward the front between 
Germany and Luxembourg. Their marching zone was 
bounded on the north by Mouzon, Carignan, Florenville, 
Jamoigne, Etalle, Habay-La-Neuve, Rodange, Grosbois, 
Diekirch; on the south by Thiaucourt, Chambley, Con- 
flans, Moyeuvre, Gondringen, Thionville, Mallingen and 
Scheng, ail inclusive. Thus almost the whole of Luxem- 
bourg and a small portion of northern Lorraine were re- 
served to the American contingents in the course of their 
march toward the German border. 

No sooner had General Pershing received full instruc- 



3IO The American Army in the European Conflict 

tions from Marshal Foch, than he at once took steps to 
Insure their execution. For the occupation of the terri- 
tory evacuated by the enemy he designated the Third 
Army under General Dickman, whose staff, constituted 
since November 7th, was at that moment at Ligny-en-Bar- 
rois. This army was to include the Third and Fourth 
Army Corps ^ minus their artillery, and in addition the 
Sixty-sixth Brigade of field artillery, the Three hundred 
and twenty-second Field Signal Battalion, the Fifty-first 
and Four hundred and seventeenth Telegraph Battalions. 
\\\ these troops passed into the ranks of the Third Army 
at 5 A.M. on November 17th. General Dickman's or- 
ders were to advance, maintaining four divisions in the 
front line, succeeded by two others at an interval of not 
more than two days' march. Thus, according to 
Marshal Foch's instructions, the Third Army would be 
able, if occasion arose, to take the offensive at forty-eight 
hours' notice.^ 

The First and Second Armies were provisionally in- 
stalled in rest billets. 

The French troops which had, up to that time, been 
incorporated in the First Army were returned to the con- 
trol of French headquarters on November i7th.^ 

On the eve of the day fixed for the forward march, the 
commander-in-chief of the allied forces completed his in- 
structions by a supplementary note in regard to the occu- 
pation of the Rhine provinces. 

^The Third Army Corps was made up of the Second, Thirty-second, 
and Forty-second Divisions, the Fourth Army Corps was composed of the 
First, Third, and Fourth Divisions. 

2 On November 22d the Third Army was reenforced by the Seventh 
Army Corps containing the Fifth, Eighty-ninth, and Nineteenth Divisions. 

^ Seventeenth Army Corps, Second Colonial Army Corps, Tenth and 
Fifteenth Colonial Divisions. 



March to the Rhine 311 

This document specified that all troops not employed 
in the occupation of German territory should be main- 
tained in Belgium, in Luxembourg, or in Alsace-Lor- 
raine. A portion of these forces were, however, to re- 
main ready to march at a moment's notice, and pene- 
trate into German territory at the slightest alarm. It 
was also prescribed that the American contingents should 
be kept up to a minimum force of ten divisions and should 
be stationed beyond a line marked by the river Meuse as 
far as Mezieres, then the road Mezieres-Hirson-Mau- 
beuge. The territorial zone in Germany which was as- 
signed to the American troops was bounded on the north 
by the limit separating the districts of Coblenz and of 
Treves, from those of Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle ^; 
and on the south by the line Sierck-Taben, on the Sarre, 
Frommersbach, Rheinsfeld-Thalfang, Marbach, Kirch- 
berg-Simmern-RheinboUen-Heimbach-on-the-Rhine.^ 

The bridgehead of Coblenz was to be held by an army 
corps. In the rear two army corps of two divisions each 
were to remain in reserve, hold the intermediary pas- 
sages on the Rhine, and assure the occupation of the coun- 
try. 

Finally, in the American zone, an army corps com- 
posed of two divisions was to be billeted in the region of 
Treves. 

The orders of the marshal commander-in-chief, dis- 
tributed the duties incumbent on each of the Allies pro- 
portionately to their effectives. He, however, requested 
the Belgians and Americans to furnish to the troops of 

*This line is marked approximately by Lammersweiller, Manderfeld, 
Kronenburg, Rheinbacb, and Oberwinter. 

^ Sierck allotted to the French troops, the other localities to the 
Americans. 



312 The American Army in the European Conflict 

occupation a more important contribution than had been 
asked of the French and British armies, on account of the 
forces which these latter were obliged to maintain in 
other theaters of war. 

Such were the general plans for the occupation of the 
territory vacated by the vanquished foe. 

An important modification was shortly to be made, 
however, in these arrangements. The lack of discipline 
which had been apparent for some time in the ranks of the 
German services of the rear reached more serious propor- 
tions near the front; in many units the officers had quite 
lost control over their men, and it seemed probable that 
the numerous deserters and stragglers from the retreat- 
ing armies might provoke scenes of disorder in the evacu- 
ated regions, during the time still to run between the de- 
parture of the last German troops and the arrival of the 
first allied contingents. The German command itself 
here solicited the intervention of the Allies in order to 
obviate this danger. On the eighteenth of November, 
Marshal Foch, after an understanding to this effect with 
the adverse command, authorized his armies to penetrate 
at once into the evacuated territory, leaving, however, be- 
tween their advance guards and the rear of the retreating 
armies a minimum distance of six and one-half miles. 
This change of plan, which authorized our armies to 
accelerate their advance, in no way permitted them to 
retard it. 

On November 17th, at 5.30 in the morning the ad- 
vance guards of the Third Army crossed the line defined 
by the armistice, on the entire front. 

The march was effected so that a rapid deployment was 
possible, in case of any alarm or untoward happening. 

On the right the Fourth Corps (General Muir) main- 



March to the Rhine 313 

tained In first line the Third Division (General Brown), 
and the First (General Parker). The Fourth (General 
Hersey) was held in reserve. 

On the left the Third Corps (General Hines) marched 
in a similar formation, the Thirty-second Division (Gen- 
eral Hahn), the Second Division (General Lejeune) 
in first line and the Forty-second Division (General Mc- 
Arthur) in support. 

The first stage of this march was marked by absolutely 
no untoward incident, nor was any enemy detachment en- 
countered; the rear guards of the vanquished army were 
already distant. The following days passed in the same 
manner. In the course of their march toward the Rhine 
the Americans found the country entirely freed from 
enemy troops in conformity with the provisions of the 
armistice. We may therefore limit ourselves to a mere 
mention of the stages of the Third Army's advance. 

On November 21st General Dickman's troops at three 
in the afternoon, occupied the city of Luxembourg, and 
the grand duchy was crossed in the same order as has 
been hitherto indicated; after the Twenty-second the 
Seventh Corps, ^ which was then part of the Third Army, 
followed in the traces of the first-line corps. 

The Eighty-ninth Division followed the Fourth Corps, 
the Ninetieth behind the Third. 

After the completion of this stage the Third Army, 
on November 23rd, edged the entire frontier between 
Luxembourg and Germany and there rested, the first 
phase of the march toward the Rhine over friendly and 
neutral territory being thus terminated. 

"Reduced to two divisions, the Eighty-ninth (General Winn) and the 
Ninetieth (General Allan) as the Fifth (General Ely) had been employed 
on construction work on the line of communication. 



314 The American Army in the European Conflict 

On the morning of December ist the occupation of the 
German territory was to begin. 

The Third Army '' crossed over into the German Em- 
pire, one of its columns traversing the very bridge at 
WasserbiUig where in August, 19 14, the first troops of 
the Eighth German Corps had entered the Luxembourg 
territory. 

The same day the Americans occupied Treves, and 
during the following days the advance continued without 
changes, two army corps being maintained in the first line 
with one in reserve. 

The headquarters of the army of occupation, at first 
stationed at Luxembourg, now moved to Bitburg, while 
General Pershing established at Treves an advanced post 
of command. On December 7th, a battalion of infantry 
was sent forward by rail to Coblenz in order to keep 
order in that town. On the eighth the first cavalry pa- 
trols arrived on the Rhine at Remagen; on the tenth the 
Third Army reached the river upon its entire front. The 
headquarters, removed from Bitburg, were now estab- 
lished at Mayen. There remained only for the Amer- 
icans to take possession of the bridgehead at Coblenz. 

This Coblenz bridgehead included an arc of a circle 
whose radius was some nineteen miles, having as central 
point the eastern end of the Pfaffendorf bridge. On this 
line the advance posts were to be established. 

We have already seen that on December ist two 
French divisions were temporarily attached to the Third 
Army in order to participate in the occupation of the 
Coblenz bridgehead. The units in question were now 

■^ Reenforced temporarily by two French divisions, the Second (Chasseurs 
a pied), and the Forty-eighth Infantry Division, assigned to the Third 
Corps. 



March to the Rhine 315 

placed to the right of the American line, and It was nat- 
ural to join them to the French Tenth Army now occu- 
pying the neighboring zone. This was done on Decem- 
ber 1 2th. Thus the American sector was somewhat nar- 
rowed, its southern limit being formed by the admin- 
istrative frontier line separating the districts of Bern- 
castel, Wittllch, Cochem, Mayen, Coblenz, and Wester- 
berg from those of WImmern, Zell, St. Goar, St. Goars- 
hausen, Diez, and LImburg. 

On the thirteenth of December at 7 A. M., the Third 
Corps, designated to occupy the bridgehead itself, sent its 
first elements across the Rhine and pursued this operation 
during the following days without the smallest incident. 
On the sixteenth the American advance posts were estab- 
lished along the exterior circumference of the bridgehead, 
with the corps headquarters fixed at Neuwied.^ 

On the left bank the Fourth Corps ^ with headquarters 
at Cochem on the Moselle, was stationed in support. 
Further rearward, the Seventh Corps ^° with headquar- 
ters at Grevenmacher, was placed in reserve near Treves. 

The army headquarters were now transported from 
Mayen to Coblenz. 

On December 17th, the occupation of the enemy terri- 
tory, as It had been foreseen and laid down by the armis- 
tice conventions, was. In so far as the Americans were con- 
cerned, completely terminated. The zone of the rear, 
occupied by the Third Army, ceased at the Luxembourg 
frontier, and the troops stationed In the territory of the 

8 Now formed with the First, Thirty-second, and Second Divisions. 

^ Now formed with the Third, Fourth, and Forty-second Divisions. 

lOReenforced by the Thirty-third Division under General Bell from 
December i2th. The artillery of the army included the Fifty-fifth, Fifty- 
eighth, Sixty-sixth, One Hundred Fifty-eighth, One Hundred Sixty-fourth 
field artillery brigades. 



3i6 The American Army in the European Conflict 

grand duchy were attached, for administration and for 
instruction, to the Second Army whose headquarters were 
at Toul. 

In the entire course of their march on German territory 
the American troops never encountered an enemy detach- 
ment, but, in order to complete the account of their do- 
ings, it is necessary here to say a word about their rela- 
tions with the civil population in the occupied regions. 

On first entering Germany, the American soldier was 
indeed somewhat astonished by the warm welcome which 
he received. Knowing the Germans by what he had seen 
of them on the field of battle and by the atrocities he had 
read of and heard recounted, as well as by the far from 
flattering portrait given him by his chiefs, he was now sur- 
prised to find himself in a country, not as he had been 
led to suppose, torn by revolution and civil discord and 
on the brink of starvation, but in a land of comparative 
plenty, among people of amiable appearance, exceedingly 
submissive to all orders, and even anticipating his wants. 
Order reigned everywhere. In the villages, when the 
troops passed, the civilians lined up to watch them defile, 
showing, especially the women and children, quite a 
friendly curiosity in their movements. 

The line of conduct which the Germans had traced for 
themselves was simplicity itself. 

The burgher intended to show himself as pleasant and 
cordial as possible, in the hope of obtaining thereby the 
benefit of a very lenient occupation. 

With that spirit of discipline which has always char- 
acterized the masses in Germany, every one worked to 
keep up this tacit understanding, and endeavored to the 



March to the Rhine 317 

best of his ability, individual and collective, to fructify 
various more or less clever schemes for " fraternization." 

In the long run these attempts met with absolutely no 
success. 

In the first place, it was impossible for the German 
civilian to sustain for a long period the part he had chosen, 
to assume; the bitterness of his hate and disappointment 
soon made themselves felt, resistance was made to certain 
necessary requisitions, and in the towns, the American 
officers were frequently lodged in a most inferior man- 
ner. This sudden change of front sufficed to open the 
eyes of the few who had allowed themselves to be de- 
ceived by the first friendly demonstrations, under which it 
was easy to perceive a hypocritical attitude, and the Amer- 
ican who has a natural contempt for the man who volun- 
tarily humiliates himself before his adversary was unfa- 
vorably impressed with what he, day by day, observed. 
Relations between the two nationalities became less and 
less frequent. 

The Third Army issued stringent orders against fra- 
ternization of any sort, the different brigades and divi- 
sions followed suit. According to the rules prescribed, 
communications between the soldier and the citizen were 
to be limited strictly to business and to the service 
and, In order to reduce even such direct dealings there 
was established in each unit — division brigade or regi- 
ment — a special bureau of civilian affairs to treat with 
the population of the occupied regions. In this way no 
officer or trooper had occasion to address himself directly 
to enemy civilians. 

On the other hand, the soldier's day was taken up by 
such a complete program of instruction that little time 



3i8 The American Army in the European Conflict 

was left for anything but the work laid down for him to 
do. It is an ungrateful task to attempt to occupy the 
time of a soldier who has just been making war, but it was 
one of which the American officers acquitted themselves 
with rare tact. 

The programs had a double object; to keep the troops 
well in hand, and at the same time prepare them for a re- 
turn to civil life. Many schools were created with this 
object in view. Even in the regiments, enough instruc- 
tors were found to give courses in applied mechanics, 
electricity, telephone and telegraph service, history and 
modern languages. Thus the American combatant who 
has been through the war comes out of it not only with 
his experience wonderfully enlarged, but also with his gen- 
eral instruction greatly improved over what it was upon 
entering the army. 

The great benevolent societies which we shall describe 
elsewhere took a prominent part in the education of the 
soldier and did much to keep him, while occupying Ger- 
man territory, away from the unwholesome influence of 
enemy propagandr.. The Red Cross, the Young Men's 
Christian Association, the Knights of Columbus, and the 
Salvation Army all established comfortable clubs which 
the men of the occupation forces regularly frequented and 
where they found amusements, dances, theatricals, and 
lectures to keep them among their own compatriots. 

Thus, in mid December, 191 8, our American associates 
had concluded without the slightest hitch, and within the 
specified time, the occupation of the German territory 
allotted to them. 

Solidly established on the right bank of the Rhine, and 
disposing of powerful effectives which would have made it 



March to the Rhine 319 

possible at a moment's notice to take up arms, the Amer- 
ican soldiers quietly prepared to resume the occupations 
of peace time, equally ready to plunge once more into 
active operations at the first alarm. 



CHAPTER X 

PART TAKEN BY AMERICAN UNITS IN THE OPERATIONS 
ON BRITISH FRONT AND IN SECONDARY THEA- 
TERS OF THE WAR 

It was perfectly natural, the British navy having gener- 
ously come to the aid of the Americans in order to facili- 
tate their arrival in Europe/ that at the moment of the 
enemy offensive toward Amiens, certain units should be 
sent into this threatened area rather than to points of 
the French front. These divisions, while training at the 
rear and in some of the quiet front sectors, would serve 
to augment the density of the troops and at the same time 
strengthen the resistance. 

General Pershing arranged with the British authorities 
that ten divisions should be thus distributed In the British 
cantonments, maneuver and training camps, and subse- 
quently trained for trench warfare at the front pending 
the day when they would be regrouped and become a part 
of the great American Army. 

These divisions; th^ Fourth, Twenty-seventh, Twenty- 
eighth, Thirtieth, Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, Seventy-sev- 
enth, Seventy-eighth, Eightieth, and Eighty-second, ar- 
rived in France at the end of April during the month of 
May and in the first days of June, 191 8. 

No sooner were they disembarked than their training 
began. The program of instruction had been drawn up 

1 48.5 per cent, of the effectives disembarked in Europe were carried 
overseas by British tonnage. 

320 



British Front 321 

by the American general headquarters at Chaumont. 
They differed slightly from those imposed upon the troops 
who were assembled in the American zone. 

It had been necessary to modify the American regu- 
lations slightly considering that these new contingents, 
and in particular the infantry, were armed with English 
equipment. For it was with the British army rifle and 
machine gun that these American divisions made their first 
essay in arms. 

It was also imperative to take into account the very 
special situation in which the British Army found itself 
at this moment from the point of view of its organization. 
After the German attacks of March and April our allies 
were obliged to suppress one battalion out of three in 
many of their brigades. Besides, in several divisions the 
infantry had been withdrawn. These units lacking 
troops kept their officers, their services, their trains, and 
found themselves at rest awaiting the arrival of reen- 
forcements. They were called " Cadre Divisions." 

Thus, when the American units arrived in the Brit- 
ish zone to perfect their training, the services and trans- 
portation facilities of these Cadre Divisions were at once 
turned over to the American divisions. The one pos- 
sessed all that was lacking in the other. The name given 
by the British to such units working side by side and com- 
pleting one other was " Affiliated Divisions." 

During these periods of instruction the British officers 
without troops were placed near the American officers of 
the same rank and served a« " text-book," according to 
another of the British expressions. 

As soon as the American troops were pronounced fit 
for sector duty, it was decided to send them into line b^ 
battalion, and this measure would have permitted the 



322 The American Army in the European Conflict 

British brigades to recuperate their missing third bat- 
talion. 

This primary phase being terminated, the American 
battahons were to have been returned to their own regi- 
ment, and these units also were then to pass a certain 
length of time in the front hne. As a matter of fact it 
was impossible to realize this program, at least for the 
ten divisions in question. 

When the enemy broke through our lines along the 
Chemin-des-Dames and advanced toward Chateau- 
Thierry, it seemed prudent to post between Paris and the 
front the Fourth and Twenty-eighth Divisions," and to 
send into the quiet sectors of Lorraine and the Vosges, 
the Thirty-fifth, Seventy-seventh, and Eighty-second Divi- 
sions in order that they might relieve French units, thus 
rendering these trained troops available for action. 

When these movements had been effected, there re- 
mained only five American divisions in the British zone. 
These units went into service at the front on the follow- 
ing dates: 

The Twenty-seventh on July 22nd. 

The Thirtieth on July i6th. 

The Thirty-third on July 3rd. 

The Seventy-eighth on August 12th. 

The Eightieth on July 2 2d. 

The commander-in-chief, in an order dated June 25th, 
had organized the Second American Army Corps and 
had placed General Read at its head. Fruges became the 
headquarters of this new corps, whose mission was to ad- 
minister the American divisions scattered in the British 
zone, to superintend their instruction awaiting the day — 

2 See Chapter IV, the role of the Fourth and Twenty-eighth Divisions 
during the spring defensive. 



British Front 323 

which was now approaching — when the corps would as- 
sume the direction of tactical operations. 

During the last week of August, General Pershing di- 
rected the Thirty-third, Seventy-eighth and Eightieth Di- 
visions to proceed by rail to the American zone, having 
decided to utilize these units for the general offensive 
which he was contemplating in the autumn. During their 
training in the British zone these divisions had had but a 
single chance to accustom themselves to trench warfare. 
But they had nevertheless been able already to signalize 
themselves In a way which called forth the admiration 
of their British comrades for the courage and audacity 
which they had there displayed. 

The Thirty-third Division, in particular, had brilliantly 
distinguished Itself. 

On Independence Day, July 4th, one of Its battalions, 
joined with some Australian troops, participated in a raid 
near Villers-Bretonneux which was remarkably prepared 
and carried out. 1,400 prisoners were brought home, 
and these acknowledged having been so completely taken 
by surprise that they had not even been able to snatch 
their muskets. 

One of the British generals present in this affair con- 
fided to us that the original thousand Americans forming 
the assault battalion had been greatly augmented by the 
impromptu enlistment of a quantity of " Sammies " whOj 
posted in the second line, could not resist the tempta- 
tion of joining their comrades which they had been 
able to do by carefully evading the vigilance of their 
chiefs. 

The departure from the British front of the three divi- 
sions which we have enumerated left to the second Ameri- 
can corps, operating at Fruges, the Twenty-seventh and 



324 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Thirtieth only. General Read then assumed command 
of these divisions.^ ^ 

During July, 19 18, these two divisions were to be found 
in the first line, engaged totally or in fractions before 
Poperinghe,^ Ypres,^ Lake Dlckbusch,^ Voormezeele,^ 

^ In the course of the operations in which the Twenty-seventh and Thir- 
tieth Divisions participated, they were incorporated in the ranks of the 
Second British Arm)'. Thus the staff of the American corps exercised 
over them only administrative control. 

4 ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE SECOND ARMY CORPS 
Major-General G. W. Read commanding the corps 

Chief of Staff Colonel G. Simonds 

Chief of First Section ( G-i ) Colonel R. K. Hale 

Chief of Second Section (G-2) Lt.-Col. K. T. Riggs 

Chief of Third Section (G-3) Col. F. E. Buchan 

Chief of Fourth Section (G-4) Col. H. S. Herrick 

Tvjenty-seventh Dwision 

Major-General J. F. O'Ryan commanding the division 

Chief of Staff: Colonel Stanley H. Ford 

S^d Infantry Brigade s^t/i Infantry Brigade 

Col. G. M. Andrews Brig.-Gen. P. E. Pierce 

losth Infantry Regiment loyth Infantry Regiment 

Major C. W. Berry Col. C. T. de Bevoise 

Io6th Infantry Regiment 108th Infantry Regiment 

Col. W. A. Taylor Col. E. S. Jennings 

Thirtieth Di'vision 

Major-General E. M. Lewis commanding the division 

Chief of Staff: Lt.-Col. J. K. Herr 

SQth Infantry Brigade 60th Infantry Brigade 

Brig.-Gen. L. D. Tyson Brig.-Gen. S. L. Faison 

liyth Infantry Regiment Jjgth Infantry Regiment 

Col. C. F. Spence Col. J. Van B. Metts 

llSth Infantry Regiment I20th Infantry Regiment 

Col. O. R. Wolfe Col. S. W. Minor 

^ Twenty-seventh Division totally engaged from July 9th to August 20th. 
"Thirtieth totally engaged from July 17th to August 9th. 
^ Twenty-seventh totally engaged from August 21st to August 30th. 
^ First brigade of the Thirtieth Division engaged from August 31st to 
September 2d. 



British Front 325 

The Lankhof Farm,^ and the heights of Vierstraat.^'* 
When these operations were brought to a close the 
Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth Divisions which had 
counted in the ranks of the Second British Army returned 
to General Read's command. 

The Second American Corps had been designated to 
take part in the offensive of the Fourth British Army. 
The mission of General Rawlinson consisted in exerting 
pressure upon the enemy's front between Cambrai and 
St. Quentin, and it may be remembered that toward the 
middle of September the progression of Rawlinson's army 
which, working in conjunction with the French left wing, 
followed the line of the Somme Valley had arrived at 
the Hindenburg Line, where it met with obstinate resist- 
ance. 

Here the enemy occupied a position along the edge of 
the St. Quentin Canal. Near the environs of Belllcourt 
and between this village and Vendhuille — that is to say, 
on that part of the front held by the Australian corps — 
this canal passes under a tunnel six kilometers long. 

The second American corps was placed at the disposi- 
tion of General Rawlinson, on the twenty-first of Septem- 
ber, that It might aid in the taking of that portion of the 
enemy line which it appeared would be fiercely disputed. 

The British general conceived the following plan for 
the employment of his own elite troops, and also of the 
American infantry which before long was to show Itself 
equal In courage and daring to the Australians. General 
Read's soldiers were to alternate with those of General 

^ First brigade of the Thirtieth Division engaged from August 31st to 
September 2d. 

^0 Numerous elements of the Twenty-seventh Division engaged from 
August 31st to September ist. 



326 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Monash for the conduct of the fight, the Initiative of 
which was to be left with the Americans. 

The Second Corps commander placed his divisions side 
by side, the Twenty-seventh at the left, the Thirtieth at 
the right, and moved them on September 27th fronting 
their objectives. Their mission was to seize the first 
Hindenburg Line, and after, to storm the villages of 
Nauroy and Gouy. As soon as the German line was 
broken, General Monash with his Australians was to pass 
through the American lines and exploit this first success. 

From the twenty-second to the twenty-ninth of Septem- 
ber preliminary operations were undertaken with the ob- 
ject simply of establishing the first attacking lines on a 
solid basis. 

On the twenty-ninth the attack was launched. A heavy 
fog favored the surprise, helped in the tank action, but 
rendered very difficult the mopping up of the battle-field, 
back of the first assault waves. For the ground especially 
that which the Twenty-seventh Division was to traverse 
bristled with defenses of all kinds. The trenches were 
deep, ditches and sunken roads, cleverly concealed by 
camouflage, crossed it in every direction. The enemy 
made use also of subterranean passages in order to reach 
the tunnel of which we have spoken and which served 
them as a strong position for the concentration of troops. 

While the assailant was precipitating himself upon the 
successive objectives his adversary remained concealed 
under ground while the wave broke, then leaped forth and 
engaged, under cover of the mist, in a confused hand-to- 
hand combat. The Twenty-seventh Division was unable 
to attain its objectives that day on account of these ob- 
stacles. On the other hand, the Thirtieth Division, 
whose way led them over a less difficult and cut-up region, 



British Front 327 

not only succeeded in gaining the Hindenburg Line, but 
went beyond, taking the position Le Catelet Nauroy. 

On September 30th, according to plan. General Mon- 
ash, at the head of the i\ustralians, went through the 
Second American Corps, and completed the mopping up 
of the battle-field. But the work of General Read's men 
was not yet finished. A short breathing spell only was 
accorded them before they, in their turn, replaced the 
Australian division. 

The sixth of October found the Americans again in line, 
the Thirtieth Division in contact with the enemy on an 
advanced position west of Montbrehain. 

Continuing the offensive these valiant troops pursued 
their success up to the Selle, where they encountered a 
powerful resistance, and the Twenty-seventh came to 
their aid. At this moment the Second Corps found it- 
self placed at the extremity of a salient which bit into 
the enemy line to a depth of twenty-five kilometers. 
Progress continued nevertheless and, after a good ar- 
tillery preparation, the Thirtieth Division succeeded in 
forcing the line of the Selle. On October 20th the 
vicinity of Catillon was attained where the ground occu- 
pied dominates the Sambre Canal. Here the Twenty- 
seventh Division at the left was deployed along the St. 
Maurice River, linking the Americans with the Thirteenth 
Army Corps at Bazuel. 

These fine American divisions, whose aid had been ex- 
tremely valuable to the allied cause, had suffered greatly 
during these combats. Losses were heavy; more than 
8,000 men had been evacuated in the course of the fight- 
ing and 2,225 dead were left on the field. 

The Second Corps had helped to penetrate the Hinden- 
burg Line at one of the vital points where it was the most 



328 The American Army in the European Conflict 

strongly organized and had even carried the fight far 
forward into the enemy's ground, on an average front of 
5,500 yards. It had advanced sixteen miles, capturing 
the villages of Bellicourt, Nauroy, Brancourt, Fremont, 
Busigny, Rocquigny, Escaufort, St. Souplet, St. Martin, 
Ecaillons, Ribeauville, and Mazinghem. A large amount 
of booty was taken; 6,000 prisoners of whom 150 were 
officers, 73 field guns, 9 heavy guns, 400 machine guns, a 
complete train on rails, and supplies of all sorts. 

The Second Corps had taken an active part in this ad- 
vance between Cambrai and St. Quentin, causing the 
liberation of these two towns a few days later. 

General Rawlinson hastened to congratulate General 
Read on the prowess of his divisions, and when the plan 
of the operations had entirely been realized the American 
general was able to communicate the following flattering 
appreciation of their services to his men. The first was 
a telegram from their own chief, the second from the 
British high command. 

" The commander-in-chief desires you to convey to the officers 
and soldiers of your corps his appreciation of the magnificent quali- 
ties which have enabled them, against powerful resistance, to ad- 
vance more than ten miles and to take more than 6,000 prisoners 
since September 27th." 

Field Marshal Sir Douglass Haig expressed himself 
in the following terms : 

October 20th. 

I wish to express to you personally and to all of the officers and 
men serving under you, my warm appreciation of the very val- 
uable and gallant services rendered by you throughout the recent 
operations with the Fourth British Army. Called upon to attack 
positions of great strength held by a determined enemy, all ranks of 
the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth American Divisions under your 
command displayed an energy, courage, and determination in attack 



Italian and Russian Fronts 329 

which proved irresistible. It does not need me to tell you that in 
the heavy fighting of the past three weeks you have earned the 
lasting esteem and admiration of your British comrades in arms 
whose successes you have so nobly shared. 

The Thirtieth Division was withdrawn from the sector 
the night of October i9-2oth; the Twenty-seventh was re- 
lieved the following night. 

The Second American Army Corps was in turn with- 
drawn from the front, leaving the ground to be guarded 
by the Ninth and Thirteenth Army Corps. 

Entrained at Roisel, these two divisions went, the 
Twenty-seventh to Corbye, the Thirtieth to Querrleu, 
where they were to be reenforced and to continue their 
mihtary training. 

But before the conclusion of this period of Instruction 
and of rest, the armistice was signed. 

On November 19th the Second Corps with its con- 
stituent divisions, was transferred to Le Mans, there to 
await embarkation orders for America. 

In compliance with a request from the Italian Gov- 
ernment, the commander-in-chief of the Expeditionary 
Forces detached from the Eighty-fourth Division, the 
332d Infantry Regiment, which was placed at the disposi- 
tion of General Diaz. 

The regiment arrived on October 29th at Trevlso; on 
the thirty-first, when the enemy was In retreat It reached 
the left bank of the Plave. On the third of November, 
arriving at the Taghamento, the regiment took contact, 
through Its patrols with the enemy's rear-guard and or- 
ganized along a four-mile front the bridgehead of Ponte 
della Dellzla. November 4th capturing Codroipo on the 



330 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Udlne road, it seized upon important stores and supplies 
which the enemy had been obliged to abandon. After as- 
sisting at the disarmament of the Austrian forces, the 
332nd by a rapid march reached Ipplis on the seventh and 
there was disloca.ted. One battalion was directed to Cat- 
taro by way of Venice, the two others were sent to Cor- 
mons (Austria). On November 17th one of the two 
battalions garrisoned at Cormons was detached and sent 
to Fiume. 

The Expeditionary Forces detached for operations In 
Russia with the allied contingents the 339th Infantry 
Regiment, a battalion of engineers, a field hospital, and a 
field ambulance. These troops, which numbered in all 
about 4,800 men, embarked on August 26th at Newcastle, 
and operated with the force of 29,000 French and British 
In the region of Arkangel. 

Together with the Allies they mounted the river Dvlna, 
attaining Shenkursk, which they occupied for a time but 
where they were unable to maintain themselves. 

The twenty-fifth of January, 19 19, our combined forces, 
attacked by Red troops much superior in number, were 
obliged to withdraw as far as the junction of the Vaga 
and Dvlna rivers. There they seem to be solidly es- 
tablished protecting the base port of Arkangel as well 
as that of Murmansk with which they remained linked 
by rail and from which they drew their supplies. 



CHAPTER XI 

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION 

ORGANIZATION • IN AMERICA SEA TRANSPORT A- 

TIO.N GROWTH OF THE SERVICES OF THE REAR 

IN FRANCE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF TRANSPORTA- 
TION MOTOR TRANSPORT SERVICE MILITARY 

BOARD OF ALLIED SUPPLY 

" All the Fighting is not done at the Front " was 
an inscription which might be frequently seen on placards 
hung upon the walls of the various offices of the services 
of supply. 

In fact from April, 19 17, to November, 19 18, Ameri- 
can services of the rear had been waging incessant war 
against the tremendous difficulties of every kind entailed 
by the huge distances to be covered, the initial unpre- 
paredness, and the element of danger supplied by the 
German submarines during the crossing of the Atlantic. 

In a preceding chapter we have endeavored to convey 
to our readers some idea of the complex and difficult 
problems with which the authorities of the United States 
were confronted. We have seen that the five main serv- 
ices which had administered America's army in peace 
time had set themselves to work without delay. Power- 
ful help had been given by the voluntary cooperation of 
a great number of prominent men of business, manufac- 
turers, bankers, engineers, scientists, who put their 
technical knowledge and their experience of great com- 
mercial enterprises at the disposal of their government. 

331 



22^ The American Army in the European Conflict 

In the space of a few weeks the War Department had 
placed upward of 60,000 contracts, requiring thousands 
of tons of raw material and employing hundreds of thou- 
sands of workmen. New manufacturing plants were 
erected; at the same time immense services intended for 
the reception, distribution, and transportation of supplies 
and material were being organized. 

The setting on foot of a great system of war manu- 
factures had been most difficult; factories became quickly 
congested with orders from divers ministerial depart- 
ments that came in pell-mell in competition not only with 
one another but also with those of the allied govern- 
ments. Shortage of raw material was acutely felt almost 
everywhere, and the establishment of some order of pri- 
ority soon became necessary. The Council of National 
Defense was utilized as a clearing house for dealing with 
these problems, and later the War Industries Board was 
formed. There, representatives of the Army, Navy, and 
other departments met with delegates of the manufac- 
turers and settled particularly knotty points as they arose. 
As problems of this type became more complex, and as the 
War Department bureaus began to get their work more 
in hand, centralization of the purchasing mechanism of 
the army became both desirable and possible. This was 
done in February, 191 8, through the creation, as part 
of the General Staff, of two important sections. One, 
that of " Purchase and Supply," was charged with the 
purchase of all material, equipment, and supplies re- 
quired for the needs of the army. 

The other, called " Division of Storage and Traffic," 
controlled the storage of all supplies and furthermore 
was in charge of military sea or land transportation. On 
April 1 6th these two sections were united and placed un- 



Organization in America 333 

der Quartermaster General Goethals, the builder of the 
Panama Canal, under the title of Director of Purchase, 
Storage, and Traffic. He had absolute control of all 
American Services of the Rear, from the production cen- 
ters in the United States to the European ports of de- 
barkation on the Atlantic. 

During a period of particularly intense activity, for a 
few months beginning May, 19 18, Mr. Edward R. Stet- 
tinlus, of J. P. Morgan & Co., well known to the allied 
governments for the services he had rendered in organiz- 
ing their system of purchases in the United States, served 
as Second Assistant Secretary of War with general super- 
vision over the purchasing functions of the War Depart- 
ment. 

Under such management, the organizations established 
in the United States were not long in reaching a high 
degree of efficiency, and in the first months of 19 18 con- 
stantly growing streams of men and material flowed into 
the ports of embarkation. 

Thanks to energetic action on the part of the Shipping 
Board and of its section for the control of tonnage, the 
number of ships available for the crossing of the Atlantic 
considerably increased. As has already been said the 
German ships that had been seized in the American ports 
had been put Into service In the fall of 19 17. In Feb- 
ruary, 19 1 8, the Shipping Board had purchased seven 
British transports. By the end of March, the German 
drive which placed the Allies In such a perilous position, 
convinced them that the moment had come for drastic 
measures. The British Government lent all the trans- 
ports It could dispose of. The American War Trade 
Board absolutely prohibited all non-essential Importa- 
tions. Eighty-seven Dutch boats heretofore idle In 



334 ^^^ American Army in the European Conflict 

United States ports, with a total deadweight of 533,000 
tons, were requisitioned; in the course of the summer 
important quantities of Japanese and Scandinavian ship- 
ping was chartered. 

To conclude, the output of the new American ship- 
building yards began slowly to make itself felt. At the 
time of the armistice there existed three hundred and 
forty-one of these yards with a total of 1,284 launching 
ways; more than double the number existing in the rest 
of the world. Om November i, 19 18, the army had in 
service a fleet of its own consisting of 39 troop ships, 38 
animal transports, 18 refrigerator ships, 228 cargo ships, 
and 4 tankers. In addition. General Pershing had gath- 
ered in Europe a cross-Channel fleet which numbered 104 
vessels averaging 3,000 tons. By adding to these figures 
those of the vessels lent by the Allies, we will find that, 
at the time of the armistice, the American Army had 
shipping either in operation or under definite allocation 
totalling 3,800,000 tons deadweight, a fleet twice as large 
as the entire American merchant marine engaged in 
foreign trade when the war began. 

While the number of boats was thus augmenting the 
time employed for the round trips decreased as a direct 
consequence of the improvements in the operation of the 
ports. From February i, 19 18, to the armistice the 
troop ships, including the slower vessels, averaged under 
forty days for a complete circular trip. The faster ships 
averaged under thirty days; during the summer the 
Leviathan, former Vaterland, and the Mount Vernon, 
former Kronprinzessin Cecilie, averaged under twenty- 
seven; The Great Northern and Northern Pacific aver- 
aged respectively twenty-five and twenty-six days, and 
have each made the round trip in nineteen days. During 



Sea Transportation 335 

the whole summer the Leviathan landed American troops 
in France at the rate of over four hundred men a day. 

The round trip voyages of the cargo transports which 
are much slower and carry large amounts of freight which 
is difficult to handle, were naturally effected less rapidly. 
These ships, nevertheless, during the spring and summer 
of 19 1 8 maintained an average of seventy days. When 
it is remembered that these results were achieved by ves- 
sels which were compelled to navigate in convoys and to 
wait for escorts, it will be readily seen that there was no 
slackness in the ports on either side of the Atlantic during 
the decisive months. 

To mention the American ports only: New York, 
during the fall, shipped to the Expeditionary Forces 
a monthly average of 400,000 tons of freight, and did 
so with a normal detention in port for the large army 
cargo transports of only fifteen days. Newport News 
had been developed to such a point that at the time of the 
armistice, cargo to the extent of 150,000 tons a month 
and animals to the number of 20,000 a month were 
shipped from this port. 

Baltimore and Philadelphia shipped, respectively, 
80,000 tons a month. 

The first convoy of troops left America for France 
in June, 1917. In July and August few men were em- 
barked, but from September on, in consequence of the 
entry into service of German shipping, the rate of troop 
transportation seriously increased and reached 50,000 
men in December. By February, 19 18, a total of 
195,000 had been attained. In March, shipment for 
this month alone was 84,000. But at that time, the 
German armies, having assumed the offensive, there 
was a great demand for American infantry; the British 



336 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Government furnished many ships for this purpose. 
Transports were loaded fifty per cent, in excess of their 
normal capacity. From this time on the monthly rate of 
embarkation increased by gigantic leaps — 118,500 men 
in April, 246,000 in May, 278,800 in June. Before the 
first of July 1,000,000 men had been transported. The 
July record exceeded all expectations, the number of 
troops embarked being 306,185, and before the end of 
October the second million had sailed from American 
shores. During the four months of May, June, July, and 
August 121,703 men were embarked. When the armi- 
stice was signed the total embarkations amounted to 
2,076,000. 

Out of this number, 49.9 per cent, was transported by 
British shipping; 43.7 per cent, by American, 6.4 per 
cent, by French Russian, and Italian shipping. In the 
words of Secretary Baker, " Never had such a troop 
movement been contemplated." This achievement 
wrought a decisive effect upon the world's history, at one 
of its most crucial moments. 

If we turn to the question of cargo movement, taking 
into account only the shipments made from the United 
States, we find that the figures were low at the beginning; 
16,000 tons In June, 19 17, 12,000 in July, 19,000 in 
August. From that time on, under the influence of meas- 
ures taken to increase the number of vessels, a sharp as- 
cending movement began, which continued regularly so 
that, in October, 19 18, the monthly rate of transatlantic 
transportation was 636,000 tons. The total monthly 
transatlantic and cross-Channel tonnage discharged dur- 
ing the two highest months was 911,000 and 913,000 
tons. 

Almost all of the 5,150,000 tons of freight transported 



Sea Transportation 337 

from America to Europe before the armistice was carried 
in American bottoms, and less than 5 per cent, was lifted 
by allied ships. It may be interesting to quote here, from 
the report of Secretary Baker, some information con- 
cerning the material in question. It Included among 
other Items 1,145 consolidation locomotives of the 100- 
ton type, of which 350 were shipped already set up on 
their own wheels, so that they could run under their own 
steam a few hours after having been unloaded onto the 
tracks by the powerful hoisting machines of Brest and St. 
Nazalre. This is the first time that the annals of mari- 
time transportation have recorded the voyage of locomo- 
tives of such size entirely mounted. Special vessels with 
extra large hatches were withdrawn from the Cuban ore 
trade for this purpose. In the meantime, the hatches of 
other ships were specially lengthened so that on the day 
of the armistice the military authorities were prepared to 
ship these engines at the rate of 200 a month. By that 
time, the number of standard-gauge freight cars imported 
from America to France for the A. E. F. amounted to 
17,000 of the 33-ton type; that is to say, with a carrying 
capacity of 51,000 cars of the French lo-ton type. 

Although this enumeration may appear somewhat 
lengthy It Is indispensable to give an idea of what was 
accomplished In transportation. Indispensable, but in- 
adequate — for with results obtained we must also take 
into account those which were In process of formation and 
on the point of becoming effective when hostilities were 
suddenly brought to a close. In November, 19 18, the 
sea tonnage at the disposal of the A. E. F. was increasing 
at the rate of half a million tons a month. The output 
of the shipbuilding yards had become so enormous that, 
by the spring of 19 19, it was hoped that all boats bor- 



338 The American Army in the European Conflict 

rowed from the British merchant service might be re- 
stored: and before the end of the summer, the United 
States expected to be themselves in a position to lend to 
England a like amount of shipping. 

At the close of the war the diagram of monthly trans- 
portation of freight from America to France was still on 
the ascending curve ; the increase in the number of availa- 
ble ships combined with the decrease of submarine danger 
fully justified the assertion that the program of an Ex- 
peditionary Force of eighty divisions would certainly have 
been entirely carried out in a short time. 

Every one had his share of glory in obtaining these 
magnificent results. 

The American departments which organized a formid- 
able system of war manufacture, of transportation and 
supply, which succeeded in finding ships when it seemed 
quite impossible to discover any, and which, in ever-in- 
creasing numbers, embarked upon these vessels men and 
material in enormous masses; the navy which, at the cost 
of immense efforts, was able to cut down to an almost 
insignificant figure the losses inflicted by German sub- 
marines upon the American Expeditionary Forces; the 
British, who transported on their ships almost half of 
these effectives; the French finally, who came in for a 
large share of praise by the manner in which their ports 
and railroads responded to the demands which many ex- 
perts supposed to be impossible after forty months of 
war; this brings us to the question of organization in 
France. 

When General Pershing at the beginning of the war 
decided that the direction of his services of the rear would 
be for some time located at the Chaumont headquarters, 



Services of Rear in France 339 

he counted, as has been previously mentioned, upon leav- 
ing them there for as short a time as possible. 

With the constant increase in the numbers of the Ex- 
peditionary Forces, and the development of their organ- 
izations, questions of supply became more and more com- 
plicated and called for an ever-growing personnel. The 
network of American activities by degrees covered the en- 
tire territory of France, and it became urgent to take 
advantage of local resources of all kinds. 

On December 14th a new base section had been es- 
tablished in Great Britain. On account of great distances 
involved it now became Imperative to locate the central 
direction of this network not at the extremity of the line, 
but in its very center. On January 15th it was trans- 
ported to Tours. From here its activities extended over 
the whole of France and of Great Britain. Its propor- 
tions were those of a ministry such as might have been 
formed had we combined our French departments of 
War, of Public Works, and of Transportation. The of- 
fices entirely filled three large barracks which the French 
Government had placed at the disposal of the Americans. 
From one of these offices the general commanding the 
service of supplies controlled the enormous organization 
charged with meeting the requirements of the Expedition- 
ary Forces.^ Under his immediate orders he had a staff 
and several departments. The staff consisted of three 
sections : 

The First Section exercised delegated authority over 
all matters of organization administration, and the pro- 
curing of personnel and material from both the United 

1 General Kernan controlled the service of supplies up to the end of 
July, 1918, at which date he was replaced by General James G. Harboard, 
who commanded the S. O. S. up to the end of the war. 



340 The American Army in the European Conflict 

States and Europe. It disposed of two powerful 
agencies; the sea tonnage and the General Purchasing 
Board. Notified every month by the Shipping Board at 
Washington of the quantity of shipping available for the 
succeeding month, it distributed it among the divers serv- 
ices in proportion to their wants and in the measure in 
which they had been unable to meet those needs by pur- 
chase on the European markets. 

The Second Section, far less important, controlled all 
questions of intelligence and information counter-espion- 
age, and postal censorship. 

The Fourth Section, for there was no third section, 
had a general surveillance over all questions of construc- 
tion, transportation, and supply, took charge of men, 
animals, and material at the time of their debarkation 
or, in what concerns the two latter, at the time when they 
were acquired by the American Army through purchase 
in Europe. From that time on, this service was responsi- 
ble for their housing and storage in the camps, barracks, 
depots of all kinds whose establishment it also supervised, 
as well as of their transportation by rail, roads, or canals 
to their ultimate destination. It was responsible for the 
reception and billeting of troops upon their arrival In 
Europe. On French territory it directed all labor units,, 
finally it controlled the salvage and remount service. 

These three sections, of course, kept in constant touch 
with the corresponding sections of headquarters at Chau- 
mont. 

Such was the organization which assumed the heavy 
task of coordinating and facilitating the work of the great 
services whose activities have been already dealt with In 
a preceding chapter. 

How was this central direction to make Its action felt 




Organization of the Services of the war 



Services of Rear in France 341 

wherever It was necessary? That is to say, at every spot 
where American troops, American Installations, American 
leave areas were stationed or established? 

It must be remembered that after the spring of 19 18 
there were actually more or less important American de- 
tachments stationed in the whole of France and in the 
southeastern part of England. 

The key to the difficulty had been sought and found 
in a territorial organization similar to that existing in 
the United States in peace time. The S. O. S. head- 
quarters at Tours corresponded to the War Department 
in Washington. The territory had been divided into sec- 
tions corresponding to the military departments in the 
United States. 

At the head of each section was placed an officer — a 
brigadier-general in most cases — who had a double role. 
On the one hand, he controlled all questions of discipline, 
police, sanitation, of all American troops stationed in his 
section. On the other hand he was responsible for the 
technical running of all activities that were established on 
his territory by services of the A. E. F. 
The final organization consisted of: 

7 Base Sections, 

I Intermediate Section, 

I Advance Section. 

The limits of these are Indicated on the annexed dia- 
gram. - 

The departments of the Seine and of Seine-et-OIse on 
one hand, the region of Tours, on the other hand, formed 
two Independent districts placed under the Immediate con- 

2 After the armistice were organized: 

Base Section No. 8 (Italy), 

Base Section No. 9 (Antwerp and Rotterdam). 



342 The Amej'ican Army in the European Conflict 

trol of the general commanding the district of Paris and 
the Tours headquarters commandant. All the different 
base sections were, of course, far from possessing the 
same degree of importance. 

Chief of these, according both to date of creation and 
extent of output, was Base No. i developed in the region 
of the lower Loire. 

When the armistice was signed, twenty-six American 
ships could simultaneously unload in its ports; fourteen at 
St. Nazaire, one at Montoir, eight at Nantes, three at 
Sables d'Olonne. Over thirty-seven per cent, of all ma- 
terials and supplies imported for the Expeditionary 
Forces had passed through there : 1,600,000 had been un- 
loaded at St. Nazaire, 639,000 at Nantes. 

The changes that had occurred at Montoir, the gen- 
eral storage depot for the port of St. Nazaire, were in- 
deed astounding. In 19 17, before the work of filling and 
draining was started, the site of these future installations 
was nothing but a vast area of flat, marshy ground. 
Work was actually started in January, 19 18; in March, 
at the time of Secretary Baker's visit, a forest of piles 
made of reenforced concrete appeared above the surface, 
ready to support the heavy iron trestles which were to 
serve for the construction of the warehouses. On the 
day of the armistice, 138 of these warehouses were en- 
tirely completed, and 125 miles of standard-gauge rail- 
way tracks, out of 250 which were contemplated in the 
finished project, had already been laid down. 

As to the eight berths whose construction had been 
decided on the Loire, near the mouth of the Brivet, only 
one was completed at that time. 

It is not in the region of the lower Loire that a com- 
plete type of a maritime base entirely constructed by the 



Services of Rear in France 343 

Americans is to be found, but rather in the region of the 
Gironde, the center of Base Section No. 2. There, at 
the close of hostilities, the port of Bassens and the gen- 
eral storage depot of St. Sulpice were being operated to 
their full capacity. At Bassens twenty ships could unload 
at the same time; ten at the French docks and ten at the 
American, all of which were now entirely completed. 
Twenty-five per cent, of all the supplies imported for the 
A. E, F. had been unloaded at Bassens. The American 
piers built on wooden piles supported two lines of ware- 
houses parallel to the shore. The floor of these ware- 
houses had a weight-carrying capacity of 300 pounds 
per square foot. One of them attained the immense 
dimensions of 1,340 feet in length and 100 feet in 
breadth. 

Hardly had a ship docked, than it was taken hold of 
by companies of stevedores. These companies were 
organized in as many sections as there were holds in each 
ship, an arrangement which made it possible to supervise 
and direct the work. Instantly, all available hoisting ma- 
chines on board the ship or on the pier came into play, 
emptying the contents of the holds into the freight cars 
which were constantly being lined up alongside. No 
sooner were these loaded than they were forwarded to 
St. Sulpice over the American tracks which had been laid 
beside the Bordeaux-Paris main line. If we follov/ this 
track we reach not far from St. Sulpice a refrigerating 
plant with a capacity of 4,000 tons, where American beef 
scarcely lifted from the vessel's holds underwent a new 
process of chilling before being continued on its way to 
Gievres. 

The visit to such an establishment as this may be recom- 
mended to the numerous French consumers who have a 



344 The American Army in the European Conflict 

prejudice against frozen meat as unreasoning as it is 
detrimental to their pockets. 

The American soldier is the heaviest meat consumer 
in the world. His ration normally of 200 ounces is in- 
creased to 240 ounces in winter during field service. Ac- 
cording to statistics published in February, 19 19, by the 
French Government, the number of existing cattle in 
France was reduced by the war to 13,314,000 heads. 
What would have happened had the American Army, in- 
stead of being fed upon frozen meat imported from 
America, been compelled to draw upon the meat resources 
in France at the rate of over half a kilo per man and per 
day? 

Continuing to follow the American tracks, we arrive 
at St. Sulpice-Izon, fifteen miles from Bordeaux, at the 
general storage depot established to absorb the output 
of the port of Bassens. It is interesting to make a short 
stop at this place. From the statistical point of view, 
the installations of St. Sulpice are the most remarkable 
example of work of such importance completed in such a 
short time; from the practical point of view, they seem 
to be destined to play a great part in the economical de- 
velopment of the Bordeaux region. 

The St. Sulpice general storage depot was established 
for the supply of 1,000,000 men during thirty days. The 
entire project, which was almost finished at the end of 
hostilities, comprised 108 warehouses, with a total sur- 
face of 2,500,000 square feet, distributed among the fol- 
lowing services: air service, chemical warfare, engineers, 
medical corps, motor transport, ordnance, quartermaster, 
signal corps. 

Besides, 6,000,000 square feet of open storage were 
provided for and ninety-two miles of standard-gauge 



Services of Rear in France 345 

tracks were laid for the service of this immense depot, 
where at the close of the war some eight hundred cars 
were loaded and unloaded each day. The daily ship- 
ment toward the zone of the advance and the intermediate 
section amounted to 55,000 tons. 

The speed record in warehouse construction during the 
course of the war was probably attained at St. Sulpice : 
In fourteen days six hundred German prisoners, working 
under the supervision of American engineers, built eight- 
een warehouses, the majority of which were fifty by five 
hundred feet. 

Troops permanently stationed at St. Sulpice numbered 
255 oflicers and 11,000 men. In the neighborhood, at 
St, Loubes on the Dordogne River, the ordnance had 
established an immense ammunition depot. 

Such were the main installations constructed by the 
Americans in the Gironde region. 

We have dwelt at length on the description of the base 
sections of St. Nazaire and Bordeaux, because it is there 
that the most important and varied work was carried out 
by the Americans. As to all the others we may confine 
ourselves to the mention of their main characteristics. 

Base Section No. 3 which included Great Britain, was 
especially important on account of the large transit of 
American troops going to France and also on account of 
the enormous quantities of material and supplies — a 
total of 2,485,019 short tons, that crossed the Channel 
for the use of the Expeditionary Forces up to May i, 
1919. 

Coal figures at the rate of seventy-five per cent, in this 
total. 

In this connection it may be of interest to mention the 
arrangements made between the French Government and 



34^ The American Army in the European Conflict 

the A. E. F. with a view to economizing railroad trans- 
portation. According to this agreement, part of the coal 
imported from Great Britain for the supply of American 
troops was turned over to the French on its unloading at 
the Channel ports. 

The French Government refunded the same amount of 
tonnage extracted from the coal fields of central France, 
located in close proximity to the American lines of com- 
munication. 

Supplies imported from Great Britain were unloaded 
in France at the docks operated by the French and British 
in the ports of Base Section No. 4 (Le Havre) ; however, 
at the time of the armistice four berths were permanently 
assigned to the American Expeditionary Forces in this 
port. 

Brest, headquarters of Base Section No. 5, thanks to 
the depth and excellence of its harbor became the landing 
place of huge masses of troops transported during the 
summer of 191 8. There it was that the Leviathan 
which draws forty-two feet, disembarked every month 
effectives which equalled in number those of a German 
infantry division. 

Base Section No. 6, Marseilles, was organized only in 
June, 19 1 8. On the one hand it had become essential at 
that time to take advantage of all existing port facilities 
on account of the ever-growing importance of debarka- 
tion of American supplies. On the other hand the Allies 
had the submarine menace pretty well under control. 
When the armistice was signed the Expeditionary Forces 
were able to unload simultaneously nine ships in the port 
of Marseilles. The great general storage depot at 
Miramas, created for the supply of the Salonica Army, 



Services of Rear in France 347 

was partially turned over to the American services of the 
rear. 

It occupied the same comparative position toward Mar- 
seilles, as Montoir toward St. Nazaire, or St. Sulpice to- 
ward Bassens. 

Finally, Base Section No, 7 was established between 
Base Sections Nos. i and 2 with its center at La Palice 
and La Rochelle. It was intended to be equipped at an 
early date with a port of the same size as that established 
at Bassens, and the site of which was to be Talmont on 
the Gironde. Its construction was made unnecessary by 
the signing of the armistice. 

While the principal base sections were being developed 
after the manner above described, the installations in the 
intermediate zone were proceeding with equal rapidity. 
Extensive work was being carried on at the great general 
storage depot at Gievres which was destined to receive 
the material for quartermaster, engineers, ordnance, 
medical department, and chemical warfare services. Al- 
though far from completion when the armistice was 
signed it had already attained dimensions and handled 
an output of which the following figures may convey some 
slight idea. Of standard-gauge track 120 miles out of 
the 240 projected, were in active operation. During Oc- 
tober a daily average of 1,600 cars were discharged and 
loaded. The capacity of the oil and gasoline tanks al- 
ready in service was 2,000,000 gallons with a plan for 
double the quantity. The refrigerator plant could con- 
tain 6,500 tons of meat; that is to say, a quantity suffi- 
cient for them to have distributed one pound of meat 
daily to each inhabitant of Paris, London, New York, and 
Chicago, united. 



34^ The American Army in the European Conflict 

Every twenty-four hours sixty carloads of meat arriv- 
ing from the United States were placed in refrigeration, 
and an equal number forwarded to the front. The plant 
was ready for work six months after construction began. 
Refrigeration was obtained by means of circulatory am- 
monia pipes which, if put down in line would have reached 
from New York to Philadelphia.^ 

A number of other American establishments were 
ranged in the vicinity of the Tours — Bourges — Nevers 
— Dijon railway line. None, however, were so inter- 
esting as that belonging to the salvage service which was 
situated in the intermediate section at St. Pierre des 
Corps, near Tours. 

A visit to this workshop is one of the most instructive 
which can be made. Every possible implement and sys- 
tem serving for the repair and recuperation of articles of 
clothing and equipment, was here to be found. And 
many things which an outsider would lightly pronounce 
fit for nothing but the scrap heap were made over " as 
good as new." Upon their arrival at St. Pierre des 
Corps all effects were carefully sorted, and subsequently 
subjected to a series of steaming and sterilizing pro- 
cesses, from which they emerge perfectly cleansed. Dry- 
ing was effected by the combined action of compressed 
air and centrifugal force, and each article then repaired 
according to its category when first sorted out, either 
mechanically or by hand. A special machine in the space 
of a few seconds could fit a new heel and sole on a worn- 
out shoe. Waterproofs were mended by hand from 

3 The machines were capable of producing five hundred tons of ice in 
twenty-four hours, but, as a matter of fact they were not utilized for this 
purpose, experience having shown that in the moderate climate of France 
it was not necessary to ice the refrigerator cars used for meat transpor- 
tation. 



Services of Rear in France 349 

patches cut from others judged completely unfit for serv- 
ice. We have already mentioned in Chapter VI the im- 
mense pecuniary saving which the salvage service ^ as- 
sured to the American Government, and in this case we 
may consider that the money-saving was unimportant in 
comparison with the economy thus realized on the mari- 
time tonnage. 

Naturally the details of organization of the services 
of the rear are — when they run through the advance sec- 
tion — largely dependent upon the conduct of hostilities. 
Beside the permanent installations of which we have been 
speaking, we must also mention others of a more tem- 
porary kind. Regulating stations, advanced depots, 
evacuation hospitals, etc., which the German offensive 
near Chateau-Thierry obliged the Americans to install 
behind that portion of the battle area in which the Ameri- 
can divisions were called upon to intervene. And we 
may say here that if all the difl^culties were at length 
happily surmounted, it is principally to the perfect co- 
operation between the Franco-American services that 
credit should be given. This complete accord was as- 
sured during the active operations by General Moseley, 
chief of the Fourth Section at American headquarters on 
the one side, and by General Payot, director of the 
French services of the rear on the other. 

The permanent installations in the advance section had 
progressed along the same lines as those of the other 
intermediate and base sections, and were either completed 

* In October, 1918, the factory at St. Pierre des Corps employed the fol- 
lowing personnel: 26 officers, 745 enlisted men, 730 male civilians, 5,300 
women workers, the total being 6,801. 

The minimum women's salary was seven francs a day, while a num- 
ber of those who worked by the piece gained from fifteen to twenty francs 
daily. 



350 The American Army in the European Conflict 

or in process of completion well within the specified time 
limit. 

In particular, the advanced depot of Is-sur-Tille, which 
was to play in the zone of advance the same important 
role as the general storage depot of Gievres for the in- 
termediate zone section, was about finished. The total- 
ity of the projected track system, iio miles, was in 
process of exploitation. The bakeries furnished 300 tons 
of bread daily. Further, toward the front, the regulat- 
ing station of Liffol-le-Grand was capable of supplying 
400,000 men; together with St. Dizier, this station 
played an important part at the moment of the German 
retreat. All the establishments of the divers services: 
Ordnance depots, hospitals, remount stations, and forestry 
centers were in normal process of development, so that 
during the formidable offensive in the St. Mihiel salient, 
and the final operations between the Meuse and the Ar- 
gonne, the services of supply and of evacuation were 
running smoothly enough for it to be said that these 
services of transportation so modestly begun had at length 
attained the proportions of a colossal organization. 

General Atterbury had under his orders at the date of 
the armistice 2,000 officers and 53,000 men. We have 
already seen how, upon his arrival in France, he had set 
about organizing the railroad service of the Expedition- 
ary Forces along the same general lines as those used by 
one of the great companies in peace time. His program 
had been perfectly carried out. 

It is interesting to mention here that the Amer- 
ican railway service possessed a special organization 
thanks to which they were enabled to trace each car and 



Director of Transportation 351 

follow its every movement. The system employed may 
be briefly described as follows: 

Each American car bore an individual number, and at 
the moment of loading in port or warehouse, this number 
was telegraphed to the central direction together with the 
numbers of all the cars which formed the same train. 

From this moment it was never lost sight of. In each 
station utilized by the American services were stationed 
" car checkers " whose duty was to note the numbers of 
all cars loading, unloading, and sidetracked in the station. 

Thus in comparing the lists established on this double 
information the central direction was always able to as- 
certain the whereabouts of each particular car, in what 
station it was to be found, over what lines it had passed, 
and the length of time that it had been on the road. Any 
car which was not listed within twenty-four hours was 
placed upon a tracer bulletin. This method of organiza- 
tion made it possible even during the most difficult periods 
to make the best of all rolling-stock resources. In order 
to work satisfactorily the system requires a telegraph and 
telephone organization of the best quality as well as a 
numerous checking personnel. But the resulting cost is 
amply compensated by the economies made in material 
and the time saved in transportation. 

As we have already seen the Americans did not con- 
struct any important railway line in France; however, as 
part of the different installations of their rear services, 
large quantities of rails were laid down in the vicinity of 
the ports and warehouses which, if spread out in length, 
would have attained 1,000 miles of standard-gauge track. 

Besides the 1,145 locomotives imported with 17,000 
cars from the United States before the armistice, the rail- 
way repair personnel overhauled no less than 1,423 loco- 



352 The American Army in the European Conflict 

motives and 48,000 cars belonging to the French and set 
in motion upon our canals and waterways more than 100 
barges navigating in the American service. 

An Order dated December 8, 19 17, had organized the 
automobile service of the Expeditionary Forces. Two 
subsequent orders dated respectively February 16, and 
May II, 1918, rendered this service completely inde- 
pendent of the quartermaster's corps, and at the same 
time defined the precise duties of the service, which was 
entrusted with the furnishing and upkeep of all auto- 
mobile vehicles with the exception of those whose type 
rendered them exclusively appropriate to a definite serv- 
ice, such as, for instance, the artillery tractors which re- 
mained under the control of the ordnance, the rolling 
kitchens, furnished by the quartermaster corps and the 
motor ambulances belonging to the medical department. 
The quartermaster, as we have seen in a previous chapter, 
was also responsible for the furnishing of gasoline, oil, 
and grease. 

On the eleventh of July the " automobile service " 
changed its name and became the " Motor Transport 
Corps," General M. L. Walker being placed at its head. 

During the entire war and for the same reasons which 
have already been indicated as limiting the other services, 
the American Army in France was constantly confronted 
by the lack of two-thirds of the necessary personnel, and 
one-half of the vehicles necessary for the Motor Trans- 
port. It was not until August, 19 18, that the tables of 
organization were definitely drawn up for the Motor 
Transport Corps. 

At this time about 1,300,000 men had already arrived 
in France and the personnel required by this corps for 



Motor Transport Service 353 

each army was estimated at 45,000 men. The total 
effectives in personnel then present in Europe amounted 
to 20,000 men only. At the moment when the troops of 
the Second Army began to arrive it was found necessary 
to borrow drivers and mechanics from all the services 
capable of lending them. As a large part of the Amer- 
ican personnel were comparatively without instruction, a 
school for motor service was established at Decize in 
July, 191 8. At the end of hostilities 700 officers or 
candidates and 3,000 men had received or were receiving 
instruction. 

The difficulties in regard to material were equally 
great. It had been decided that for every vehicle sent to 
France a six months' supply of spare parts should be 
shipped, after which the system of automatic supply 
would be practiced. The magnitude of the demands 
from the allied armies prevented the carrying out of this 
project, as the troops came too fast for the motor ma- 
terial to keep abreast of their needs. 

On April I, 19 1 8, the total number of vehicles on hand 
was 37,959, whereas after calculations made the effectives 
of the Expeditionary Forces would have required at least 
108,000. All that could be found were purchased in 
Europe with the result that the motor material in use 
throughout the American Army included 78 different 
types of passenger cars, 78 kinds of trucks, and 9 kinds of 
motor-cycles, a fact which was scarcely calculated to 
simplify repair or the renewal of parts. 

The shops of Verneuil ^ and Romorantin, which pos- 

5 Construction of this shop was begun May, 1918, and carried out en- 
tirely by the personnel of the Motor Transport Corps and German pris- 
oners. This establishment was not only capable of making all repairs but 
also of manufacturing the spare parts required by every type of car. 
By March ist, 1919, 505,cx)0 pieces had been turned out. 



354 The American Army in the European Conflict 

sessed a highly perfected equipment, were charged with 
the repairs — the first of American machines, the second 
with that of European-made vehicles. 

In the zone of the interior, the motor material was not 
permanently assigned to any particular service, but re- 
mained under the control of the central direction which 
decided where and how it could be utilized to the greatest 
advantage, and distributed it where most needed. This 
organization gave excellent practical results, making the 
very most of the rather slender material on hand. 

With troops in the field, the motor transport corps 
limited its activities to the technical supervision and main- 
tenance of all automobile material. This service had 
representatives both In divisions and armies. 

At the conclusion of hostilities the Expeditionary 
Forces disposed of: 7,604 passenger cars and of 24,055 
trucks, (),2>^2) had a carrying capacity less than a ton and 
a half, 3,912 a capacity between a ton and a half and two 
tons, 11,503 of three tons, 2,277 of ^^^ tons. Con- 
sequently by that time the deficit in material was being 
rapidly made up. 

In order to complete this account of the American 
services we must now say a word In regard to that one 
which was perhaps the most important of all and without 
which the scope of the other services would have been 
necessarily considerably curtailed. We mean the Gen- 
eral Purchasing Board enlarged Into the Military Board 
of Allied Supply. 

Had the American Army been obliged to import from 
the United States all the necessary material for its 
organization, maintenance, and fighting power, the war 



Military Board. of Allied Supply 355 

would probably not be over at the present time of writing. 

A few figures will serve to indicate the truth of this 
assertion. Between June, 19 18, and the armistice, as we 
have seen, some 5,000,000 tons of supplies had been im- 
ported from the United States into France. During this 
same period, the Expeditionary Forces procured through 
the Purchasing Board 10,000,000 tons on the European 
markets. 

General Pershing, from the moment of his arrival in 
France, had no illusions as to the questions of tonnage and 
the inevitable delays which must elapse before a sufficient 
number of vessels could become available to meet his re- 
quirements. According to all estimates and for a long 
period, the Expeditionary Forces would be compelled to 
draw on the resources of Europe for a large portion of 
their supplies. 

In the existing organizations, Quartermaster, Engi- 
neers, Medical Department, etc., the main services alone 
disposed of credits and had authority to make purchases. 
In securing large categories of material destined for gen- 
eral consumption the services would have found them- 
selves competing with one another for their purchase as 
well as with the other Allies. 

It was on this account, and contrary to the advice of a 
consulting board that General Pershing on August 20th, 
1917, decided upon the creation of a central board formed 
by representatives from every service, and presided over 
by a general purchasing agent, who, without personally 
disposing of budgetary appropriations, had control and 
veto power over contracts and bargains made by the 
other services which only became valid after his approba- 
tion. 



35 6 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The general purchasing agent was obliged to remain in 
constant touch with the allied governments, to keep in- 
formed as to purchasing facilities in neutral countries, 
and was also charged with recruiting the labor units em- 
ployed by the Expeditionary Forces. Colonel Charles 
G. Dawes (since promoted general) and one of the best 
known bankers in the United States, was, from the first, 
placed at the head of the General Purchasing Board. 

The program of Colonel Dawes from the very start 
was clear and definite, and may be thus summarized: 
On the one hand to procure for the divers American serv- 
ices, according to the best interests of all, what was neces- 
sary for each, suppressing the hard and fast lines hereto- 
fore drawn between these various services. On the other 
hand to centralize and coordinate the purchases among 
the Allies, so that they would act as associates and no 
longer as rivals. They could thus procure essentials at 
a uniform price and distribute them according to the pro 
rata of individual needs. 

On the nineteenth of October, 19 17, General Pershing 
proposed to create in Paris an Inter-Allied Board for 
Purchasing, composed of representatives from the United 
States, Great Britain, and France. He suggested that 
the three contracting countries should no longer buy in 
competition with one another but by commissions acting In 
their name. 

The Allies fully entered into the views of the Ameri- 
can commander-in-chief and the organization proposed by 
him was adopted. 

On June 20, 19 18, Colonel Dawes was designated to 
represent the American Army In the Interallied Commit- 
tee of Supplies. 

To-day, now that every one Is grateful to the Amerl- 



Military Board of Allied Supply 357 

cans for having contributed in no small measure toward 
bringing about the unity of command at the front, it 
should not be forgotten that General Pershing and Gen- 
eral Dawes rendered us an almost equal service in giving 
to the Allies, after the manner that we have just de- 
scribed, what was essential to the common welfare : unity 
of purchase. 

He suggested that, in the future, all purchase of sup- 
plies for the three allied armies be made no longer in 
competition, but in common, by means of a Central-Inter- 
allied Purchasing Board. This, however, was only a be- 
ginning. 

In April, 19 18, the experience gained by Colonel 
Dawes as general purchasing agent of the American Ex- 
peditionary Forces had led him to the conclusion that, in 
the words of a report he addressed to General Pershing: 

" Just as there is now a unified military command of the Allies 
at the front . . . there must be a corresponding merging of all 
separate individual authority of the Allies in reference to the 
service of supply into one military authority responsible to the 
corresponding military authority at the front. One is just as 
necessary as the other." 

This principle of a military dictator of the rear of the 
allied armies — a rear covering France, England, and the 
United States — in absolute control of all their resources 
in the supplies, transportation by land and by sea, and 
facilities of all kinds, involved an economy of labor, 
money, time — and consequently, of human life the great- 
ness of which can hardly be realized. 

It was immediately and completely endorsed by Gen- 
eral Pershing. 

From that time on, in the course of complicated and 
strenuous negotiations with the allied authorities, the 



358 ^he American Army in the European Conflict 

American High Command constantly tried to enforce that 
great principle of unity. 

A detailed account of these negotiations would, of 
course, go far beyond the scope of this book. We must, 
of necessity, limit ourselves to a brief summary of the 
main results that had been achieved at the time of the 
armistice. 

By the end of May, 19 18, the American, British, and 
French Governments agreed to the principle of unification 
of military supplies and utilities for their armies. With 
this object in view, a board — the Military Board of 
Allied Supply — was constituted. It consisted of three 
members ^ whose decisions regarding the allotment of 
material and supplies, when unanimously taken had the 
immediate force of law. The new institution, although 
it did not possess the character of unity called for by the 
American suggestion, nevertheless marked a tremendous 
progress over the situation that had existed so far. 

Thanks to the activity, energy, and spirit of coopera- 
tion of its members, it constantly gained more and more 
authority and the scope of its activities kept steadily in- 
creasing up to the end of the war. 

Among the achievements which, in the future, will 
earn for the Military Board of Allied Supply the ever- 
lasting gratitude of the Allies, let us here mention the 
pooling of ammunition between the Americans and the 
French, the creation of a mobile automobile reserve be- 
hind the allied armies, the establishment of a system regu- 

^ General Payot (president), for the French Army; General Dawes, for 
the American Army; General Ford, for the British Army (afterwards 
General Travers Clarke). 

Later on, the Belgian and Italian Governments also sent representatives 
to the Military Board of Allied Supply. They were Major Cumont and 
General Merrone respectively. 



Services of the Rear. Conclusion 359 

lating automobile transports, the solution of the very 
difficult problems concerning the wood and tie situation, 
and of those concerning the supplies of forage. 

The war was brought to its close before the Military 
Board of Allied Supply had had time to give full measure 
of the enormous possibilities that were in it. The work 
it accomplished in the course of its short existence will, 
nevertheless, in the future be a cause of surprise to the 
students of the war who will trace to that great, although* 
incomplete, realization of the plans of General Pershing 
and General Dawes the first successful attempt to carry 
out, in a practical way, the idea of a Society of Nations. 

We have thus rapidly passed in review the organiza- 
tions of the different American services of the rear in 
France, and certainly the work as it was carried out was a 
very great one. But we cannot lay too great a stress upon 
the fact, that in order to comprehend the real magnitude 
of the effort furnished by the United States, we should 
not content ourselves with an examination of what was 
actually accomplished, but take also into consideration the 
gigantic work which was being "set on foot. 

As has already been seen in connection with the ship- 
building question, when the armistice was signed the 
services of the rear were only just beginning to give the 
full measure of their capacity, and had war continued we 
should have seen four million of men on our shores in the 
autumn of 1919, together with everything which the ar- 
rival of such numbers would necessarily entail. 

November, 19 18, sav/, on the contrary all construction 
work stopped and all contracts annulled, but it still re- 
mains interesting to glance for a moment over some of the 
enterprises in course of realization at this time. 



360 The American Army in the European Conflict 

In the ports, on a plan of 159 berths, 77 were aban- 
doned. Out of 98,000 cars and 4,000 locomotives about 
to be delivered, the orders for 68,000 and 2,400 respec- 
tively were cancelled. Out of 358,961 beds ordered for 
the base hospitals, all but 182,196 were stopped in the 
course of installation. 

During the last thirty days of the war, there had been 
sent from the United States twice as much material as had 
arrived during seven whole months of 19 17 — between 
June and December. 

From the first of June, 19 18, to the armistice — that 
is to say, five months and eleven days — the Expedi- 
tionary Forces had received from America 2,880,000 tons 
of supplies against 1,530,000 during the previous year. 

But it is useless to add more figures which only prove a 
foregone conclusion. 

What we have already set down is certainly sufficient 
to demonstrate that in capitulating on November 11, 
191 8, Germany did the only possible thing which had 
been left her to do. 



CHAPTER XII 

GREAT BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATIONS UNDER THE MILITARY 

AUTHORITY AMERICAN RED CROSS YOUNG 

men's CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION KNIGHTS OF 

COLUMBUS SALVATION ARMY AMERICAN LIB- 
RARY ASSOCIATION JEWISH WELFARE YOUNG 

women's CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION, ETC., ETC. 

America is indubitably the country where the greatest 
use is made of the free right of association. 

When a person whose intention it is to found a school, 
college, hospital, or library, to fight for an idea, or create 
a fashion, finds that his individual means are inadequate 
to a large enterprise, an association is formed. And 
these societies founded in a common interest are powerful 
in direct proportion to the personal importance and num- 
ber of their members. 

Such societies are often political, others seek success of 
a material nature, many others are benevolent, moral, or 
religious in character, for, in this tolerant democracy, 
charity is as general and frequent as religion is powerful. 

The statistics collected at the time of the American 
Civil War gave an indication of what might be expected 
from the collective philanthropy of the United States. 
In 1864, individual subscriptions and the sums voted 
by the municipal or legislative bodies attained the 
immense figure of $228,000,000. The " Sanitary Com- 
mission," toward the end of hostilities, disposed of an 
annual sum exceeding $8,000,000, and was formed of 

361 



362 The American Army in the European Conflict 

more than thirty thousand committees charged with the 
care and comfort of the soldier at the front. 

The " Western Sanitary Commission," founded by 
General Fremont at the beginning of the Rebellion, was 
particularly interested in the welfare of the armies who 
were drawn from the western sections of the country. 

The " Christian Commission " looked after the dis- 
tribution of tracts and pamphlets in the divers camps and 
the " Commission of War Claims," presided over by 
General Scott, took charge of claims, even those against 
the government, by private soldiers. 

Such a patriotic and charitable movement at a time 
when money was scarce gave some idea of what modern 
America might be expected to accomplish in aid of the 
combatants of the European war. But the actual effort 
surpassed all expectations. Those societies, already 
powerful from their numbers, their wealth, and the posi- 
tion of the directors, at once came to the aid not only of 
the American combatant, but also of the allied armies. 

Unfortunately we shall be able here to give but a short 
resume of the extraordinary work accomplished by some 
of them. 

General Pershing at once sought a method by which he 
might reconcile military prerogatives and centralized au- 
thority with the autonomy and spirit of initiative of each 
individual society. We may consider that his actions 
were well inspired since, under his authority, the chari- 
table organizations placed under military control grew, 
developed, and extended the sphere of their utility al- 
ways for the greater good and comfort of the combatant 
and without the slightest encroachment upon army discip- 
line. This centralization of authority usefully coordi- 



Great Benevolent Associations 363 

nated these separate activities and prevented the waste 
which would have resulted if several different societies 
had worked on precisely the same lines. 

Many of the associations recognized by the Federal 
Government already existed before the beginning of hos- 
tilities. Upon the declaration of war, they were mili- 
tarized and placed under the direct authority of the 
Secretary of War and afterward under that of the com- 
mander-in-chief. General Pershing, in his turn, had to 
decide as to the particular range of each society in France 
and placed these philanthropic organizations under the 
immediate control of the first section of the General Staff. 

Thus we read in General Order No. 26 that the Ameri- 
can Red Cross Society would be particularly entrusted 
with the care of sick and wounded, while the Y. M. C. A. 
would work more especially for the moralization, recrea- 
tion, instruction, and amusement of the contingents. 

The supervision exercised over all the philanthropic 
societies by the high command was constant; every month 
an officer from headquarters assembled the delegates of 
each association in Paris, studied their reports, listened to 
their suggestions or to their complaints. 

In each army, likewise, and sometimes in each corps, a 
staff officer was particularly accredited to the surveillance 
of the organization operating with his unit. 

Certain societies such as the Red Cross, Y. M. C. A., 
Knights of Columbus, Salvation Army kept their own 
complete autonomy, and were under the direct control of 
the high command. Others less powerful, or whose work 
was less specialized, like the Library Association, the 
Jewish Welfare, or Young Women's Christian Associa- 
tion were affiliated with the Y. M. C. A. 



364 The American Army in the European Conflict 
Let us rapidly examine the work of each. 

On the twelfth of July, 19 17, twelve delegates of the 
American Red Cross arrived in France at the same date 
with General Pershing. The day the armistice was 
signed, more than six thousand employees of the society 
assigned only to the French service were devoting them- 
selves to the care of the wounded in hospitals or to that 
of children and refugees. 

The first duty of the Red Cross was to aid and to 
ameliorate the condition not only of the soldier but like- 
wise of his family and other war victims. 

The American Army was not yet disembarked, when 
in order to respond to the desire manifested by 
20,000,000 Americans and subscribers who by their gen- 
erosity had raised $100,000,000, the delegates of the 
Red Cross came to Europe to get in close touch with the 
Allies. 

They began by augmenting the number of French can- 
teens. Many women offered their services, so that in the 
lapse of a few months these establishments were able to 
distribute food and hot drinks to 250,000 soldiers a week. 

The sum of $3,000,000 was distributed in aid of the 
families of French soldiers who were in need and who 
were recommended by our high command. 

Thirty dispensaries or children's hospitals were opened. 
At Evian the French civilians repatriated through Ger- 
many found American counters hospitably and liberally 
provisioned. 

Five thousand homeless persons were lodged in Paris 
thanks to the work of the Red Cross and other French 
societies who terminated the construction of unfinished 
buildings. 



American Red Cross 365 

From March to June, 19 17, 620,000 persons were 
cared for by this organization.^ 

When the Expeditionary Forces reached France, its 
services attained a far greater extension; but this growth 
was accomplished without detriment to anything already 
being done for our own soldiers or civil population. 

It became, however, necessary to multiply the number 
of canteens, and thirty more were constructed capable of 
furnishing nourishment for from six to eight thousand 
men per day. 

More delegates were appointed in each important unit 
whose mission was to oversee and arrange for the arrival 
of all sorts of material in the hospitals and ambulances 
at the front. Each division had an officer called 
" searcher " whose object was to get In touch with such 
soldiers as were seeking means of communicating with 
their family, to look after his private Interests at 
home, or who was simply in need of moral " cheering 

The Red Cross succeeded also In establishing movable 
canteens at the front In order to provide the men who 
could not be reached by regular food supplies with hot 
drinks. 

But the most useful, if not the most brilliant, aim of 
this organization was to install hospitals and to furnish 
medical necessities to the sanitary formations of the 
army. 

Improvised hospitals were opened at Beauvais, Jouy, 
and Jullly which rendered great services during the battles 
of the spring and summer of 19 18. At the same time, 
the sanitary formations of the Red Cross of the Paris 

1 Marshall Petain officially expressed his appreciation of the immense 
service of the American Red Cross. 



366 The American Army in the European Conflict 

region were increased. Toward the end of September, 
the number of beds available in the capital and its sur- 
roundings was over 7,000. 

During the month which preceded the armistice, the 
Red Cross provided beds, medical care, and food to an 
average of 300,000 men a day. 

All the bandages of the army and a portion of the 
splints came from the Red Cross stores. This organiza- 
tion supplied at the same time 4,000 French hospitals with 
medical necessities and surgical appliances. 

The bandages were Issued by the workrooms at the 
rate of 200,000 a week. This number was doubled by 
the shipments coming from the United States. 

Special diet kitchens for the sick were installed and 
directed by the same organization in French and American 
hospitals. 

There were about 20,000 trained nurses; those speak- 
ing French were detached for service In our hospitals. 

A special department was organized for the care of 
the mutilated. This section combined to supply our Sani- 
tary Commission with one hundred and fifty artificial 
limbs a month. 

Four hundred men and women were employed in hos- 
pitals and dressing stations, to write advising the families 
in America as to the circumstances In which their soldier 
relatives had been killed or wounded, supplying any avail- 
able Information on those who were missing. In the lat- 
ter half of the year 19 18, the special Information (home 
communication and searchers) department wrote or re- 
ceived on an average of 13,500 letters a month. The 
same department organized more than eighty barracks in 
the neighborhood of the hospitals in order to take care of 
convalescents. 



American Red Cross 367 

The Welfare and Recreation bureaus distributed 
pamphlets,^ books, magazines, and newspapers by the 
hundred thousand, as well as games of all sorts. In many 
of the hospitals and camps, it founded officers' or nurses' 
clubs. 

The Scientific Section of the Red Cross organized a 
service of medical and surgical information and published 
a monthly review which was widely distributed. It or- 
ganized a department for research as to the best means 
of fighting vermin, curing trench fever, wounds to the 
lungs, and poison gas. To this list, already so extensive, 
of practical work efficiently accomplished, we must add 
the liberal distribution of clothing, of knitted garments, 
sweaters, shoes, trench boots and socks, sent to the French 
as well as to American soldiers. 

This great organization rendered services to which it 
is difficult here to do justice, as they go beyond the limits 
of our present sketch. The following sums may give 
some idea of the work accomplished by the American 
Red Cross. At the time of the armistice, the amount of 
money subscribed and which the organization held at its 
disposal was $300,000,000. To this sum should be 
added the bandages, and surgical dressings, clothes, and 
materials of all sorts of which the value to-day Is 
$80,000,000. 

The success which the American Red Cross achieved 
on the field of charity was not alone due to the extent 
of its wealth, but also to the enlightenment with which its 
chiefs administered and distributed that wealth. By the 
use of direct method and the suppression of red tape, the 
directors succeeded in reaching without delay their allies 
as well as their own compatriots. They invariably 

2 See later on the American Library Association. 



368 The American Army in the European Conflict 

showed in difficult and unforeseen circumstances prompt 
decision and instantaneous grasp of the situation. 

Among those to whom France and the United States 
owe so much, four stand out whose names will always be 
remembered in connection with the work of this benefi- 
cent organization. In the United States, Ex-President 
Taft, head of the Red Cross, who by his eloquent ap- 
peals elicited such a generous response from individuals 
as well as from the certain collectivities. This gigan- 
tic accumulation made it possible to achieve the great 
things which were accomplished. In France, Mr. P. 
Davison, president of the war committee for Europe, 
Colonel Gibson, commissioner for France, and Mr. 
James H. Perkins directed the work in all its ramifica- 
tions. 

The Young Men's Christian Association, known to all 
Americans and now to most of the French, existed long 
before the war, which had scarcely been declared before 
the Y. M. C. A., on the twentieth of April, offered its 
services to the President. 

This organization set to work without losing any time. 
While it was estabhshing its canteens and its recreation 
halls in the first American camps where recruits were 
gathered, it sent Messrs. Carter and Davis to Paris, 
where the European seat of the association began its la- 
bors. In Order No. 26, General Pershing indicated to 
the Y. M. C. A. that its object should be the social, phys- 
ical, and religious perfecting of the soldier. By Order 
No. 33 of the sixth of September, 19 17, the commander- 
in-chief of the Expeditionary Forces advised his officers 
and men to make use of the advantages offered by the 
association. He added: 



Y. M. C. A. 369 

" The canteens of the Y. M. C. A. will be organized like mili- 
tary canteens, of which they are to take the place. In that way, 
officers and soldiers will not be distracted from their military 
service. 

" Consequently in future, officers will forbid the opening of 
military canteens in the places where the Y. M. C. A. has already 
established a canteen. 

" The canteens will not only be operated in the areas which are 
removed from active operations; on the contrary, it is desirable to 
have them as near the front as the military situation will permit so 
that the soldiers can have the comfort which these establishments 
offer at a time when they are likely to be most in need of them." 

The Y. M. C. A. took pains to carry out the wishes of 
the commander-in-chief. Wherever there was an agglo- 
meration of American soldiers, a canteen was installed. 
As a result, the organization operated as many as 1,252 
canteens or recreation halls. 

In the Y. M, C. A. huts, the men could purchase cer- 
tain kinds of food — chocolate, toilet articles, etc. — and 
procure, free of charge, writing paper, newspapers, and 
books. These installations rendered good service, and 
General Pershing was able to write to Mr. Carter at the 
end of the war that : 

" The society had given valuable assistance to the Expeditionary 
Forces by the working of their canteens. Handicapped by the 
shortage of transport by sea and land, the Y. M. C. A. had accom- 
plished more than could have been expected, and you may be sure 
that the association has had a large part in the great work accom- 
plished by the American Army." 

The Association endeavored to keep always in view 
the moral and religious work which it proposed to achieve. 
It got in touch with the chaplains of all the different de- 
nominations and placed halls at their disposal for the 
exercise of religious services. 



370 The American Army in the European Conflict 

In their reading rooms were to be found besides books 
furnished by the Library Association and the mllHons of 
newspapers distributed by the Y. M. C. A., pamphlets and 
booklets edited by the Association itself; the section for 
the distribution of the writings of a moral nature alone 
sent out 600,000 publications a week. Another section 
specialized the study of the Bible which it undertook to 
spread and interpret. 

The Association was bent on entertaining the soldiers 
and keeping them from being homesick. It secured the 
assistance of 427 professional actors and actresses and 
gave, in the neighborhood of its centers, 3,000 perform- 
ances. It provided 825 costumes a month to enable the 
officers and men to organize theatricals at the front. In 
the month of January, 191 8, it distributed 1,118 instru- 
ments and 20,000 pieces of music. 

The moving picture section gave, on an average, 2,400 
representations a week in France and later on in the 
enemy zone occupied by the Americans. They often or- 
ganized free performances for the children in our villages. 

The department for athletic sports was very active. 
It encouraged more particularly baseball, basketball, 
tennis, boxing, football, and races of all sorts. The 
competition games organized by the Y. M. C. A. during 
the last six months of 191 8 brought together 4,770,000 
players and 9,000,000 spectators. In Paris, the Associa- 
tion gave exhibitions of boxing or other athletic games at 
the Palais de Glace and In the Circus to which men in uni- 
form were admitted free. 

Several of the teachers of the sports department be- 
came monitors in the regular army and prepared the men 
for the June international games where the competitors 
belonged to twenty-one allied and associated countries. 



Y. M. C. A. 371 

The Educational Section opened courses for the 
illiterate, courses in French, and courses for higher educa- 
tion, even for studies of law and architecture. 

More recently, the Y. M. C. A. has largely contributed 
toward the founding of the university of the American 
Army at Beaune, destined to accommodate 20,000 
scholars. 

The Association also opened in France seventy-five 
hotels, restaurants, or cafes. It organized recreation 
halls in the leave areas for American officers and men: 
Aix-les-Bains, Chambery, Challes-les-aux, Chamonix, St. 
Gervais, in Haute-Savoie; Nimes in the department of 
Gard, Grenoble, Uriage-les-Bains, Allevard-les-Bains in 
the Dauphine, Nice, Cannes, Menton, Monte Carlo on 
the Riviera, Valse-les-Bains in the Ardeche; Lamalou-les- 
Bains in the Herault, La Bourboule, le Mont-Dore in 
Auvergne; Cauterets, Eaux-Bonnes, Bagneres-de-Luchon 
in the Pyrenees, St. Malo, Dinard, and Parame in 
Brittany. 

The organization also undertook to facilitate communi- 
cations between the soldier and his family, following 
which purpose it distributed 180,000,000 sheets of writ- 
ing paper and sent to the United States more than 
$16,000,000 transmitted by the officers and men to their 
relations in America. 

As a matter of principle, the Y. M. C. A. made it a 
habit to sell articles in its canteens at a moderate price, 
without, however, looking for profit; it has also shown 
that it knows how to give. We find in its budget, under 
the head of " Donations," sums aggregating more than 
$1,000,000. The Christmas presents alone amounted to 
more than $500,000.^ 

3 $2oo,ooo,ocx) were sent to the Y. M. C. A. from America. 



372 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The organization on January loth, 19 19, had 586 
active members, sixty-eight of whom have been decorated 
and cited for their courage by the commanders-in-chief of 
the aUied armies. The Association operated 1,414 estab- 
lishments besides canteens, depots, garages, theaters, and 
gymnasiums. 

The Y. M. C. A. collaborated in the work of the 
" Foyer du Soldat," and the two societies combined 
founded 1,452 foyers. 

It also centralized the work of the American Library 
Association, the Jewish Welfare, and the Young Women's 
Christian Association, acting as their intermediary with 
the commander-in-chief of the Expeditionary Forces. 

The scope of this work was extensive and grew In pro- 
portion as the army developed. It was impossible to 
visit a cantonment, a camp, or a village, however near to 
the front they might be, without finding on a house, often 
in ruins, on a tent or a barrack, the symbolical triangle of 
the Association.* 

The association of the Knights of Columbus was 
founded in the United States about twenty years ago. 
It started with 65,000 members; now it has more than 
500,000. 

In the beginning, this organization, composed entirely 
of Catholics, assisted American soldiers during the war 
against Mexico. At that time, no private contribution 
with a view to Increasing Its resources had been raised, 
and, without any special appeal to the generosity of its 
members, the society of the Knights of Columbus had 
succeeded in making large distribution of food, of equip- 

* The triangle represents, by its three points, the body, the mind, and 
the spirit. 



K. of C. 373 

ment, and of games to the combatants. When America 
entered into the European conflict, the Knights offered 
their services to the President of the United States; they 
were accepted. The capital at their disposal not being 
sufficient to carry out in America and in France the liberal 
program which the society had In view, the Knights of 
Columbus raised generous subscriptions amounting during 
the war to more than $15,000,000. 

The society opened in the United States 150 recreation 
halls and canteens where the soldier could find games, 
writing paper, newspapers, books, musical instruments, 
and also facilities for the practice of the Catholic religion. 
In Europe, the Knights of Columbus were represented by 
765 delegates. They shipped several thousand tons of 
merchandise. One hundred and twenty-five barracks 
were erected, where writing paper, pens and Ink, choco- 
late, candy, tobacco, soap, towels, paper, and hot drinks 
were given out free of charge.^ 

The Knights of Columbus, like the Red Cross, sent 
their rolling kitchens — of which fifteen were in opera- 
tion at the end of hostilities — into the front-line trenches 
in order to distribute hot soup to the soldiers. 

This society made a great effort to develop a taste for 
athletic games. Its budget shows a large provision for 
the acquirement of the accessories necessary to the sports 
most favored by the x'\merican soldiers. Great success 
was achieved in the organization of all sorts of shows, 
and in theatricals a band of minstrels gave frequent and 
extremely popular performances. 

5 General headquarters were in favor of gratuitous distribution in the 
trenches or when the soldiers could not procure regular rations. On the 
other hand it was considered that the troops ought to pay for the above 
articles when they were withdrawn from the front or scattered in the 
rest areas. The American soldier's pay was more than one dollar a day. 



374 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Under the vigorous impulsion of Supreme Knight Ed- 
ward L. Hearn, the Knights of Columbus contributed 
largely to the well-being of the American trooper and suc- 
ceeded in gaining his confidence and esteem entirely re- 
gardless of religious opinions. 

The Salvation Army, which began work in July, 19 17, 
differed mainly from the other benevolent organizations 
in having specialized its work near and at the front. 
No canteens were established by this society in the large 
towns or at the rear, but canteens were opened for the 
fighting units at the earliest possible moment; thus, before 
the First Division had completed its installation in the 
neighborhood of Gondrecourt, the Salvation Army had 
already opened its recreation halls and reading rooms for 
the men. When the troops moved into line the workers 
who had been with them during periods of rest or instruc- 
tion followed them to points close to the firing line where 
canteens were set up and hot coffee and chocolate dis- 
tributed freely to those who were leaving the trenches or 
going under fire, hot doughnuts were also cooked and sent 
into the trenches. 

When an offensive was in progress the Salvation Army 
women assisted in the advance dressing stations, and 
when the American front was extended to the Montdidier 
and Soissons sector, canteens were operated in dugouts 
which were alone available. 

This society was directed by Colonel Baker and com- 
prised about two hundred men and women and about three 
hundred French or American workers, most of whom 
were frequently under shell-fire, and as may readily be 
imagined the delegates of the Salvation Army were ex- 
tremely popular with the fighting troops. 



A. L. A. 375 

The American Library Association began its regular 
work in January, 191 8. 

At this time a dispatch office was established at Hobo- 
ken for the purpose of assembling books and placing 
them on the transports. The books sent in this way 
were unloaded in France and placed at the disposal of the 
men either in the Y, M. C. A. huts or directly with the 
men themselves. 

At the same time, the American Library Association 
dispatched a representative to France to lay the founda- 
tion of a broader service. 

The delegate easily convinced the commander-in-chief 
of the utility of his mission, and General Pershing took 
pains to request the Secretary of War that fifty tons a 
month might be reserved on the military transports for 
the carriage of the books and pamphlets for the American 
Army. 

By common agreement, it was decided that the Library 
Association should furnish books to the American Red 
Cross, the Y. M. C. A., and the Knights of Columbus. 
These societies on their part agreed to see that the sol- 
diers received the books entrusted to their care. 

In the month of April, the Association inaugurated its 
present headquarters at Paris and its central library at 
10 Rue de FElysee. 

In September, the Postmaster General in Washington 
agreed to forward free all publications sent to Europe by 
this society, and general headquarters authorized its rep- 
resentatives to communicate directly with the military 
authorities of the Expeditionary Forces. 

From that time on, the Library Association developed 
rapidly and extensively. 

Shipping bureaus were installed at Newport News, 



376 The American Army in the European Conflict 

Boston, Philadelphia, and New York. They succeeded 
in shipping upward of 100,000 volumes a month. 

By February i, 19 19, 1,800,000 books had been sent 
to France. A lot of libraries were opened in Y. M. C. A., 
Knights of Columbus, Salvation Army, Y. W. C. A., and 
Jewish Welfare organizations and 264 in detached camps 
belonging to the Expeditionary Forces. 

Each American ambulance was endowed with a collec- 
tion of books. 

A similar service was organized in England and in 
Russia for. the benefit of the troops stationed and fighting 
in these countries. 

The Paris shipping office sent out 4,347 specified 
volumes to certain soldiers who had requested them. 

The library in Paris was much frequented by officers 
and men stationed there, or passing through the capital. 
It was utilized by 30,000 members of the Expeditionary 
Forces. 

After the armistice was signed, the number of books 
asked for by all the branch offices was greatly increased. 
The soldiers wished particularly to have Instructive books, 
text-books, works of elementary education used in primary 
and in high schools. More than half a million books of 
this sort were recently Issued; most of these volumes were 
taken by officer-instructors In the military schools. 

A delegate of the Library Association, to be found in 
every army, brought to the notice of the central com- 
mittee any criticism which he might think necessary, on 
the operation of the work in the unit to which he was 
attached. 

Libraries were also opened at Chatillon, Chaumont, 
Dijon, Gondrecourt, Neufchateau, Nevers, Tours, and in 
the hospital centers of Allerey, Le Mans, Mesves, Save- 



Jewish Welfare Board 2>11 

nay. A reading room was later installed at Coblenz, 
another opened at Treves. Sixty-two army transports 
were supplied with a library. 

The society largely contributed to the supply of works 
on technical and specialized subjects, which could be con- 
sulted either at the second section of general headquarters 
at Chaumont or at the staff school at Langres. 

Representing the Congressional Library at Washing- 
ton, it also furnished the necessary documents for the 
labor of the Peace Conference. 

Latterly, it has collaborated with the " Association des 
Bibliothecaires Frangais " and the sub-committee of the 
" Renaissance des Cites " with the Idea of making Ameri- 
can Library methods better known in France, also to 
facilitate the future establishment of libraries in the de- 
vastated regions. 

The Jewish Welfare Board did not begin work In 
France until the last months of the war. 

The Association desired to ensure the exercise of the 
Jewish rites In the American Army, to distribute certain 
kinds of literature, and to render personal service to the 
Jewish soldier, more especially to locate his relatives In 
Russia or Poland. 

Fourteen central offices were Installed at Bordeaux, 
Brest, Coblenz, Dijon, Gievres, Le Mans, Nantes, Paris, 
St. Aignan, St. NazaIre, Tours, Pontanezen, Kerhuon, 
and In the principal camps where the soldiers gathered 
before their embarkation for the United States. In these 
centers, the rabbis exercised the rites of the Jewish 
church, preferably on Friday night. ii,ooo abbreviated 
Jewish prayers, 7,000 books on Jewish thought, and 5,000 
extracts from the Scriptures were distributed. 



378 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The soldiers were also supplied in the canteens with 
tea, chocolate, bread, preserves, cakes, cigarettes, and 
writing paper. 

At the request of certain French and English organiza- 
tions and also in answer to the call of the Y. M. C. A., the 
Young Women's Christian Association decided to carry 
on in Europe the charitable work which had been largely 
organized among the munition workers in the United 
States. 

The object of its members was to give help to the 
women of all nationalities working for the armies. Thus, 
wherever women were employed, especially in the ser- 
vices of the chief signal officer, the Association estab- 
lished lodgings or " Hostess Houses." It was thus rep- 
resented at Brest, St. Nazaire, Bordeaux, Le Havre, 
Tours, Paris, Nevers, Langres, Chaumont, Neufchateau, 
Toul where telephone centrals had been installed, and 
even at Souilly during the battle between the Meuse and 
the Argonne when the First Army general headquarters 
was operating in this locality. 

The Y. W. C. A. opened clubs for women in the neigh- 
borhood of base hospitals in order to provide rest and 
recreation halls for the nurses. Clubs were organized in 
Paris, Savenay, Brest, St. Nazaire, Coetquidan, Nantes, 
Angers, Tours, Joinville, Chatel-Guyon, Vichy, Mars, 
Allerey, Dijon, Chaumont Contrexeville, Vittel, and 
Bazoilles. 

The association Installed and operated three hotels in 
Paris where women employed in war work found board 
and lodging at low rates. Other hotels of the same 
order were opened at Brest, Bordeaux, Le Havre, Le 
Mans, Tours, Toul, Chaumont, and Coblenz. 



Other Benevolent Associations 379 

Canteens, where French women working either for the 
American services or in our own factories were admitted, 
were organized: Five in Paris; three in Lyons; three at 
Bourges; two at Roanne; one at Tours, St. Etienne, Ro- 
morantin, Montlugon, and Is-sur-Tille. 

At Lyons, to mention the work done by this association 
in only one of these cities, 6,000 women made use of the 
canteens of this organization, which in this one center 
succeeded in serving 1,200 meals a day. 

M. Loucheur, in recognition of the devoted work of 
this society, asked the Y. W. C. A. not to close its can- 
teens at the end of the war. This organization continued 
accordingly after the armistice under Franco-American 
direction. 

While some American organizations, such as the Red 
Cross, did not hesitate before the landing of the Amerian 
troops and even after their arrival to offer their services 
and to assist our combatants, there was another category 
which did not wait until the United States declared war 
to manifest their interest in our cause with equal devotion 
and enlightenment. 

A few weeks after the opening of hostilities, the Ameri- 
can colony in Paris organized the ambulance of Neuilly." 
This hospital center soon disposed of about a thousand 
beds. The sick and wounded were cared for at Neuilly 
by a personnel of nurses and doctors as devoted as they 
were capable, and the admirable service given there was 
soon effectively supplemented by the generous gift of a 

^ When the commander-in-chief decided to militarize the various or- 
ganizations which were placed at the service of the army, general orders, 
dated July 20th, converted the Neuillv Ambulance into Base Hospital 
No. I. 



380 The American Army in the European Conflict 

sanitary train for the direct evacuation of the wounded. 
Colonel Robert Bacon, former ambassador to Paris, 
whose zeal in our cause was as much appreciated in his 
lifetime as his death is now regretted, placed this train 
at the disposal of the French command. It remained 
throughout the war the best equipped and the most com- 
fortable of its kind in service. 

Nor were the large funds of which the Neuilly am- 
bulance disposed utilized only for the running of the hos- 
pital or of the train. A distributing committee, pre- 
sided over by Mrs. Robert Woods Bliss, was formed with 
the object of collecting American gifts and subscriptions 
for the soldier at the front. 

A service of field ambulances was also subscribed for by 
funds largely sent from the United States. It consisted 
of twenty-five sections of motor ambulances for the 
transportation of wounded and operated by volunteers 
enrolled under the direction of Mr. Piatt H. Andrew, 
whose zeal and devotion were appreciated in all the 
French divisions. 

The Norton-Harjes ambulance service, due also to 
American generosity and which comprised fifteen sections, 
was also placed at the disposal of the French command. 

Many American women, responding to the call of the 
'' American Fund for French Wounded," ^ grouped 
themselves together to help our combatants. 

■^ The first appeal for the French wounded was made In England by 
Mrs. Floyd. Later the society assumed a purely American character. 

At the head of this formation was Mrs. Lathrop, who worked in- 
defatigably up to the end of the war. Six hundred committees were 
formed in the United States and gifts to the value of $5,000,000 were 
sent to France, permitting the establishment of depots and dispensaries 
in thirty French towns. 

Among the women who directed the efforts in the aid of the French 
wounded we ought to mention Mrs. Francis Shaw, Mrs. William Gwin, 



Other Benevolent Associations 381 

The American Surgical Dressings Association, founded 
In Paris by Mrs. Austin, had also many working com- 
mittees in America. Thanks to this work our hospitals 
rarely lacked dressings or bandages for the wounded. 

The Fatherless Children of France, working in close 
touch with the French Government, through the care and 
adoption of war orphans has accomplished a work too 
well known in America and too extensive to be here fully 
described. 

The same may be said of the work of Miss Anne Mor- 
gan, particularly in the devastated regions, which has been 
constant and devoted from the first. 

Probably the American woman whose work covered 
the broadest field was Mrs. Wharton. Her ouvroir or 
workroom gave employment to quantities of girls thrown 
out of work by the war. 

The American Hostels for Refugees, into which was 
merged the " Foyer Franco-Beige," was created under 
the presidency of Mrs. Wharton during the early days 
of October, 19 14. Six separate committees worked to 
aid the refugees of the invaded districts; an infirmary was 
established, a depot for the gratuitous distribution of sup- 
plies opened, an employment bureau established, a res- 
taurant, dispensary, and a workroom, still running in 
19 1 9, were installed down town, as well as a center for 
the free distribution of clothing. 

Later under the increasing stress of the German offen- 

and Miss Anna M. Vail, all working in Paris; Mrs. Charles Chapin 
and Mrs. Ethelbert Nevin in New York; Miss Edith Bangs in Boston 
and Mrs. Russell Tyson in Chicago. Thanks to the enterprise and de- 
votion of these ladies and their collaborators, 41,812 cases were re- 
ceived from America, and 44,794 were distributed to hospitals and 
among the needy families of soldiers. The committee unwilling to cease 
their good works with the cessation of hostilities plan to endow a perma- 
nent children's hospital of one hundred beds in Rheims. 



382 The American Army in the European Conflict 

sive of 19 1 8, several apartment houses were opened and 
free lodging given to refugees. 

For one year, the society worked in collaboration with 
the Red Cross, but once more obtained full autonomy in 
August, 19 1 8. 

The work of the Children of Flanders, with a large 
colony of refugee children, was established in five different 
centers in France, and a group of workrooms for the 
supply of garments and knitted goods. 

The American Convalescent Homes established three 
principal homes in France for the families and children 
of refugees either suffering from or threatened by tuber- 
culosis. 

French Tuberculosis War Victims was founded in 19 16 
with a view to the care and cure of light cases of tuber- 
culosis through obtaining the best conditions of fresh air 
and hygiene for the patients. Over $700,000 were 
raised in America for this enterprise, which was subse- 
quently taken over by the Red Cross. 

During the summer of 19 14, Mr. Herrick, American 
ambassador in Paris, seeing the number of charitable or- 
ganizations that were being formed in France and with 
a view of coordinating the individual efforts which were 
being made by an arrangement with the French Govern- 
ment and high command, established the : 

American Relief Clearing House with Mr. Harjes as 
president and Mr. H. O. Beatty as director. This or- 
ganization remained in touch with our front and rear 
services, obtained free transportation on the principal 
lines of navigation and railways, thus distributing gratis 
the quantities of gifts of all sorts which were due to 
American generosity. 



Other Benevolent Associations 383 

From November, 19 14, to June, 19 17, the clearing 
house handled 150,000 cases of clothing and supplies, dis- 
tributed over $2,000,000 in cash, and $1,000,000 worth 
of supplies. 

When America entered the war, the Relief Clearing 
House passed over its work to the American Red Cross. 

Naturally the great benevolent organizations deserve a 
more complete study than our insufficient experience of 
their varied activities has permitted us to record here. It 
is to be hoped not only that they may one day be more 
worthily described, but also that we may investigate in 
France the causes which have brought about such colos- 
sal results as have been achieved by the American method 
of association. 

Almost all these societies have, in a great measure, 
ameliorated the material welfare of our combatants, but 
this perhaps is one of the least important parts of the 
work accomplished. In attenuating the sufferings of 
the victims of war, they have succeeded in maintaining 
a high morale near the front, and have accomplished the 
great result of shortening the distance which separates 
the soldier from his home. 

It would be difficult to describe adequately the mani- 
fold activities undertaken by the American residents and 
even of the transient visitors in Paris when the war 
broke out and which were developed by private or col- 
lective initiative as it continued. To do so would require 
a volume and not merely a chapter. We must therefore 
beg our readers to consider that none have been volun- 
tarily omitted in this brief sketch, but that those of which 
we speak from certain personal knowledge may be taken 
as a type of the many others, equally meritorious, which 



384 The American Army in the European Conflict 

the authors of this book have not had the chance of know- 
ing individually. 

Thanks to all of them, and thanks to the great variety 
and scope of their benevolent activities, the man no longer 
of fighting age who was obliged to remain in the United 
States, and the woman whom family duties kept at home, 
were both able to take a useful share in the European 
war according to their means but more especially in direct 
proportion to their personal influence and energy. 



CHAPTER XIII 

FRANCO-AMERICAN COOPERATION CONCLUSION 

During the two years that the American forces were 
estabhshing their services and fighting upon French soil, 
they were necessarily brought into close and constant re- 
lations with our military administration and with the civil 
population of our country. 

In order to procure supplies and material of all sorts 
— lodgings, transport, and so forth — they were obliged 
to apply to the competent French authorities, and, when 
actively engaged, they were in permanent touch with the 
French military command. 

A complete association of the French and American 
services, both In the Interior and in the army zones, be- 
came an essential element of future success. 

During their first Interview upon these subjects. Gen- 
eral Pershing and the Minister of War, M. Palnleve, 
found themselves In complete agreement as to the neces- 
sity of hastening the entry Into line of the American con- 
tingents; and, in order to facilitate this in every way, they 
at once decided to organize a permanent liaison system. 

The Americans proceeded to appoint a certain number 
of missions or individual officers to act as liaison agents 
with the particular allied staffs called upon to work In 
conjunction with their own. According to the Importance 
of the questions involved, these American representatives 
were empowered either to reach a direct settlement or re- 
port the affair to their superiors. 

Officers representing the high command of the Ex- 

385 



386 The American Army in the European Conflict 

peditionary Forces were to be found in all the offices of 
our French general headquarters, of our War Ministry, 
of our regional staffs and railway regulating stations 
where American interests were involved, as well as at the 
headquarters of the interallied commander-in-chief.^ 

In order to facilitate the work of the Americans, we on 
our side increased our liaison services and even when it 
seemed advisable, modified the interior organization of 
some of our departments, so that our new ally would find 
his task simplified. 

As soon as the American headquarters were perma- 
nently constituted at Chaumont, the French commander- 
in-chief appointed a military mission, composed of analog- 
ous corresponding services, which was particularly en- 
trusted with the duty of furnishing interpreters and liaison 
agents ^ to the recently arrived American units. 

In the interior, wherever important American ser- 
vices were to be found, as in the base ports and regional 
staffs, the Minister of War created missions which were 
to serve as intermediaries between our allies and the civil 
and military administration. In the principal staffs and 
important services of our ministry, bureaus were installed 
to supervise and coordinate all questions involving 
American cooperation. 

^ The heads of these American military missions were: 

At the headquarters of the Allied Armies: Colonel T. Bentley Mott, 
at present military attache in Paris. 

At the headquarters of the French Armies: Colonel Frank Parker, suc- 
ceeded by Colonel C. de Witt Wilcox, subsequently by Colonel Paul H. 
Clark. 

At the headquarters of the British Armies: Colonel Robert Bacon. 

Colonel Herman Harjes was entrusted with the organization and in- 
spection of the personnel of all the liaison missions attached to the various 
staffs and services. 

- This French mission was at first under the orders of General Raguen- 
eau, subsequently under those of Colonel Linard. 



Franco-American Cooperation 387 

On December 19, 19 17, the Prime Minister appointed 
a special Councillor on Franco-American Affairs to the 
under Secretary of War ^ and also created a central office 
of Franco-American Relations. 

On June 19th, 19 18, the General Commission for 
Franco-American War Affairs ^ was organized. Its chief, 
to whom was entrusted the duty of coordinating the work 
of the Franco-American bureaus in the ministries, was 
also to follow up the execution of the different measures 
which had been judged necessary. At the same time the 
High Commissioner directed the work which was under- 
taken in America through a delegate who was to take 
charge of the services already created in the United States 
by the French Republic. 

In general such were the measures taken in France to 
facilitate the entry into line of the American contingents. 

It is not for us to estimate the value of this assistance. 
We may, with greater relevance, reproduce here one of 
the passages from General Pershing's telegraphic report 
to the War Department in Washington summing up, after 
the armistice, the operations in which his armies had 
taken part: 

" The French Government and Army have always stood ready 
to furnish us with supplies, equipment, and transportation and to 
aid us in every way. In the towns and hamlets wherever our 
troops have been stationed or billeted, the French people have 
everywhere received them more as relatives and intimate friends 
than as soldiers of a foreign army. 

" For these things words are quite inadequate to express our 
gratitude." 

3 M. Jules Cambon, formerly French Ambassador to Washington and 
to Berlin. 

* Under the direction of M. Andre Tardieu. 



388 The American Army in the European Conflict 

The armistice found General Pershing at the head of 
an army more than two milHon strong. In the course 
of 19 1 9 this force would have been doubled. Both in 
France and America every provision was made to attain 
this result; the powerful mechanism which had been set on 
foot in view of mobilization was running without a hitch. 
Transports and reception camps in Europe were kept up 
to their full capacity. Nothing, not even the German 
submarine, was now able to seriously impede the regular 
movement of reenforcement. 

Undoubtedly the knowledge of this situation had its 
influence on the enemies' decision to abandon the struggle, 
so that America would not pursue her effort to a finish 
even more disastrous to Germany. 

The two million soldiers already in Europe sufficed to 
determine our victory. Thanks to American aid, the 
enemy had been forced: first to stabilize, then to defen- 
sive warfare followed by a more and more precipitate 
retreat and, finally, on the eleventh of November, to a 
capitulation. 

No sooner had the armistice been signed than the com- 
mander-in-chief, while watching the advance of his troops 
toward the Rhine, had his mind preoccupied by another 
thought, that of lightening war-worn France of an occu- 
pation which had now become unnecessary. From that 
moment, the Americans turned homeward with the same 
order and the same rapidity which had characterized their 
arrival on our shores. 

Of their passage among us, of their exploits on our 
battlefields, are they to leave no more than a memory? 
We hope otherwise. 

The contact of our populations with these Americans, 
energetic in action, of open minds and rapid initiative, 



Conclusion 389 

has surely enlarged their horizon. Our industrial, com- 
mercial and agricultural methods, possibly our social and 
political conceptions, may be modified by interchange of 
thought with men constantly seeking movement and 
progress. We may perhaps find that the natural tendency 
toward routine and bureaucracy with which we are often 
reproached will be gradually modified by the penetration 
of new ideas. 

The love of open air and outdoor sports so character- 
istic of American youth cannot but have been an excellent 
example. 

Our technicists, brought in touch with the American 
method of work, will surely have made many useful ob- 
servations concerning, for instance, the scientific and at 
the same time simple working of railroads, telephones, 
and telegraphs. 

Let us recall that, upon leaving France, the American 
services have turned over to us various working; facilities 
— ports, docks, warehouses, shops, rolling stock, and even 
a trained and organized civilian labor, all of which should 
make our future economic struggles easier. 

French officers and soldiers who have throughout the 
last two years been in contact with the American forces, 
working beside them will, it is to be hoped, have watched 
with interest and profit the fashion in which these have 
accomplished their tasks. 

The eminently aggressive spirit which the American 
soldier brings with him to the firing line will not have 
failed to Impress our French observers, nor will the effort 
made by each commander to develop the physical and 
moral qualities of his men have passed unnoticed. 

In this connection, one question may be asked: 

" Why was the American officer unready to profit by 



390 The American Army in the European Conflict 

the veterans' experience, unless he found that it accorded 
with his own? " 

To this we may reply that, with the mentality of this 
new army, each individual chief, to gain and maintain 
ascendancy over his men, was oblisjed to show an unflinch- 
ing confidence in his own personal ability. 

The men also were eager to show their commander 
what they could do unaided. Both had the desire, per- 
haps unacknowledged, of owing to themselves above all 
that consciousness which the good soldier must ever pos- 
sess — his superiority over the foe. Fine and martial 
spirit of a people that has never known defeat! 

It is to be hoped that our army staff may remain in 
touch with American headquarters and continue to study 
the working methods of their associates of yesterday, 
their friends of the present and future. Our American 
comrades are certain to codify in their new Field Service 
Regulations a portion of that experience gained on the 
battle-fields of the great war. 

The names of the ofl^cers upon whom this work will 
devolve are already known to us. We cannot for a mo- 
ment doubt as to what their conclusions will be. 

All have been trained in that school to which General 
Pershing belongs. The spirit of offensive warfare has 
permeated their tactical conceptions and will surely in- 
spire their future writings. 

As for ourselves, who have witnessed all that has been 
set down in these pages, we have endeavored to relate 
with perfect impartiality the events which are herein 
chronicled, convinced that the simple and unvarnished 
truth is the best homage we can ever render to the admir- 
able effort of our brothers in arms. 

Paris, July 4th. 



APPENDIX I 

Following is the order of battle of the American Expeditionary 
Forces on December i, 1918: 

This date has been selected preferably to any other as being that 
of the most complete development and greatest numerical strength 
of the command. 

In consulting this document, it should be borne in mind that, as 
a consequence of numerous promotions and new assignments, on 
the one hand many American officers had had for a very short time 
the ranks and employments with which their names are herein 
associated; on the other hand, many others had, at that time, been 
but recently transferred from positions which they held for a long 
period in the course of the war. 

Finally, the lack of available space has compelled the writers, 
much to their regret, to limit themselves to the troops in the field 
and omit those permanently assigned to the Services of Supply. 

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE AMERICAN EXPEDI- 
TIONARY FORCES AT THE DATE OF 
DECEMBER i, 1918 

General Headquarters 

American Expeditionary Forces 

General John J. Pershing Commanding 

Major-General James W. McAndrew. . . .Chief of Staff 

Brigadier-General LeRoy Eltinge Deputy Chief of Staff 

Lieutenant-Colonel Albert S. Kuegle Secretary-General Staff 

Brigadier-General Avery D. Andrews. . . .Asst. C. of S., G-i 

Brigadier-General Dennis E. Nolan Asst. C. of S., G-2 

Brigadier-General Fox Connor Asst, C. of S., G-3 

Brigadier-General George V. H. Moseley.Asst. C. of S., G-4 

Brigadier-General H. B. Fiske Asst. C. of S., G-5 

391 



392 Appendix I 

Major-General Ernest Hinds Chief of Artillery 

Major-General Mason M. Patrick Chief of Air Service 

Brigadier-General S. D. Rockenbach Chief of Tank Corps 

FIRST ARMY 

Lieutenant-General Hunter Liggett Commanding 

Brigadier-General Hugh A. Drumm... Chief of Staff 

Colonel Leon B. Kromer Asst. C. of S., G-i 

Colonel Willey Howell Asst. C. of S., G-2 

Colonel Lawrence Halstead Asst. C. of S., G-3 

Colonel John L. DeWitt Asst. C. of S., G-4 

Colonel Lewis H. Watkins Asst. C. of S., G-5 

Major-General William S. McNair Chief of Artillery 

FIRST ARMY CORPS: 

Major-General William M. Wright... Commanding 

Colonel Walter S. Grant Chief of Staff 

Major Lemuel L. Bolles Asst. C. of S., G-i 

Lieutenant-Colonel Noble B. Juab Asst. C. of S., G-2 

Lieutenant-Colonel Royden E. Beebe. . . Asst. C. of S., G-3 

Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Selleck Atg. Chief of Artillery 

Thirty-sixth Division: 

Major-General William R. Smith Commanding 

Colonel Ezekiel J. Williams Chief of Staff 

yist Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Pegram Whitworth. . .Comdg. 

Colonel Luther H. James Comdg., 141st Regt. Inf. 

Colonel Alfred W. Bloor Comdg., i42d Regt. Inf. 

y2d Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General John A. Hulen Comdg. 

Colonel Irving J. Phillipson Comdg., 143d Regt. 

Colonel Oscar E. Roberts Comdg., 144th Regt. 

6 1 St Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General John E. Stephens Comdg. 

Colonel Claud V. Birkhead Comdg., 131st Rgt. F.A. 



Appendix t 393 

Colonel Arthur R. Sholars Comdg., I32d Rgt. F.A. 

Colonel Fred A. Logan Comdg., 133d Rgt. F.A. 

Seventy-eighth Division : 

Major-General James H. McRae Commanding 

Colonel Charles D, Herron C. of S. 

155th Infantry Brigade 

Brig.-General Sanford D. Stanberry. . .Comdg. 

Colonel John M. Morgan Comdg., 309th Regt. Inf. 

Colonel Walter C. Babcock Comdg., 310th Regt. Inf. 

156th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General James T. Dean Comdg. 

Colonel Marcus B. Stokes Comdg., 311th Regt. 

Colonel Alvord V. P. Anderson Comdg., 312th Regt. 

153d Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Clint C. Hearn Comdg. 

Colonel A. G. Fisher Comdg., 307th Rgt. F. A. 

Colonel Chas. M. Bunker Comdg., 308th Rgt. F. A. 

Colonel Edwin O. Sarratt Comdg., 309th Rgt. F. A. 

Eightieth Division: 

Major-General Samuel D. Sturgis. . . . Commanding 
Colonel William H. Waldron C. of S. 

159th Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Geo. H. Jamerson .. Comdg. 

Colonel Chas. Keller Comdg. 317th Regt. Inf. 

Colonel Harry C. Jones Comdg. 318th Regt. Inf. 

1 60th Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Lloyd M. Brett. .. .Comdg. 

Colonel James M. Love Comdg. 319th Regt. Inf. 

Colonel Ephraim C. Peyton Comdg. 320th Regt. Inf. 

155th Field Artillery Brigade 
Brigadier-General James H. Bryson. . .Comdg. 
Colonel O. L. Brunzell Comdg. 313th Regt. F. A. 



394 Appendix I 

Colonel Jas. F. Walker Comdg. 314th Regt. F. A. 

Colonel Wm. Tidball Comdg. 315th Regt. F. A. 

FIFTH ARMY CORPS: 

Major-General Charles P. Summerall. . .Commanding 

Brigadier-General Wilson B. Burtt Chief of Staff 

Lt.-Colonel Albert W. Foreman Asst. C. of S., G-i 

Lt.-Colonel George M. Russell Asst. C. of S., G-2 

Colonel T. H. Emerson Asst. C. of S., G-3 

Brigadier-General Dwight E. Aultman. .Comdg. Corps Artillery 

Twenty-sixth Division: 

Major-General Harry C. Hale Commanding 

Colonel Duncan K. Major Chief of Staff 

Sist Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General L. L. Durfee Comdg. 

Colonel Horace P. Hobbs Comdg. loist Regt. Inf. 

Colonel Hiram I. Bearss Comdg. I02d Regt. Inf. 

52d Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Geo. H. Shelton Comdg. 

Lieut.-Colonel Cassius M. Dowell Comdg. 103d Regt. 

Colonel B. Frank Cheatham Comdg. 104th Regt. 

51st Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General P. D. Glassford Comdg. 

Colonel Robert E. Goodwin Comdg. loist Regt. F. A. 

Colonel J. A. Mack Comdg. io2d Regt. F. A. 

Colonel J. Alden Twachtman Comdg. 103d Regt. F. A. 

Twenty-ninth Division: 

Major-General Charles G. Morton Commanding 

Colonel S. A. Cloman Chief of Staff 

57th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Leroy S. Upton Comdg. 

Colonel Wm. R. Polk Comdg. 1 13th Regt. Inf. 

Colonel Geo. Williams .Comdg. 1 14th Regt. Inf. 



Appendix I 395 

^8th Infantry Brigade 

Colonel John McKay Palmer Comdg. Temp. 

Colonel Milton A. Reckord Comdg. 115th Regt. Inf. 

Colonel Reginald H. Kelley Comdg. 11 6th Regt. Inf. 

54th Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Lucius R. Holbrook. . .Comdg. 

Colonel Washington Bowie Comdg. i loth F. A. 

Colonel Wm. F. Jones Comdg. 1 1 ith F. A. 

Colonel Quincy A. Gillmore Comdg. 1 12th F. A. 

Eighty-second Division : 

Major-General George B. Duncan Commanding 

Colonel Gordon Johnson C. of S. 

163d Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Marcus D. Cronin ... Comdg. 

Colonel Walter M. Whitman Comdg. 325th Regt. Inf. 

Colonel Pierce A. Murphy Comdg. 326th Regt. Inf. 

164th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Julian R. Lindsey Comdg. 

Lieut.-Colonel Frank W. Blalock Comdg. 327th Regt. 

Colonel Richard Wetherill Comdg. 328th Regt. 

157th Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Daniel F. Craig Comdg. 

Colonel Earl D. Pierce Comdg. 319th Regt. F. A. 

Colonel Harry C. Williams Comdg. 320th Regt. F. A. 

Lieut.-Colonel Churchill B. Meahard. .Comdg. 321st Regt. F. A. 

EIGHTH ARMY CORPS: 

Major-General Henry T. Allen Comdg. 

Colonel George C. Marshall C. of S. 

Lieut.-Col. William B. Graham Asst. C. of S., G-i 

Major Thorn C. Catron Asst. C. of S., G-2 

Colonel Hjalmer Erickson Asst. C. of S., G-3 



396 Appendix I 

Sixth Division: 

]\Iajor-General Walter H. Gordon Commanding 

Colonel Joseph W. Beacham Chief of Staff 

nth Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Wm. R. Dashiell Comdg. 

Colonel Thos. H. Slavens Comdg. 51st Regt. 

Colonel Ernest V. Smith Comdg. 52d Regt. 

I2th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General James B. Erwin Comdg. 

Colonel Frederick G. Stritzinger Comdg. 53d Regt. 

Colonel Matthias Crowley Comdg. 54th Regt. 

6th Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Edward A. Miller Comdg. 

Colonel Willard D. Newbill Comdg. 3d Regt. 

Colonel W. G. Peace Comdg. 1 1 th Regt. 

Colonel Samuel Frankenberger Comdg. 78th Regt. 

Seventy-seventh Division : 

Major-General Robert Alexander Commanding 

Colonel Clarence C. Scherfill C. of S. 

153d Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Michael J. Lenihan. . . .Comdg. 

Colonel Raymond Sheldon Comdg. 305th Regt. 

Colonel George Vidmer Comdg. 306th Regt. 

154th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Harrison J. Price Comdg. 

Colonel Eugene Houghton Comdg. 307th Regt. 

Colonel John R. R. Hannay Comdg. 308th Regt. 

I52d Field Artillery Brigade 
Brigadier-General Manus McCloskey. .. .Comdg. 

Lieut. -Colonel Wm. McCleave Comdg. 304th Regt. 

Colonel Fred C. Boyle Comdg. 305th Regt. 

Colonel C. D. Winn Comdg. 306th Regt. 



Appendix I 397 

Seventy-ninth Division : 

Major-General Joseph E. Kuhn Commanding 

Colonel Tenney Ross Chief of Staff 

i^yth Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General John S. Winn Comdg. 

Colonel C. B. Sweezey Comdg. 313th Regt. 

Colonel Wm. H. Oury Comdg. 314th Regt. 

i$8th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Evan M. Johnson Comdg. 

Colonel Alden C. Knowles Comdg. 315th Regt. 

Colonel Garrison McCaskey Comdg. 316th Regt. 

754/A Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Andrew Hero Comdg. 

Colonel Howard Landers Comdg. 310th Regt. 

Colonel Chas. Mortimer Comdg. 3 nth Regt. 

Colonel Harry P. Wilbur Comdg. 312th Regt. 

Eighty-first Division: 

Major-General Charles J. Bailey Commanding 

Colonel Charles D. Roberts Chief of Staff 

i6ist Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Geo. W. Mclver Comdg. 

Colonel Frank Halstead Comdg. 321st Regt. 

Colonel Lorain T. Richardson Comdg. 322d Regt. 

i62d Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Monroe McFarland. . .Comdg. 

Colonel Thos. A. Pierce Comdg. 323d Regt. 

Colonel Geo. W. Moses Comdg. 324th Regt. 

156th Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Andrew Moses Comdg. 

Colonel R. P. Reeder Comdg. 316th F. A. Regt. 

Colonel N. E. Margetts Comdg. 317th Regt. 

Colonel J. P. Robinson .Comdg. 3 1 8th Regt. 



398 Appendix I 



SECOND ARMY 

Lieutenant-General Robert L. Bullard . . Commanding 
Brigadier-General Stuart Heintzelman. .Chief of Staff 

Colonel G. K. Wilson Asst. C. of S., G-i 

Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Thompson. . , .Asst. C. of S., G-2 

Colonel W. N. Haskell Asst. C. of S., G-3 

Colonel George P. Tyner Asst. C. of S., G-4 

Colonel J. E. Bell Asst. C. of S., G-5 

Brigadier-General Dwight E. Aultman. .Chief of Army Artillery 

SIXTH CORPS: 

Major-General Charles T. Mencher. . . -Commanding 

Colonel Edgar T. Collins Chief of Staiif 

Colonel Charles H. Bridges Asst. C. of S., G-i 

Lieut.-Colonel Samuel T. Mackall Asst. C. of S., G-2 

Colonel George F. Baltzell Asst. C. of S., G-3 

Brigadier-General Albert J. Bowley Chf. of Cps. Artillery 

Seventh Division : 

Major-General Edmund Wittenmyer .... Commanding 
Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Parker Chief of Staff 

13th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General A. W. Bjornstad Comdg. 

Colonel Jas. V. Heidt Comdg. 55th Regt. Inf. 

Colonel Arthur L. Bump Comdg. 56th Regt. 

14th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Lutz Wahl Comdg. 

Colonel Fred L. Munson Comdg. 34th Regt. 

Colonel Edson A. Lewis Comdg. 64th Regt. 

7th Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Pienann N. Horn Comdg. 

Colonel Harrison Hall Comdg. 8th Regt. 

Colonel Edgar A. Sirmyer Comdg. 79th Regt. 

Colonel F. W. Stopford Comdg. 80th Regt. 



Appendix 1 399 

Twenty-eighth Division : 

Major-General William H. Hay Commanding 

Colonel Walter C. Sweeney Chief of Staff 

S5th Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Wilds P. Richardson .. Comdg. 

Colonel A. F. Prescott Comdg. 109th Regt. 

Colonel Samuel V. Ham Comdg. i loth Regt. 

S6th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General H. A. Allen Comdg. 

Colonel C. F, Armistead Comdg. 11 ith Regt. 

Colonel Geo. C. Richards Comdg. 11 2th Regt. 

Sjd Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General William G. Price Comdg. 

Colonel Richard C. Burleson Comdg. 107th Regt. 

Colonel Franc Lacocq Comdg. io8th Regt. 

Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Fuller Comdg. 109th Regt. 

Ninety-second Division : 

Major-General Charles H. Martin Commanding 

Colonel Allen J. Greer Chief of Staff 

183d Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Malvern H. Barnum. .Comdg. 

Colonel Hunter B. Nelson Comdg. 365th Regt. 

Colonel Ralph B. Parrott Comdg. 366th Regt. 

184th Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Albert H. Blanding. . .Comdg. 

Colonel Wm. G. Doane Comdg. 367th Regt. 

Colonel Fred R. Brown Comdg. 368th Regt. 

167th Field Artillery Brigade 
Brigadier-General John H. Sherburne. .Comdg. 

Colonel John O'Neil Comdg. 349th Regt. F.A. 

Colonel Walter E. Prosser Comdg. 350th Regt. 

Colonel W. H. Carpenter Comdg. 351st Regt. 



400 Appendix I 

NINTH ARMY CORPS: 

Major-General Adelbert Cronkhite Comdg. 

Brigadier-General W. K. Naylor Chief of Stafif 

Lieutenant-Colonel Dabney Ward Asst. C. of S., G-i 

Lieutenant-Colonel Miles Sherman Asst. C. of S., G-2 

Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. Richmond. . . .Asst. C. of S., G-3 
Brigadier-General R. P. Davis Comdg. Corps Artillery 

Thirty-third Division : 

Major-General George Bell Comdg. 

Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Simpson. .Chief of Staff 

63th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Edward L. King Comdg. 

Colonel Edgar A. Myer Comdg. 129th Rgt. Inf. 

Colonel John B. Clinnin Comdg. 130th Regt. 

66th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Paul E. Wolfe Comdg. 

Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn Comdg. 131st Regt. 

Colonel Abel Davis Comdg. I32d Regt. 

58th Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Henry Todd, Jr Comdg. 

Colonel Milton J. Forman Comdg. I22d Regt. 

Colonel Chas. B. Davis Comdg. 123d Regt. 

Colonel Horatio B. Hackett Comdg. 124th Regt. 

Thirty-fifth Division : 

Major-General Peter E. Traub Commanding 

Colonel Hamilton S. Hawkins Chief of Staff 

6gth Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Thomas W. Darrah. . .Comdg. 

Colonel Ira L. Reeves Comdg. 137th Regt. 

Col. Americus Mitchell Comdg. 138th Regt. 

70th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Thos. B. Dugan Comdg. 

Colonel Carl L. Ristine Comdg. 139th Regt. 

Colonel Alonzo Gray Comdg. 140th Regt. 



Appendix I 401 

60th Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Lucien G. Berry. . Comdg. 

Colonel Geo. A. Taylor Comdg. 128th F. A. Regt. 

Colonel Karl D. Klemm Comdg. 129th Regt. 

Colonel Hugh S. Brown Comdg. 130th Regt. 



THIRD ARMY 

Major-General Joseph T. Dickman Commanding 

Brigadier-General Malin Craig Chief of Staff 

Colonel James A. Logan Asst. C. of S., G-i 

Colonel R. H. Williams Asst. C. of S., G-2 

Colonel John C. Montgomery Asst. C. of S., G-3 

Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Perkins Asst. C. of S., G-4 

Colonel Walter C. Short Asst. C. of S., G-5 

THIRD CORPS: 

Major-General John L. Hines Commanding 

Brigadier-General Campbell King Chief of Staff 

Lieutenant-Colonel M. C. Shallenburger. .Asst. C. of S., G-i 
Lieutenant-Colonel Horace C. Stebbins. . .Asst. C. of S., G-2 
Colonel Adna H. Chaffee Asst. C. of S., G-3 

Second Division: 

Brigadier-General John A. Lejeune Commanding 

Colonel H. B. Myers Chief of Staff 

3d Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Charles E. Kilbourne. .Comdg. 

Colonel Robert O. VanHorn Comdg. 9th Regt. 

Colonel Edward R. Stone Comdg. 23d Regt. 

4th Infantry Brigade 

Brig.-General Wendell C. Neville .... Comdg. 

Colonel Logan H. Feland Comdg. 5th Regt. Marines 

Colonel Harry Lee Comdg. 6th Regt. Marines 



402 Appendix I 

2nd Field Artillery Brigade 

Colonel Dan T. Moore Comdg. 

Colonel David McC. McKell Comdg. I2th Regt. 

Colonel J. P. Davis Comdg. 15th Regt. 

Colonel Robert H, Dunlap Comdg. 17th Regt. 

Thirty-second Division: 

Major-General William Lassiter Commanding 

Colonel Robert McC. Beck Chief of Staflf 

63d Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Wm. R. Smedburg. . . .Comdg. 

Colonel Edgar G. Meckel Comdg. 125th Regt. 

Major Guy M. Wilson Comdg. 126th Regt. 

64th Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Edmund B. Winans. . .Comdg. 

Colonel Russell C. Langden Comdg. 127th Regt. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry A. Meyer Comdg. 128th Regt. 

66th Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Johnson Hagood (Ord. to command) 

Colonel Conrad H. Lanza Comdg. 

Colonel Phillip H. Worcester Comdg. 146th Regt. 

Colonel Boyd Wales Comdg. 147th Regt. 

Colonel Marion S. Battle Comdg. 148th Regt. 

Forty-second Division : 

Major-General C. A. F. Flagler Commanding 

Colonel William N. Hughes Chief of Staff 

8sd Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Frank M. Caldwell. . .Comdg. 

Colonel C. R. Howland Comdg. 165th Regt. 

Colonel Benson W. Hough Comdg. i66th Regt. 

84th Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Douglas McArthur. . .Comdg. 

Colonel Wm. P. Screws Comdg. 167th Regt. 

Colonel Matthew A. Tinley Comdg. i68th Regt. 



Appendix I 403 

67th Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General George G. Gatley Comdg. 

Colonel Henry J. Rielly Comdg. 149th Regt. 

Colonel Robert H. Tyndall Comdg. 150th Regt. 

Colonel Geo. E. Leach Comdg. 151st Regt. 

FOURTH CORPS: 

Major-General Charles H. Muir Commanding 

Brigadier-General Briant H. Wells Chief of Staf? 

Lieutenant-Colonel Mack Garr Asst. C. of S., G-i 

Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Stilwell Asst. C. of S., G-2 

Colonel Berkeley Enochs Asst. C. of S., G-3 

Brigadier-General Wm. M. Cruikshank. .Chief of Corps Art. 

First Division: 

Major-General E. F, McGlachlan Commanding 

Colonel Stephen O. Fuqua Chief of Staff 

1st Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Frank Parker Comdg. 

Colonel W. F. Harrell Comdg. i6th Rgt. Inf. 

Col. C. A. Hunt Comdg. i8th Regt. 

2d Infantry Brigade 

Brigade-General F. C. Marshall Comdg. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt. .Comdg. 26th Regt. 
Lieutenant-Colonel T. W. Hammond .... Comdg. 28th Regt. 

1st Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Henry W. Butner Comdg. 

Colonel C. L. Corbin Comdg. 5th F. A. Rgt. 

Colonel Wm. H. Dodds Comdg. 6th F. A. Rgt. 

Colonel Francis Ruggles Comdg. 7th Rgt. 

Third Division : 

Major General Robert L. Howze Commanding 

Colonel Robert McCleave Chief of Staff 



404 Appendix I 

5th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Fred W. Sladen Comdg. 

Colonel Geo. R. Herbst Comdg. 4th Inf. Regt. 

Colonel Wm. M. Morrow Comdg. 7th Inf. Regt. 

6th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Ora E. Hunt Comdg. 

Colonel Howard R. Perry Comdg. 30th Regt. 

Colonel Frank H. Adams Comdg. 38th Regt. 

3rd Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Harry G. Bishop Comdg. 

Colonel Chas. Reese Lloyd Comdg. loth Regt. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Ronald B. Johnson ... Comdg. i8th Regt. 
Colonel E. St. J. Greble Comdg. 76th Regt. 

Fourth Division: 

Major General Mark L. Hersey Commanding 

Colonel Christian A. Bach Chief of Staff 

yth Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Benjamin A. Poore. . . .Comdg. 

Colonel Frank C. Bolles Comdg. 39th Regt. 

Colonel Troy H. Middleton Comdg. 47th Regt. 

8th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Ewing E. Booth Comdg. 

Colonel O. P. M. Hazzard Comdg. 58th Regt. 

Colonel F. M. Wise Comdg. 59th Regt. 

4th Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Edwin B. Babbitt Comdg. 

Colonel Wright Smith Comdg. 13th Regt. 

Colonel Henning F. Colly Comdg. i6th Regt. 

Colonel Archibald F. Comiskey Comdg. 77th Regt. 

SEVENTH CORPS: 

Major-General Wm. G. Haan Commanding 

Colonel H. J. Brees Chief of Staff 

Colonel Clifford Game Asst. C. of S., G-l 



Appendix I 405 

Major Elmer F. Rice Asst. C. of S., G-2 

Colonel Roger S. Fitch Asst. C. of S., G-3 

Major F. J. Dunnigan Corps Artillery Cdr. 

Fifth Division: 

Major General Hanson E. Ely Commanding 

Colonel Clement A. Trott Chief of StafiE 

gth Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Jos. G. Castner Comdg. 

Colonel Frank B. Hawkins Comdg. 6oth Regt. 

Colonel Phillip B. Peyton Comdg. 6ist Regt. 

lOth Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Paul B. Malone Comdg. 

Colonel Henry J. Hunt Comdg. 6th Regt. 

Colonel Robert H. Peck Comdg. i ith Regt. 

^th Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Wm. C. Rivers Comdg. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. E. Dunn Comdg. 19th Regt. 

Colonel Brooke Payne Comdg. 20th Regt. 

Colonel Richard H. McMaster Comdg. 2ist Regt. 

Eighty-ninth Division: 

Major-General Frank L. Winn Commanding 

Colonel John C. H. Lee Chief of Staff 

177th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Herman Hall Comdg. 

Colonel James H. Reeves Comdg. 353d Regt. 

Colonel Conrad S. Babcock Comdg. 354th Regt. 

178th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Geo. C. Barnhardt. .. .Comdg. 

Colonel Wm. A. Cavanaugh Comdg. 355th Regt. 

Colonel Robert H. Allen Comdg. 356th Regt. 



4o6 Appendix I 

164th Field Artillery Brigade 
Brigadier-General Edgar T. Donnelly. . . .Comdg. 

Colonel Ernest Wheeler Comdg. 340th Regt. 

Colonel Robert Davis Comdg. 341st Regt. 

Colonel Earle Biscoe , Comdg. 342d Regt. 

Ninetieth Division: 

Major-General Leroy S. Lyon Commanding 

Colonel John J. Kingman Chief of Stafi 

179th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Jos. T. O'Neil Comdg. 

Colonel Edgar T. Hartman Comdg. 357th Regt. 

Colonel Woodson Hocker Comdg. 358th Regt. 

180th Infantry Brigade 

Brig.-Gen. Ulysses G. McAlexander Comdg. 

Colonel E. Kearsley Sterling Comdg. 359th Regt. 

Colonel Howard C. Price Comdg. 360th Regt. 

165th Field Artillery Brigade 

Colonel R. S. Abernathy Comdg. Temp. 

Colonel Henry B. Farrar Comdg. 343d Regt. 

Colonel A. U. Falkner Comdg. 344th Regt. 

Colonel G. L. Wertenbaker Comdg. 345th Regt. 

UNASSIGNED 

SECOND ARMY CORPS: 

Major-General George W. Read Commanding 

Brigadier-General George S. Simonds. . . .Chief of Staff 

Colonel Richard K. Hale Asst. C. of S., G-i 

Colonel Kerr T. Riggs Asst. C. of S., G-2 

Colonel Fred E. Buchanan Asst. C. of S., G-3 

Colonel John P. Terrell Asst. C. of S., G-4 

Twenty-seventh Division : 

Major-General John F. O'Ryan Commanding 

Colonel Stanley H. Ford Chief of Staff 



Appendix I 407 

53d Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Charles I. DeBevoise. .Comdg. 

Colonel James M. Andrews Comdg. 105th Regt. 

Colonel Franklin W. Ward Comdg. io6th Regt. 

54th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Palmer E. Pierce Comdg. 

Colonel Mortimer D. Bryant Comdg. 107th Regt. 

Colonel Edgar S. Jennings Comdg. io8th Regt. 

52d Field Artillery Brigade 
Brigadier-General George A. Wingate. . . .Comdg. 

Colonel Charles C. Pulis Comdg. 104th Regt. 

Colonel DeWitt C. Weld Comdg. 105th Regt. 

Colonel E. P. Smith Comdg. io6th Regt. 

Thirtieth Division: 

Major-General Edward M. Lewis Commanding 

Colonel John K. Herr Chief of Staff 

59th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General L. D. Tyson Comdg. 

Colonel Carey F. Spence Comdg. 1 1 7th Regt. 

Colonel Orren R. Wolfe Comdg. i i8th Regt. 

60th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General S. L. Faison Comdg. 

Colonel J. Van B. Metts Comdg. 1 19th Regt. 

Colonel Sidney B. Minor Comdg. 120th Regt. 

55th Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General John W. Kilbreth Comdg. 

Colonel Albert L. Cox Comdg. 1 13th Regt. 

Colonel Luke Lee Comdg. 1 14th Regt. 

Colonel Harry S. Berry Comdg. 1 15th Regt. 

Thirty-seventh Division : 

Major-General Charles S. Farnsworth .... Commanding 
Colonel Dana T. Merrill Chief of Staff 



408 Appendix I 

7jd Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Wm. M. Fassett Comdg. 

Colonel Frank C. Gerlach Comdg. 145th Regt. 

Colonel James M. Pickering Comdg. 146th Regt. 

74th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General W, P. Jackson Comdg. 

Colonel Frederick W. Galbraith Comdg. 147th Regt. 

Colonel Geo. W. Stewart Comdg. 148th Regt. 

62 d Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Edward Burr Comdg. 

Colonel Harold M. Bush Cdg. 134th F. A. Rgt. 

Colonel Dudley J. Hurd Cdg. 135th F. A. Rgt. 

Colonel Paul L. Mitchell Comdg. 136th Regt. 

Eighty-seventh Division : 

Brigadier-General Wm. F, Martin Commanding 

Colonel Henry R. Richmond Chief of Staff 

173d Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General Marcus D. Cronin .... Comdg. 

Colonel John O'Shea Comdg. 345th Regt. 

Major George R. Byrd Comdg. 346th Regt. 

174th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Wm. F. Martin Comdg. Div. Temp. 

Colonel Pearl M. Shaffer Comdg. 347th Regt. 

Colonel Dwight W. Ryther Comdg. 348th Regt. 

i62d Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General John L. Hayden Comdg, 

Colonel F. Wharton-Griffith Cdg. 334th F. A. Rgt. 

Colonel Lewis S. Ryan Comdg. 335th Regt. 

Major Milton B. Taulbee Comdg. 336th Regt. 

Eighty-eighth Division : 

Major-General William Weigel Commanding 

Colonel Fay W. Brabson Chief of Staff 



Appendix I 409 

175th Infantry Brigxide 

Brigadier-General M, B. Stewart Comdg. 

Colonel Girard Sturtevant Comdg. 349th Regt. 

Colonel Chas. B. Stone Comdg. 350th Regt. 

176th Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Wm. B. Beach Comdg. 

Colonel Herbert B. Crosby Comdg. 351st Regt. 

Colonel Clyde E. Hawkins Comdg. 352d Regt. 

163d Field Artillery Brigade 

Brigadier-General Stephen M. Foote Comdg. 

Colonel Geo. R. Greene Comdg. 337th Regt. 

Colonel Ned B. Rehkopf Comdg. 338th Regt. 

Colonel Samuel C. Vestal Comdg. 339th Regt. 

Ninety-first Division: 

Major-General Wm. H. Johnston Commanding 

Colonel Henry C. Jewett Chief of Staff 

181st Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier-General John B. McDonald. . . .Comdg. 

Colonel Avery D. Cummings Comdg. 361st Regt. 

Colonel Jas. B. Woolnough Comdg. 362d Regt. 

l82d Infantry Brigade 

Brigadier-General Vernon A. Caldwell. . .Comdg. 

Colonel Harry LaT. Cavanaugh Comdg. 363d Regt. 

Colonel Lucius C. Bennett Comdg. 364th Inf. 

1 66th Field Artillery Brigade 
Brigadier-General Beverly F. Browne. . . .Comdg. 

Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Gay Cdg. 346th F. A. Rgt. 

Colonel Louis E. Bennett Cdg. 347th F. A. Rgt. 

Colonel S. F. Bottom Cdg. 348th F. A. Rgt. 



APPENDIX II 

ORGANIZATIONS OF THE AMERICAN EXPEDI- 
TIONARY FORCES CITED IN GENERAL ORDERS 
BY THE FRENCH HIGH COMMAND ^ 

Third Infantry Brigade. In the course of operations north of 
the Marne, from June i, to July 2, 1918, under the energetic 
and gallant leadership of its commander, General Lewis, and of 
its officers, without taking heed of heavy casualties valiantly sup- 
ported, stormed the village of Vaux and La Roche Wood. It 
thus gave a splendid example of aggressive value and self-sacrifice, 
and took an important share in the victorious offensive, the result 
of which was to compel the enemy to evacuate the soil of France 
and to sue for an armistice. 
y Fourth Infantry Brigade (Marines). In the course of heavy 
fighting was rushed to a part of the front that was being violently 
attacked by the enemy and immediately proved itself a first-class 
fighting unit. No sooner entered into line than the brigade, in 
conjunction with French troops checked a violent attack launched 
on an important sector of our positions ; and afterward, on its own 
account, undertook a succession of offensive operations in the course 
of which, thanks to the courage, energy, aggressiveness, and 
tenacity of its men who allowed themselves to be checked neither 
by hardships nor by losses, thanks to the activity and energy of its 
officers, and thanks especially to the personal action of its com- 
mander, General James G. Harbord, the efforts of the Fourth 
Brigade were crowned with success. 

Operating in closest liaison, its two regiments and its machine- 
gun battalion, after twelve days of incessant fighting (from June 
2d to June 13th) succeeded in making an advance of a mile to a 
mile and a half on a two mile and a quarter front over very diffi- 

1 The citations printed herewith have been notified to the General Head- 
quarters of the American Expeditionary Forces prior to April 15, 1919. 

410 



7 



V 



Appendix II 411 

cult ground, capturing during their advance important quantities 
of material and making over five hundred prisoners ; they inflicted 
very severe losses on the enemy, took two strongholds of paramount 
importance: the village of Bouresches and the strongly fortified 
Belleau Wood. 

Sixty-third Infantry Brigade. Composed of the 125th and 
126th Regiments covered itself with glory in the fighting around 
Juvigny on August 28, 1918. Immediately upon arriving on the 
battle-field it assumed the offensive, surprised the enemy, whom it 
demoralized by the speed and vigor of its attack. The Sixty-third 
Brigade proved its superiority in terrible hand-to-hand fighting, 
from which it emerged victorious in spite of repeated enemy 
counter-attacks. It pushed back the foe to the vicinity of Terny- 
Sorny and vanquished him, thus affording powerful aid to the 
French troops who were in close proximity during the attacks 
which took place from August 30th to September ist. 

Sixty-fourth Infantry Brigade. A splendid brigade to which 
the French soldiers fighting in its neighborhood paid the sincere 
tribute of calling it " The Terrible Brigade." Composed of the 
127th and 128th Infantry Regiments, stormed the village of 
Juvigny on August 30th with irresistible dash and on August 31st 
and September ist continued its advance, constantly maintaining 
its superiority over the enemy notwithstanding severe losses, check- 
ing most violent counter-attacks, and, fighting for three days with- 
out rest or pause, and almost without food. 

5th Regiment of Infantry (Marines). Engaged unexpectedly 
in the offensive of July 18, 191 8, during a very dark night on 
unknown and difficult ground, for two days it displayed remarkable 
vigor and tenacity without allowing itself to be discouraged either 
by hardships or difficulty of supply. It pushed back the enemy to a 
depth of seven miles, capturing 2,700 prisoners, twelve cannon, and 
several hundred machine guns. This regiment was commanded 
by Colonel Logan H. Feland. 

5th Regiment of Infantry (Marines). Took a glorious part in 
the operations engaged in Champagne during October, 19 18, by 
the Fourth Army. Participated on October 3d in the attack on 
the strong enemy positions between the White Hills and Medeah 
Farm; pushed forward to St. Etienne a Arnes, thus making an 
advance of three miles and a half. It captured several thousands 



412 Appendix II 

of prisoners, cannon, machine guns, and important quantities of 
war material. 

This attack, together with that of the French divisions, com- 
pelled the enemy to evacuate both banks of the Suippe and the 
high ground around Notre Dame-des-Champs. 

6th Regiment of Infantry (Marines). Engaged unexpectedly 
in the offensive of July i8, 191 8, during a very dark night on 
unknown and difficult ground, for two days it displayed remarkable 
vigor and tenacity without allowing itself to be discouraged either 
by hardships or difficulty of supply. It pushed back the enemy to a 
depth of seven miles, capturing 2,700 prisoners, twelve cannon, and 
several hundred machine guns. This regiment was commanded by 
Colonel Logan H. Feland. Took a glorious part in the operations 
engaged in Champagne during October, 191 8, by the Fourth Army. 
Participated on October 3d in the attack on the strong enemy po- 
sitions between the White Hills and Medeah Farm; pushed for- 
ward to St. Etienne a Arnes, thus making an advance of three 
miles and a half. It captured several thousands of prisoners, 
cannon, machine guns, and important quantities of war material. 
This attack, together with that of the French divisions, com- 
pelled the enemy to evacuate both banks of the Suippe and the 
high ground around Notre Dame-des-Champs. 

gth Regiment of Infantry. Under command of Colonel Up- 
ton. Engaged unexpectedly in the offensive of July 18, 19 18, 
during a very dark night on unknown and difficult ground, for 
two days it displayed remarkable vigor and tenacity without al- 
lowing itself to be discouraged either by hardships or difficulty of 
supply. It pushed back the enemy to a depth of seven miles, cap- 
turing 2,700 prisoners, twelve cannon, and several hundred ma- 
chine guns. 

gth Regiment of Infantry. Took a glorious part in the opera- 
tions engaged in Champagne during October, 19 18, by the Fourth 
Army. Participated on October 3d in the attack on the strong 
enemy positions between the White Hills and Medeah Farm; 
pushed forward to St. Etienne a Arnes, thus making an advance 
of three miles and a half. It captured several thousands of pris- 
oners, cannon, machine guns, and important quantities of war ma- 
terial. This attack, together with that of the French divisions. 



Appendix II 413 

compelled the enemy to evacuate both banks of the Suippe and the 
high ground around Notre Dame-des-Champs. 

i8th Regiment of Infantry. A splendid regiment of attack per- 
meated with the spirit of ofFensive. On July 18, 19 18, under the 
energetic leadership of its commander, Colonel Frank Parker, it 
elicited the admiration of all the neighboring units in taking by 
storm all the objectives assigned to it absolutely without check and 
in spite of severe casualties. During the days following it con- 
tinued to display the same aggressive spirit and determination. In 
October, 191 8, under the excellent leadership of Colonel Charles 
A. Hunt, assisted by a body of officers of the first order, the 1 8th 
Regiment displayed the same qualities of abnegation, launching 
desperate attacks on powerful positions and, thanks to its in- 
domitable will to conquer, succeeded at last in throwing back the 
enemy. 

2^d Regiment of Infantry. Engaged unexpectedly in the of- 
fensive of July 18, 19 1 8, during a very dark night on unknown 
and difficult grounds, for two days it displayed remarkable vigor 
and tenacity without allowing itself to be discouraged either by 
hardships or difficulty of supply. It pushed back the enemy to a 
depth of seven miles, capturing 2,700 prisoners, twelve cannon, and 
several hundred machine guns. This regiment was commanded by 
Colonel Paul B. Malone. 

2^d Regiment of Infantry. Took a glorious part in the opera- 
tions engaged in Champagne during October, 19 18, by the Fourth 
Army. Participated on October 3d in the attack on the strong 
enemy positions between the White Hills and Medeah Farm; 
pushed forward to St. Etienne a Ames, thus making an advance 
of three miles and a half. It captured several thousands of pris- 
oners, cannon, machine guns, and important quantities of war 
material. 

28th Regiment of Infantry. Imbued with superb offensive 
spirit, on May 28, 19 18, with Colonel H. E. Ely in command, 
attacked a strongly fortified village and with irresistible dash 
reached all objectives and retained the ground conquered in spite 
of repeated counter-attacks. 

30th Regiment of Infantry. One of the old original regiments 
of the American Army which, under the fine and energetic lead 



414 Appendix II 

of its chief, Colonel E. L. Buth, proved true to its traditions, with- 
standing the main onslaught of the German attack of July 15, 
1918, on the front of the army corps to which it had been assigned. 
Under heavy artillery fire which entailed severe losses the 30th 
Regiment checked the enemy's drive and reestablished its initial 
positions after capturing more than two hundred prisoners. 

38th Regiment of Infantry. A crack regiment, under the clever 
and energetic leadership of its commander, Colonel McAlexander, 
displayed unshakable firmness in resisting the German assault of 
July 15, igi8. Attacked on its front and outflanked on both 
wings, it maintained its position on the banks of the Marne accord- 
ing to orders received to that effect and, in spite of everything, 
hurled back an enemy superior in numbers and captured two hun- 
dred prisoners. 

jgth Regiment of Infantry. Attached to a division entrusted 
with the defense of the sector, was called upon to take part in a 
battle on the day following its arrival in the line. Under the 
command of Colonel Frank C. Rolles displayed remarkable bravery 
in the course of its baptism of fire. It captured the Cresnes 
Thickets, the town of Norroy, an enemy battery, important quanti- 
ties of trench equipment, and machine guns together with over a 
hundred prisoners. 

104th Regiment of Infantry. In the course of the fighting on 
April loth, I2th, and 13th, displayed great courage and spirit of 
self-sacrifice. Subjected to heavy bombardment and attacked by 
powerful German forces, it succeeded in checking a dangerous 
enemy advance, energetically counter-attacking with the bayonet 
and taking prisoners, recaptured the trenches which it had been 
forced to abandon in the course of the enemy's initial assault. 

125th and 126th Regiments of Infantry. Are mentioned in 
general orders concerning the Sixty-third Brigade. 

127th and 128th Regiments of Infantry. Are mentioned in 
orders concerning the Sixty-fourth Brigade. 

jdgth Regiment of Infantry. Led by Colonel Hayward, who, 
though wounded, insisted on retaining command of his regiment 
during action, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Pickering, an officer of 
remarkable coolness and courage, by Major Cobb (killed), by 
Major Spencer (severely wounded), by Major Little, an excel- 



Appendix II 415 

lent leader, the 369th Regiment of American infantry, which, in 
the September attacks of 191 8 was, for the first time, under fire, 
captured strong and vigorously defended enemy entrenchments, 
stormed the village of Sechault, and took prisoners, six cannon, 
and large numbers of machine guns. 

371st Regiment of Infantry. Displayed, in the course of the 
first fighting in which it participated, all the qualities of daring 
and bravery characteristic of first-rate storm troops. Under com- 
mand of Colonel Miles it launched, with fine dash and utter 
contempt of danger, an attack on an obstinately defended position, 
captured it after desperate fighting and under exceptionally heavy 
machine-gun fire. Continuing its advance, in spite of enemy 
artillery fire which entailed severe losses, captured many prisoners 
besides cannon, machine guns, and important quantities of material. 

372d Regiment of Infantry. Displayed, in the course of the 
first fighting in which it participated, all the qualities of daring 
and bravery characteristic of first-rate storm troops. Under com- 
mand of Colonel Tupes it launched, with fine dash and utter 
contempt of danger, an attack on an obstinately defended position, 
captured it after desperate fighting and under exceptional heavy 
machine-gun fire. Continuing its advance, in spite of enemy 
artillery fire which entailed severe losses, captured many prisoners 
besides cannon, machine guns, and important quantities of material. 

I2th Regiment of Artillery. This regiment with remarkable 
audacity and skill assisted the Second Division's attack on July 
1 8th southwest of Soissons, firing at close range. The guns were 
boldly pushed forward, following the advancing infantry and 
inflicted severe losses on the enemy. 

After the relief of the infantry of the Second Division on July 
20th, the 1 2th Regiment valiantly fought side by side with the 
Fifty-eighth and Twelfth French Divisions, helping the infantry 
in the course of their unceasing attacks and more especially on 
July 2 1 St during the assault on Hartennes. Officers and enlisted 
men of the regiment showed themselves worthy, by their courage 
and devotion to duty, of the best traditions of their army. 

15th Regiment of Artillery. This regiment displayed great 
daring and remarkable skill in backing the infantry of the Second 
Division. On July 18, 191 8, at the southwest of Soissons, pluckily 



41 6 Appendix II 

pushing its guns ahead upon the heels of the advancing infantry, it 
inflicted extremely heavy losses on the enemy. The Second Divi- 
sion having been relieved on July 20th, the 15th Regiment was 
successively ordered to sustain the Fifty-eighth and Twelfth 
French Divisions with which it valiantly fought, and in the 
course of the frequent counter-attacks launched by these two divi- 
sions and, more especially during the assault on Hartennes (July 
2 1st), officers and enlisted men of the regiment showed themselves 
worthy of the best traditions of their army through their gallantry 
and devotion. 

17th Regiment of Artillery. With untiring zeal and unflagging 
energy this regiment valiantly aided the attack of the Second 
Division on July i8th southwest of Soissons. Always impatient 
to push forward the guns and in spite of heavy enemy bombard- 
ment, it constantly inundated the foe under a terrific destruction 
fire from its 155's. After the Second Division had been relieved 
on July 20th, it remained in line sustaining the Fifty-eighth and 
Twelfth French Divisions. 

Ofllicers and enlisted men displayed remarkable energy in the 
courageous accomplishment of all the missions entrusted to them; 
during the continuous attacks launched by the French divisions 
they inflicted severe losses on the enemy, and displayed, amid 
dangers and hardships of all kinds, high valor and extraordinary 
tenacity. 

2d Regiment of Engineers. With Colonel Mitchell in com- 
mand. Engaged unexpectedly in the offensive of July 18, 1918, 
during a very dark night on unknown and difficult ground, for two 
days it displayed remarkable vigor and tenacity without allowing 
itself to be discouraged either by hardships or difficulty of supply. 
It pushed back the enemy to a depth of seven miles, capturing 2,700 
prisoners, twelve cannon, and several hundred machine guns. 

2d Regiment of Engineers. Played a glorious part in the opera- 
tions undertaken in Champagne in October, 191 8. On October 
3d, during the attack on the White Hills and Medeah Farm, 
through its bravery and endurance under fire it powerfully aided 
in the advance of the infantry as far as St. Etienne a Arnes. 
Thanks to the great assistance which it afforded to the infantry 
operation it became possible to eject the enemy from the banks of 



Appendix II 417 

the Suippe and from the high ground around Notre Dame-des- 
Champs. 

302d Regiment of Engineers. This regiment with Colonel 
Sherill in command on September 6, 1918, constructed a bridge 
over the Vesle in three hours, the work being carried out under 
constant artillery fire. The success of this feat rendered it pos- 
sible for the French artillery to cross the river at the very start of 
operations and contributed to the success of the offensive then 
under way. 

7^/ Battalion of the I02d Regiment of Infantry. A crack unit 
with Colonel Hiram J. Bears conducting the attack in first line, 
it carried out an extremely difficult operation in brilliant style and 
at the cost of splendid effort. It rushed aggressively into the 
battle and after desperate fighting triumphed over the enemy who 
was greatly superior in number and extremely tenacious, and who 
was, besides, entrenched in concrete shelters backed by great masses 
of machine guns and a powerful artillery, and who, in the course 
of action, made use of infamous methods of warfare. It heroically 
effected its mission, storming a village and maintaining its positions 
throughout the day notwithstanding four enemy counter-attacks, 
thus setting the finest example of self-sacrifice. 

4th Machine-gun Battalion. On the evening of July 18, 19 18, 
near Vierzy, this battalion displayed exceptional bravery and dash 
in assisting in the attack delivered by the Third Brigade. In the 
course of an advance with an attacking infantry and thanks to its 
skillful employment of fire, it overcame the resistance of the 
enemy. By the destruction of strongly enforced machine-gun 
nests it gave valuable help to the infantry in the course of the 
latter's brilliant attack and by occupying the objectives gained and 
holding them against powerful counter-attacks the Fourth 
Machine-gun Battalion made itself recognized as an important 
factor in the success of the day. 

5th Machine-gun Battalion. On the evening of July 18, 191 8, 
near Vierzy, this battalion displayed exceptional bravery and dash 
in assisting in the attack delivered by the Third Brigade. In the 
course of an advance with an attacking infantry and thanks to its 
skillful employment of fire, it overcame the resistance of the en- 
emy. By the destruction of strongly enforced machine gun nests 



41 8 'Appendix II 

it gave valuable help to the Infantry in the course of the latter's 
brilliant attack and by occupying the objective gained and holding 
them against powerful counter-attacks the Fourth Machine-gun 
Battalion made itself recognized as an important factor in the 
success of the day. 

^6th Machine-gun Battalion (Fourth Brigade, Second Division), 
was mentioned in general orders concerning the Fourth Brigade 
(Marines). 
*^ 6th Machine-gun Battalion. Although exhausted by a long 
journey in trucks and a lengthy night march over difficult roads, 
this battalion, on July i8, 191 8, rushed into battle in the vicinity 
of Vierzy and aided in consolidating the position captured that 
day. On the morning of the nineteenth it gallantly pushed for- 
ward in the open, under a rain of artillery and machine-gun fire, 
and helped resolutely in the assault which was being launched 
against the enemy's reenforced positions. Confronted with ob- 
stinate resistance and subjected to continuous counter-attacks it dis- 
played the finest courage in rapidly organizing and resolutely 
holding the important positions which the infantry had just 
conquered. 

yth Machine-gun Battalion (Third Division). Prevented the 
enemy from crossing the Marne, and in the course of fierce fight- 
ing, especially on May 31st and June ist, contested the northern 
suburbs of Chateau-Thierry foot by foot, covering itself with glory 
as much by its valor as by its skill, and inflicted tremendous losses 
upon the enemy. 

iigth Machine-gun Battalion. Fought for four days in the 
vicinity of Juvigny with energy, endurance, and skill. Although 
hard hit by the enemy bombardment it unceasingly pushed forward, 
keeping the foe under direct and accurate fire, checking his counter- 
attacks, and inflicting upon him serious losses. It gave powerful 
assistance in the capture of Juvigny and also in retaining the 
conquered positions. 

1st Anti-aircraft Battalion. Under the able and efficient leader- 
ship of its commander, Major Cushing, made itself conspicuous 
through the excellent results achieved on the Marne and the 
Moselle by its bravery and fine spirit. 

2d Field Signal Battalion (First Division). Having received 



Appendix II 419 

orders to repair the telephone lines in a dangerous zone, carried 
out its mission with utmost bravery, working all night under a 
heavy bombardment of gas shells, which entailed severe losses. 

The following organizations also obtained mention in the gen- 
eral orders of the French High Command: 

1st Battery, ist Anti-aircraft Battalion. 

Company F, 9th Regiment of Infantry. 

Company G, 9th Regiment of Infantry. 

Company I, 9th Regiment of Infantry. 

Company L, 9th Regiment of Infantry. 

Company C, 370th Regiment of Infantry. 

Company B, 30th Regiment of Engineers. 

Company C, 56th Regiment of Engineers (Searchlights). 

Battery D, 17th Regiment of Artillery. 

Battery B, 53d Regiment of Artillery. 

Battery H, 53d Regiment of Artillery. 

308th Battery, Trench Artillery. 

2d Platoon, Stokes Trench Mortars, I02d Infantry. 

2d Platoon, Company B, i68th Infantry. 

Shenkel Platoon, Company B, iiith Infantry. 

Benz Platoon, Company A, iiith Infantry. 

Pioneer Platoon, Trench Mortar Battery, i68th Infantry. 

1st Platoon, Company B, i68th Infantry. 

1st Platoon, Company C, 308th Infantry. 

2d Platoon, Company C, 308th Infantry. 

Air Squadron 91. 

Air Squadron 94. 

Air Squadron 103 (Lafayette) three citations. 

Sanitary Sections. Sanitary Sections. 



No. 


I, 


two citations. 


No. 


585. 




No. 


2. 




No. 


586. 




No. 


7. 




No. 


591, 


two citations. 


No. 


8, 


two citations. 


No. 


593- 




No. 


9- 




No. 


594. 




No. 


14- 




No. 


621, 


two citations. 



420 



Appendix II 



No. 17. 
No. 26. 
No. 65. 
No. 503. 
No. 504. 
No. 510. 
No. 516, 
No. 523, 
No. 525. 
No. 533. 
No. 534, 
No. 535- 
No. 539, 
No. 544. 
No. 546. 
No. 553. 
No. 558. 
No. 567, 
No. 568. 
No. 583. 



two citations, 
two citations. 



two citations, 
two citations. 

two citations, 
two citations. 



No. 622. 
No. 623, 
No. 625, 
No. 626, 
No. 627. 
No. 628, 
No. 629, 
No. 633, 
No, 634. 
No. 635. 
No. 636, 
No. 637. 
No. 639. 
No. 641. 
No. 642. 
No. 643. 
No. 644. 
No. 645. 
No. 646, 
No. 648. 



two citations, 
two citations, 
three citations. 

two citations, 
three citations, 
three citations. 



two citations. 



four citations. 



INDEX 



Accounting division of quartermas- 
ter corps, 228. 

Adjutant-general, function of, in 
American forces in France, 46- 

47- 

Administrative section, of quarter- 
master corps, 228 ; of ordnance 
department, 233. 

Aerial squadrons, formation of, 
207 ; the Lafayette squadron, 
207-208 ; mention of, in general 
orders of French high command, 
419. See Aviation service. 

Aeronautical school of American 
army in France, 71. 

Aerostation, development of, by A. 
E. F., 212-213. 

Affiliated Divisions, 321. 

Aircraft Production Board, creation 
of, 84. 

Airplanes, types of, 203-204; num- 
ber of, received by A. E. F., 205. 

Air service, organization of, in 
American army in France, 202- 
208; system adopted for supplies 
and repairs, 208-210. See Avi- 
ation. 

Alexandre, General, in charge of 
Fifth American Corps artillery 
before St. Mihiel, 270. 

Alien eneinies in United States, de- 
tention of, II. 

Allen, General Henry T., in com- 
mand of Ninetieth Division, 
252 n. 

Allied Supply, Military Board of, 
24s; account of work of, 354- 
358; summary of results secured 
by, 358-359- 

Alvord, Benjamin, first adjutant- 
general of American forces in 
France, 46 n. 

Ambulance companies, 221, 222. 

Ambulance of Neuilly, 379. 

Ambulances donated by Americans, 
380. 

America, slowness of, in going to 
war, 1-2; Germany's inability to 

42 



understand, 3; judged to desire 
"peace at any price," 4; review 
of causes leading to rupture with 
Germany, 5-10; declaration of 
war between Germany and, 11; 
unreadiness of, for war, 12; visit 
of French and English war mis- 
sions to, 12-13; new energy given 
to conscription movement in, by 
visit of war missions, 13; prep- 
aration of armed forces for war, 
13-32. 

American Convalescent Homes, the, 
382. 

American Fund for French Wound- 
ed, 380. 

American Hostels for Refugees, 
creation of, 381. 

American Library Association, 363, 
370; work of, centralized by Y. 
M. C. A., 372; account of work 
of, 375-377- 

American Surgical Dressings As- 
sociation, 381. 

American Zone, section of French 
country called, 59-60. 

Ammunition, used by A. E. F., 236- 
238 ; pooling of, between Ameri- 
cans and French, 358. 

Anamite soldiers as drivers for 
Americans, 174. 

Ancona, Italian ship sunk in Med- 
iterranean, 8. 

Anderson, Colonel Alvord, V. P., 
255 n. 

Anderson, Colonel T. M., 156 n. 

Andrew, Piatt H., service of field 
ambulances directed by, 380. 

Andrews, General Alvery D., 
45 n. 

Andrews, Colonel G. M., 324 n. 

Angers, training center for heavy 
artillery at, 63 ; railway trans- 
portation school at, 76. 

Anti-aircraft battalion, cited in gen- 
eral orders by French high com- 
mand, 418. 

Anti-aircraft school, in France, 69. 



422 



Index 



Arabic, sinking of, 8. 

Argonne Forest, operations between 
river Meuse and, in autumn of 
1918, 277-306; occurrence of most 
dramatic episodes of the war in, 
295. 

Arms equipment of American 
forces in France, 53-55- 

Army, United States: condition of, 
upon declaration of war with 
Germany, 13-14; system of 
grouping of fighting units, 29- 
32 ; Pershing's plans for organi- 
zation of, in France, 36-37; mar- 
tial qualities and military defects 
of Americans, 37-38; constitution 
of General Staff, 45-46; constitu- 
tion of fighting units, 47-52; plan 
for field army services, 52-53; 
arms and ordnance equipment of, 
53-55; principles governing in- 
struction of, 55-59; first appear- 
ance of American contingents in 
France, 116-128; operations of, 
in spring defensive (1918), 133- 
167; in summer counter-offensive, 
168-184; account of organization 
of main services of Expeditionary 
Forces, 186 ff . ; situation of, at be- 
ginning of September, 1918, 247- 
261 ; activities during general 
offensive September-November, 
1918, 262-306; losses in Meuse- 
Argonne fighting, 303 ; the march 
to the Rhine, 307-319; part taken 
by American units in operations 
on British front, 320-329; forces 
detached for operations in Italy 
and in Russia, 329-330; review 
of organization and activities of 
services of the rear, 331-360; or- 
der of battle of, on December i, 
1918, 391-409; organizations of, 
cited in general orders by the 
French high command, 410-420. 

Army corps, formation of, 48-49; 
command of, 52. 

Army schools in France, 63-70. 

Artillery, camps for training offi- 
cers for, 24; increase in number 
of regiments of, and shortage of 
equipment, 31-32; composition of 
divisional, in American army in 
France, 50-51; camps selected in 



France for training in, 60-63 ; 
rate of arrival of, in France, 
61 n; army schools for training 
in, in France, 69-70; first use of 
American, on firing line in 
France, 1 19-120; functions of 
chief of, 189; account of organi- 
zation, equipment, and composi- 
tion of, 189-192; French admira- 
tion for American, 192; supply of 
material for, 236-237; situation 
pf American, at beginning of 
September, 1918, 259-260; situa- 
tion of, before St. Mihiel, 271; 
in Meuse-Argonne operations, 
282-284; regiments of, men- 
tioned in general orders of 
French high command, 419. 

Association, use made of free right 
of, in America, 361; colossal re- 
sults achieved by American 
method of, 383. 

Athletic games, effort of Knights of 
Columbus to develop taste for, 
373- 

Atterbury, General, 113, 350; ap- 
pointed director-general of trans- 
portation in France, 105. 

Aultman, General D. E., 138 n., 154 
n. 

Austin, Mrs., founder of American 
Surgical Dressings Association, 
381. 

Automobile service, 352; achieve- 
ments in regard to, of Military 
Board of Allied Supply, 358-359. 

Auto-surgical ambulances, French, 
222 n. 

Autun, military police corps train- 
ing detachment at, 75. 

Averill, Colonel N. K., 171 n. 

Aviation, schools for training in, 

72-74- 

Aviation service, work of, to meet 
demands of war time, 84-85; at 
time of Meuse-Argonne opera- 
tions, 290 n. See also Air serv- 
ice. 

Avord, aviation instruction center 
at, 72. 

Aztec, sinking of the, ion. 

Babcock, Colonel Conrad S., 252 n. 
Babcock, Colonel Walter C, 2550. 



Index 



423 



Bacon, Robert, sanitary train do- 
nated by, 379-380. 

Bailey, General Charles J., in com- 
mand of Eighty-first Division, 
258 n. 

Baker, Newton D., Secretary of 
War, on the firing line, 130-131; 
with General Pershing during 
operations against St. Mihiel, 
272; enters St. Mihiel, 276-277; 
quoted on shipment of troops 
from America, 336; cargo move- 
ment, 337. 

Baker, Colonel, Salvation Army, 

374-. 
Bakeries, daily output of American, 

230; bread supplied by, 350. 
Balloon service of A. E. F., 212- 

213- 

Ballou, General Charles C, in com- 
mand of Ninety-Second Division, 
254 n. 

Baltzell, Colonel George F., 250 n. 

Bandholtz, General H. H., 255 n. 

Bangs, Miss Edith, 380 n. 

Barber, Colonel A. E., 155 n., 249. 

Barney, Lieutenant James W., 
251 n. 

Barnum, General M. H., 254 n. 

Barracks, erection of, by engineer 
corps, 198. 

Barth, General C. H., in command 
of Seventh Division, 257 n. 

Base sections of service of supplies, 

341-349- 

Bassens, as a base port for Ameri- 
can use, 96; work on improve- 
ment of, 100-102 ; operated by 
Americans, 343. 

Bathelemont, tomb near, of first 
American killed in action, 120 

Battalion, composition of a, 50. 

Beach, General W. O., 258 n. 

Bears, Colonel Hiram J., 417. 

Beatty, H. O., director of American 
Relief Clearing House, 382. 

Bell, General George, in command 
of Thirty-third Division, 255 n. 

Belleau Wood, taking of, by Sec- 
ond Division, 151-153. 

Benevolent associations under mili- 
tary authority, 318, 361-384. 

Bennet, Colonel E. R., 160 n. 

Bennet, Colonel John B., 253 n. 



Berry, Major C. W., 324. 

Berry, General L. G., 253 n 

Bethel, General, head of judge-ad- 
vocate's department, 244. 

Bevoise, Colonel C. T. de, 324 n. 

Bjoranstad, General A. W., 173 n. 

Blatchford, General R. M., in com- 
mand of lines of communication, 
104. 

Bliss, Mrs. Robert Woods, president 
of distributing committee, 380. 

Bliss, General Tasker H., repre- 
sents America at Supreme War 
Council, 134 n. 

Bloor, Colonel A. W., 257 n. 

Bolles, Colonel Frank C, 414. 

Boiling, Colonel, 202 n. 

Books sent to American army in 
France, 375-377- 

Bordeaux, harbor for debarkation 
of American troops, 39; descrip- 
tion of American base section of, 

342-345- 

Bowley, Colonel A. J., 147 n. 

Boyd, Captain, United States mili- 
tary attache in France, 92-94. 

Bradley, General Alfred E., chief 
surgeon A. E. F., 219-220. 

Brest, American base section at, 
346. 

Brett, General Lloyd M., 256 n. 

Bridges, Colonel Charles H., 250 n. 

Brigade, composition of a, 50; com- 
mand of, 51. 

Briggs, Colonel R. N., 171 n. 

British front, American units on 
the, 320-329. 

Brown, Colonel Fred R., 254 n. 

Brown, Colonel M. D., 162 n. 

Brown, General R. A., 160 n. 

Browning guns used by American 
army in France, 54. 

Buchan, Colonel F. E., 324 n. 

Buck, General B. B., 138 n. 

Bullard, General R. L., 117; takes 
command of First Division, 121 ; 
high morale of First Division as 
commanded by, 138; in command 
of Third Corps, 173, 249; in com- 
mand on the Vesle, 181-182; 
placed in command of Second 
Army, 296. 

Bundy, General Omar, 117, 146 n.; 
in command of Second Division, 



424 



Index 



122; in command of Sixth Corps, 
250. 

Burnham, General W. P., in com- 
mand of Eighty-second Division, 
252 n. 

Burtt, General W. B., 250 n. 

Buth, Colonel E. L., in command of 
30th Regiment of Infantry, 414. 

Buttle, Lt.-Col. G. M., 255. 

Butts, Colonel Edmund L., 1560. 



Cadre Divisions in British army, 
321. 

Caldwell, Colonel V. A., 254 n. 

Cambon, Jules, Councillor on 
Franco-American Affairs, 387. 

Cameron, General George H., in 
command of Sixth Corps, 250; in 
command of Fifth Corps, 270. 

Camouflage section of engineer 
service, 200. 

Camps, establishment of training, 
29; system of drilling in, 30; for 
training of American forces in 
France, 59-60; of embarkation, 
86. 

Candidates, school for, in France, 
68. 

Cargo movement from America, 
336-338- 

Castelli, Chief Surgeon (French 
Army), 220. 

Castner, General J. C, 253 n. 

Catlin, Colonel A., 146 n. 

Cavanaugh, Colonel H. La T., 
257 n. 

Cavanaugh, Colonel W. A., 252 n. 

Cement supply for engineer serv- 
ice, 201. 

Cemeteries, American military, in 
Europe, 231-232. 

Chamberlaine, General W., 147 n.; 
in command of American rail- 
road artillery, 191. 

Chapin, Mrs. Charles, 380 n. 

Chaplains, school at Le Mans for 
instruction of, 76. 

Charles, Colonel Oscar J., 257 n. 

Chateau-Thierry, work of Third 
Division at, 157-158. 

Chaumont, American headquarters 
established at, 77; all heads of 
main services of American 



forces stationed for a time at, 
186. 

Chemical warfare, schools for, 75. 

Chemical warfare service of Amer- 
ican army, 239; organization of, 
240-242. 

Chief of artillery, functions of, 189. 

Children of Flanders, work of the, 
382. 

Citations of organizations of Amer- 
ican army by French high com- 
mand, 410-420. 

City of Memphis, sinking of, 10 n. 

Civil War, benevolent associations 
at time of, 361-362. 

Clark, Lt.-Col. Francis W., 173 n. 

Clark, Colonel Paul H., 386 n. 

Clarke, General Travers, member 
of Military Board of Allied Sup- 
ply, 358 n. 

Clemenceau, Premier, congratulates 
American soldiers after storm- 
ing of Cantigny, 145. 

Clermont, training center for 
heavy artillery at, 63. 

Clinnin, Colonel J. V., 255 n. 

Cobb, Major, killed in action, 414. 

Coblenz, occupation of, by Third 
Army, 314-315. 

Cochon, Colonel Frank S., 256 n. 

Coe, General, in command of 
American railroad artillery, 191. 

Coetquidan, American artillery 
training camp at, 61, 62; artil- 
lery aerial observation school at, 

73- 
Cold-storage plants, American, 

343-344, 347-348- 

Cole, General Charles H., 1540. 

Colored officers, camps for instruc- 
tion of, 28. 

Colored troops, divisions composed 
of, 29 n. 

Companies, composition of, 50 n. 

Compulsory military service, pas- 
sage of act creating, 15; applica- 
tion of law, 16-22. 

Connor, General W. D., 46 n., 
170 n. ; chief of coordination sec- 
tion, 112. 

Construction and maintenance di- 
vision of ordnance department, 
234. 

Corps. See Army corps. 



Index 



425 



Corps schools in France, 70-72. 
Corvisart, General, 127. 
Council of National Defense, 332. 
Courneau, American artillery train- 
ing camp at, 62. 
Courts-martial, administration of 

military justice by American, 245. 
Craig, Colonel Malin, 155 n. 
Crawford, General C, 156 n. 
Cronin, General M. D., 252 n. 
Cronkhite, General Adelbert, in 

command of Eightieth Division, 

256 n. 
Crookston, Lt.-Col. A. V., 162 n. 
Crosby, Colonel H. B., 258 n. 
Crowder, made Provost-Marshal 

General, 17. 
Crowley, Colonel M., 2540. 
Cruikshank, Colonel Wm. M., 

156 n. 
Cumont, Major, Belgian member of 

Military Board of Allied Supply, 

358 n. 
Cushing, Major, in command of ist 

Battalion, 418. 



Dabney, Lt.-Col. Ward S., 251 n. 

Darrah, General T. W., 162 n. 

Dashiell, General Wm. R., 254 n. 

Davis, Colonel Abel, 255 n. 

Davis, Colonel J. R., 147 n. 

Davis, General Robert C, adju- 
tant-general of American forces 
in France, 46 n. 

Davis, Colonel Wm. D., 257 n. 

Davison, H. P., president of Red 
Cross war committee for Europe, 
368. 

Dawes, General Charles G., head 
of General Purchasing Board, 
356; service rendered by, 357; 
work of, on Military Board of 
Allied Supply, 358. 

Dean, General James T., 255 n. 

Deems, Colonel Clarence, Jr., 2520. 

Depot divisions, 48-49. 

De Witt, Colonel J. L., 249 n. 

Dickman, General Joseph T., in 
command of Third Division, 156; 
activities of, in spring defensive, 
158, 161; in command of Fourth 
Corps, 249, 269 ; in command of 
First Corps, 297. 



Dillon, Colonel T. H., in command 
of 37th Engineers, 200. 

Divisions of United States Army, 
organization and composition of, 
29-30; of army corps, 48-50; 
command of, 51 ; composition of 
the staff, 51-52. 

Dorey, Colonel Halstead, 156 n. 

Doyle, Colonel Fred C, 171 n. 

Drumm, General Hugh A., 249 n.; 
chief of staff, 266, 267. 

Duncan, General George B., 121, 
138 n.; in command of Seventy- 
seventh Division, 171. 

Dutch ships, requisitioning of, 333- 
334- 

Educational section of Y. M. C. A., 
371- 

Edwards, General Clarence, in 
command of Twenty-sixth Divi- 
sion, 124-125, 154 n. 

Eightieth Division, in September, 
1918, 256; operations of, on Brit- 
ish front, 320 ff. 

Eighty-first Division, in September, 
1918, 258. 

Eighty-second Division, order of 
battle in September, 19 18, 252 n.; 
operations of, on British front, 
320 ff. 

Eighty-eighth Division, in Septem- 
ber, 1918, 251 n. 

Eighty-ninth Division, order of bat- 
tle in September, 1918, 252 n. 

Eltinge, General Le Roy, deputy 
chief of staff of American army, 
45 n. 

Ely, Colonel Frank D., 252 n. 

Ely, Colonel Hanson E., 138 n., 
145 n. ; in command of 28th Regi- 
ment of Infantry, 413. 

Emerson, Lt.-Col. T. H., 250 n. 

Engineering division of ordnance 
department, 234. 

Engineers, camps for training offi- 
cers for, 24; school for, in 
France, 66 ; increase in number 
of effectives, 85 n.; regiments of, 
assigned to transportation de- 
partment in France, 114; duties 
of, 197-200; subdivisions of, 200- 
201 ; quantities of material re- 
quired by, 201 ; regiments of, 



426 



Index 



mentioned in general orders of 
French high command, 419. 

England, war mission from, to 
United States, 12-13. 

Erwin, General James B., 254 n. 

Esperey, General Franchet d', 127. 

Faison, General S. L., 324 n. 

Farnsworth, General C. S., in com- 
mand of Thirty-seventh Division, 
254 n. 

Farr, Colonel Otho W. B., 156 n. 

Fatherless Children of France, 
work of the, 381. 

Feland, Colonel Logan H., 411, 412. 

Field hospitals, 221, 222. 

Field officers, course for, 69. 

Field signal battalions, 216. 

Fifth Corps, in September, 1918, 
250; in operations against St. 
Mihiel, 270. 

Fifth Division, in September, 1918, 
253; the first to cross river 
Meuse, 301 n. 

Fighting units, organization of, 47- 
52. 

Finance division of quartermaster 
corps, 228. 

First American Army Corps, crea- 
tion of, 155-156; Order of Battle 
July 4, 1918, 155 n. ; in Septem- 
ber, 1918, 249; in operations 
against St. Mihiel, 269; order of 
battle December i, 1918, 392-397. 

First Division, arrival and estab- 
lishment of, in France, 116-122; 
inspected by Secretary of War 
Baker, 130; confided to Fifth 
French Army, 137; splendid qual- 
ities of, 137-138; Order of Battle 
of, May 1, 1918, 138 n.; opera- 
tions of, in spring defensive of 
1918, 139 ff.; successful storming 
of Cantigny by, 143-44; losses of, 
145 ; situation of, on eve of sum- 
mer counter-offensive, 168; oper- 
ations of, 175-177; in September, 
1918, 253. 

Fiske, Harold B., 46 n. 

Flagler, General C. A. F., 253 n. 

Floyd, Mrs., 380 n. 

Foch, General, made supreme com- 
mander of Allied forces on 
Western front, 134; congratu- 



lates American soldiers after 
storming of Cantigny, 145. 

Foltz, General F. S., 256 n. 

Ford, Colonel Stanley H., 324 n. 

Ford, General, member of Military 
Board of Allied Supply, 358 n. 

Forman, Lt.-Col. Albert W., 250 n. 

Forty-second Division, entrance of, 
into active service, 128-129; in- 
spected by Secretary of War 
Baker, 130; Order of Battle on 
July 10, 1918, 160 n.; losses of, in 
defending the Marne, 167; sit- 
uation of, on eve of summer 
counter-ofFensive, 171; in Sep- 
tember, 1918, 253. 

Foulois, General, 202. 

Fourth Corps, in September, 1918, 
249-250; in operations against 
St. Mihiel, 269. 

Fourth Division, situation of, on 
eve of summer counter-offensive, 
169; consolidated with First 
American Corps, 178; in Sep- 
tember, 1918, 253; operations of, 
on British front, 320 ff. 

Fox-Connor, General, 46 n. 

Foyer du Soldat, collaboration of 
Y. M. C. A. in work of, 372. 

France, war mission from, to 
United States, 12-13; arrival of 
General Pershing in, 36; arrival 
of first American contingents in, 
116-128. 

Franco-American cooperation, 385- 
390. 

Fraternization, unsuccessful Ger- 
man attempts at, 316-318. 

French Tuberculosis War Victims, 
founding of, 382. 

Fries, General, chief of gas service, 
239. 



Galbraith, Colonel F. W., 254 n. 
Garrett, W. A., American railway 

expert in France, ii2. 
Gas defense school at Chaumont, 

75- 

Gas mask, efficiency of the, de- 
signed by medical corps, 86. 

Gas masks, deliveries of, 241. 

Gas Regiment, organization of, 
239-240. 



Inde: 



427 



Gas school, army, in France, 67. 

Gas service of American army, 239. 

Gasser, Lt.-Col. Lorenzo D., 173 n. 

General Purchasing Board, account 
of the, 354-359- 

General Staff, formation of, by 
General Pershing, 45 ; five sec- 
tions into which divided, 45-46 ; 
function of adjutant-general, 46- 

47- . 

Geological section of engineer serv- 
ice, 200-201. 

Germans, bulletin of, quoted on 
American soldiers, 153; superior- 
ity of American artillery over 
that of, 192; position of forces 
of, opposed to Americans at St. 
Mihiel, 271 ; account issued from 
headquarters, concerning Ameri- 
can-French assault on St. Mihiel, 
275-276; order of battle in 
Meuse-Argonne operations, 286- 
287; occupation of territory of, 
after the armistice, by Allied 
forces, 312-319; wisdom of, in 
capitulating, 360. 

Germany, diplomatic error of, in 
regard to United States, 3 ; pro- 
claims that United States will 
have peace at any price, 4; con- 
tinued acts of provocation by, 5- 
lo; breaking off of diplomatic 
relations with, 10; United States 
declares war upon, 11. 

Gettysburg and St. Mihiel contrast- 
ed, 277. 

Gibson, Colonel, Red Cross com- 
missioner for France, 368. 

Gievres, main American storage de- 
pot at, 109, 347. 

Gironde region, installations by 
Americans in, 342-345. 

Glassford, Colonel P. D., 155 n. 

Goethals, Quartermaster-General, 

333- 

Gondrecourt, camp at, for training 
of First Division, 44, 59 ; installa- 
tion of First Division at, 118. 

Gordon, General Walter H., in 
command of Sixth Division, 
254 n. 

Graves registration service of 
American army, 229 ; work done 
by, 231-232. 



Greble, Lt.-Col. E. St. John, Jr., 

162 n. 
Grunert, Major George, 155 n. 
Guns, supply of, for A. E. F., 236- 

237- 
Gwin, Mrs. William, 3800. 

Hacker, Colonel T. B., chief of 
salvage service, 231. 

Haig, Field Marshal Sir Douglas, 
congratulations of, expressed to 
Second American Army Corps, 
328-329. 

Hale, Colonel R. K., 324. 

Halen, General John A., 2570. 

Hall, Colonel Charles L., 249 n. 

Halstead, Colonel Frank, 258 n. 

Hamilton, Colonel Clad., 253 n. 

Han, General William G., in com- 
mand of Thirty-second Division, 
170. 

Hanson, General T. G., 252 n. 

Harbord, General James G., first 
chief of staff of American army, 
45 n.; in command of Fourth In- 
fantry Brigade (Marines), 146 
n.; high qualities of, 147; suc- 
ceeds to £ommand of Second 
Division, 168; in charge of serv- 
ice of supplies, 339 n.; cited in 
general orders by French high 
command, 410. 

Harjes, Mr., president of American 
Relief Clearing House, 382. 

Harjes, Colonel Herman, 3860. 

Harris, Colonel A. J., 255 n. 

Harsey, General Mark L., 255 n. 

Hartman, Colonel Ed. T., 2520, 

Haskell, Lt.-Col. W. H., 2500. 

Haubery, Colonel Sanford B., 
254 n. 

Hawkins, Colonel Clyde E., 258 n. 

Hawkins, Colonel F. B., 253 n. 

Hay, General William H., 254 n. 

Hayward, Colonel, distinguished 
services of, 414. 

Headquarters and supply section 
of field signal battalions, 216. 

Healdton, sinking of, 10 n. 

Hearn, Edward L., Supreme 
Knight, Knights of Columbus, 

374- 
Heidt, Colonel J. M., 257 n. 
Heintzelman, Colonel Stuart, 250 n. 



428 



Index 



Herr, Lt.-Col. J. K., 32411. 
Herrick, American ambassador in 

Paris, 382. 
Herrick, Colonel H. S., 324 n. 
Hill 204, attack on, shared by 30th 

Regiment, 158. 
Hines, General John L., 138 n.; 

in command of Third Corps, 

297. 
Holbrook, Colonel I. R., 138 n. 
Hollingsworth, Lt.-Col. C. P., 

253 n. 
Hoover, Colonel John S., 257 n. 
Hospital system, organization of, 

220-223 ; in the interior, 225- 

226. 
Hospital trains, 225, 379-380. 
Hostess houses established in 

France by Y. W. C. A., 378. 
Hough, Colonel Benson W., 160 n. 
Housatonic, sinking of, 10. 
House, Colonel, seconds idea of 

unified high command among Al- 
lies, 133. 
Hume, Colonel Frank M., 154 n. 
Hunt, Colonel Charles A., 413. 
Hunt, Colonel Henry J., 253 n. 

Illinois, sinking of, 10 n. 
Infantry schools in France, 66. 
Information, section of, American 

army, 191. 
Inspection service of quartermaster 

corps, 228. 
Inspector-general's department of 

American army, 242-244. 
Instruction of American forces in 

France, principles governing, 55- 

59- 

Intelligence school, army, m 
France, 69. 

Inter-Allied Tank Committee, 196. 

Irwin, Colonel Isaac, 171 n. 

Irwin, General Le Roy G., 170 n. 

Is-sur-Tille, American regulating 
station at, in. 

Italy, Expeditionary Forces de- 
tached for operations in, 329- 
330. 

Jackson, Colonel W. E., 257 n. 
Jackson, General W. P., 254 n. 
Jadwin, General E., engineer corps 
under direction of, 198. 



Jamerson, General George H., 

256 n. 

Jennings, Colonel E. S., 324 n. 

Jewish Welfare Board, affiliated 
with Y. M. C. A., 363, 372; ac- 
count of work of, 377-378. 

Joffre, member of French war 
mission to United States, 12 ; 
Pershing met by, in Paris, 36; 
advises early appearance of 
American contingent on French 
soil, n6; visit paid by, to first 
American troops, 119. 

Johnson, General E. M., 171 n. 

Johnson, Lt.-Col. Gordon, 251 n. 

Johnson, Colonel W. O.. 257 n. 

Johnston, General William H., in 
command of Ninety-first Divi- 
sion, 256 n. 

Jones, Colonel Harry C, 255. 

Judge-advocate of American army, 
244-245. 

Juvigny, capture of, 183-184. 

Kemp, Colonel George M., 162 n. 

Kenly, General, 202. 

Kernan, General, in charge of 
service of supplies, 339 n. 

King, General Edw. L., 255 n. 

Klemm, Colonel Karl D., 253 n. 

Knights of Columbus, 318; under 
direct control of high military 
command, 363; founding of, and 
early work, 372 ; work done by, 
in European conflict, 373-374. 

Knowles, Colonel Alden C, 257 n. 

Kuhn, General Joseph E., in com- 
mand of Seventy-Ninth Division, 

257 n. 

Laconia, sinking of, 10 n. 

La Courtine, American artillery 

training camp at, 62. 
Lafayette, American soldiers at 

tomb of, 118. 
Lafayette squadron, the, 207—208. 
Langdon, Colonel C. R., 170 n. 
Langres, army general staff college 

at, 65-66. 
La Pallice, as a base port for 

American use, 95. 
Lassiter, General, in command of 

Fourth Corps artillery, 269. 
Lathrop, Mrs., 380 n. 



Index 



429 



Leach, Colonel George E., 160 n. 

Le Mans, chaplains' school at, 76. 

Lenihan, General M. J., 160 n. 

Lewis, Colonel E. A., 257 n. 

Lewis, General E. M., 146 n., 
324 n.; forces of, take Vaux Vil- 
lage, i';3-i54. 

Liberty engine, adoption of, by avi- 
ation service, 84. 

Liberty No. 8 tank, 194-195. 

Libourne, training center for heavy 
artillery at, 63. 

Libraries established in France, 

375-377- 

Library Association. See Ameri- 
can Library Association. 

Liffol-le-Grand, American regulat- 
ing station at, 111-112. 

Liggett, General Hunter, in com- 
mand of First Army Corps, 155- 
156, 249, 269; placed in com- 
mand of First Army, 296. 

Limoges, training center for heavy 
artillery at, 63. 

Lincoln, President, position of, 
prior to Civil War, 2, 3. 

Lindsey, General J. R., 252 n. 

Lines of communication, activities 
in connection with establishment 
of, 78-115; work of signal corps 
to establish, 214. 

Little, Major, 414. 

Lloyd, Colonel Charles Rees, 
156 n. 

Locke, Colonel Morris E., 155 n. 

Locomotives, shipment of, to 
France, 337; overhauling of 
French, by Americans, 352. 

Logan, Colonel E. L., 154 n. 

Logan, General James A., 45 n. 

Logan, Major, head of American 
military mission in France, 92- 
94. 

Loire, changes wrought in region 
of the lower, by American S. O. 
S., 342. 

Lost Battalion, Major Whittlesey 
and the, 295. 

Lusitania, sinking of, 6. 

Lyman M. Laiv, sinking of, 10. 

Lynch, Colonel J. A., 254 n. 



McAlexander, Colonel Ulysses G., 



i56n., 414; praise of, by a 
French officer, 166. 

McAlexander, General V. S., 252. 

McAndrew, General James W., ap- 
pointed chief of staff of Ameri- 
can army, 45 n.; head of army 
general staff college at Langres, 
65-66. 

McArthur, Colonel John C, 252 n. 

McCleave, Colonel R., 249 n. 

McCloskey, Colonel Manus, 147 n.. 
171 n. 

McClure, General N. F., 253 n. 

McConnick, Colonel C. B., 170 n. 

McCoy, Colonel Frank, 160 n. 

McCoy, Colonel Robert, 170 n. 

McCrae, General James H., in 
command of Seventy-eighth Di- 
vision, 255 n. 

McDonald, General J. B., 256 n. 

McFarland, General M., 258 n. 

McGlachlin, General, in command 
of artillery of First Army, 191. 

Machine-gun battalions, citation of, 
in general orders of French high 
command, 417-418. 

Machine-gun company, composition 
of a, 50. 

Machine-gun school in France, 66. 

Mclver, General G. W., 258 n. 

Mackall, Lt.-Col. S. T., 250 n. 

McKinley, President, position of, at 
time of war with Spain, 2 n. 

McKinstry, General C, 160 n.; 
light railway service directed by, 

199- 

McMahon, General John, in com- 
mand of Fifth Division, 253 n. 

MacMaster, Colonel H., 253 n. 

Maine, blowing up of the, 2 n. 

Malone, Colonel Paul B., 46 n., 
147 n., 253, 413- . . ... 

Marines, the, 147; distinguished 
behavior of, at Belleau Wood, 
152-153; cited in general orders 
by the French high command, 
410-411. 

Maritime bases constructed by 
Americans in France, 342-343. 

Marne, part taken in defense of, 
by American troops (1918), 159- 

167- 
Marseilles, American base section 

at, 346. 



430 



Index 



Martin, General Charles I., 253 n. 

Meat, American, for army in 
France, 343-344. 347.-348- 

Medical corps, activities of the, 
85-86, 187; hospitals established 
by, 108. 

Medical service, organization and 
achievements of American, in 
France, 219-225 ; in the interior, 
225-226. 

Medical supplies, statistics of, 226. 

Menoher, General Charles T., in 
command of Forty-second Divi- 
sion, 128, 160, 164. 

Merritt, Camp, 86. 

Merrone, General, Italian member 
of Military Board of Allied 
Supply, 358 n. 

Metts, Colonel J. Van B., 324 n. 

Meucon, American artillery train- 
ing camp at, 61, 62; American 
balloon school at, 72; artillery 
aerial observation school at, 73. 

Meuse, operations between Ar- 
gonne Forest and, 277-306. 

Mezey, fight between Second Divi- 
sion and Germans near, 122-124. 

Miles, Colonel, 415. 

Military Board of Allied Supply, 
245; account of, 354-358; re- 
sults secured by, summarized, 

358-359- 

Military schools in France, plan 
for organization of, 63-77. 

Mills, Camp, 86. 

Miner, Colonel Asher, 162 n. 

Minor, Colonel S. W., 324 n. 

Mitchell, Colonel Americus, 202, 
252 n., 416. 

Mobile hospitals, 221, 222. 

Mobilization of American forces 
for war, 13-32. 

Montoir, storage depot at, 99; im- 
provements at, 342. 

Morgan, Miss Anne, 381. 

Morgan, Colonel John M., 2550. 

Morrow, Colonel Wm. V., 170 n. 

Morton, General Charles G., in 
command of Twenty-ninth Divi- 
sion, 255 n. 

Moseley, General George Van H., 
46 n. 

Moses, Colonel G. W., 258 n. 

Moss, Colonel James A., 254 n. 



Motor transport corps, 114-115, 
245-246, 352-3 54- 

Motor transport school, 75. 

Mott, Colonel T. Bentley, 386 n. 

Muir, General Charles H., in com- 
mand of Twenty-eighth Division, 
162; known by his men as 
" Uncle Charlie," 170. 

Munson, Colonel Fred L., 257 n. 

Music, school for instruction in 
military, 75. 

Murphy, Colonel Pierce A., 253 n. 

Myer, Colonel E. A., 255 n. 

National Guard, condition of, at 
outbreak of war with Germany, 

13-14- 

Navy, work of, in protecting troops 
en route to France, 91-92. 

Nelson, Colonel H. B., 252 n. 

Neuiljy ambulance, the, 379. 

Neville, Colonel W. C, 147 n. 

Nevin, Mrs. Ethelbert, 380 n. 

Newell, Colonel Isaac, 254 n. 

Nicholson, General Wm. J., 257 n. 

Ninetieth Division, order of battle 
in September, 1918, 252 n. 

Ninety-first Division, in September, 
1918, 256. 

Ninety-second Division, in Septem- 
ber, 1918, 254. 

Nivelle, General, 133. 

Noble, General K. H., 257 n. 

Nolan, General Dennis E., 46 n. 

Norton-Harjes ambulance service, 
380. 

Nuttman, Colonel L. M., 252 n. 



Officers' training camps, organiza- 
tion of, 23 ; course of instruction 
at, 24; work of, as summarized 
by Secretary of War, 25-26; 
opened in training areas of divi- 
sions of National Guard or Na- 
tional Army, 27-28; for colored 
officers, 28. 

Oil, statistics of, supplied to Amer- 
ican army, 230. 

O'Neil, General J. P., 252 n. 

Ordnance department of American 
army, 232-238; function of, in 
peace time, 80; difficulties en- 
countered by, in meeting war- 



Index 



431 



time demands, 82-84; recruiting 

of personnel, 238-239. 
Ordnance equipment of American 

army in France, 53-55. 
Ordnance schools, 74-75. 
Organization of main services of 

American Expeditionary Forces, 

186 if. 
Ornans, American artillery train- 
ing camp in zone of, 62. 
O'Ryan, General J. F., 324 n. 
Oury, Colonel Wm. H., 257 n. 
Outpost company of signal corps, 

217. 

Painleve, French Minister of War, 

36, 39, 119, 385- 

Palmer, Colonel John McA., 46 n. 

Paris, first American battalion to 
parade in, 117-118. 

Parker, Colonel Cortland, 138 n. 

Parker, Colonel Frank, 138 n., 
386 n., 413. 

Parker, Colonel J. H., 154 n. 

Parrott, Colonel Ralph B., 254 n. 

Parsons, William Barclay, railway 
expert in France, 112. 

Patrick, General, chief of air serv- 
ice, 203. 

Payne, Colonel Brooke, 253 n. 

Payot, General, director of French 
service of the rear, 112; presi- 
dent of Military Board of Allied 
Supply, 358 n. 

Pearce, Colonel E. d'A., 252 n. 

Pearce, Colonel Thomas A., 258 n. 

Penhouet, shipbuilding yards at, 99. 

Penner, Colonel Carl, 171 n. 

Perkins, James H., work of, in 
connection with Red Cross, 368. 

Perry, Colonel Howard R., 256 n. 

Pershing, General John J., depar- 
ture of, for France, 33; career 
of, prior to appointment as com- 
mander of American Expedition- 
ary Forces, 33-36; officers who 
accompanied, 36; visit of, to 
London and arrival in Paris, 36; 
plans of, for organization of his 
army, 36-37; two dominant ideas 
of, 37; close acquaintance of, 
with characteristics of his men, 
37-38 ; choice of debarkation 
ports and of railroads by, 38- 



39; interviews between General 
Petain and, 39-44; decisions ar- 
rived at, with Petain, 43-44; or- 
ganization of General Staff by, 
45-46 ; constitution of fighting 
units by, 47-52; establishes head- 
quarters at Chaumont, 77 ; or- 
ganization of services of the rear, 
92-116; at tomb of Lafayette, 
118; advice of, on practical 
methods of fighting, 119; work 
of American soldiers closely fol- 
lowed by, 125-126; eagerness of, 
to learn from French experience, 
127; in favor of a unified high 
command among Allies, 133; 
places American forces at dis- 
posal of General Foch, 134; pre- 
vious safeguarding by, of auton- 
omy of Expeditionary Forces, 
134-135; recommends employ- 
ment of American troops in large 
units, 135; attitude of, toward 
summer counter-offensive of 
1918, 167-168; desire of, that 
American divisions be main- 
tained side by side in summer 
counter-offensive, 173 ; firm pol- 
icy of, in handling his forces, 
184-185; correct military intui- 
tion of, 185; plan of, in having 
all heads of main services sta- 
tioned for a time at Chaumont 
headquarters, 186; importance of 
air service recognized by, 202; 
position of forces of, at begin- 
ning of September, 1918, 247- 
261 ; account of operations of, 
against St. Mihiel, 262-276; en- 
trance of, into St. Mihiel, 276- 
277 ; street in St. Mihiel named 
for, 277 n. ; activities of, in oper- 
ations between river Meuse and 
Argonne Forest, 278-306; Gen- 
eral Order issued by, upon sign- 
ing of armistice, 307-308 ; crea- 
tion of General Purchasing 
Board by, 355-356; creates Inter- 
Allied Board for Purchasing, 
356; service rendered by, in se- 
curing unity of purchase, 357; 
treatment of the great benevolent 
associations by, 362-363 ; report 
by, on value to American army 



432 



Index 



of French cooperation and assist- 
ance, 387-388. 

Persia, sinking of, 8. 

Personal division of quartermaster 
corps, 228. 

Petain, General, 39, 131, 136. 
137 "•; position of, in a military 
way, 39-41 ; General Pershings' 
first visit to, 41 ; collaboration of 
Pershing and, 42-45; inspects 
front line of battle on the Marne 
(1918), 162; advice by, on "No 
maneuvring under fire," 163; co- 
operation between Pershing and, 
in autumn oifensive of 1918, 264; 
entrance of, with General Persh- 
ing, into St. Mihiel, 276-277. 

Peyton, Lt.-Col. Ephraim G., 256 n. 

Photographic division of signal 
corps, 219. 

Pickering, Lt.-Col. 254 n.; distin- 
guished services of, 414. 

Pierce, General P. E., 324 n. 

Pigeon school at Saizerais, 75. 

Plattsburg, officers' training camp 
at, 23. 

Plunkett, Rear-Admiral, in com- 
mand of naval gunners, 192. 

Poincare, President, review of first 
American troops by, 119. 

Police duties, schools for, 75. 

Pope, Lt.-Col. William R., 255 n. 

Ports, choice of, for use of Ameri- 
cans in France, 94-96. 

Prentice, Captain John H., 251 n. 

Price, Colonel H. C, 252 n. 

Price, Colonel H. J., 258 n. 

Price, General William G., 162 n. 

Priority schedule, the, 91. 

Purchasing board and agent, estab- 
lishment of, in Paris, 105. 

Quartermaster corps, functions of, 
in peace time, 80; reorganization 
of, to meet war-time emergen- 
cies, 81-82; duties devolving on, 
227-229; results accomplished by, 
230-232; personnel of, 232. 

Radio company of signal corps, 217. 

Railway lines, choice of, for link- 
ing American base ports with 
combat zone, 97, 104. 

Railway service, organization of 



American, in France, 112, 199, 
350-351. 

Railway transportation school, 76. 

Read, General G. W., in command 
of Second Army Corps, 249, 322, 
324 n. 

Reckord, Colonel Milton A., 255 n. 

Recruiting system, mechanism of, 
for carrying out universal mili- 
tary service measure, 17-20. 

Red Cross, American, 318; en- 
trusted with care of sick and 
wounded, 363 ; under direct mili- 
tary control, 363 ; account of 
work of, 364-368. 

Reeves, Colonel James H., 252 n. 

Regiment, composition of a, 50; 
command of a, 51. 

Regulating stations, system of, iio- 
112. 

Reilly, Colonel Henry J., 160 n. 

Relief Clearing House, American, 
382. 

Remount division of quartermaster 
corps, 229; achievements of, 
230-231. 

Renault type of tank, 194, 195. 

Repair shop organization, 235-236. 

Replacement divisions, 48. 

Requirements division of ordnance 
department, 233. 

Rhine, march of Franco-American 
army to the, 307-319. 

Rhodes, General C. D., 252 n. 

Ribot, French Prime Minister, 12. 

Richards, Colonel George C, 162 n. 

Richardson, Colonel L. T., 258 n. 

Rifle shortage at beginning of war, 
31- 

Riggs, Lt.-Col. K. T., 324 n. 

Rivers, Colonel W. C., 156 n. 

Road-service section of engineer 
service, 199. 

Rockenbach, General, chief of tank 
corps, 194. 

Rogers, Quartermaster - General 
Harry L., 227. 

Roosevelt, Theodore, correspond- 
ence between Secretary of War 
and, 6; military preparedness ad- 
vocated bv, 14 n. 

Rumbold, Colonel F. M., 253 n. 

Russell, General, chief signal of- 
ficer, 218. 



Index 



433 



Russell, Lt.-Col. George M., 25011. 
Russia, Expeditionary Forces de- 
tached for operations in, 330. 



Saint-Mihiel, discussion of opera- 
tions for taking, by Pershing and 
Petain, 43; early plans bearing 
upon, 262-264; maturing of plans 
for operations against, in Sep- 
tember offensive, 264-271 ; the 
American assault on, 272-276; 
entrance of Pershing and Petain 
into, 276-277. 

St. Nazaire, as a base port for 
American use, 39, 94-95 ; work 
of improving conditions at, 99- 
100; description of, 342. 

St. Pierre des Corps, American 
salvage service headquarters at, 
348-349. 

St. Sulpice-Izon, American storage 
depot at, 102, 344-345. 

Salvage service of American army 
in France, 228-229; results of 
work of, 231 ; description of 
work, 348-349. 

Salvation Army, 318; under direct 
control of high military com- 
mand, 363 ; account of work of, 

374- 
Sanborn, Colonel Joseph B., 255 n. 
Sanitary school, army, in France, 

Sanitary sections, mentioned in 
general orders of French high 
command, 419-420. 

Saumur, army school at, 68; artil- 
lery school at, 70. 

Schools in France: army, 65-70; 
corps, 70-72; for aviation, 72- 
74; for ordnance, 74-75; for 
miscellaneous branches of serv- 
ice, 75-76; the inter-allied, 76. 

Scientific section of American Red 
Cross, 367. 

Screws, Colonel Wm. P., 160 n. 

Searchlight section of engineer 
service, 200; mentioned in gen- 
eral orders of French high com- 
mand, 419. 

Second Army Corps, 249; Order of 
Battle of, 324 n.; distinguished 
services of, 326-327; order of 



battle, December i, 1918, 398- 
401. 
Second Division, training of, re- 
ceived in France, 122; gives 
good account of itself, 122-124; 
inspected by Secretary of War 
Baker, 130; passes into ranks of 
French Fifth Army, 146; Order 
of Battle of, June i, 1918, 146 n.; 
operations of, in spring defen- 
sive of 1918, 147 ff.; attack and 
capture of Beileau Wood by, 
I5i~i53) 3 German army bulle- 
tin quoted concerning, 153; cap- 
ture of Vaux Village by Third 
Brigade, 153-154; losses of, 155; 
situation of, on eve of summer 
counter-offensive, 168; operations 
of, 175-177; in September, 1918, 

253- 

Seicheprey, gallant conduct of 
Twenty-sixth Division at, 131- 
132. 

Sergy, fighting about village of, 
179-180. 

Services of Supply (S. O. S.), com- 
position of, 187; organization of, 
339; functions of three sections 
of, 339-340; base, intermediate, 
and advance section of, 341-349. 

Services of the rear, organization 
and work of, 78-82, 88-89, 92- 
115; General Order which cre- 
ated, 103-104; reorganization of, 
in spring of 1918, 187-188; ac- 
count of activities of, 331-359; 
projects under way, when armis- 
tice was signed, 359-360. 

Seventh Corps, in September, 1918, 
250. 

Seventh Division, 257. 

Seventy-eighth Division, in Sep- 
tember, 1918, 255; operations of, 
on British front, 320 ff. 

Seventy-ninth Division, in Septem- 
ber, 1918, 257. 

Seventy-seventh Division, situation 
of, on eve of summer counter- 
offensive, 171 ; Order of Battle 
on August 19, 1918, 171 n.; oper- 
ations of, on British front, 320 ff. 

Shannon, Colonel Ed. C, 162 n. 

Shaw, Mrs. Francis, 380 n. 

Shelton, Colonel George H., 154 "• 



434 



Index 



Sherburne, Colonel J. H., 155 n. 

Sherill, Colonel, 417. 

Shipment of troops to France, 
problems and achievements con- 
nected with, 87-88, 334-336. 

Shortage of military equipment at 
opening of war, 31. 

Sibert, General, in command of 
First Division, 117-122. 

Signal corps, functions of, in peace 
time, 80; work of, in France, 
108, 213-216; personnel of, 218. 

Signal school, army, in France, 67. 

Simonds, Colonel G., 324 n. 

Sims, Admiral, in London to or- 
ganize protection of American 
ships, 91. 

Sixth Corps, in September, 1918, 
250. 

Sixth Division, 254. 

Sixty-fourth Infantry Brigade 
(^"The Terrible Brigade"), 411. 

Sladen, General Fred W., 156 n. 

Smedberg, Colonel W. R., Jr., 
171 n. 

Smith, Colonel Ernest V., 254 n. 

Pmith, Lt.-Col. F. H., 171 n. 

Smith, Colonel Hamilton, 138 n. 

Smith, General William R., in 
command of Thirty-sixth Divi- 
sion, 257 n. 

Souge, American artillery training 
camp at, 61, 62; artillery aerial 
observation school at, 73. 

Spanish-American War, slowness 
of United States in beginrxing, 2. 

Spence, Colonel C. F., 324 n. 

Spencer, Major, 414. 

Spring defensive of 1918, 133-167. 

Staff of a division, composition of, 
51-52. 

Stark, Colonel, army surgeon of 
First Army, 223. 

Stettinius, Edward R., Second As- 
sistant Secretary of War, 333. 

Stewart, General M. B., 258 n. 

Stillwell, Major Joseph, 250 n. 

Stokes, Colonel Marcus B., 255 n. 

Storage depots established by 
Americans in France, 343-345. 

Stretzinger, Colonel F. G., 254 n. 

Students' Army Training Corps, 
22 n. 

Sturdevant, Colonel G.. 258 n. 



Submarines, German, outrages by, 
6-8. 

Summerall, General C. P., 138 n., 
139, 140; succeeds General Bul- 
lard in command of First Divi- 
sion, 168; in command of Fifth 
Corps, 297. 

Summer counter-offensive of 1918, 
167-184. 

Supplies division, of quartermaster 
corps, 228 ; of ordnance depart- 
ment, 234. 

Sussex, sinking of, 8. 

Sweezy, Colonel Claude B, 257 n. 

Taft, former President, work of, in 
connection with Red Cross, 368. 

Tank school of American army in 
France, 70. 

Tanks, different types of, 193-195; 
good use made of, by American 
troops, 197; used by American 
army in Argonne Forest, 289. 

Tardieu, Andre, director of Gen- 
eral Commission for Franco- 
American War Affairs, 387 n. 

Taylor, Colonel James D., 252 n. 

Taylor, Colonel W. A., 324 n. 

Taylor, General, at head of en- 
gineer service, 197 n. 

'Telegraph and telephone equip- 
ment, 218. 

Telegraph battalions, 216. 

Telephone system, excellence of 
American, in France, 219. 

Third American Corps, staff of, on 
July 16, 1918, 173 n.; operations 
of, on Vesle River, 181-183; in 
September, 1918, 249; occupa- 
tion of Coblenz bridgehead by, 
315; Order of Battle December 
I, 1918, 401-406. 

Third Division, operations of, in 

I spring defensive of 1918, 156— 
158; Order of Battle of. May 
31, 1918, 156 n.; situation of, on 
eve of summer counter-offensive, 
168-169; in September, 1918, 253. 

Third Infantry Brigade, cited in 
general orders by French high 
command, 410. 

Thirtieth Division, operations of, 
on British front, 320 ff. 

Thirtieth Regiment of Infantry, 



Ind 



ex 



435 



cited in general orders by French 
high command, 413-414. 

Thirty-fifth Division, in September, 
1918, 253; operations of, on Brit- 
ish front, 320 ff. 

Thirty-second Division, composi- 
tion of, 170; operations of, 183. 

Thirty-seventh Division, in Sep- 
tember, 1918, 254. 

Thirty-sixth Division, in Septem- 
ber, 1918, 257. 

Thirty-third Division, in Septem- 
ber, 1918, 255; operations of, on 
British front, 320 ff.; distin- 
guished services of, 323. 

Tours, headquarters of Services of 
Supply at, 187; air training sec- 
tions at, 202, 203 ; aviators grad- 
uated from school at, 207 ; ac- 
tivities of American medical 
corps at, 220 ff. ; headquarters of 
American forces at, 339. 

Tractor artillery school in France, 
70- 

Training camps, for officers, 23 ; 
for troops, 29-30; for American 
forces in France, 46 ; principles 
governing instruction in France, 

55-59- 

Transportation, department of, 
245-246. 

Transportation of American sol- 
diers to France, 78-79, 87-88, 
333-338. 

Transportation lines, work of ex- 
perts on, 112-114. 

Traub, General Peter E., i54n.; 
in command of Thirty-fifth Divi- 
sion, 253 n. 

Tupes, Colonel, 415. 

Twenty-eighth Division, Order of 
Battle on August i, 1918, 162 n.; 
situation of, on eve of summer 
counter-oflFensive, 169-170; oper- 
tions of, on British front, 320 ff. 

Twenty-ninth Division, in Septem- 
ber, 1918, 254, 255. 

Twenty-sixth Division, arrival and 
early activities of, in France, 
124-125 ; fight of, at Seicheprey, 
131-132; Order of Battle of, July 
ID, 1918, 154 n.; situation of, on 
eve of summer counter-offensive, 
169; in September, 1918, 253. 



Twenty-seventh Division, opera- 
tions of, on British front, 320 ff. 
Tyndall, Colonel R. H., 160 n. 
Tyson, General L. D., 324 n. 
Tyson, Mrs. Russell, 380 n. 

U 21, German submarine, 6. 
Ulio, Major James, 250 n. 
United States. See America. 
Unity of purchase, the securing of, 

355-357- 
Universal military service measure, 

passage of, 12-13. 
Upton, Colonel Leroy, 146 n. ; of 

9th Regiment of Infantry, 412. 

Vail, Miss Anna M., 3800. 

Valbonne, American army school 
at, 68. 

Valdahon, American artillery 
training camp at, 60. 

Vandenburg, General, 141 n. 

Vaux Village, capture of, by Third 
Brigade of Second Division, 
153-154- 

Vesle, crossing of the, 180. 

Vidner, Colonel G., 171 n. 

Vigilanda, sinking of the, 10 n. 

Villers-Bretonneux, raid near, 323. 

Vincent, General, in command of 
First Corps artillery, 269. 

Viviani, head of French war mis- 
sion to United States, 12 n. 

Wadhams, Colonel, 220; coordina- 
tion of medical activities at the 
front by, 221-223. 

Wahl, General Lutz, 257 n. 

Walch, General, in charge of artil- 
lery of First Corps, 282 n. 

Wales, Colonel Boyd, 171 n. 

Walker, Colonel Kirby, 253 n. 

Walker, General M. L., head of 
Motor Transport Corps, 352. 

War Council at Versailles, 133- 

134- 
War Industries Board, formation 

of, 332. 
Water supply service, functions of, 

200. 
Watkins, Colonel Lewis H., 249 n. 
Weeks, Colonel George MacD., 

257 n. 
Weigel, General William, 162 n.; 



43^ 



Index 



7 



in command of Eighty-eighth 
Division, 258 n. 

Welfare and recreation bureaus of 
American Red Cross, 367. 

Wells, General Briant H., 250 n. 

Westnedge, Colonel Jos. B., 170 n. 

Wharton, Mrs. Edith, work of, 
381. 

White, Colonel George P., 253 n. 

Whitman, Colonel Walter M., 
252 n. 

Whittlesey, Major, commander of 
famous " Lost Battalion," 295. 

Wilcox, Colonel C. de Witt, 386 n. 

Wilgus, W. F., member of com- 
mission of specialists in France, 
99; plans designed by, for rail- 
road system at Bassens, loi ; ap- 
pointed deputy director-general 
of transportation in France, 105; 
member of commission of railway 
experts, 112. 

Williams, Colonel H. C, 252 n. 

Williams, Lt.-Col. R. H., 155 n. 

Williams, General, chief of ord- 
nance department, 233. 

Wilson, Lt.-Col. James E., 253 n. 

Wilson, President, breaks off diplo- 
matic relations with Germany, 
10; declares state of war be- 
tween Germany and United 
States, 11; satisfaction of, over 
unification of Allied command, 
134 n. 

Winans, General Ed. B., 170 n. 



Winn, General Frank L., in com- 
mand of Eighty-ninth Division, 
252 n. 

Wire company of signal corps, 217. 

Wise, Colonel Hugh D., 253 n. 

Wittenmyer, General E., 171 n. 

Witworth, General Pegram, 257 n. 

Woevre, repulse of German force 
at, 131. 

Wolf, General Paul A., 255 n. 

Wolfe, Colonel O. R., 324 n. 

Wood, General Leonard, crusade 
of, for military preparedness, 
yn. ; influential in organizing of- 
ficers' training camps, 23. 

Woolnough, Lt.-Col. J. B., 2570. 

Worillow, Colonel Ulysses G., 
256 n. 

Wright, Colonel William K., 257 n. 

Wright, General W. W., in com- 
mand of Seventh Corps, 250, 
251 n. 



Young Men's Christian Associa- 
tion, 318; duties assigned to, by 
General Pershing, 363; under 
direct military control, 363; ac- 
count of work of, 368-372. 

Young Women's Christian Associa- 
tion, 363; affiliated with Y. M. 
C. A., 372; work done by, 378- 
379- 

Zimmerman, General C. X., 254 n. 



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